The front half of a sunken South Korean naval ship is lifted from waters near the disputed Yellow Sea border with North Korea at Baengnyeong Island Yonhap News Agency
Wednesday, May. 19, 2010
By Bill Powell
More than a month after the mysterious incident, the South Korean Defense Ministry will present what a diplomatic source called "credible and extensive" evidence that a North Korean submarine fired a torpedo at and sunk the Cheonan, a South Korean naval vessel operating in Seoul's own territorial waters. Forty-six sailors died as result of the attack.
What happens after that announcement — which will present the evidence that was gathered for more than a month by a team of international investigators — is decidedly less clear.
The question squarely on the table now for Seoul and its allies in Washington and Tokyo — not to mention North Korea's patron in Beijing — is straightforward: What price should North Korea pay in response to what appears to have been an act of war and a clear violation of the armistice agreement that has kept a tenuous peace on the peninsula since 1953? (See rare pictures of North Korea.)
U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton will take up that question with her counterparts in China, Japan and then South Korea when she arrives on Friday for a visit to East Asia. Though South Korean President Lee Myung Bak has said that no option — military included — is off the table, analysts believe there is little chance of any retaliatory strike from Seoul. Even if Kim Jong Il and his generals in the North "fully understand who would be the ultimate loser" if a hot war on the peninsula suddenly broke out," as Ralph Cossa, president of the Pacific Forum at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, says, the potential cost of any escalation to the South remains too much to bear. So while there may be "genuine fury" amid the highest echelons of the South Korean government, as a Western diplomat said on Wednesday, Seoul also "knows well that it can't risk this getting out of hand. There is no appetite in South Korea for a war." (See how the world deals with North Korea's provocations.)
For the Obama Administration, the key issue going forward is whether the six-party talks aimed at denuclearizing the North (which started under the Bush Administration) are worth salvaging or whether the Cheonan attack renders them moot once and for all. (A State Department spokesman, with comical understatement, said on Tuesday that the North's "provocative actions" have "at times impeded progress on the six-party process.") Kim earlier this month visited Beijing for the first time since 2006, and according to China's official news agency, the Dear Leader said "the Democratic People's Republic of Korea will work with China to create favorable conditions for restarting six-party talks." Since even that statement stopped well short of saying that Kim would return to the table, both the Americans and the Chinese must know that the six-party obsession must, at minimum, be put aside for a good long while. Seoul, with full American support, diplomatic sources say, will now go to the U.N. Security Council seeking a range of intensified sanctions against Pyongyang. "We have enough evidence [to do so]," South Korean Foreign Minister Yu Myung Hwan said on Tuesday. (See the rise of Kim Jong Il.)
How Beijing reacts to that effort will be critically important, since China remains North Korea's de facto economic lifeline. China accounts for fully one-third of North Korea's total external trade, and in the wake of sanctions enacted a year ago after Pyongyang's second nuclear test, it is thus "even more central to any effective sanctions effort," says Marcus Noland, a fellow at the Peterson Institute of International Economics in Washington.
"A cutoff of critical Chinese oil shipments, much less a complete trade embargo, would bring the country to its knees."
See pictures of North Koreans at the polls.
Which is why it's unlikely to happen. Beijing to date has never evinced any serious interest in bringing the economic hammer down on Pyongyang. It values stability over anything else, and the death of 46 South Korean sailors is unlikely to change that view. It took China a month, in fact, to offer Seoul its condolences after the attack. Moreover, Kim no doubt pleaded his case about the Cheonan attack during the Dear Leader's recent visit to Beijing. From the North's perspective, it was a strike in retaliation for another naval clash in November 2009 in the West Sea, when an undetermined number of North Korean sailors were killed. Pyongyang's military doctrine, North Korea watchers in Seoul say, has always stressed retaliation for anything that smacks of defeat in an individual skirmish, and indeed there have been South Korean media reports since the Cheonan sinking that those military officers who pulled it off have been promoted. China, says Cheong Seong-chang, a fellow at the Sejong Institute, will weigh carefully how detailed and convincing the evidence Seoul presents before deciding what kind of sanctions it will be willing to go along with at the U.N.
Seoul's options are limited, given how paltry economic ties between the Koreas are. It may choose to shutter the Kaesong special economic zone just across the border in North Korea, where more than 100 South Korean companies, mainly in light industry like textiles, have factories employing about 40,000 North Koreans. (Though even that move would be unpopular with the South Korean employers, who use the factories to compete with inexpensive Chinese imports.) (See pictures of China on the wild side.)
That means the U.S. needs to decide how much heavy lifting it will do beyond backing new U.N. sanctions. Plausibly, Washington could once again add North Korea to the State Department's list of state sponsors of terrorism. President Bush took Pyongyang off the list in 2008. But arguably the most effective measure Washington could take would be for the Treasury Department to again go after any international financial institution that handles North Korean money — whether it be trade finance or funds laundered by senior leaders in Pyongyang — by cutting off their access entirely to the U.S. It was precisely this form of a sanction a few years ago — which centered on a Macao-based bank called Banco Delta Asia — that infuriated the North Koreans. So much so, in fact, that some analysts believe it led to the North's first major act of nuclear defiance: its initial test in the autumn of 2006. Cheong of the Sejong Institute believes that if the U.S. again seeks tough, targeted financial sanctions, the result will probably be the same: Pyongyang's third nuclear test.
He may be right. Such is the nature of trying to coerce Kim Jong Il into something remotely resembling acceptable behavior. Unless China decides that that day must come, it probably won't.
— With reporting by Stephen Kim / Seoul
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