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Tuesday, November 10, 2009
Pipeline-Istan: Everything You Need to Know About Oil, Gas, Russia, China, Iran, Afghanistan and Obama
By Pepe Escobar, Tomdispatch.com
Posted on May 13, 2009
As Barack Obama heads into his second hundred days in office, let's head for the big picture ourselves, the ultimate global plot line, the tumultuous rush towards a new, polycentric world order. In its first hundred days, the Obama presidency introduced us to a brand new acronym, OCO for Overseas Contingency Operations, formerly known as GWOT (as in Global War on Terror). Use either name, or anything else you want, and what you're really talking about is what's happening on the immense energy battlefield that extends from Iran to the Pacific Ocean. It's there that the Liquid War for the control of Eurasia takes place.
Yep, it all comes down to black gold and "blue gold" (natural gas), hydrocarbon wealth beyond compare, and so it's time to trek back to that ever-flowing wonderland -- Pipelineistan. It's time to dust off the acronyms, especially the SCO or Shanghai Cooperative Organization, the Asian response to NATO, and learn a few new ones like IPI and TAPI. Above all, it's time to check out the most recent moves on the giant chessboard of Eurasia, where Washington wants to be a crucial, if not dominant, player.
We've already seen Pipelineistan wars in Kosovo and Georgia, and we've followed Washington's favorite pipeline, the BTC, which was supposed to tilt the flow of energy westward, sending oil coursing past both Iran and Russia. Things didn't quite turn out that way, but we've got to move on, the New Great Game never stops. Now, it's time to grasp just what the Asian Energy Security Grid is all about, visit a surreal natural gas republic, and understand why that Grid is so deeply implicated in the Af-Pak war.
Every time I've visited Iran, energy analysts stress the total "interdependence of Asia and Persian Gulf geo-ecopolitics." What they mean is the ultimate importance to various great and regional powers of Asian integration via a sprawling mass of energy pipelines that will someday, somehow, link the Persian Gulf, Central Asia, South Asia, Russia, and China. The major Iranian card in the Asian integration game is the gigantic South Pars natural gas field (which Iran shares with Qatar). It is estimated to hold at least 9% of the world's proven natural gas reserves.
As much as Washington may live in perpetual denial, Russia and Iran together control roughly 20% of the world's oil reserves and nearly 50% of its gas reserves. Think about that for a moment. It's little wonder that, for the leadership of both countries as well as China's, the idea of Asian integration, of the Grid, is sacrosanct.
If it ever gets built, a major node on that Grid will surely be the prospective $7.6 billion Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) pipeline, also known as the "peace pipeline." After years of wrangling, a nearly miraculous agreement for its construction was initialed in 2008. At least in this rare case, both Pakistan and India stood shoulder to shoulder in rejecting relentless pressure from the Bush administration to scotch the deal.
It couldn't be otherwise. Pakistan, after all, is an energy-poor, desperate customer of the Grid. One year ago, in a speech at Beijing's Tsinghua University, then-President Pervez Musharraf did everything but drop to his knees and beg China to dump money into pipelines linking the Persian Gulf and Pakistan with China's Far West. If this were to happen, it might help transform Pakistan from a near-failed state into a mighty "energy corridor" to the Middle East. If you think of a pipeline as an umbilical cord, it goes without saying that IPI, far more than any form of U.S. aid (or outright interference), would go the extra mile in stabilizing the Pak half of Obama's Af-Pak theater of operations, and even possibly relieve it of its India obsession.
If Pakistan's fate is in question, Iran's is another matter. Though currently only holding "observer" status in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), sooner or later it will inevitably become a full member and so enjoy NATO-style, an-attack-on-one-of-us-is-an-attack-on-all-of-us protection. Imagine, then, the cataclysmic consequences of an Israeli preemptive strike (backed by Washington or not) on Iran's nuclear facilities. The SCO will tackle this knotty issue at its next summit in June, in Yekaterinburg, Russia.
Iran's relations with both Russia and China are swell -- and will remain so no matter who is elected the new Iranian president next month. China desperately needs Iranian oil and gas, has already clinched a $100 billion gas "deal of the century" with the Iranians, and has loads of weapons and cheap consumer goods to sell. No less close to Iran, Russia wants to sell them even more weapons, as well as nuclear energy technology.
And then, moving ever eastward on the great Grid, there's Turkmenistan, lodged deep in Central Asia, which, unlike Iran, you may never have heard a thing about. Let's correct that now.
Gurbanguly Is the Man
Alas, the sun-king of Turkmenistan, the wily, wacky Saparmurat "Turkmenbashi" Nyazov, "the father of all Turkmen" (descendants of a formidable race of nomadic horseback warriors who used to attack Silk Road caravans) is now dead. But far from forgotten.
The Chinese were huge fans of the Turkmenbashi. And the joy was mutual. One key reason the Central Asians love to do business with China is that the Middle Kingdom, unlike both Russia and the United States, carries little modern imperial baggage. And of course, China will never carp about human rights or foment a color-coded revolution of any sort.
The Chinese are already moving to successfully lobby the new Turkmen president, the spectacularly named Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov, to speed up the construction of the Mother of All Pipelines. This Turkmen-Kazakh-China Pipelineistan corridor from eastern Turkmenistan to China's Guangdong province will be the longest and most expensive pipeline in the world, 7,000 kilometers of steel pipe at a staggering cost of $26 billion. When China signed the agreement to build it in 2007, they made sure to add a clever little geopolitical kicker. The agreement explicitly states that "Chinese interests" will not be "threatened from [Turkmenistan's] territory by third parties." In translation: no Pentagon bases allowed in that country.
China's deft energy diplomacy game plan in the former Soviet republics of Central Asia is a pure winner. In the case of Turkmenistan, lucrative deals are offered and partnerships with Russia are encouraged to boost Turkmen gas production. There are to be no Russian-Chinese antagonisms, as befits the main partners in the SCO, because the Asian Energy Security Grid story is really and truly about them.
By the way, elsewhere on the Grid, those two countries recently agreed to extend the East Siberian-Pacific Ocean oil pipeline to China by the end of 2010. After all, energy-ravenous China badly needs not just Turkmen gas, but Russia's liquefied natural gas (LNG).
With energy prices low and the global economy melting down, times are sure to be tough for the Kremlin through at least 2010, but this won't derail its push to forge a Central Asian energy club within the SCO. Think of all this as essentially an energy entente cordiale with China. Russian Deputy Industry and Energy Minister Ivan Materov has been among those insistently swearing that this will not someday lead to a "gas OPEC" within the SCO. It remains to be seen how the Obama national security team decides to counteract the successful Russian strategy of undermining by all possible means a U.S.-promoted East-West Caspian Sea energy corridor, while solidifying a Russian-controlled Pipelineistan stretching from Kazakhstan to Greece that will monopolize the flow of energy to Western Europe.
The Real Afghan War
In the ever-shifting New Great Game in Eurasia, a key question -- why Afghanistan matters -- is simply not part of the discussion in the United States. (Hint: It has nothing to do with the liberation of Afghan women.) In part, this is because the idea that energy and Afghanistan might have anything in common is verboten.
And yet, rest assured, nothing of significance takes place in Eurasia without an energy angle. In the case of Afghanistan, keep in mind that Central and South Asia have been considered by American strategists crucial places to plant the flag; and once the Soviet Union collapsed, control of the energy-rich former Soviet republics in the region was quickly seen as essential to future U.S. global power. It would be there, as they imagined it, that the U.S. Empire of Bases would intersect crucially with Pipelineistan in a way that would leave both Russia and China on the defensive.
Think of Afghanistan, then, as an overlooked subplot in the ongoing Liquid War. After all, an overarching goal of U.S. foreign policy since President Richard Nixon's era in the early 1970s has been to split Russia and China. The leadership of the SCO has been focused on this since the U.S. Congress passed the Silk Road Strategy Act five days before beginning the bombing of Serbia in March 1999. That act clearly identified American geo-strategic interests from the Black Sea to western China with building a mosaic of American protectorates in Central Asia and militarizing the Eurasian energy corridor.
Afghanistan, as it happens, sits conveniently at the crossroads of any new Silk Road linking the Caucasus to western China, and four nuclear powers (China, Russia, Pakistan, and India) lurk in the vicinity. "Losing" Afghanistan and its key network of U.S. military bases would, from the Pentagon's point of view, be a disaster, and though it may be a secondary matter in the New Great Game of the moment, it's worth remembering that the country itself is a lot more than the towering mountains of the Hindu Kush and immense deserts: it's believed to be rich in unexplored deposits of natural gas, petroleum, coal, copper, chrome, talc, barites, sulfur, lead, zinc, and iron ore, as well as precious and semiprecious stones.
And there's something highly toxic to be added to this already lethal mix: don't forget the narco-dollar angle -- the fact that the global heroin cartels that feast on Afghanistan only work with U.S. dollars, not euros. For the SCO, the top security threat in Afghanistan isn't the Taliban, but the drug business. Russia's anti-drug czar Viktor Ivanov routinely blasts the disaster that passes for a U.S./NATO anti-drug war there, stressing that Afghan heroin now kills 30,000 Russians annually, twice as many as were killed during the decade-long U.S.-supported anti-Soviet Afghan jihad of the 1980s.
And then, of course, there are those competing pipelines that, if ever built, either would or wouldn't exclude Iran and Russia from the action to their south. In April 2008, Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India actually signed an agreement to build a long-dreamt-about $7.6 billion (and counting) pipeline, whose acronym TAPI combines the first letters of their names and would also someday deliver natural gas from Turkmenistan to Pakistan and India without the involvement of either Iran or Russia. It would cut right through the heart of Western Afghanistan, in Herat, and head south across lightly populated Nimruz and Helmand provinces, where the Taliban, various Pashtun guerrillas and assorted highway robbers now merrily run rings around U.S. and NATO forces and where -- surprise! -- the U.S. is now building in Dasht-e-Margo ("the Desert of Death") a new mega-base to host President Obama's surge troops.
TAPI's rival is the already mentioned IPI, also theoretically underway and widely derided by Heritage Foundation types in the U.S., who regularly launch blasts of angry prose at the nefarious idea of India and Pakistan importing gas from "evil" Iran. Theoretically, TAPI's construction will start in 2010 and the gas would begin flowing by 2015. (Don't hold your breath.) Embattled Afghan President Hamid Karzai, who can hardly secure a few square blocks of central Kabul, even with the help of international forces, nonetheless offered assurances last year that he would not only rid his country of millions of land mines along TAPI's route, but somehow get rid of the Taliban in the bargain.
Should there be investors (nursed by Afghan opium dreams) delirious enough to sink their money into such a pipeline -- and that's a monumental if -- Afghanistan would collect only $160 million a year in transit fees, a mere bagatelle even if it does represent a big chunk of the embattled Karzai's current annual revenue. Count on one thing though, if it ever happened, the Taliban and assorted warlords/highway robbers would be sure to get a cut of the action.
A Clinton-Bush-Obama Great Game
TAPI's roller-coaster history actually begins in the mid-1990s, the Clinton era, when the Taliban were dined (but not wined) by the California-based energy company Unocal and the Clinton machine. In 1995, Unocal first came up with the pipeline idea, even then a product of Washington's fatal urge to bypass both Iran and Russia. Next, Unocal talked to the Turkmenbashi, then to the Taliban, and so launched a classic New Great Game gambit that has yet to end and without which you can't understand the Afghan war Obama has inherited.
A Taliban delegation, thanks to Unocal, enjoyed Houston's hospitality in early 1997 and then Washington's in December of that year. When it came to energy negotiations, the Taliban's leadership was anything but medieval. They were tough bargainers, also cannily courting the Argentinean private oil company Bridas, which had secured the right to explore and exploit oil reserves in eastern Turkmenistan.
In August 1997, financially unstable Bridas sold 60% of its stock to Amoco, which merged the next year with British Petroleum. A key Amoco consultant happened to be that ubiquitous Eurasian player, former national security advisor Zbig Brzezinski, while another such luminary, Henry Kissinger, just happened to be a consultant for Unocal. BP-Amoco, already developing the Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, now became the major player in what had already been dubbed the Trans-Afghan Pipeline or TAP. Inevitably, Unocal and BP-Amoco went to war and let the lawyers settle things in a Texas court, where, in October 1998 as the Clinton years drew to an end, BP-Amoco seemed to emerge with the upper hand.
Under newly elected president George W. Bush, however, Unocal snuck back into the game and, as early as January 2001, was cozying up to the Taliban yet again, this time supported by a star-studded governmental cast of characters, including Undersecretary of State Richard Armitage, himself a former Unocal lobbyist. The Taliban were duly invited back to Washington in March 2001 via Rahmatullah Hashimi, a top aide to "The Shadow," the movement's leader Mullah Omar.
Negotiations eventually broke down because of those pesky transit fees the Taliban demanded. Beware the Empire's fury. At a Group of Eight summit meeting in Genoa in July 2001, Western diplomats indicated that the Bush administration had decided to take the Taliban down before year's end. (Pakistani diplomats in Islamabad would later confirm this to me.) The attacks of September 11, 2001 just slightly accelerated the schedule. Nicknamed "the kebab seller" in Kabul, Hamid Karzai, a former CIA asset and Unocal representative, who had entertained visiting Taliban members at barbecues in Houston, was soon forced down Afghan throats as the country's new leader.
Among the first fruits of Donald Rumsfeld's bombing and invasion of Afghanistan in the fall of 2001 was the signing by Karzai, Pakistani President Musharraf and Turkmenistan's Nyazov of an agreement committing themselves to build TAP, and so was formally launched a Pipelineistan extension from Central to South Asia with brand USA stamped all over it.
Russian President Vladimir Putin did nothing -- until September 2006, that is, when he delivered his counterpunch with panache. That's when Russian energy behemoth Gazprom agreed to buy Nyazov's natural gas at the 40% mark-up the dictator demanded. In return, the Russians received priceless gifts (and the Bush administration a pricey kick in the face). Nyazov turned over control of Turkmenistan's entire gas surplus to the Russian company through 2009, indicated a preference for letting Russia explore the country's new gas fields, and stated that Turkmenistan was bowing out of any U.S.-backed Trans-Caspian pipeline project. (And while he was at it, Putin also cornered much of the gas exports of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan as well.)
Thus, almost five years later, with occupied Afghanistan in increasingly deadly chaos, TAP seemed dead-on-arrival. The (invisible) star of what would later turn into Obama's "good" war was already a corpse.
But here's the beauty of Pipelineistan: like zombies, dead deals always seem to return and so the game goes on forever.
Just when Russia thought it had Turkmenistan locked in…
A Turkmen Bash
They don't call Turkmenistan a "gas republic" for nothing. I've crossed it from the Uzbek border to a Caspian Sea port named -- what else -- Turkmenbashi where you can purchase one kilo of fresh Beluga for $100 and a camel for $200. That's where the gigantic gas fields are, and it's obvious that most have not been fully explored. When, in October 2008, the British consultancy firm GCA confirmed that the Yolotan-Osman gas fields in southwest Turkmenistan were among the world's four largest, holding up to a staggering 14 trillion cubic meters of natural gas, Turkmenistan promptly grabbed second place in the global gas reserves sweepstakes, way ahead of Iran and only 20% below Russia. With that news, the earth shook seismically across Pipelineistan.
Just before he died in December 2006, the flamboyant Turkmenbashi boasted that his country held enough reserves to export 150 billion cubic meters of gas annually for the next 250 years. Given his notorious megalomania, nobody took him seriously. So in March 2008, our man Gurbanguly ordered a GCA audit to dispel any doubts. After all, in pure Asian Energy Security Grid mode, Turkmenistan had already signed contracts to supply Russia with about 50 billion cubic meters annually, China with 40 billion cubic meters, and Iran with 8 billion cubic meters.
And yet, none of this turns out to be quite as monumental or settled as it may look. In fact, Turkmenistan and Russia may be playing the energy equivalent of Russian roulette. After all, virtually all of Turkmenistani gas exports flow north through an old, crumbling Soviet system of pipelines, largely built in the 1960s. Add to this a Turkmeni knack for raising the stakes non-stop at a time when Gazprom has little choice but to put up with it: without Turkmen gas, it simply can't export all it needs to Europe, the source of 70% of Gazprom's profits.
Worse yet, according to a Gazprom source quoted in the Russian business daily Kommersant, the stark fact is that the company only thought it controlled all of Turkmenistan's gas exports; the newly discovered gas mega-fields turn out not to be part of the deal. As my Asia Times colleague, former ambassador M.K. Bhadrakumar put the matter, Gazprom's mistake "is proving to be a misconception of Himalayan proportions."
In fact, it's as if the New Great Gamesters had just discovered another Everest. This year, Obama's national security strategists lost no time unleashing a no-holds-barred diplomatic campaign to court Turkmenistan. The goal? To accelerate possible ways for all that new Turkmeni gas to flow through the right pipes, and create quite a different energy map and future. Apart from TAPI, another key objective is to make the prospective $5.8 billion Turkey-to-Austria Nabucco pipeline become viable and thus, of course, trump the Russians. In that way, a key long-term U.S. strategic objective would be fulfilled: Austria, Italy, and Greece, as well as the Balkan and various Central European countries, would be at least partially pulled from Gazprom's orbit. (Await my next "postcard" from Pipelineistan for more on this.)
IPI or TAPI?
Gurbanguly is proving an even more riotous player than the Turkmenbashi. A year ago he said he was going to hedge his bets, that he was willing to export the bulk of the eight trillion cubic meters of gas reserves he now claims for his country to virtually anyone. Washington was -- and remains -- ecstatic. At an international conference last month in Ashgabat ("the city of love"), the Las Vegas of Central Asia, Gurbanguly told a hall packed with Americans, Europeans, and Russians that "diversification of energy flows and inclusion of new countries into the geography of export routes can help the global economy gain stability."
Inevitably, behind closed doors, the TAPI maze came up and TAPI executives once again began discussing pricing and transit fees. Of course, hard as that may be to settle, it's the easy part of the deal. After all, there's that Everest of Afghan security to climb, and someone still has to confirm that Turkmenistan's gas reserves are really as fabulous as claimed.
Imperceptible jiggles in Pipelineistan's tectonic plates can shake half the world. Take, for example, an obscure March report in the Balochistan Times: a little noticed pipeline supplying gas to parts of Sindh province in Pakistan, including Karachi, was blown up. It got next to no media attention, but all across Eurasia and in Washington, those analyzing the comparative advantages of TAPI vs. IPI had to wonder just how risky it might be for India to buy future Iranian gas via increasingly volatile Balochistan.
And then in early April came another mysterious pipeline explosion, this one in Turkmenistan, compromising exports to Russia. The Turkmenis promptly blamed the Russians (and TAPI advocates cheered), but nothing in Afghanistan itself could have left them cheering very loudly. Right now, Dick Cheney's master plan to get those blue rivers of Turkmeni gas flowing southwards via a future TAPI as part of a U.S. grand strategy for a "Greater Central Asia" lies in tatters.
Still, Zbig Brzezinski might disagree, and as he commands Obama's attention, he may try to convince the new president that the world needs a $7.6-plus billion, 1,600-km steel serpent winding through a horribly dangerous war zone. That's certainly the gist of what Brzezinski said immediately after the 2008 Russia-Georgia war, stressing once again that "the construction of a pipeline from Central Asia via Afghanistan to the south... will maximally expand world society's access to the Central Asian energy market."
Washington or Beijing?
Still, give credit where it's due. For the time being, our man Gurbanguly may have snatched the leading role in the New Great Game in this part of Eurasia. He's already signed a groundbreaking gas agreement with RWE from Germany and sent the Russians scrambling.
If, one of these days, the Turkmenistani leader opts for TAPI as well, it will open Washington to an ultimate historical irony. After so much death and destruction, Washington would undoubtedly have to sit down once again with -- yes -- the Taliban! And we'd be back to July 2001 and those pesky pipeline transit fees.
As it stands at the moment, however, Russia still dominates Pipelineistan, ensuring Central Asian gas flows across Russia's network and not through the Trans-Caspian networks privileged by the U.S. and the European Union. This virtually guarantees Russia's crucial geopolitical status as the top gas supplier to Europe and a crucial supplier to Asia as well.
Meanwhile, in "transit corridor" Pakistan, where Predator drones soaring over Pashtun tribal villages monopolize the headlines, the shady New Great Game slouches in under-the-radar mode toward the immense, under-populated southern Pakistani province of Balochistan. The future of the epic IPI vs. TAPI battle may hinge on a single, magic word: Gwadar.
Essentially a fishing village, Gwadar is an Arabian Sea port in that province. The port was built by China. In Washington's dream scenario, Gwadar becomes the new Dubai of South Asia. This implies the success of TAPI. For its part, China badly needs Gwadar as a node for yet another long pipeline to be built to western China. And where would the gas flowing in that line come from? Iran, of course.
Whoever "wins," if Gwadar really becomes part of the Liquid War, Pakistan will finally become a key transit corridor for either Iranian gas from the monster South Pars field heading for China, or a great deal of the Caspian gas from Turkmenistan heading Europe-wards. To make the scenario even more locally mouth-watering, Pakistan would then be a pivotal place for both NATO and the SCO (in which it is already an official "observer").
Now that's as classic as the New Great Game in Eurasia can get. There's NATO vs. the SCO. With either IPI or TAPI, Turkmenistan wins. With either IPI or TAPI, Russia loses. With either IPI or TAPI, Pakistan wins. With TAPI, Iran loses. With IPI, Afghanistan loses. In the end, however, as in any game of high stakes Pipelineistan poker, it all comes down to the top two global players. Ladies and gentlemen, place your bets: will the winner be Washington or Beijing?
Copyright 2009 Pepe Escobar
© 2009 Tomdispatch.com All rights reserved.
Posted on May 13, 2009
As Barack Obama heads into his second hundred days in office, let's head for the big picture ourselves, the ultimate global plot line, the tumultuous rush towards a new, polycentric world order. In its first hundred days, the Obama presidency introduced us to a brand new acronym, OCO for Overseas Contingency Operations, formerly known as GWOT (as in Global War on Terror). Use either name, or anything else you want, and what you're really talking about is what's happening on the immense energy battlefield that extends from Iran to the Pacific Ocean. It's there that the Liquid War for the control of Eurasia takes place.
Yep, it all comes down to black gold and "blue gold" (natural gas), hydrocarbon wealth beyond compare, and so it's time to trek back to that ever-flowing wonderland -- Pipelineistan. It's time to dust off the acronyms, especially the SCO or Shanghai Cooperative Organization, the Asian response to NATO, and learn a few new ones like IPI and TAPI. Above all, it's time to check out the most recent moves on the giant chessboard of Eurasia, where Washington wants to be a crucial, if not dominant, player.
We've already seen Pipelineistan wars in Kosovo and Georgia, and we've followed Washington's favorite pipeline, the BTC, which was supposed to tilt the flow of energy westward, sending oil coursing past both Iran and Russia. Things didn't quite turn out that way, but we've got to move on, the New Great Game never stops. Now, it's time to grasp just what the Asian Energy Security Grid is all about, visit a surreal natural gas republic, and understand why that Grid is so deeply implicated in the Af-Pak war.
Every time I've visited Iran, energy analysts stress the total "interdependence of Asia and Persian Gulf geo-ecopolitics." What they mean is the ultimate importance to various great and regional powers of Asian integration via a sprawling mass of energy pipelines that will someday, somehow, link the Persian Gulf, Central Asia, South Asia, Russia, and China. The major Iranian card in the Asian integration game is the gigantic South Pars natural gas field (which Iran shares with Qatar). It is estimated to hold at least 9% of the world's proven natural gas reserves.
As much as Washington may live in perpetual denial, Russia and Iran together control roughly 20% of the world's oil reserves and nearly 50% of its gas reserves. Think about that for a moment. It's little wonder that, for the leadership of both countries as well as China's, the idea of Asian integration, of the Grid, is sacrosanct.
If it ever gets built, a major node on that Grid will surely be the prospective $7.6 billion Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) pipeline, also known as the "peace pipeline." After years of wrangling, a nearly miraculous agreement for its construction was initialed in 2008. At least in this rare case, both Pakistan and India stood shoulder to shoulder in rejecting relentless pressure from the Bush administration to scotch the deal.
It couldn't be otherwise. Pakistan, after all, is an energy-poor, desperate customer of the Grid. One year ago, in a speech at Beijing's Tsinghua University, then-President Pervez Musharraf did everything but drop to his knees and beg China to dump money into pipelines linking the Persian Gulf and Pakistan with China's Far West. If this were to happen, it might help transform Pakistan from a near-failed state into a mighty "energy corridor" to the Middle East. If you think of a pipeline as an umbilical cord, it goes without saying that IPI, far more than any form of U.S. aid (or outright interference), would go the extra mile in stabilizing the Pak half of Obama's Af-Pak theater of operations, and even possibly relieve it of its India obsession.
If Pakistan's fate is in question, Iran's is another matter. Though currently only holding "observer" status in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), sooner or later it will inevitably become a full member and so enjoy NATO-style, an-attack-on-one-of-us-is-an-attack-on-all-of-us protection. Imagine, then, the cataclysmic consequences of an Israeli preemptive strike (backed by Washington or not) on Iran's nuclear facilities. The SCO will tackle this knotty issue at its next summit in June, in Yekaterinburg, Russia.
Iran's relations with both Russia and China are swell -- and will remain so no matter who is elected the new Iranian president next month. China desperately needs Iranian oil and gas, has already clinched a $100 billion gas "deal of the century" with the Iranians, and has loads of weapons and cheap consumer goods to sell. No less close to Iran, Russia wants to sell them even more weapons, as well as nuclear energy technology.
And then, moving ever eastward on the great Grid, there's Turkmenistan, lodged deep in Central Asia, which, unlike Iran, you may never have heard a thing about. Let's correct that now.
Gurbanguly Is the Man
Alas, the sun-king of Turkmenistan, the wily, wacky Saparmurat "Turkmenbashi" Nyazov, "the father of all Turkmen" (descendants of a formidable race of nomadic horseback warriors who used to attack Silk Road caravans) is now dead. But far from forgotten.
The Chinese were huge fans of the Turkmenbashi. And the joy was mutual. One key reason the Central Asians love to do business with China is that the Middle Kingdom, unlike both Russia and the United States, carries little modern imperial baggage. And of course, China will never carp about human rights or foment a color-coded revolution of any sort.
The Chinese are already moving to successfully lobby the new Turkmen president, the spectacularly named Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov, to speed up the construction of the Mother of All Pipelines. This Turkmen-Kazakh-China Pipelineistan corridor from eastern Turkmenistan to China's Guangdong province will be the longest and most expensive pipeline in the world, 7,000 kilometers of steel pipe at a staggering cost of $26 billion. When China signed the agreement to build it in 2007, they made sure to add a clever little geopolitical kicker. The agreement explicitly states that "Chinese interests" will not be "threatened from [Turkmenistan's] territory by third parties." In translation: no Pentagon bases allowed in that country.
China's deft energy diplomacy game plan in the former Soviet republics of Central Asia is a pure winner. In the case of Turkmenistan, lucrative deals are offered and partnerships with Russia are encouraged to boost Turkmen gas production. There are to be no Russian-Chinese antagonisms, as befits the main partners in the SCO, because the Asian Energy Security Grid story is really and truly about them.
By the way, elsewhere on the Grid, those two countries recently agreed to extend the East Siberian-Pacific Ocean oil pipeline to China by the end of 2010. After all, energy-ravenous China badly needs not just Turkmen gas, but Russia's liquefied natural gas (LNG).
With energy prices low and the global economy melting down, times are sure to be tough for the Kremlin through at least 2010, but this won't derail its push to forge a Central Asian energy club within the SCO. Think of all this as essentially an energy entente cordiale with China. Russian Deputy Industry and Energy Minister Ivan Materov has been among those insistently swearing that this will not someday lead to a "gas OPEC" within the SCO. It remains to be seen how the Obama national security team decides to counteract the successful Russian strategy of undermining by all possible means a U.S.-promoted East-West Caspian Sea energy corridor, while solidifying a Russian-controlled Pipelineistan stretching from Kazakhstan to Greece that will monopolize the flow of energy to Western Europe.
The Real Afghan War
In the ever-shifting New Great Game in Eurasia, a key question -- why Afghanistan matters -- is simply not part of the discussion in the United States. (Hint: It has nothing to do with the liberation of Afghan women.) In part, this is because the idea that energy and Afghanistan might have anything in common is verboten.
And yet, rest assured, nothing of significance takes place in Eurasia without an energy angle. In the case of Afghanistan, keep in mind that Central and South Asia have been considered by American strategists crucial places to plant the flag; and once the Soviet Union collapsed, control of the energy-rich former Soviet republics in the region was quickly seen as essential to future U.S. global power. It would be there, as they imagined it, that the U.S. Empire of Bases would intersect crucially with Pipelineistan in a way that would leave both Russia and China on the defensive.
Think of Afghanistan, then, as an overlooked subplot in the ongoing Liquid War. After all, an overarching goal of U.S. foreign policy since President Richard Nixon's era in the early 1970s has been to split Russia and China. The leadership of the SCO has been focused on this since the U.S. Congress passed the Silk Road Strategy Act five days before beginning the bombing of Serbia in March 1999. That act clearly identified American geo-strategic interests from the Black Sea to western China with building a mosaic of American protectorates in Central Asia and militarizing the Eurasian energy corridor.
Afghanistan, as it happens, sits conveniently at the crossroads of any new Silk Road linking the Caucasus to western China, and four nuclear powers (China, Russia, Pakistan, and India) lurk in the vicinity. "Losing" Afghanistan and its key network of U.S. military bases would, from the Pentagon's point of view, be a disaster, and though it may be a secondary matter in the New Great Game of the moment, it's worth remembering that the country itself is a lot more than the towering mountains of the Hindu Kush and immense deserts: it's believed to be rich in unexplored deposits of natural gas, petroleum, coal, copper, chrome, talc, barites, sulfur, lead, zinc, and iron ore, as well as precious and semiprecious stones.
And there's something highly toxic to be added to this already lethal mix: don't forget the narco-dollar angle -- the fact that the global heroin cartels that feast on Afghanistan only work with U.S. dollars, not euros. For the SCO, the top security threat in Afghanistan isn't the Taliban, but the drug business. Russia's anti-drug czar Viktor Ivanov routinely blasts the disaster that passes for a U.S./NATO anti-drug war there, stressing that Afghan heroin now kills 30,000 Russians annually, twice as many as were killed during the decade-long U.S.-supported anti-Soviet Afghan jihad of the 1980s.
And then, of course, there are those competing pipelines that, if ever built, either would or wouldn't exclude Iran and Russia from the action to their south. In April 2008, Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India actually signed an agreement to build a long-dreamt-about $7.6 billion (and counting) pipeline, whose acronym TAPI combines the first letters of their names and would also someday deliver natural gas from Turkmenistan to Pakistan and India without the involvement of either Iran or Russia. It would cut right through the heart of Western Afghanistan, in Herat, and head south across lightly populated Nimruz and Helmand provinces, where the Taliban, various Pashtun guerrillas and assorted highway robbers now merrily run rings around U.S. and NATO forces and where -- surprise! -- the U.S. is now building in Dasht-e-Margo ("the Desert of Death") a new mega-base to host President Obama's surge troops.
TAPI's rival is the already mentioned IPI, also theoretically underway and widely derided by Heritage Foundation types in the U.S., who regularly launch blasts of angry prose at the nefarious idea of India and Pakistan importing gas from "evil" Iran. Theoretically, TAPI's construction will start in 2010 and the gas would begin flowing by 2015. (Don't hold your breath.) Embattled Afghan President Hamid Karzai, who can hardly secure a few square blocks of central Kabul, even with the help of international forces, nonetheless offered assurances last year that he would not only rid his country of millions of land mines along TAPI's route, but somehow get rid of the Taliban in the bargain.
Should there be investors (nursed by Afghan opium dreams) delirious enough to sink their money into such a pipeline -- and that's a monumental if -- Afghanistan would collect only $160 million a year in transit fees, a mere bagatelle even if it does represent a big chunk of the embattled Karzai's current annual revenue. Count on one thing though, if it ever happened, the Taliban and assorted warlords/highway robbers would be sure to get a cut of the action.
A Clinton-Bush-Obama Great Game
TAPI's roller-coaster history actually begins in the mid-1990s, the Clinton era, when the Taliban were dined (but not wined) by the California-based energy company Unocal and the Clinton machine. In 1995, Unocal first came up with the pipeline idea, even then a product of Washington's fatal urge to bypass both Iran and Russia. Next, Unocal talked to the Turkmenbashi, then to the Taliban, and so launched a classic New Great Game gambit that has yet to end and without which you can't understand the Afghan war Obama has inherited.
A Taliban delegation, thanks to Unocal, enjoyed Houston's hospitality in early 1997 and then Washington's in December of that year. When it came to energy negotiations, the Taliban's leadership was anything but medieval. They were tough bargainers, also cannily courting the Argentinean private oil company Bridas, which had secured the right to explore and exploit oil reserves in eastern Turkmenistan.
In August 1997, financially unstable Bridas sold 60% of its stock to Amoco, which merged the next year with British Petroleum. A key Amoco consultant happened to be that ubiquitous Eurasian player, former national security advisor Zbig Brzezinski, while another such luminary, Henry Kissinger, just happened to be a consultant for Unocal. BP-Amoco, already developing the Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, now became the major player in what had already been dubbed the Trans-Afghan Pipeline or TAP. Inevitably, Unocal and BP-Amoco went to war and let the lawyers settle things in a Texas court, where, in October 1998 as the Clinton years drew to an end, BP-Amoco seemed to emerge with the upper hand.
Under newly elected president George W. Bush, however, Unocal snuck back into the game and, as early as January 2001, was cozying up to the Taliban yet again, this time supported by a star-studded governmental cast of characters, including Undersecretary of State Richard Armitage, himself a former Unocal lobbyist. The Taliban were duly invited back to Washington in March 2001 via Rahmatullah Hashimi, a top aide to "The Shadow," the movement's leader Mullah Omar.
Negotiations eventually broke down because of those pesky transit fees the Taliban demanded. Beware the Empire's fury. At a Group of Eight summit meeting in Genoa in July 2001, Western diplomats indicated that the Bush administration had decided to take the Taliban down before year's end. (Pakistani diplomats in Islamabad would later confirm this to me.) The attacks of September 11, 2001 just slightly accelerated the schedule. Nicknamed "the kebab seller" in Kabul, Hamid Karzai, a former CIA asset and Unocal representative, who had entertained visiting Taliban members at barbecues in Houston, was soon forced down Afghan throats as the country's new leader.
Among the first fruits of Donald Rumsfeld's bombing and invasion of Afghanistan in the fall of 2001 was the signing by Karzai, Pakistani President Musharraf and Turkmenistan's Nyazov of an agreement committing themselves to build TAP, and so was formally launched a Pipelineistan extension from Central to South Asia with brand USA stamped all over it.
Russian President Vladimir Putin did nothing -- until September 2006, that is, when he delivered his counterpunch with panache. That's when Russian energy behemoth Gazprom agreed to buy Nyazov's natural gas at the 40% mark-up the dictator demanded. In return, the Russians received priceless gifts (and the Bush administration a pricey kick in the face). Nyazov turned over control of Turkmenistan's entire gas surplus to the Russian company through 2009, indicated a preference for letting Russia explore the country's new gas fields, and stated that Turkmenistan was bowing out of any U.S.-backed Trans-Caspian pipeline project. (And while he was at it, Putin also cornered much of the gas exports of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan as well.)
Thus, almost five years later, with occupied Afghanistan in increasingly deadly chaos, TAP seemed dead-on-arrival. The (invisible) star of what would later turn into Obama's "good" war was already a corpse.
But here's the beauty of Pipelineistan: like zombies, dead deals always seem to return and so the game goes on forever.
Just when Russia thought it had Turkmenistan locked in…
A Turkmen Bash
They don't call Turkmenistan a "gas republic" for nothing. I've crossed it from the Uzbek border to a Caspian Sea port named -- what else -- Turkmenbashi where you can purchase one kilo of fresh Beluga for $100 and a camel for $200. That's where the gigantic gas fields are, and it's obvious that most have not been fully explored. When, in October 2008, the British consultancy firm GCA confirmed that the Yolotan-Osman gas fields in southwest Turkmenistan were among the world's four largest, holding up to a staggering 14 trillion cubic meters of natural gas, Turkmenistan promptly grabbed second place in the global gas reserves sweepstakes, way ahead of Iran and only 20% below Russia. With that news, the earth shook seismically across Pipelineistan.
Just before he died in December 2006, the flamboyant Turkmenbashi boasted that his country held enough reserves to export 150 billion cubic meters of gas annually for the next 250 years. Given his notorious megalomania, nobody took him seriously. So in March 2008, our man Gurbanguly ordered a GCA audit to dispel any doubts. After all, in pure Asian Energy Security Grid mode, Turkmenistan had already signed contracts to supply Russia with about 50 billion cubic meters annually, China with 40 billion cubic meters, and Iran with 8 billion cubic meters.
And yet, none of this turns out to be quite as monumental or settled as it may look. In fact, Turkmenistan and Russia may be playing the energy equivalent of Russian roulette. After all, virtually all of Turkmenistani gas exports flow north through an old, crumbling Soviet system of pipelines, largely built in the 1960s. Add to this a Turkmeni knack for raising the stakes non-stop at a time when Gazprom has little choice but to put up with it: without Turkmen gas, it simply can't export all it needs to Europe, the source of 70% of Gazprom's profits.
Worse yet, according to a Gazprom source quoted in the Russian business daily Kommersant, the stark fact is that the company only thought it controlled all of Turkmenistan's gas exports; the newly discovered gas mega-fields turn out not to be part of the deal. As my Asia Times colleague, former ambassador M.K. Bhadrakumar put the matter, Gazprom's mistake "is proving to be a misconception of Himalayan proportions."
In fact, it's as if the New Great Gamesters had just discovered another Everest. This year, Obama's national security strategists lost no time unleashing a no-holds-barred diplomatic campaign to court Turkmenistan. The goal? To accelerate possible ways for all that new Turkmeni gas to flow through the right pipes, and create quite a different energy map and future. Apart from TAPI, another key objective is to make the prospective $5.8 billion Turkey-to-Austria Nabucco pipeline become viable and thus, of course, trump the Russians. In that way, a key long-term U.S. strategic objective would be fulfilled: Austria, Italy, and Greece, as well as the Balkan and various Central European countries, would be at least partially pulled from Gazprom's orbit. (Await my next "postcard" from Pipelineistan for more on this.)
IPI or TAPI?
Gurbanguly is proving an even more riotous player than the Turkmenbashi. A year ago he said he was going to hedge his bets, that he was willing to export the bulk of the eight trillion cubic meters of gas reserves he now claims for his country to virtually anyone. Washington was -- and remains -- ecstatic. At an international conference last month in Ashgabat ("the city of love"), the Las Vegas of Central Asia, Gurbanguly told a hall packed with Americans, Europeans, and Russians that "diversification of energy flows and inclusion of new countries into the geography of export routes can help the global economy gain stability."
Inevitably, behind closed doors, the TAPI maze came up and TAPI executives once again began discussing pricing and transit fees. Of course, hard as that may be to settle, it's the easy part of the deal. After all, there's that Everest of Afghan security to climb, and someone still has to confirm that Turkmenistan's gas reserves are really as fabulous as claimed.
Imperceptible jiggles in Pipelineistan's tectonic plates can shake half the world. Take, for example, an obscure March report in the Balochistan Times: a little noticed pipeline supplying gas to parts of Sindh province in Pakistan, including Karachi, was blown up. It got next to no media attention, but all across Eurasia and in Washington, those analyzing the comparative advantages of TAPI vs. IPI had to wonder just how risky it might be for India to buy future Iranian gas via increasingly volatile Balochistan.
And then in early April came another mysterious pipeline explosion, this one in Turkmenistan, compromising exports to Russia. The Turkmenis promptly blamed the Russians (and TAPI advocates cheered), but nothing in Afghanistan itself could have left them cheering very loudly. Right now, Dick Cheney's master plan to get those blue rivers of Turkmeni gas flowing southwards via a future TAPI as part of a U.S. grand strategy for a "Greater Central Asia" lies in tatters.
Still, Zbig Brzezinski might disagree, and as he commands Obama's attention, he may try to convince the new president that the world needs a $7.6-plus billion, 1,600-km steel serpent winding through a horribly dangerous war zone. That's certainly the gist of what Brzezinski said immediately after the 2008 Russia-Georgia war, stressing once again that "the construction of a pipeline from Central Asia via Afghanistan to the south... will maximally expand world society's access to the Central Asian energy market."
Washington or Beijing?
Still, give credit where it's due. For the time being, our man Gurbanguly may have snatched the leading role in the New Great Game in this part of Eurasia. He's already signed a groundbreaking gas agreement with RWE from Germany and sent the Russians scrambling.
If, one of these days, the Turkmenistani leader opts for TAPI as well, it will open Washington to an ultimate historical irony. After so much death and destruction, Washington would undoubtedly have to sit down once again with -- yes -- the Taliban! And we'd be back to July 2001 and those pesky pipeline transit fees.
As it stands at the moment, however, Russia still dominates Pipelineistan, ensuring Central Asian gas flows across Russia's network and not through the Trans-Caspian networks privileged by the U.S. and the European Union. This virtually guarantees Russia's crucial geopolitical status as the top gas supplier to Europe and a crucial supplier to Asia as well.
Meanwhile, in "transit corridor" Pakistan, where Predator drones soaring over Pashtun tribal villages monopolize the headlines, the shady New Great Game slouches in under-the-radar mode toward the immense, under-populated southern Pakistani province of Balochistan. The future of the epic IPI vs. TAPI battle may hinge on a single, magic word: Gwadar.
Essentially a fishing village, Gwadar is an Arabian Sea port in that province. The port was built by China. In Washington's dream scenario, Gwadar becomes the new Dubai of South Asia. This implies the success of TAPI. For its part, China badly needs Gwadar as a node for yet another long pipeline to be built to western China. And where would the gas flowing in that line come from? Iran, of course.
Whoever "wins," if Gwadar really becomes part of the Liquid War, Pakistan will finally become a key transit corridor for either Iranian gas from the monster South Pars field heading for China, or a great deal of the Caspian gas from Turkmenistan heading Europe-wards. To make the scenario even more locally mouth-watering, Pakistan would then be a pivotal place for both NATO and the SCO (in which it is already an official "observer").
Now that's as classic as the New Great Game in Eurasia can get. There's NATO vs. the SCO. With either IPI or TAPI, Turkmenistan wins. With either IPI or TAPI, Russia loses. With either IPI or TAPI, Pakistan wins. With TAPI, Iran loses. With IPI, Afghanistan loses. In the end, however, as in any game of high stakes Pipelineistan poker, it all comes down to the top two global players. Ladies and gentlemen, place your bets: will the winner be Washington or Beijing?
Copyright 2009 Pepe Escobar
© 2009 Tomdispatch.com All rights reserved.
Green tea is more than a way of life in South Korea
The farming, harvesting and drinking of the beverage dates back about 1,500 years.
By Cecilia Hae-Jin Lee reporting from Boseong, South Korea
May 13, 2009
Seasonal changes are subtle in Los Angeles. Having lived here most of my life, I appreciate the delicate, small signs that signal a new season. Spring rains bring fluffy white clouds that gather above our surrounding mountains. Large bunches of basil make their way into our farmers markets in the summer. The autumn brings cooler nights. And the Southern California winter yields fragrant lemons and tangerines, ripe for the picking.
Although I love the mild climate of my adopted Southland, the cool breezes and early morning fog this time of year sometimes find me reaching for a cup of green tea and longing for the verdant hills of my birth country, South Korea.
In early spring, the first leaves from the tea plant poke their heads into the sunshine of Boseong, a tiny town in the southern part of the country known for its tea fields. The leaves are harvested from early April through the first part of September, but these earliest leaves are the most prized. Handpicked by the local women who live in the South Jeolla Province, they're sold for exorbitant prices at fancy tea shops throughout the country.
Tea drinking has been part of Korean culture since at least the 7th century. There are historical documents that describe Emperor Suro (he founded the Gaya Kingdom, during Korea's Three Kingdom Period) and Queen Seondeok (the first female ruler of the neighboring Silla Kingdom) enjoying cups of green tea. The seeds most likely traveled to the peninsula in the luggage of monks from China's Yunnan province, who imported Buddhism along with the precious plants.
War-torn fields
The fields of Boseong have a less peaceful history. During their occupation of Korea in the 1930s, the Japanese noticed that Boseong had the perfect combination of temperature, humidity and soil for growing green tea. Having conquered the country, the Japanese established the first commercial tea plantation there to grow the coveted leaves and ship them back to Japan. But when the Japanese were defeated and forced to leave Korea in 1945, production came to a standstill. The fields became overgrown with weeds and lay fallow for years.
In 1957, Jang Young-seob, a visionary entrepreneur, bought the land and established the Daehan Tea Plantation (Daehan Dawon), the largest in the area, restoring green tea production in Jeolla-do. Now Boseong, famous for growing quality tea leaves, produces over a third of South Korea's green tea.
The Boseong region is to green tea what the Napa Valley is to wine. There are hundreds of tiny producers in the area. Visiting the plantations, I was struck by the pungent aroma of the leaves even before I caught sight of the fields. But it was the view that took my breath away. The soft rolling rows of tea plants stretching up along the hillside stood majestically in the morning fog.
Tea plants grow like shrubs; they're cultivated to grow only waist high for easier harvesting. If left to grow in the wild, the plants mature into tall trees.
Even with the plants at a comfortable height, green tea harvesting (like any farm work) is drudgery. I watched rural women, their hair tied up with scarves, their skin tanned a golden brown from hours under the sun, picking each leaf by hand, one by one, placing them in their plastic baskets.
Since higher-quality tea plants grow in higher elevations (the slower growth makes for a better flavor), the plants climb up the steep slopes of Boseong's hillsides. The lower rows were the most popular, while only the hard-working few climbed to pluck from the highest-growing leaves.
Tea's many uses
Even the busload of tourists from Seoul didn't want to climb to the top of the tea plantation. They oohed and aahed from below, pointing up at the green fields. I huffed and puffed my way to the top and turned around to find myself alone. By the time I had climbed up, it was break time for the female workers. They were squatting on the lower part of the hill eating their cream-filled buns and drinking cans of chilled green tea. I ran my hand over the tiny green leaves and took a deep breath of the crisp, tea-filled air before making my way back down the incline.
All kinds of tea -- green, black, white, oolong -- come from the same plant. The type of tea the leaves become is determined by fermentation and oxidation processes. Green tea comes from leaves that are wilted but left unoxidized (so the leaves retain their green color), unlike black tea leaves that are oxidized at the same time they are dried (causing their color to become darker, as tannins are released).
Green tea is the most popular in Korea, and the people in the Boseong area have incorporated the leaves into everything. They make beauty products with green tea, put green tea in their noodles and even have hot springs where you can soak in mineral waters infused with green tea. One of my favorite specialties of the region is nokdon samgyeopsal, sliced pork belly made from pigs who have dined on green tea leaves.
That afternoon, I settled for a bowl of noodles with bits of green tea in the broth, a cup of the green tea from the first harvest of the year and topped it off with a bowl of green tea ice cream, saving the pig belly for my next visit.
food@latimes.com
Copyright © 2009, The Los Angeles Times
By Cecilia Hae-Jin Lee reporting from Boseong, South Korea
May 13, 2009
Seasonal changes are subtle in Los Angeles. Having lived here most of my life, I appreciate the delicate, small signs that signal a new season. Spring rains bring fluffy white clouds that gather above our surrounding mountains. Large bunches of basil make their way into our farmers markets in the summer. The autumn brings cooler nights. And the Southern California winter yields fragrant lemons and tangerines, ripe for the picking.
Although I love the mild climate of my adopted Southland, the cool breezes and early morning fog this time of year sometimes find me reaching for a cup of green tea and longing for the verdant hills of my birth country, South Korea.
In early spring, the first leaves from the tea plant poke their heads into the sunshine of Boseong, a tiny town in the southern part of the country known for its tea fields. The leaves are harvested from early April through the first part of September, but these earliest leaves are the most prized. Handpicked by the local women who live in the South Jeolla Province, they're sold for exorbitant prices at fancy tea shops throughout the country.
Tea drinking has been part of Korean culture since at least the 7th century. There are historical documents that describe Emperor Suro (he founded the Gaya Kingdom, during Korea's Three Kingdom Period) and Queen Seondeok (the first female ruler of the neighboring Silla Kingdom) enjoying cups of green tea. The seeds most likely traveled to the peninsula in the luggage of monks from China's Yunnan province, who imported Buddhism along with the precious plants.
War-torn fields
The fields of Boseong have a less peaceful history. During their occupation of Korea in the 1930s, the Japanese noticed that Boseong had the perfect combination of temperature, humidity and soil for growing green tea. Having conquered the country, the Japanese established the first commercial tea plantation there to grow the coveted leaves and ship them back to Japan. But when the Japanese were defeated and forced to leave Korea in 1945, production came to a standstill. The fields became overgrown with weeds and lay fallow for years.
In 1957, Jang Young-seob, a visionary entrepreneur, bought the land and established the Daehan Tea Plantation (Daehan Dawon), the largest in the area, restoring green tea production in Jeolla-do. Now Boseong, famous for growing quality tea leaves, produces over a third of South Korea's green tea.
The Boseong region is to green tea what the Napa Valley is to wine. There are hundreds of tiny producers in the area. Visiting the plantations, I was struck by the pungent aroma of the leaves even before I caught sight of the fields. But it was the view that took my breath away. The soft rolling rows of tea plants stretching up along the hillside stood majestically in the morning fog.
Tea plants grow like shrubs; they're cultivated to grow only waist high for easier harvesting. If left to grow in the wild, the plants mature into tall trees.
Even with the plants at a comfortable height, green tea harvesting (like any farm work) is drudgery. I watched rural women, their hair tied up with scarves, their skin tanned a golden brown from hours under the sun, picking each leaf by hand, one by one, placing them in their plastic baskets.
Since higher-quality tea plants grow in higher elevations (the slower growth makes for a better flavor), the plants climb up the steep slopes of Boseong's hillsides. The lower rows were the most popular, while only the hard-working few climbed to pluck from the highest-growing leaves.
Tea's many uses
Even the busload of tourists from Seoul didn't want to climb to the top of the tea plantation. They oohed and aahed from below, pointing up at the green fields. I huffed and puffed my way to the top and turned around to find myself alone. By the time I had climbed up, it was break time for the female workers. They were squatting on the lower part of the hill eating their cream-filled buns and drinking cans of chilled green tea. I ran my hand over the tiny green leaves and took a deep breath of the crisp, tea-filled air before making my way back down the incline.
All kinds of tea -- green, black, white, oolong -- come from the same plant. The type of tea the leaves become is determined by fermentation and oxidation processes. Green tea comes from leaves that are wilted but left unoxidized (so the leaves retain their green color), unlike black tea leaves that are oxidized at the same time they are dried (causing their color to become darker, as tannins are released).
Green tea is the most popular in Korea, and the people in the Boseong area have incorporated the leaves into everything. They make beauty products with green tea, put green tea in their noodles and even have hot springs where you can soak in mineral waters infused with green tea. One of my favorite specialties of the region is nokdon samgyeopsal, sliced pork belly made from pigs who have dined on green tea leaves.
That afternoon, I settled for a bowl of noodles with bits of green tea in the broth, a cup of the green tea from the first harvest of the year and topped it off with a bowl of green tea ice cream, saving the pig belly for my next visit.
food@latimes.com
Copyright © 2009, The Los Angeles Times
Defying the Economic Odds: The World Melts Down, China Grows
Posted May 4, 2009.
By Dilip Hiro, Tomdispatch.com.
In the midst of the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression, a new world order is emerging -- with its center gravitating towards China. The statistics speak for themselves. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) predicts the world's gross domestic product (GDP) will shrink by an alarming 1.3% this year. Yet, defying this global trend, China expects an annual economic growth rate of 6.5% to 8.5%. During the first quarter of 2009, the world's leading stock markets combined fell by 4.5%. In contrast, the Shanghai stock exchange index leapt by a whopping 38%. In March, car sales in China hit a record 1.1 million, surpassing the U.S. for the third month in a row.
"Despite its severe impact on China's economy," said Chinese President Hu Jintao, "the current financial crisis also creates opportunity for the country." It can be argued that the present fiscal tsunami has, in fact, provided China with a chance to discard its pioneering reformer's leading guideline. "Hide your capability and bide your time" was the way former head of the Communist Party Deng Xiaoping once put it. No longer.
Recognizing that its time has indeed come, Beijing has decided to play an active, interventionist role in the international financial arena. Backed by China's $2 trillion in foreign exchange reserves, its industrialists have gone on a global buying spree in Africa and Latin America, as well as in neighboring Russia and Kazakhstan, to lock up future energy supplies for its ravenous economy. At home, the government is investing heavily not only in major infrastructure, but also in its much neglected social safety net, its health care system, and long overlooked rural development projects -- partly to bridge the increasingly wide gap between rural and urban living standards.
Among those impressed by the strides Beijing has made since launching its $585 billion stimulus package in September is the Obama administration. It views the continuing rise in China's GDP as an effective corrective to the contracting GDP of almost every other major economy on the planet, except India's. So it has stopped arguing that, by undervaluing its currency -- the yuan -- with respect to the U.S. dollar, China is making its products too cheap, thus putting competing American goods at a disadvantage in foreign markets.
The Secret of China's Success
What is the secret of China's continuing success in the worst of times? As a start, its banking system -- state-controlled and flush with cash -- has opened its lending spigots to the full, while bank credit in the U.S. and the European Union (EU) still remains clogged up, if not choked off. Therefore, consumer spending and capital investment have risen sharply.
Ever since China embarked on economic liberalization under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping in 1978, it has experienced economic ups and downs, including high inflation, deflation, recessions, uneven development of its regions, and a widening gap between the rich and the poor, as well as between the urban and the rural -- all characteristics associated with capitalism.
While China's Communist leaders have responded with a familiar range of fiscal and monetary tools like adjusting interest rates and money supply, they have achieved the desired results faster than their capitalist counterparts. This is primarily because of the state-controlled banking system where, for instance, government-owned banks act as depositories for the compulsory savings of all employees.
In addition, the "one couple, one child" law, enacted in 1980 to control China's exploding population, and a sharp decline in the state's social-support network for employees in state-owned enterprises, compelled parents to save. Add to this the earlier collapse of a rural cooperative health insurance program run by agricultural cooperatives and communes -- and many Chinese parents were left without a guarantee of being cared for in their declining years. This proved an additional incentive to set aside cash. The resulting rise in savings filled the coffers of the state-controlled banks.
On top of that came China's admission to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, which led to a dramatic jump in its exports. An average economic expansion of 12% a year became the norm.
When the credit crash in North America and the EU caused a powerful drop in China's exports, throwing millions of migrant workers in the industrialized coastal cities out of work, the authorities in Beijing focused on controlling the unemployment rate and maintaining the wages of the employed. They can now claim an urban unemployment rate of a mere 4.2% because many of the laid-off factory workers returned to their home villages. Those who did not were encouraged to enroll in government-sponsored retraining programs to acquire higher skills for better jobs in the future.
Whereas most Western leaders could do nothing more than castigate bankers filling their pockets with bonuses as the balance sheets of their companies went crimson red, the Chinese government compelled top managers at major state-owned companies to cut their salaries by 15% to 40% before tinkering with the remuneration of their workforce.
To ensure the continued rapid expansion of China's economy, which is directly related to the country's level of energy consumption, its leaders are inking many contracts for future supplies of oil and natural gas with foreign corporations.
Energy Security
Once China became an oil importer in 1993, it proved voracious. Its imports doubled every three years. This made it vulnerable to the vagaries of the international oil market and led the government to embed energy security in its foreign policy. It decided to actively participate in hydrocarbon prospecting and energy production projects abroad as well as in transnational pipeline construction. By now, the diversification of China's foreign sources of oil and gas (and their transportation) has become a cardinal principle of its foreign ministry.
Conscious of the volatility of the Middle East, the leading source of oil exports, China has scoured Africa, Australia, and Latin America for petroleum and natural gas deposits, along with other minerals needed for industry and construction. In Africa, it focused on Angola, Congo, Nigeria, and Sudan. By 2004, China's oil imports from these nations were three-fifths the size of those from the Persian Gulf region.
Nearer home, China began locking up energy deals with Russia and the Central Asian republic of Kazakhstan long before the current collapse in oil prices and the global credit crunch hit. Now, reeling from the double whammy of low energy prices and the credit squeeze, Russia's leading oil company and pipeline operator recently agreed to provide 300,000 barrels per day (bpd) in additional oil to China over 25 years for a $25 billion loan from the state-controlled China Development Bank. Likewise, a subsidiary of the China National Petroleum Corp agreed to lend Kazakhstan $10 billion as part of a joint venture to develop its hydrocarbon reserves.
Similarly, Beijing continued to make inroads into the oil and gas regions of South America. As relations between Hugo Chavez's Venezuela and the Bush administration worsened, ties with China strengthened. In 2006, during his fourth visit to Beijing since becoming president in 1999, Chavez revealed that Venezuela's oil exports to China would treble in three years to 500,000 bpd. Along with a joint refinery project to handle Venezuelan oil in China, the Chinese companies contracted to build a dozen oil-drilling platforms, supply 18 oil tankers, and collaborate with PdVSA, the state-owned Venezuelan oil company, to explore new oilfields in Venezuela.
During Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping's tour of South America in January 2009, the China Development Bank agreed to loan PdVSA $6 billion for oil to be supplied to China over the next 20 years. Since then China has agreed to double its development fund to $12 billion, in return for which Venezuela is to increase its oil shipments from the current 380,000 bpd to one million bpd.
The China Development Bank recently decided to lend Brazil's petroleum company $10 billion to be repaid in oil supplies in the coming years. This figure is almost as large as the $11.2 billion that the Inter-American Development Bank lent to various South American countries last year. China had established its commercial presence in Brazil earlier by offering lucrative prices for iron ore and soybeans, the export commodities that have fuelled Brazil's recent economic growth.
Similarly, Beijing broke new ground in the region by giving Buenos Aires access to more than $10 billion in yuans. Argentina was one of three major trading partners of China given this option, the others being Indonesia and South Korea.
Will the Yuan Become an International Currency?
Without much fanfare, China has started internationalizing the role of its currency. It is in the process of increasing the yuan's role in Hong Kong. Though part of China, Hong Kong has its own currency, the Hong Kong Dollar. Since Hong Kong is one of the world's freest financial markets, the projected arrangement will aid internationalization of the yuan.
In retrospect, an important aspect of the G-20 Summit in London in early April centered around what China did. It aired its in-depth analysis of the current fiscal crisis publicly and offered a bold solution.
In a striking on-line article, Zhou Xiaochuan, governor of China's central bank, referred to the "increasingly frequent global financial crises" that have embroiled the world. The problem could be traced to August 1971, when President Richard Nixon took the dollar off the gold standard. Until then, $35 bought one ounce of gold stored in bars in Fort Knox, Kentucky -- the rate having been fixed in 1944 during World War II by the Allies at a conference in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire. At that time, the greenback was also named as the globe's reserve currency. Since 1971, however, it has been backed by nothing more tangible than the credit of the United States.
A glance at the past decade and a half shows that, between 1994 and 2000 alone, there were economic crises in nine major countries which impacted the global economy: Mexico (1994), Thailand-Indonesia-Malaysia-South Korea-the Philippines (1997-98), Russia and Brazil (1998), and Argentina (2000).
According to Zhou, financial crises resulted when the domestic needs of the country issuing a reserve currency clashed with international fiscal requirements. For instance, responding to the demoralization caused by the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. Federal Reserve Board drastically reduced interest rates to an almost-record low of 1% to boost domestic consumption at a time when rapidly expanding economies outside the United States needed higher interest rates to cool their growth rates.
"The [present] crisis called again for creative reform of the existing international reserve currency," Zhou wrote. "A super-sovereign reserve currency managed by a global institution could be used to both create and control global liquidity. This will significantly reduce the risks of a future crisis and enhance crisis management capability."
He then alluded to the Special Drawing Rights (SDR) of the International Monetary Fund. The SDR is a virtual currency whose value is set by a currency "basket" made up of the U.S. dollar, the European euro, the British pound, and the Japanese yen, all of which qualify as reserve currencies, with the greenback being the leader. Ever since the SDR was devised in 1969, the IMF has maintained its accounts in that currency.
Zhou noted that the SDR has not yet been allowed to play its full role. If its role was enhanced, he argued, it might someday become the global reserve currency.
Zhou's idea received a positive response from the Kremlin, which suggested adding gold to the IMF's currency basket as a stabilizing element. Its own currency, the ruble, is already pegged to a basket that is 55% the euro and 45% the dollar. Within a decade of its launch, the euro has become the second most held reserve currency in the world, garnering nearly 30% of the total compared to the dollar's 67%.
Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner's immediate reaction to Zhou's article was: "China's suggestion deserves some consideration." Nervous financial markets in the U.S. took this as a sign from the Treasury Secretary that the dollar was losing its primacy. Geithner retreated post-haste. And President Obama quickly joined the fray, saying: "I don't think there is need for a global currency. The dollar is extraordinarily strong right now."
Actually, maintaining the customary Chinese discretion, Zhou never mentioned the state of the U.S. dollar in his article, nor did he even imply that the yuan should be included in the super-sovereign currency he proposed. Yet it was clear to all that at a crucial moment -- with world leaders about to meet in London to devise a way to defuse the most severe fiscal crisis since the Great Depression -- that a China which had bided its time, even though it had the third largest economy on the planet, was now showing its strong hand.
All signs are that Washington will be unable to restore the status quo ante after the present "great recession" has finally given way to recovery. In the coming years, its leaders will have to face reality and concede, however reluctantly, that the economic tectonic plates are shifting -- and that it is losing financial power to the thriving regions of the Earth, the foremost of which is China.
Dilip Hiro is the author, most recently, of Blood of the Earth: The Battle for the World's Vanishing Oil Resources (Nation Books). His upcoming book After Empire: The Rise of a Multipolar World will be published by Nation Books this year.
© 2009 Tomdispatch.com All rights reserved.
By Dilip Hiro, Tomdispatch.com.
In the midst of the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression, a new world order is emerging -- with its center gravitating towards China. The statistics speak for themselves. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) predicts the world's gross domestic product (GDP) will shrink by an alarming 1.3% this year. Yet, defying this global trend, China expects an annual economic growth rate of 6.5% to 8.5%. During the first quarter of 2009, the world's leading stock markets combined fell by 4.5%. In contrast, the Shanghai stock exchange index leapt by a whopping 38%. In March, car sales in China hit a record 1.1 million, surpassing the U.S. for the third month in a row.
"Despite its severe impact on China's economy," said Chinese President Hu Jintao, "the current financial crisis also creates opportunity for the country." It can be argued that the present fiscal tsunami has, in fact, provided China with a chance to discard its pioneering reformer's leading guideline. "Hide your capability and bide your time" was the way former head of the Communist Party Deng Xiaoping once put it. No longer.
Recognizing that its time has indeed come, Beijing has decided to play an active, interventionist role in the international financial arena. Backed by China's $2 trillion in foreign exchange reserves, its industrialists have gone on a global buying spree in Africa and Latin America, as well as in neighboring Russia and Kazakhstan, to lock up future energy supplies for its ravenous economy. At home, the government is investing heavily not only in major infrastructure, but also in its much neglected social safety net, its health care system, and long overlooked rural development projects -- partly to bridge the increasingly wide gap between rural and urban living standards.
Among those impressed by the strides Beijing has made since launching its $585 billion stimulus package in September is the Obama administration. It views the continuing rise in China's GDP as an effective corrective to the contracting GDP of almost every other major economy on the planet, except India's. So it has stopped arguing that, by undervaluing its currency -- the yuan -- with respect to the U.S. dollar, China is making its products too cheap, thus putting competing American goods at a disadvantage in foreign markets.
The Secret of China's Success
What is the secret of China's continuing success in the worst of times? As a start, its banking system -- state-controlled and flush with cash -- has opened its lending spigots to the full, while bank credit in the U.S. and the European Union (EU) still remains clogged up, if not choked off. Therefore, consumer spending and capital investment have risen sharply.
Ever since China embarked on economic liberalization under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping in 1978, it has experienced economic ups and downs, including high inflation, deflation, recessions, uneven development of its regions, and a widening gap between the rich and the poor, as well as between the urban and the rural -- all characteristics associated with capitalism.
While China's Communist leaders have responded with a familiar range of fiscal and monetary tools like adjusting interest rates and money supply, they have achieved the desired results faster than their capitalist counterparts. This is primarily because of the state-controlled banking system where, for instance, government-owned banks act as depositories for the compulsory savings of all employees.
In addition, the "one couple, one child" law, enacted in 1980 to control China's exploding population, and a sharp decline in the state's social-support network for employees in state-owned enterprises, compelled parents to save. Add to this the earlier collapse of a rural cooperative health insurance program run by agricultural cooperatives and communes -- and many Chinese parents were left without a guarantee of being cared for in their declining years. This proved an additional incentive to set aside cash. The resulting rise in savings filled the coffers of the state-controlled banks.
On top of that came China's admission to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, which led to a dramatic jump in its exports. An average economic expansion of 12% a year became the norm.
When the credit crash in North America and the EU caused a powerful drop in China's exports, throwing millions of migrant workers in the industrialized coastal cities out of work, the authorities in Beijing focused on controlling the unemployment rate and maintaining the wages of the employed. They can now claim an urban unemployment rate of a mere 4.2% because many of the laid-off factory workers returned to their home villages. Those who did not were encouraged to enroll in government-sponsored retraining programs to acquire higher skills for better jobs in the future.
Whereas most Western leaders could do nothing more than castigate bankers filling their pockets with bonuses as the balance sheets of their companies went crimson red, the Chinese government compelled top managers at major state-owned companies to cut their salaries by 15% to 40% before tinkering with the remuneration of their workforce.
To ensure the continued rapid expansion of China's economy, which is directly related to the country's level of energy consumption, its leaders are inking many contracts for future supplies of oil and natural gas with foreign corporations.
Energy Security
Once China became an oil importer in 1993, it proved voracious. Its imports doubled every three years. This made it vulnerable to the vagaries of the international oil market and led the government to embed energy security in its foreign policy. It decided to actively participate in hydrocarbon prospecting and energy production projects abroad as well as in transnational pipeline construction. By now, the diversification of China's foreign sources of oil and gas (and their transportation) has become a cardinal principle of its foreign ministry.
Conscious of the volatility of the Middle East, the leading source of oil exports, China has scoured Africa, Australia, and Latin America for petroleum and natural gas deposits, along with other minerals needed for industry and construction. In Africa, it focused on Angola, Congo, Nigeria, and Sudan. By 2004, China's oil imports from these nations were three-fifths the size of those from the Persian Gulf region.
Nearer home, China began locking up energy deals with Russia and the Central Asian republic of Kazakhstan long before the current collapse in oil prices and the global credit crunch hit. Now, reeling from the double whammy of low energy prices and the credit squeeze, Russia's leading oil company and pipeline operator recently agreed to provide 300,000 barrels per day (bpd) in additional oil to China over 25 years for a $25 billion loan from the state-controlled China Development Bank. Likewise, a subsidiary of the China National Petroleum Corp agreed to lend Kazakhstan $10 billion as part of a joint venture to develop its hydrocarbon reserves.
Similarly, Beijing continued to make inroads into the oil and gas regions of South America. As relations between Hugo Chavez's Venezuela and the Bush administration worsened, ties with China strengthened. In 2006, during his fourth visit to Beijing since becoming president in 1999, Chavez revealed that Venezuela's oil exports to China would treble in three years to 500,000 bpd. Along with a joint refinery project to handle Venezuelan oil in China, the Chinese companies contracted to build a dozen oil-drilling platforms, supply 18 oil tankers, and collaborate with PdVSA, the state-owned Venezuelan oil company, to explore new oilfields in Venezuela.
During Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping's tour of South America in January 2009, the China Development Bank agreed to loan PdVSA $6 billion for oil to be supplied to China over the next 20 years. Since then China has agreed to double its development fund to $12 billion, in return for which Venezuela is to increase its oil shipments from the current 380,000 bpd to one million bpd.
The China Development Bank recently decided to lend Brazil's petroleum company $10 billion to be repaid in oil supplies in the coming years. This figure is almost as large as the $11.2 billion that the Inter-American Development Bank lent to various South American countries last year. China had established its commercial presence in Brazil earlier by offering lucrative prices for iron ore and soybeans, the export commodities that have fuelled Brazil's recent economic growth.
Similarly, Beijing broke new ground in the region by giving Buenos Aires access to more than $10 billion in yuans. Argentina was one of three major trading partners of China given this option, the others being Indonesia and South Korea.
Will the Yuan Become an International Currency?
Without much fanfare, China has started internationalizing the role of its currency. It is in the process of increasing the yuan's role in Hong Kong. Though part of China, Hong Kong has its own currency, the Hong Kong Dollar. Since Hong Kong is one of the world's freest financial markets, the projected arrangement will aid internationalization of the yuan.
In retrospect, an important aspect of the G-20 Summit in London in early April centered around what China did. It aired its in-depth analysis of the current fiscal crisis publicly and offered a bold solution.
In a striking on-line article, Zhou Xiaochuan, governor of China's central bank, referred to the "increasingly frequent global financial crises" that have embroiled the world. The problem could be traced to August 1971, when President Richard Nixon took the dollar off the gold standard. Until then, $35 bought one ounce of gold stored in bars in Fort Knox, Kentucky -- the rate having been fixed in 1944 during World War II by the Allies at a conference in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire. At that time, the greenback was also named as the globe's reserve currency. Since 1971, however, it has been backed by nothing more tangible than the credit of the United States.
A glance at the past decade and a half shows that, between 1994 and 2000 alone, there were economic crises in nine major countries which impacted the global economy: Mexico (1994), Thailand-Indonesia-Malaysia-South Korea-the Philippines (1997-98), Russia and Brazil (1998), and Argentina (2000).
According to Zhou, financial crises resulted when the domestic needs of the country issuing a reserve currency clashed with international fiscal requirements. For instance, responding to the demoralization caused by the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. Federal Reserve Board drastically reduced interest rates to an almost-record low of 1% to boost domestic consumption at a time when rapidly expanding economies outside the United States needed higher interest rates to cool their growth rates.
"The [present] crisis called again for creative reform of the existing international reserve currency," Zhou wrote. "A super-sovereign reserve currency managed by a global institution could be used to both create and control global liquidity. This will significantly reduce the risks of a future crisis and enhance crisis management capability."
He then alluded to the Special Drawing Rights (SDR) of the International Monetary Fund. The SDR is a virtual currency whose value is set by a currency "basket" made up of the U.S. dollar, the European euro, the British pound, and the Japanese yen, all of which qualify as reserve currencies, with the greenback being the leader. Ever since the SDR was devised in 1969, the IMF has maintained its accounts in that currency.
Zhou noted that the SDR has not yet been allowed to play its full role. If its role was enhanced, he argued, it might someday become the global reserve currency.
Zhou's idea received a positive response from the Kremlin, which suggested adding gold to the IMF's currency basket as a stabilizing element. Its own currency, the ruble, is already pegged to a basket that is 55% the euro and 45% the dollar. Within a decade of its launch, the euro has become the second most held reserve currency in the world, garnering nearly 30% of the total compared to the dollar's 67%.
Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner's immediate reaction to Zhou's article was: "China's suggestion deserves some consideration." Nervous financial markets in the U.S. took this as a sign from the Treasury Secretary that the dollar was losing its primacy. Geithner retreated post-haste. And President Obama quickly joined the fray, saying: "I don't think there is need for a global currency. The dollar is extraordinarily strong right now."
Actually, maintaining the customary Chinese discretion, Zhou never mentioned the state of the U.S. dollar in his article, nor did he even imply that the yuan should be included in the super-sovereign currency he proposed. Yet it was clear to all that at a crucial moment -- with world leaders about to meet in London to devise a way to defuse the most severe fiscal crisis since the Great Depression -- that a China which had bided its time, even though it had the third largest economy on the planet, was now showing its strong hand.
All signs are that Washington will be unable to restore the status quo ante after the present "great recession" has finally given way to recovery. In the coming years, its leaders will have to face reality and concede, however reluctantly, that the economic tectonic plates are shifting -- and that it is losing financial power to the thriving regions of the Earth, the foremost of which is China.
Dilip Hiro is the author, most recently, of Blood of the Earth: The Battle for the World's Vanishing Oil Resources (Nation Books). His upcoming book After Empire: The Rise of a Multipolar World will be published by Nation Books this year.
© 2009 Tomdispatch.com All rights reserved.
South Korea's wartime sex slaves: Hoping for closure at the end of their lives
April 30, 2009
By John M. Glionna
The 'comfort women' forced into slavery by Japanese soldiers have struggled for years to persuade the world to acknowledge their ordeal. They're growing tired now, but not giving up.
Reporting from Toechon, South Korea -- Kang Il-chul rides in the back of a van packed with gossiping old women. The 82-year-old girlishly covers her mouth to whisper a secret.
"We argue a lot about the food," she says, wrinkling her nose. "To tell you the truth, some of these old ladies are grouchy."
There are eight of them, sharing a hillside home on the outskirts of Seoul, sparring over everything from territory to room temperature.
Some wear makeup and stylish hats; others are happy in robes and slippers. A few are bitter, their golden years tarnished by painful memories; others have sweet dispositions and enjoy visiting beauty salons or performing an occasional dance in the living room.
But they all share one thing: Decades ago, they were forced to serve as sex slaves for Japanese soldiers occupying the country before and during World War II. They were repeatedly raped and beaten over months and years.
Now time is running out for the halmoni, or Korean grandmothers. About 150,000 to 200,000 Korean women served as Japanese sex slaves, most living out their lives in humiliated silence.
When activists brought the issue to light in the early 1990s, officials sought out survivors. While many were too ashamed to come forward, officials registered 234 women.
Ninety-three are still alive, according to a nonprofit group that looks after them.
In 1992, some of the so-called comfort women volunteered to live at a new House of Sharing established by Buddhist organizations and philanthropists. There is a full-time chef and nurse and volunteer caregivers. There are regular art classes, exercise sessions and trips to the doctor. Kang is the youngest of the eight remaining residents. The oldest is 92.
They are part Golden Girls, part adamant activists.
Holding out hope for closure before they die, they are waging a battle to persuade the world to acknowledge their ordeal. They are seeking reparations and a formal apology from the Japanese government. They have also pressured the South Korean government to speak out.
Japan's response has been mixed. After the war, the government maintained that military brothels had been run by private contractors. But in 1993, it officially acknowledged the Imperial Army's role in establishing so-called comfort stations.
Conservatives in the political establishment still insist there is no documentary evidence that the army conducted an organized campaign of sexual slavery -- a contention challenged by many researchers.
The testimony of the women of the House of Sharing is the riposte to those who say there is no evidence that Korean women were forced to sexually service Japanese troops. They gather every Wednesday outside the Japanese Embassy in Seoul or at various South Korean government offices. They unfurl their banners and mostly stand in silence, unflinching as guards snap their pictures. Over 17 years, they have picketed 861 times. Some have traveled to Washington to testify before Congress.
They are host to 30,000 visitors a year at the House of Sharing, part of a complex that includes the Historical Museum of Japanese Military Sexual Slavery.
They have been poked and prodded like laboratory specimens, their daily lives chronicled by sociologists, their rudimentary artwork studied to gauge the long-term emotional effects of trauma.
Now, many are tired, their years as rabble-rousers behind them. There's a changing of the guard. With a gruff, drill sergeant's demeanor, Kim Kun-ja calls herself a "troublemaker." For years, she was among the loudest activists. The others call her No. 1.
Today the 84-year-old uses a walker. She fell twice recently and rarely gets out of bed.
"We are all mentally ill and physically damaged," she says, eating a bowl of soup. "But I don't want to talk about it anymore. It brings up bad memories from the bottom of my insides."
In her place has emerged the indefatigable Kang. As a teenager, she recalls, she was lured from her home by Japanese soldiers who offered her caramel candy.
On this day, Kang receives a group of 20 mothers who sit in a semicircle on the dormitory floor. Perched on the edge of a couch, dressed in a silk shirt with a scarf wrapped stylishly around her neck, she waves her hands like a veteran politician trying to stir up a crowd.
With age, she has become more defiant, she says, and she is looking for justice.
"We have to resolve this problem before we die," she says. "We have to go away if God calls us, but until this is solved, I can't close my eyes happily."
Kang calls over to Kim, asking her to address the group.
Kim waves her off. "I am deaf," she says.
Nearby, resident Kim Soon-ok, 88, maternally strokes the hair of a visitor half her age who sits before her on the floor.
Some residents, never married, have no grandchildren to visit them. They welcome contact with strangers. They hold hands with visitors and seek long hugs as a grandfather clock in the corner ticks away their remaining days.
One carries a small stuffed rabbit. She says she likes animals more than humans.
Sometimes there is tension at the House of Sharing. Caretakers have placed each resident's photo on her bedroom door and place setting to avoid confusion and tiffs among the women, who can be territorial and cross.
"Open the window, I'm hot," one demands.
"Well, I'm cold," says the one next to her.
Often, the women have complaints. Meals served by the full-time chef are "tasteless," say several as they sit at the dining room table, talking like prisoners plotting a breakout.
Moved to temporary quarters during a renovation of the main dormitory, many complain that they no longer have keys to their rooms.
Kang, the group leader, suddenly pauses. "Shhhhh, someone is coming," she says as a nurse enters the room.
She sighs, saying that although life at the House of Sharing may not be perfect, "we have nowhere else to go."
During a tour of her room, Kang says she cannot tell the others about gifts she has been given by visitors. She holds up an exercise gripper. "If they knew this was given to me, there would be trouble," she says. She shows another gift, a silk scarf. "Isn't this pretty?"
Although many women no longer discuss their past, others seem to derive some relief from retelling their tortures.
Without prompting, Park Ok-ryun, 86, launches into an account of how, as an 18-year-old, she was abducted by two Japanese soldiers. She and a friend had gone to a stream to get water.
"Don't cry," she remembers the soldiers saying. "If you go with us, you can get some nice food and nice clothes."
Park grabs a listener's arm. "I was thrown into the truck and covered with a red-and-blue fabric," she says. She begged to be released, explaining that she had to return home to make dinner.
"But they said, 'Jackass, stop nagging,' and kicked me," she says, showing a jagged scar on her leg.
The women know that some people are listening. The U.S. Congress has called on Japan to apologize and "accept historical responsibility" for the sex slavery.
The Japanese government offered to start a fund, but the women refused the money, demanding that the government also accept responsibility for their suffering.
In a moment of quiet, Kang says that while they can never forget what happened, they must forgive the Japanese, if only for the emotional health of the next generation.
Then Kim, old No. 1, flashes a rare display of humor.
"Not all men are bad," she says, smiling. "There are good ones and there are bad ones."
john.glionna@latimes.com
Ju-min Park of The Times' Seoul Bureau contributed to this report.
By John M. Glionna
The 'comfort women' forced into slavery by Japanese soldiers have struggled for years to persuade the world to acknowledge their ordeal. They're growing tired now, but not giving up.
Reporting from Toechon, South Korea -- Kang Il-chul rides in the back of a van packed with gossiping old women. The 82-year-old girlishly covers her mouth to whisper a secret.
"We argue a lot about the food," she says, wrinkling her nose. "To tell you the truth, some of these old ladies are grouchy."
There are eight of them, sharing a hillside home on the outskirts of Seoul, sparring over everything from territory to room temperature.
Some wear makeup and stylish hats; others are happy in robes and slippers. A few are bitter, their golden years tarnished by painful memories; others have sweet dispositions and enjoy visiting beauty salons or performing an occasional dance in the living room.
But they all share one thing: Decades ago, they were forced to serve as sex slaves for Japanese soldiers occupying the country before and during World War II. They were repeatedly raped and beaten over months and years.
Now time is running out for the halmoni, or Korean grandmothers. About 150,000 to 200,000 Korean women served as Japanese sex slaves, most living out their lives in humiliated silence.
When activists brought the issue to light in the early 1990s, officials sought out survivors. While many were too ashamed to come forward, officials registered 234 women.
Ninety-three are still alive, according to a nonprofit group that looks after them.
In 1992, some of the so-called comfort women volunteered to live at a new House of Sharing established by Buddhist organizations and philanthropists. There is a full-time chef and nurse and volunteer caregivers. There are regular art classes, exercise sessions and trips to the doctor. Kang is the youngest of the eight remaining residents. The oldest is 92.
They are part Golden Girls, part adamant activists.
Holding out hope for closure before they die, they are waging a battle to persuade the world to acknowledge their ordeal. They are seeking reparations and a formal apology from the Japanese government. They have also pressured the South Korean government to speak out.
Japan's response has been mixed. After the war, the government maintained that military brothels had been run by private contractors. But in 1993, it officially acknowledged the Imperial Army's role in establishing so-called comfort stations.
Conservatives in the political establishment still insist there is no documentary evidence that the army conducted an organized campaign of sexual slavery -- a contention challenged by many researchers.
The testimony of the women of the House of Sharing is the riposte to those who say there is no evidence that Korean women were forced to sexually service Japanese troops. They gather every Wednesday outside the Japanese Embassy in Seoul or at various South Korean government offices. They unfurl their banners and mostly stand in silence, unflinching as guards snap their pictures. Over 17 years, they have picketed 861 times. Some have traveled to Washington to testify before Congress.
They are host to 30,000 visitors a year at the House of Sharing, part of a complex that includes the Historical Museum of Japanese Military Sexual Slavery.
They have been poked and prodded like laboratory specimens, their daily lives chronicled by sociologists, their rudimentary artwork studied to gauge the long-term emotional effects of trauma.
Now, many are tired, their years as rabble-rousers behind them. There's a changing of the guard. With a gruff, drill sergeant's demeanor, Kim Kun-ja calls herself a "troublemaker." For years, she was among the loudest activists. The others call her No. 1.
Today the 84-year-old uses a walker. She fell twice recently and rarely gets out of bed.
"We are all mentally ill and physically damaged," she says, eating a bowl of soup. "But I don't want to talk about it anymore. It brings up bad memories from the bottom of my insides."
In her place has emerged the indefatigable Kang. As a teenager, she recalls, she was lured from her home by Japanese soldiers who offered her caramel candy.
On this day, Kang receives a group of 20 mothers who sit in a semicircle on the dormitory floor. Perched on the edge of a couch, dressed in a silk shirt with a scarf wrapped stylishly around her neck, she waves her hands like a veteran politician trying to stir up a crowd.
With age, she has become more defiant, she says, and she is looking for justice.
"We have to resolve this problem before we die," she says. "We have to go away if God calls us, but until this is solved, I can't close my eyes happily."
Kang calls over to Kim, asking her to address the group.
Kim waves her off. "I am deaf," she says.
Nearby, resident Kim Soon-ok, 88, maternally strokes the hair of a visitor half her age who sits before her on the floor.
Some residents, never married, have no grandchildren to visit them. They welcome contact with strangers. They hold hands with visitors and seek long hugs as a grandfather clock in the corner ticks away their remaining days.
One carries a small stuffed rabbit. She says she likes animals more than humans.
Sometimes there is tension at the House of Sharing. Caretakers have placed each resident's photo on her bedroom door and place setting to avoid confusion and tiffs among the women, who can be territorial and cross.
"Open the window, I'm hot," one demands.
"Well, I'm cold," says the one next to her.
Often, the women have complaints. Meals served by the full-time chef are "tasteless," say several as they sit at the dining room table, talking like prisoners plotting a breakout.
Moved to temporary quarters during a renovation of the main dormitory, many complain that they no longer have keys to their rooms.
Kang, the group leader, suddenly pauses. "Shhhhh, someone is coming," she says as a nurse enters the room.
She sighs, saying that although life at the House of Sharing may not be perfect, "we have nowhere else to go."
During a tour of her room, Kang says she cannot tell the others about gifts she has been given by visitors. She holds up an exercise gripper. "If they knew this was given to me, there would be trouble," she says. She shows another gift, a silk scarf. "Isn't this pretty?"
Although many women no longer discuss their past, others seem to derive some relief from retelling their tortures.
Without prompting, Park Ok-ryun, 86, launches into an account of how, as an 18-year-old, she was abducted by two Japanese soldiers. She and a friend had gone to a stream to get water.
"Don't cry," she remembers the soldiers saying. "If you go with us, you can get some nice food and nice clothes."
Park grabs a listener's arm. "I was thrown into the truck and covered with a red-and-blue fabric," she says. She begged to be released, explaining that she had to return home to make dinner.
"But they said, 'Jackass, stop nagging,' and kicked me," she says, showing a jagged scar on her leg.
The women know that some people are listening. The U.S. Congress has called on Japan to apologize and "accept historical responsibility" for the sex slavery.
The Japanese government offered to start a fund, but the women refused the money, demanding that the government also accept responsibility for their suffering.
In a moment of quiet, Kang says that while they can never forget what happened, they must forgive the Japanese, if only for the emotional health of the next generation.
Then Kim, old No. 1, flashes a rare display of humor.
"Not all men are bad," she says, smiling. "There are good ones and there are bad ones."
john.glionna@latimes.com
Ju-min Park of The Times' Seoul Bureau contributed to this report.
A base Okinawans can live with
The Japan Times: Friday, Oct. 23, 2009
EDITORIAL
A base Okinawans can live with
U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates met with Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama, Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada and Defense Minister Toshimi Kitazawa in Tokyo this week. The two sides failed to resolve differences over the relocation of a U.S. military base on Okinawa Island. Under a 2006 bilateral agreement, the U.S. Marine Corps' Futenma Air Station in the urban area of Ginowan (southern part of the Island) would move to the shore area of Camp Schwab, in Nago (northeastern part of the island).
Mr. Gates reiterated that the present plan is the only feasible one, although he hinted that the U.S. might accept an alternative — floated by the Okinawa prefectural government — to move the proposed site at Camp Schwab about 50 meters toward the sea. He also stressed that unless the Futenma air facility is moved to Camp Schwab, the plan to move some 8,000 U.S. Marines and their dependents from Okinawa to Guam will not go ahead.
The Japanese side is apparently trying to postpone a final decision on the Futenma air facility's transfer. Referring to the fact that the four single-seat constituencies in Okinawa Prefecture in the Aug. 30 Lower House election elected candidates who are against the plan to move the Futenma facility to another part of Okinawa Prefecture, Mr. Okada said Japan cannot make a quick decision on the matter.
Mr. Hatoyama hinted that he will make a final decision by around June 2010 — after the Nago mayoral election in January that year. Okinawa Gov. Hirokazu Nakaima wants the transfer issue resolved sooner. The government should start looking for a location that will satisfy both the Okinawan people and the U.S. Merely postponing the decision will not be in Japan's interest.
Mr. Okada also proposed that Japan and the U.S. discuss a "no-first-use" policy for nuclear weapons. Mr. Gates stressed the importance of the U.S. having a flexible nuclear deterrence policy, although U.S. President Barack Obama has urged the creation of a world without nuclear weapons. Japan needs to carefully handle the no-first-use issue as it could disrupt security cooperation with the U.S.
(C) All rights reserved
EDITORIAL
A base Okinawans can live with
U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates met with Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama, Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada and Defense Minister Toshimi Kitazawa in Tokyo this week. The two sides failed to resolve differences over the relocation of a U.S. military base on Okinawa Island. Under a 2006 bilateral agreement, the U.S. Marine Corps' Futenma Air Station in the urban area of Ginowan (southern part of the Island) would move to the shore area of Camp Schwab, in Nago (northeastern part of the island).
Mr. Gates reiterated that the present plan is the only feasible one, although he hinted that the U.S. might accept an alternative — floated by the Okinawa prefectural government — to move the proposed site at Camp Schwab about 50 meters toward the sea. He also stressed that unless the Futenma air facility is moved to Camp Schwab, the plan to move some 8,000 U.S. Marines and their dependents from Okinawa to Guam will not go ahead.
The Japanese side is apparently trying to postpone a final decision on the Futenma air facility's transfer. Referring to the fact that the four single-seat constituencies in Okinawa Prefecture in the Aug. 30 Lower House election elected candidates who are against the plan to move the Futenma facility to another part of Okinawa Prefecture, Mr. Okada said Japan cannot make a quick decision on the matter.
Mr. Hatoyama hinted that he will make a final decision by around June 2010 — after the Nago mayoral election in January that year. Okinawa Gov. Hirokazu Nakaima wants the transfer issue resolved sooner. The government should start looking for a location that will satisfy both the Okinawan people and the U.S. Merely postponing the decision will not be in Japan's interest.
Mr. Okada also proposed that Japan and the U.S. discuss a "no-first-use" policy for nuclear weapons. Mr. Gates stressed the importance of the U.S. having a flexible nuclear deterrence policy, although U.S. President Barack Obama has urged the creation of a world without nuclear weapons. Japan needs to carefully handle the no-first-use issue as it could disrupt security cooperation with the U.S.
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60 percent of homeless around Ikebukuro Station suffering from mental disorder: survey
(Mainichi, Sep 04)
A survey of homeless people around JR Ikebukuro Station has revealed that over 60 percent are suffering from some kind of mental disorder, a group of psychiatrists said. In the survey, 80 homeless people underwent a medical examination by the team. Around 40 percent were found to be suffering from depression; 15 percent from alcohol dependency, and another 15 percent from schizophrenia or other delusional conditions.
A survey of homeless people around JR Ikebukuro Station has revealed that over 60 percent are suffering from some kind of mental disorder, a group of psychiatrists said. In the survey, 80 homeless people underwent a medical examination by the team. Around 40 percent were found to be suffering from depression; 15 percent from alcohol dependency, and another 15 percent from schizophrenia or other delusional conditions.
456-year-old letter from warlord Motonari Mori to vassal discovered in Shizuoka
(Mainichi Japan) October 30, 2009
A letter thought to be from Motonari Mori, a major leader of the Sengoku period, to a major vassal has been found in a private home in Shizuoka Prefecture.
The letter dates from when Mori, based out of present day Hiroshima Prefecture, was making the transition into an expansionist lord. The letter names a vassal very little is known about, making it "a precious record for research into both Motonari and the history of the region," according to one researcher.
Mori (1497-1571) was born toward the end of the Muromachi period, and eventually took control of most of the Chugoku region in western Honshu, becoming one of the most powerful warlords of the mid-Sengoku period.
The letter, measuring 28.5 centimeters by 44 centimeters and dated Dec. 14, 1553, was found among the belongings of a deceased descendant of a vassal. Tatsuo Kamogawa, an associate professor of historiography at the University of Tokyo, concluded that the document was written by a private secretary on Mori's direction after analyzing the content and word usage. That the letter was signed on the left side of the page is also apparently characteristic of Mori.
The recipient was Mori's son-in-law and vassal Takaie Shishido. The letter instructs Shishido to relay the official endorsement of an ally named Yuki, in a village in the domain of Bingo -- present day northeastern Hiroshima Prefecture.
It had been known that Shishido had requested to bring Yuki under his jurisdiction, but the letter shows that Mori denied Shishido's request, instead seeking to bring Yuki into a direct vassal relationship with himself. The document also reveals that Yuki called on Mori to protect Yuki's rank and territory, and that Mori accepted these conditions. Furthermore, the letter reveals that Yuki was an important subordinate and ally of Mori.
"You can see in the letter that Mori was aggressively expanding his clout at that time," says Kamogawa.
Two years after the letter was sent, Mori defeated a vastly numerically superior army under warlord Harukata Sue at the battle of Itsukushima, beginning his rise in power and prominence.
A letter thought to be from Motonari Mori, a major leader of the Sengoku period, to a major vassal has been found in a private home in Shizuoka Prefecture.
The letter dates from when Mori, based out of present day Hiroshima Prefecture, was making the transition into an expansionist lord. The letter names a vassal very little is known about, making it "a precious record for research into both Motonari and the history of the region," according to one researcher.
Mori (1497-1571) was born toward the end of the Muromachi period, and eventually took control of most of the Chugoku region in western Honshu, becoming one of the most powerful warlords of the mid-Sengoku period.
The letter, measuring 28.5 centimeters by 44 centimeters and dated Dec. 14, 1553, was found among the belongings of a deceased descendant of a vassal. Tatsuo Kamogawa, an associate professor of historiography at the University of Tokyo, concluded that the document was written by a private secretary on Mori's direction after analyzing the content and word usage. That the letter was signed on the left side of the page is also apparently characteristic of Mori.
The recipient was Mori's son-in-law and vassal Takaie Shishido. The letter instructs Shishido to relay the official endorsement of an ally named Yuki, in a village in the domain of Bingo -- present day northeastern Hiroshima Prefecture.
It had been known that Shishido had requested to bring Yuki under his jurisdiction, but the letter shows that Mori denied Shishido's request, instead seeking to bring Yuki into a direct vassal relationship with himself. The document also reveals that Yuki called on Mori to protect Yuki's rank and territory, and that Mori accepted these conditions. Furthermore, the letter reveals that Yuki was an important subordinate and ally of Mori.
"You can see in the letter that Mori was aggressively expanding his clout at that time," says Kamogawa.
Two years after the letter was sent, Mori defeated a vastly numerically superior army under warlord Harukata Sue at the battle of Itsukushima, beginning his rise in power and prominence.
4,086 honored for contributing to society
The Japan Times: Tuesday, Nov. 3, 2009
Kyodo News
The government released a list of recipients of this year's fall decorations comprising 4,025 Japanese, including 318 women, and 61 foreign nationals for their contributions to society.
Among the 11 recipients of the Grand Cordon of the Order of the Rising Sun, the highest honor in the fall commemoration, will be Fujio Cho, 72, Toyota Motor Corp. chairman.
The 61 foreign recipients hail from 32 countries. They include Torsten Wiesel, 85, winner of the 1981 Nobel Prize in physiology or medicine and president emeritus of Rockefeller University, who will receive the Grand Cordon of the Order of the Rising Sun.
Other recipients include Saburo Kawabuchi, 72, honorary president of the Japan Football Association, who will receive the Order of the Rising Sun, Gold and Silver Star.
In the field of the arts, film director Nobuhiko Obayahi, 71, and national living treasure and Japanese doll maker Komao Hayashi, 73, will be honored with the Order of the Rising Sun, Gold Rays with Rosette.
Recipients in the academic field include Tomio Tada, 75, a professor emeritus of immunology at the University of Tokyo, who will receive the Order of the Sacred Treasure, Gold and Silver Star.
Hiromitsu Komatsu, 76, a Hiroshima Prefecture firefighter who has worked hard to train younger firefighters, will receive the Order of the Sacred Treasure, Gold and Silver Rays.
An awards ceremony will be held Thursday at the Imperial Palace with Emperor Akihito and Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama in attendance.
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Kyodo News
The government released a list of recipients of this year's fall decorations comprising 4,025 Japanese, including 318 women, and 61 foreign nationals for their contributions to society.
Among the 11 recipients of the Grand Cordon of the Order of the Rising Sun, the highest honor in the fall commemoration, will be Fujio Cho, 72, Toyota Motor Corp. chairman.
The 61 foreign recipients hail from 32 countries. They include Torsten Wiesel, 85, winner of the 1981 Nobel Prize in physiology or medicine and president emeritus of Rockefeller University, who will receive the Grand Cordon of the Order of the Rising Sun.
Other recipients include Saburo Kawabuchi, 72, honorary president of the Japan Football Association, who will receive the Order of the Rising Sun, Gold and Silver Star.
In the field of the arts, film director Nobuhiko Obayahi, 71, and national living treasure and Japanese doll maker Komao Hayashi, 73, will be honored with the Order of the Rising Sun, Gold Rays with Rosette.
Recipients in the academic field include Tomio Tada, 75, a professor emeritus of immunology at the University of Tokyo, who will receive the Order of the Sacred Treasure, Gold and Silver Star.
Hiromitsu Komatsu, 76, a Hiroshima Prefecture firefighter who has worked hard to train younger firefighters, will receive the Order of the Sacred Treasure, Gold and Silver Rays.
An awards ceremony will be held Thursday at the Imperial Palace with Emperor Akihito and Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama in attendance.
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4 lay judges in murder trial reluctant to serve as citizen judges again
(Mainichi Japan) October 30, 2009
HAMAMATSU, Shizuoka -- Four lay judges who participated in a murder trial here on Thursday expressed their hesitation to take part in another trial in the future.
Four of the six jurors in the case, including one woman, attended a press conference following the ruling, and said that they feel reluctant to serve as citizen judges again, with one member expressing his dissatisfaction at the deliberation process.
The lay judges handed down a 13-year prison sentence to Koichi Matsuda, 50, for murdering his 46-year-old girlfriend, falling short of the 15-year imprisonment demanded by prosecutors, during the lay judge trial at the Shizuoka District Court's Hamamatsu branch that began on Tuesday.
Asked if they would like to take part in a trial again, three of them answered: "I don't want to," "It's hard to say," and "Not really," showing their reluctance to take on the role again.
A 28-year-old citizen judge questioned the deliberation process, saying "I didn't understand the purpose of the lay judge system. I felt that our feelings were not reflected in the decision-making. I wonder if it was just about us being forced to hang around for three days."
Feeling a lack of attention toward their opinions, he requested the judge to listen to them during the deliberations and breaks, but the judge did not accept it, the man said.
"The judge kept telling us 'It's regulated by law,' so there was nothing we could do about it."
Meanwhile, a female lay judge who served in the trial, who is a civil servant, said: "We don't really know when our views are taken into account and when not."
After the press conference, the court decided that the male juror's statement about the trial did not breach the confidentiality obligation of lay judges.
HAMAMATSU, Shizuoka -- Four lay judges who participated in a murder trial here on Thursday expressed their hesitation to take part in another trial in the future.
Four of the six jurors in the case, including one woman, attended a press conference following the ruling, and said that they feel reluctant to serve as citizen judges again, with one member expressing his dissatisfaction at the deliberation process.
The lay judges handed down a 13-year prison sentence to Koichi Matsuda, 50, for murdering his 46-year-old girlfriend, falling short of the 15-year imprisonment demanded by prosecutors, during the lay judge trial at the Shizuoka District Court's Hamamatsu branch that began on Tuesday.
Asked if they would like to take part in a trial again, three of them answered: "I don't want to," "It's hard to say," and "Not really," showing their reluctance to take on the role again.
A 28-year-old citizen judge questioned the deliberation process, saying "I didn't understand the purpose of the lay judge system. I felt that our feelings were not reflected in the decision-making. I wonder if it was just about us being forced to hang around for three days."
Feeling a lack of attention toward their opinions, he requested the judge to listen to them during the deliberations and breaks, but the judge did not accept it, the man said.
"The judge kept telling us 'It's regulated by law,' so there was nothing we could do about it."
Meanwhile, a female lay judge who served in the trial, who is a civil servant, said: "We don't really know when our views are taken into account and when not."
After the press conference, the court decided that the male juror's statement about the trial did not breach the confidentiality obligation of lay judges.
33% of middle, high school students sleepy during day
(Oct. 22, 2009)
The Yomiuri Shimbun
Thirty-three percent of the nation's middle and high school students feel very drowsy in the daytime, according to a nationwide survey conducted by a Health, Labor and Welfare Ministry study group.
As sleepiness in daytime is known to diminish learning efficiency and harm health, the survey's results suggest that such students need to be educated about matters such as the importance of getting enough rest. The survey on students' sleep and daily habits was conducted on students at 239 middle and high schools across the country, and about 87,000 students from 168 schools responded.
The results will be reported at the Japanese Society of Sleep Research's meeting in Osaka, scheduled to start Saturday.
The group, led by Prof. Takashi Oida of Nihon University, evaluated sleepiness using an international measurement.
Thirty-three percent of the respondents said they felt very sleepy during the day, evidenced in such behavior as "drowsing while sitting and talking to someone or reading." Twenty-eight percent of boys and 38 percent of girls gave this answer.
By grade, the highest percentage of sleepy students were first-grade high school students, with 36 percent of boys and 45 percent of girls reporting feeling drowsy during the day.
Going to bed late and long commutes were the main causes of daytime sleepiness, according to the survey results.
"More students than we expected feel sleepy in the daytime. As first-year high school students experience a major change in their [educational] environment, we assume this may cause their sleepiness," said Yoshitaka Kaneita, a member of the group and an associate professor at the the university. "We'd like to use the results for health education by identifying the factors that cause daytime sleepiness."
The Yomiuri Shimbun
Thirty-three percent of the nation's middle and high school students feel very drowsy in the daytime, according to a nationwide survey conducted by a Health, Labor and Welfare Ministry study group.
As sleepiness in daytime is known to diminish learning efficiency and harm health, the survey's results suggest that such students need to be educated about matters such as the importance of getting enough rest. The survey on students' sleep and daily habits was conducted on students at 239 middle and high schools across the country, and about 87,000 students from 168 schools responded.
The results will be reported at the Japanese Society of Sleep Research's meeting in Osaka, scheduled to start Saturday.
The group, led by Prof. Takashi Oida of Nihon University, evaluated sleepiness using an international measurement.
Thirty-three percent of the respondents said they felt very sleepy during the day, evidenced in such behavior as "drowsing while sitting and talking to someone or reading." Twenty-eight percent of boys and 38 percent of girls gave this answer.
By grade, the highest percentage of sleepy students were first-grade high school students, with 36 percent of boys and 45 percent of girls reporting feeling drowsy during the day.
Going to bed late and long commutes were the main causes of daytime sleepiness, according to the survey results.
"More students than we expected feel sleepy in the daytime. As first-year high school students experience a major change in their [educational] environment, we assume this may cause their sleepiness," said Yoshitaka Kaneita, a member of the group and an associate professor at the the university. "We'd like to use the results for health education by identifying the factors that cause daytime sleepiness."
33% of men sit to pee: Toto poll
The Japan Times: Saturday, Sept. 26, 2009
KITAKYUSHU (Kyodo) About one in three Japanese men tend to sit on the toilet when urinating at home, according to results of a survey by toilet maker Toto Ltd.
The Internet survey conducted in May, covering 500 men in their 20s to 60s whose homes have Western-style toilets, found 33.4 percent said they prefer to sit, citing "ease of posture" and "to make cleaning easier" as the main reasons.
The figure was 9.7 percent higher than in Toto's last survey in 2004.
Takuji Yano of Toto's public relations department said, "It seems that people are tending to be more conscious about the bathrooms in their home, such as equipping washlet attachments to the toilet and trying to keep them cleaner."
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KITAKYUSHU (Kyodo) About one in three Japanese men tend to sit on the toilet when urinating at home, according to results of a survey by toilet maker Toto Ltd.
The Internet survey conducted in May, covering 500 men in their 20s to 60s whose homes have Western-style toilets, found 33.4 percent said they prefer to sit, citing "ease of posture" and "to make cleaning easier" as the main reasons.
The figure was 9.7 percent higher than in Toto's last survey in 2004.
Takuji Yano of Toto's public relations department said, "It seems that people are tending to be more conscious about the bathrooms in their home, such as equipping washlet attachments to the toilet and trying to keep them cleaner."
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14-year-old hired 13-year-old prostitute
The Japan Times: Wednesday, Sept. 2, 2009
Kyodo News
Police on Tuesday turned over to prosecutors their case against a 14-year-old boy in Kanagawa Prefecture who allegedly paid ¥60,000 to have sex with a 13-year-old girl he met on an Internet dating site.
The boy, in his third year in a Tokyo junior high school, used money from the more than ¥100,000 he had saved from his allowance to make the payment, Kanagawa police said.
They said the boy's "indecent act" took place in a lavatory at JR Hashimoto Station in Sagamihara on March 1. At the time the girl was 13 years old and in her first year in a Sagamihara junior high.
The police quoted the boy as saying he carried out the act because he "had money and was interested in (sex)." He enticed the girl by portraying himself as an 18-year-old in a message posted from a personal computer at his home.
According to the police, he posted a message dated Feb. 20 that said: "Male, age 18. Got quite a lot of money. Waiting for your reply."
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Kyodo News
Police on Tuesday turned over to prosecutors their case against a 14-year-old boy in Kanagawa Prefecture who allegedly paid ¥60,000 to have sex with a 13-year-old girl he met on an Internet dating site.
The boy, in his third year in a Tokyo junior high school, used money from the more than ¥100,000 he had saved from his allowance to make the payment, Kanagawa police said.
They said the boy's "indecent act" took place in a lavatory at JR Hashimoto Station in Sagamihara on March 1. At the time the girl was 13 years old and in her first year in a Sagamihara junior high.
The police quoted the boy as saying he carried out the act because he "had money and was interested in (sex)." He enticed the girl by portraying himself as an 18-year-old in a message posted from a personal computer at his home.
According to the police, he posted a message dated Feb. 20 that said: "Male, age 18. Got quite a lot of money. Waiting for your reply."
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102 new ways to stroll along the river
Created: 2009-10-23 15:56:07
Author:Jane Chen
RESIDENTS will be able to enjoy water views with 102 landscaped promenades due to open alongside rivers across Shanghai's 15 districts and Chongming County by the end of November.
More than half of the boardwalks are new while the rest have had a face-lift, today's Oriental Morning Post reported.
Shanghai's greenery authority has published a list of the riverside platforms on its Website and opened a hotline on 52904343 for public comments.
Pudong New Area has the most boardwalks, with 15, while the city's largest is on Chongming Island extending 26.1 kilometers, according to the authority.
The authority hopes to improve conditions for residents by beautifying the landscape near the water.
Copyright © 2001-2009 Shanghai Daily Publishing House
Author:Jane Chen
RESIDENTS will be able to enjoy water views with 102 landscaped promenades due to open alongside rivers across Shanghai's 15 districts and Chongming County by the end of November.
More than half of the boardwalks are new while the rest have had a face-lift, today's Oriental Morning Post reported.
Shanghai's greenery authority has published a list of the riverside platforms on its Website and opened a hotline on 52904343 for public comments.
Pudong New Area has the most boardwalks, with 15, while the city's largest is on Chongming Island extending 26.1 kilometers, according to the authority.
The authority hopes to improve conditions for residents by beautifying the landscape near the water.
Copyright © 2001-2009 Shanghai Daily Publishing House
10 yrs on, Japan has yet to fully embrace 'the pill'
Sat, Sep 12, 2009
The Yomiuri Shimbun/Asia News Network
September marks the 10th anniversary of the start of birth control pill sales in Japan. How wide has their use become?
The birth control pill provides the body with a supplement of a small amount of female hormones, which are usually secreted from the ovaries, to prevent ovulation.
Formerly, there were drugs to control female hormones to treat conditions such as menorrhalgia, but due to their strong side effects such as nausea, a pill containing the minimum amount necessary of female hormones was developed specifically for birth control purposes.
Birth control pills have been widely used in Europe and the United States since the 1970s as a sure contraception method with a 99.7 percent success rate, compared with 98 percent for condoms.
But it took nine years for Japan to approve the birth control pill, and the start of domestic sales were delayed until 1999. The number of users increased more than threefold from about 200,000 in 2001 to about 660,000 in 2009. But the ratio of users to the total population of women aged 16-49 still stands at 3 percent, far less than France's 44 percent, Britain's 26 percent and the United States' 18 percent.
When Prof. Yuji Taketani of Tokyo University's Department of Obstetrics and Gynecology conducted a survey in which he asked women who had answered they "don't want to use [birth control pills]" or "won't use [them] under the current circumstances" to cite reasons for saying so, more than half of the respondents, or the largest portion, said they "are concerned about side effects."
The most worrisome side effect is thrombosis--the formation of a blood clot inside a blood vessel that obstructs the flow of blood through the circulatory system to cause stroke and heart attack. According to research conducted in the United States and Europe, thrombosis occurs in about 15 to 25 people in 100,000, higher than the rate of about five people per 100,000 when the pill is not used.
Nevertheless, the incidence of thrombosis is lower than about the 60 per 100,000 rate recorded during ordinary pregnancy. Kunio Kitamura, director of the Clinic of Japan Family Planning Association in Tokyo's Shinjuku Ward, said: "Compared with Europe and the United States, Japan has fewer incidence of thrombosis, estimated at two to six people per 100,000 who've used the pill in the past decade."
The birth control pill is used by healthy women for long periods, so its safety is, needless to say, extremely important. In foreign countries, the pill's merits are generally stressed over concern about side effects. If vague concern about side effects serves to hamper the prevalence of birth control pills, it is necessary to provide correct information.
Discussing why it took nine years for the pill's approval in Japan, some people pointed out there was concern that the incidence of sexually transmitted diseases such as HIV infection would rise as a result of an increase in sexual intercourse without the use of condoms.
In reality, the number of women who became infected with HIV as well as those cases that developed into AIDS has leveled off over the past decade. The heterosexual infection rate accounted for 20 to 30 percent of total HIV and AIDS cases.
"It can't necessarily be said that lifting the ban on the use of pills led to expanding the number of AIDS patients," Kitamura said.
The birth control pill is also useful to ease the pain from menstrual cramps and endometriosis. Of Japanese women who use the pill, only about 30 percent do for contraception purposes, according to a survey.
The contraceptive pill is an effective method not only to prevent pregnancy but also to help women maintain health. Providing correct information and bolstering education programs are needed to promote the prevalence of the pills.
THE YOMIURI SHIMBUN / ASIA NEWS NETWORK
Copyright ©2007 Singapore Press Holdings Ltd. Co. Regn. No. 198402868E. All rights reserved.
The Yomiuri Shimbun/Asia News Network
September marks the 10th anniversary of the start of birth control pill sales in Japan. How wide has their use become?
The birth control pill provides the body with a supplement of a small amount of female hormones, which are usually secreted from the ovaries, to prevent ovulation.
Formerly, there were drugs to control female hormones to treat conditions such as menorrhalgia, but due to their strong side effects such as nausea, a pill containing the minimum amount necessary of female hormones was developed specifically for birth control purposes.
Birth control pills have been widely used in Europe and the United States since the 1970s as a sure contraception method with a 99.7 percent success rate, compared with 98 percent for condoms.
But it took nine years for Japan to approve the birth control pill, and the start of domestic sales were delayed until 1999. The number of users increased more than threefold from about 200,000 in 2001 to about 660,000 in 2009. But the ratio of users to the total population of women aged 16-49 still stands at 3 percent, far less than France's 44 percent, Britain's 26 percent and the United States' 18 percent.
When Prof. Yuji Taketani of Tokyo University's Department of Obstetrics and Gynecology conducted a survey in which he asked women who had answered they "don't want to use [birth control pills]" or "won't use [them] under the current circumstances" to cite reasons for saying so, more than half of the respondents, or the largest portion, said they "are concerned about side effects."
The most worrisome side effect is thrombosis--the formation of a blood clot inside a blood vessel that obstructs the flow of blood through the circulatory system to cause stroke and heart attack. According to research conducted in the United States and Europe, thrombosis occurs in about 15 to 25 people in 100,000, higher than the rate of about five people per 100,000 when the pill is not used.
Nevertheless, the incidence of thrombosis is lower than about the 60 per 100,000 rate recorded during ordinary pregnancy. Kunio Kitamura, director of the Clinic of Japan Family Planning Association in Tokyo's Shinjuku Ward, said: "Compared with Europe and the United States, Japan has fewer incidence of thrombosis, estimated at two to six people per 100,000 who've used the pill in the past decade."
The birth control pill is used by healthy women for long periods, so its safety is, needless to say, extremely important. In foreign countries, the pill's merits are generally stressed over concern about side effects. If vague concern about side effects serves to hamper the prevalence of birth control pills, it is necessary to provide correct information.
Discussing why it took nine years for the pill's approval in Japan, some people pointed out there was concern that the incidence of sexually transmitted diseases such as HIV infection would rise as a result of an increase in sexual intercourse without the use of condoms.
In reality, the number of women who became infected with HIV as well as those cases that developed into AIDS has leveled off over the past decade. The heterosexual infection rate accounted for 20 to 30 percent of total HIV and AIDS cases.
"It can't necessarily be said that lifting the ban on the use of pills led to expanding the number of AIDS patients," Kitamura said.
The birth control pill is also useful to ease the pain from menstrual cramps and endometriosis. Of Japanese women who use the pill, only about 30 percent do for contraception purposes, according to a survey.
The contraceptive pill is an effective method not only to prevent pregnancy but also to help women maintain health. Providing correct information and bolstering education programs are needed to promote the prevalence of the pills.
THE YOMIURI SHIMBUN / ASIA NEWS NETWORK
Copyright ©2007 Singapore Press Holdings Ltd. Co. Regn. No. 198402868E. All rights reserved.
Yet another 'Battle of Okinawa'
The Japan Times: Wednesday, Nov. 11, 2009
By GAVAN McCORMACK
Special to The Japan Times
CANBERRA — Elections in August gave Japan a new government, headed by Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama. In electing him and his Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), the Japanese people, like the American people less than a year earlier, were opting for change. Remarkably, however, what followed on the part of President Barack Obama's United States has been a campaign of unrelenting pressure to block any such change.
The core issue has been the disposition of American military presence in Okinawa and the U.S. insistence that Hatoyama honor an agreement known as the Guam Treaty. Under the Guam agreement of February 2009, adopted as a treaty under special legislation in May, 8,000 U.S. Marines were to be relocated from Okinawa to Guam, and the U.S. Marine base at Futenma was to be transferred to Henoko in Nago City in northern Okinawa, where Japan would build a new base. Japan would also pay $6.09 billion toward the Guam transfer cost.
The Guam Treaty was one of the first acts of a popular "reforming" U.S. administration, and one of the last of a Japanese regime in fatal decline. It set in unusually clear relief the relationship between the world's No. 1 and No. 2 economic powers. It was worthy of close attention because the agreement was unequal, unconstitutional, illegal, redundant, colonial and deceitful.
It was unequal because it obliged the government of Japan to construct one new base and to contribute a substantial sum toward constructing another for the U.S. while the American side merely offered an ambiguous pledge to withdraw a number of troops and reserved the right, under Article 8, to vary the agreement at will.
It was unconstitutional since under Article 95 of the Japanese Constitution any law applicable only to one local public entity requires the consent of the majority of the voters of that district and the Okinawan wishes were clearly ignored in the Guam Treaty. The Diet simply rode roughshod over Okinawa.
Since the treaty took precedence over domestic law, it also had the effect of downgrading, in effect vitiating, the requirements of Japan's environmental protection laws. Any serious and internationally credible environmental impact assessment (EIA) would surely conclude that a massive military construction project was incompatible with the delicate coral and forest environment of the Oura Bay area, but it was taken for granted that Japan's EIA would be a mere formality and the treaty further undermined the procedure.
The treaty was also redundant. It simply reiterated major sections of earlier agreements (of 2005 and 2006) on which there had been little or no progress. It merely added compulsive force to those agreements and tied the hands of any successor government.
The agreement/treaty was essentially colonial, with the "natives" (Okinawans) to be guided and exploited, but not consulted. The Guam Treaty showed the Obama administration to be maintaining Bush diplomacy: paternalistic, interventionist, antidemocratic and intolerant of Japan's search for an independent foreign policy.
Finally, the treaty was characterized by what in Japanese is known as "gomakashi" — trickery and lies dressed in the rhetoric of principle and mutuality. Although reported as a U.S. concession to Japan ("troop withdrawal"), it was plainly designed to increase the Japanese contribution to the alliance by substituting a new, high-tech and greatly expanded base at Henoko for the inconvenient, dangerous and obsolescent Futenma. The figure of 8,000 marines to be withdrawn also turned out, under questions in the Diet, to be also false. The more likely figure was less than 3,000.
While working to tie Japan's hands by the deals with the collapsing Aso administration, the U.S. knew well that the (then) opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ)'s position was clear: No new base should be built within Okinawa, Futenma should simply be returned.
Drumbeats of concern, warning, friendly advice from Washington — that Hatoyama and the DPJ had better not take such pledges seriously, much less actually try to carry them out, and that any attempt to vary the Guam agreement would be seen as anti-American — rose steadily, culminating in the October Tokyo visit by U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates, who delivered an ultimatum: The Guam agreement had to be implemented.
The intimidation had an effect. Defense Secretary Toshimi Kitazawa suggested that there probably was, after all, no real alternative to construction at Henoko. Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada also began to waver. Weeks after the election victory he had said, "If Japan just follows what the U.S. says, then I think as a sovereign nation that is very pathetic." And: "The will of the people of Okinawa and the will of the people of Japan was expressed in the elections . . . I don't think we will act simply by accepting what the U.S tells us. . . ." After the Gates statement, however, he suggested that the Futenma functions might after all be transferred within Okinawa, even though he declined to endorse the Henoko project, proposing instead they be merged with those of the large Kadena U.S. Air Force Base nearby.
The prefecture's Ryukyu Shimpo newspaper, in a passionate editorial, lamented the incapacity of the new Hatoyama government to counter the "intimidatory diplomacy" of Gates and Adm. Michael Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and decried the drift back toward "acceptance of the status quo of following the U.S."
Nearly four decades have passed since Okinawa reverted from the U.S. to Japan, yet U.S. bases still take up one-fifth of the land surface of its main island. Nowhere is more overwhelmed than the city of Ginowan, reluctant host for the U.S. Marine Corps' Futenma Air Station. The U.S. and Japan agreed in 1996 that Futenma would be returned, but made return conditional on a replacement, which also would have to be built in Okinawa. Thirteen years on, there the matter still stands.
The "Futenma Replacement Facility," the subject of such intense diplomatic contention today, is one that has grown from a modest "helipad," as it was referred to in 1996 to a removable, offshore structure with a 2,500-meter runway, and then in 2006 to its current version: dual-1,800 meter runways plus a deep sea naval port and a chain of helipads — a comprehensive air, land and sea base. Time and again, the project was blocked by popular opposition, but time and again the Japanese government renewed and expanded it.
Yet opinion in the prefecture has, if anything, hardened. An October Ryukyu Shimpo/Mainichi Shimbun poll showed that 70 percent of Okinawans opposed relocation within the prefecture and a mere 5 percent favored the Henoko design endorsed by the Guam Treaty and demanded by Washington. In the August national elections, DPJ candidates who promised they would never allow construction of a new base swept the polls in Okinawa, crushing the representatives of the compliant "old regime."
Both prefectural newspapers, the majority in Okinawa's Parliament, and 80 percent of Okinawan government mayors are also opposed, believing any Futenma base substitute should be constructed either elsewhere in Japan or overseas.
There has never been such a postwar confrontation between the U.S. and Japan. With the last shots of Washington's diplomatic barrage exploding around him and Obama's visit imminent, Hatoyama continues to study his options. If he rejects the U.S. demands, a major diplomatic crisis is bound to erupt. If he swallows them, he provokes a domestic political crisis and drives Okinawa to despair. Yet choose he must.
Gavan McCormack is an emeritus professor at Australia National University in Canberra. Japan Focus (japanfocus.org) will post an unabridged version of this article.
(C) All rights reserved
By GAVAN McCORMACK
Special to The Japan Times
CANBERRA — Elections in August gave Japan a new government, headed by Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama. In electing him and his Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), the Japanese people, like the American people less than a year earlier, were opting for change. Remarkably, however, what followed on the part of President Barack Obama's United States has been a campaign of unrelenting pressure to block any such change.
The core issue has been the disposition of American military presence in Okinawa and the U.S. insistence that Hatoyama honor an agreement known as the Guam Treaty. Under the Guam agreement of February 2009, adopted as a treaty under special legislation in May, 8,000 U.S. Marines were to be relocated from Okinawa to Guam, and the U.S. Marine base at Futenma was to be transferred to Henoko in Nago City in northern Okinawa, where Japan would build a new base. Japan would also pay $6.09 billion toward the Guam transfer cost.
The Guam Treaty was one of the first acts of a popular "reforming" U.S. administration, and one of the last of a Japanese regime in fatal decline. It set in unusually clear relief the relationship between the world's No. 1 and No. 2 economic powers. It was worthy of close attention because the agreement was unequal, unconstitutional, illegal, redundant, colonial and deceitful.
It was unequal because it obliged the government of Japan to construct one new base and to contribute a substantial sum toward constructing another for the U.S. while the American side merely offered an ambiguous pledge to withdraw a number of troops and reserved the right, under Article 8, to vary the agreement at will.
It was unconstitutional since under Article 95 of the Japanese Constitution any law applicable only to one local public entity requires the consent of the majority of the voters of that district and the Okinawan wishes were clearly ignored in the Guam Treaty. The Diet simply rode roughshod over Okinawa.
Since the treaty took precedence over domestic law, it also had the effect of downgrading, in effect vitiating, the requirements of Japan's environmental protection laws. Any serious and internationally credible environmental impact assessment (EIA) would surely conclude that a massive military construction project was incompatible with the delicate coral and forest environment of the Oura Bay area, but it was taken for granted that Japan's EIA would be a mere formality and the treaty further undermined the procedure.
The treaty was also redundant. It simply reiterated major sections of earlier agreements (of 2005 and 2006) on which there had been little or no progress. It merely added compulsive force to those agreements and tied the hands of any successor government.
The agreement/treaty was essentially colonial, with the "natives" (Okinawans) to be guided and exploited, but not consulted. The Guam Treaty showed the Obama administration to be maintaining Bush diplomacy: paternalistic, interventionist, antidemocratic and intolerant of Japan's search for an independent foreign policy.
Finally, the treaty was characterized by what in Japanese is known as "gomakashi" — trickery and lies dressed in the rhetoric of principle and mutuality. Although reported as a U.S. concession to Japan ("troop withdrawal"), it was plainly designed to increase the Japanese contribution to the alliance by substituting a new, high-tech and greatly expanded base at Henoko for the inconvenient, dangerous and obsolescent Futenma. The figure of 8,000 marines to be withdrawn also turned out, under questions in the Diet, to be also false. The more likely figure was less than 3,000.
While working to tie Japan's hands by the deals with the collapsing Aso administration, the U.S. knew well that the (then) opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ)'s position was clear: No new base should be built within Okinawa, Futenma should simply be returned.
Drumbeats of concern, warning, friendly advice from Washington — that Hatoyama and the DPJ had better not take such pledges seriously, much less actually try to carry them out, and that any attempt to vary the Guam agreement would be seen as anti-American — rose steadily, culminating in the October Tokyo visit by U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates, who delivered an ultimatum: The Guam agreement had to be implemented.
The intimidation had an effect. Defense Secretary Toshimi Kitazawa suggested that there probably was, after all, no real alternative to construction at Henoko. Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada also began to waver. Weeks after the election victory he had said, "If Japan just follows what the U.S. says, then I think as a sovereign nation that is very pathetic." And: "The will of the people of Okinawa and the will of the people of Japan was expressed in the elections . . . I don't think we will act simply by accepting what the U.S tells us. . . ." After the Gates statement, however, he suggested that the Futenma functions might after all be transferred within Okinawa, even though he declined to endorse the Henoko project, proposing instead they be merged with those of the large Kadena U.S. Air Force Base nearby.
The prefecture's Ryukyu Shimpo newspaper, in a passionate editorial, lamented the incapacity of the new Hatoyama government to counter the "intimidatory diplomacy" of Gates and Adm. Michael Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and decried the drift back toward "acceptance of the status quo of following the U.S."
Nearly four decades have passed since Okinawa reverted from the U.S. to Japan, yet U.S. bases still take up one-fifth of the land surface of its main island. Nowhere is more overwhelmed than the city of Ginowan, reluctant host for the U.S. Marine Corps' Futenma Air Station. The U.S. and Japan agreed in 1996 that Futenma would be returned, but made return conditional on a replacement, which also would have to be built in Okinawa. Thirteen years on, there the matter still stands.
The "Futenma Replacement Facility," the subject of such intense diplomatic contention today, is one that has grown from a modest "helipad," as it was referred to in 1996 to a removable, offshore structure with a 2,500-meter runway, and then in 2006 to its current version: dual-1,800 meter runways plus a deep sea naval port and a chain of helipads — a comprehensive air, land and sea base. Time and again, the project was blocked by popular opposition, but time and again the Japanese government renewed and expanded it.
Yet opinion in the prefecture has, if anything, hardened. An October Ryukyu Shimpo/Mainichi Shimbun poll showed that 70 percent of Okinawans opposed relocation within the prefecture and a mere 5 percent favored the Henoko design endorsed by the Guam Treaty and demanded by Washington. In the August national elections, DPJ candidates who promised they would never allow construction of a new base swept the polls in Okinawa, crushing the representatives of the compliant "old regime."
Both prefectural newspapers, the majority in Okinawa's Parliament, and 80 percent of Okinawan government mayors are also opposed, believing any Futenma base substitute should be constructed either elsewhere in Japan or overseas.
There has never been such a postwar confrontation between the U.S. and Japan. With the last shots of Washington's diplomatic barrage exploding around him and Obama's visit imminent, Hatoyama continues to study his options. If he rejects the U.S. demands, a major diplomatic crisis is bound to erupt. If he swallows them, he provokes a domestic political crisis and drives Okinawa to despair. Yet choose he must.
Gavan McCormack is an emeritus professor at Australia National University in Canberra. Japan Focus (japanfocus.org) will post an unabridged version of this article.
(C) All rights reserved
Muted celebrations in Russia for the Fall of the Wall. And rightly so
11/10/2009 10:25
RUSSIA
Muted celebrations in Russia for the Fall of the Wall. And rightly so
58% of the population does not even know by whom and why it was built. In 20 years the country has failed to achieve democracy, survives on the export of raw materials and in a year is down 12 points, according to the report on global competitiveness. 20% of the population lives below the poverty line.
Moscow (AsiaNews) - Pluralism, democracy, free market. More human rights (maybe). That the fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989 was a historic event leading to positive change is not so obvious in many countries beyond the former Iron Curtain. According to a poll of the Pew Research Centre - conducted in nine countries of Central and Eastern Europe on individuals over the age of 50 years - the happiest with the changes in their lives since the collapse of communism are the Czechs, Poles and citizens of the former East Germany, while those who expressed greater dissatisfaction are the Ukrainians, Bulgarians and more than others, the Russians.
Yesterday, the twentieth anniversary of the end of the Cold War, in Russia, major newspapers reported the news of the celebrations in Berlin, but not with the space that would be expected in the country that was among the protagonists of this event. The problem is that the 9 November 1989 is engraved in the history of the West, but not in that of Russia. That date is not seen as decisive for the fate of the Soviet regime (which definitively ended only two years later) and still today the intellectual debate in the former USSR does not address the issue of the Wall.
According to a survey of the Russian Institute Vtsiom, 58% of Russians - despite a good general understanding that this nation has of its history - do not know who decided the construction of the Wall. And its meaning - strengthening the position of the USSR, the protection of the communist regime from foreign influence and the attempt to prevent mass emigration - is properly understood by only in 24% of Russians. While half of respondents, 52% simply do not know why it was built.
Analysts maintain, while the reunited Germany and Europe have rapidly integrated, while the East - with China and India at the forefront - has launched an astonishing economic boom and globalization, it can be said that Russia is the only one not to have successfully ridden the wind of change blowing throughout the world during those crucial years.
According to Vladimir Ryzhkov, a professor at the High School of Economics and independent politician in Moscow, the Russian Federation has not yet overcome its instability. After two decades of experiments, from Yeltsin’s reform to capitalism from the Far West of the oligarchs, the Putin regime until the economic crisis with Medvedev, Russia is still trying to figure out which direction to take. Paying the price for this, first and foremost, are the people. In an editorial published Monday in the newspaper The Moscow Times, Ryzhkov recalls a "triple failure" of the Kremlin. "First, Russia has failed to modernize its economy or social sphere. Second, it has not been able to build an effective political system, creating instead a one-man authoritarian regime. Finally Russia has lost its international reputation and its former superpower status, leaving it almost entirely without allies or the support of global public opinion” wrote the professor.
86% of Russian exports, amounting to one third of national GDP, consist of raw materials, while 80% of imports consist of finished goods. In Soviet times the exports of raw materials were only 48% of GDP. Today, Russia is dependent entirely from exports of energy resources: over 70% of the shares on the Russian market are the companies working in the field of raw materials.
Any attempt to create a modern economy based on high technology has floundered. The average income for a Russian citizen is the same as 20 years ago, while today 20% of the country lives below the poverty line. Over 50% of national wealth is concentrated in the hands of 10% of the population: in 2008, the 53 richest Russians had a lump sum equal to 30% of national GDP. In the Global Competitiveness Report of the World Economic Forum, Russia has fallen by 12 places in one year to 63rd, out of about 132 countries. For the first time it is lagging behind countries like Turkey, Mexico, Brazil and even Azerbaijan.
The same regression has been recorded in the field of human rights. In the 2008 rankings compiled by The Economist on democracy in the world, Russia was the 108th place out of 167 countries.
Perhaps Russia, yesterday, had little cause to celebrate. (MAL)
RUSSIA
Muted celebrations in Russia for the Fall of the Wall. And rightly so
58% of the population does not even know by whom and why it was built. In 20 years the country has failed to achieve democracy, survives on the export of raw materials and in a year is down 12 points, according to the report on global competitiveness. 20% of the population lives below the poverty line.
Moscow (AsiaNews) - Pluralism, democracy, free market. More human rights (maybe). That the fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989 was a historic event leading to positive change is not so obvious in many countries beyond the former Iron Curtain. According to a poll of the Pew Research Centre - conducted in nine countries of Central and Eastern Europe on individuals over the age of 50 years - the happiest with the changes in their lives since the collapse of communism are the Czechs, Poles and citizens of the former East Germany, while those who expressed greater dissatisfaction are the Ukrainians, Bulgarians and more than others, the Russians.
Yesterday, the twentieth anniversary of the end of the Cold War, in Russia, major newspapers reported the news of the celebrations in Berlin, but not with the space that would be expected in the country that was among the protagonists of this event. The problem is that the 9 November 1989 is engraved in the history of the West, but not in that of Russia. That date is not seen as decisive for the fate of the Soviet regime (which definitively ended only two years later) and still today the intellectual debate in the former USSR does not address the issue of the Wall.
According to a survey of the Russian Institute Vtsiom, 58% of Russians - despite a good general understanding that this nation has of its history - do not know who decided the construction of the Wall. And its meaning - strengthening the position of the USSR, the protection of the communist regime from foreign influence and the attempt to prevent mass emigration - is properly understood by only in 24% of Russians. While half of respondents, 52% simply do not know why it was built.
Analysts maintain, while the reunited Germany and Europe have rapidly integrated, while the East - with China and India at the forefront - has launched an astonishing economic boom and globalization, it can be said that Russia is the only one not to have successfully ridden the wind of change blowing throughout the world during those crucial years.
According to Vladimir Ryzhkov, a professor at the High School of Economics and independent politician in Moscow, the Russian Federation has not yet overcome its instability. After two decades of experiments, from Yeltsin’s reform to capitalism from the Far West of the oligarchs, the Putin regime until the economic crisis with Medvedev, Russia is still trying to figure out which direction to take. Paying the price for this, first and foremost, are the people. In an editorial published Monday in the newspaper The Moscow Times, Ryzhkov recalls a "triple failure" of the Kremlin. "First, Russia has failed to modernize its economy or social sphere. Second, it has not been able to build an effective political system, creating instead a one-man authoritarian regime. Finally Russia has lost its international reputation and its former superpower status, leaving it almost entirely without allies or the support of global public opinion” wrote the professor.
86% of Russian exports, amounting to one third of national GDP, consist of raw materials, while 80% of imports consist of finished goods. In Soviet times the exports of raw materials were only 48% of GDP. Today, Russia is dependent entirely from exports of energy resources: over 70% of the shares on the Russian market are the companies working in the field of raw materials.
Any attempt to create a modern economy based on high technology has floundered. The average income for a Russian citizen is the same as 20 years ago, while today 20% of the country lives below the poverty line. Over 50% of national wealth is concentrated in the hands of 10% of the population: in 2008, the 53 richest Russians had a lump sum equal to 30% of national GDP. In the Global Competitiveness Report of the World Economic Forum, Russia has fallen by 12 places in one year to 63rd, out of about 132 countries. For the first time it is lagging behind countries like Turkey, Mexico, Brazil and even Azerbaijan.
The same regression has been recorded in the field of human rights. In the 2008 rankings compiled by The Economist on democracy in the world, Russia was the 108th place out of 167 countries.
Perhaps Russia, yesterday, had little cause to celebrate. (MAL)
Ozawa lashes out with scathing remarks on Christianity
The Japan Times: Wednesday, Nov. 11, 2009
Kyodo News
Ichiro Ozawa, secretary general of the Democratic Party of Japan, criticized Christianity on Tuesday, saying the religion is "exclusive and self-righteous" and that Western society is "stuck in a dead end."
Ozawa also said "Islamism is also exclusive, although it's somewhat better than Christianity" regarding exclusiveness.
The comments will no doubt cause a stir as he is the most influential figure in the ruling party.
He made the comments to reporters after meeting with Yukei Matsunaga, chairman of the Japan Buddhist Federation, a body of 102 Buddhist sects and groups, in Koyacho, Wakayama Prefecture.
Christianity "is an exclusive, self-righteous religion. Western society, whose background is Christianity, has been stuck in a dead end," Ozawa said.
"Modern society has forgotten or lost sight of the sprit of the Japanese people," he said. "Buddhism teaches you how humans should live and how the conditions of the mind should be from a fundamental standpoint."
(C) All rights reserved
Kyodo News
Ichiro Ozawa, secretary general of the Democratic Party of Japan, criticized Christianity on Tuesday, saying the religion is "exclusive and self-righteous" and that Western society is "stuck in a dead end."
Ozawa also said "Islamism is also exclusive, although it's somewhat better than Christianity" regarding exclusiveness.
The comments will no doubt cause a stir as he is the most influential figure in the ruling party.
He made the comments to reporters after meeting with Yukei Matsunaga, chairman of the Japan Buddhist Federation, a body of 102 Buddhist sects and groups, in Koyacho, Wakayama Prefecture.
Christianity "is an exclusive, self-righteous religion. Western society, whose background is Christianity, has been stuck in a dead end," Ozawa said.
"Modern society has forgotten or lost sight of the sprit of the Japanese people," he said. "Buddhism teaches you how humans should live and how the conditions of the mind should be from a fundamental standpoint."
(C) All rights reserved
Japanese women's lifespan longest in the world for 24th straight year
Jul 16 06:43 AM US/Eastern
TOKYO, July 16 (AP) - (Kyodo)—Japanese women had the world's longest lifespan for the 24th consecutive year in 2008 with an average life expectancy of 86.05 years, a health ministry report released Thursday showed.
Japanese men, along with their female compatriots, saw their average life expectancy reach a record high for the third consecutive year at 79.29 years but fell to fourth in the world from third in 2007.
Iceland topped the men's list with 84.3 years, and Hong Kong and Switzerland shared second at 79.4. Hong Kong women came second with 85.5 years, followed by France at 84.3, according to the Health, Labor and Welfare Ministry.
The ministry attributed the growing lifespan of the Japanese people mainly to improved medial treatment and care that have led to decreases in the death rates associated with cancer, heart diseases and strokes, which are considered the three major causes of death in the country.
The ministry also cited a decline in the number of fatal traffic accidents in 2008.
The lifespan grew by 0.06 year from 2007 for Japanese women and 0.10 for Japanese men, according to the ministry report.
TOKYO, July 16 (AP) - (Kyodo)—Japanese women had the world's longest lifespan for the 24th consecutive year in 2008 with an average life expectancy of 86.05 years, a health ministry report released Thursday showed.
Japanese men, along with their female compatriots, saw their average life expectancy reach a record high for the third consecutive year at 79.29 years but fell to fourth in the world from third in 2007.
Iceland topped the men's list with 84.3 years, and Hong Kong and Switzerland shared second at 79.4. Hong Kong women came second with 85.5 years, followed by France at 84.3, according to the Health, Labor and Welfare Ministry.
The ministry attributed the growing lifespan of the Japanese people mainly to improved medial treatment and care that have led to decreases in the death rates associated with cancer, heart diseases and strokes, which are considered the three major causes of death in the country.
The ministry also cited a decline in the number of fatal traffic accidents in 2008.
The lifespan grew by 0.06 year from 2007 for Japanese women and 0.10 for Japanese men, according to the ministry report.
Japanese vending machines
September 1, 10:18
Japan has become infamous for its vending machines. Pictures of ever stranger items being sold, such as batteries, eggs, or even underwear, can be found around online. When I asked rock music and radio DJ Brian Hardgroove about any strange experiences he’s had while traveling in Japan, his first thought was “just the fact that there were soda and drink machines on the street.”
How many vending machines are there in Japan?
According the Japan Vending Machine Manufactures Association (JVMA), there were 5,263,900 vending machines in Japan in 2008, with drink machines making up 49% of that number. That means there is about one drink vending machine for every fifty people in the country.
Although America is said to have the most vending machines in terms of overall numbers, at 7.76 million, Japan is the number one vending machine society in terms of machines per person.
What kind of vending machines are there in Japan?
The JVMA divides vending machines into three large categories: product vending machines, automated service machines, and information booth machines. Product vending machines include food and drink, cigarettes, tickets, newspapers, etc. Service machines include change machines, coin lockers, laundromats, photo booths, etc.
Top vending machines by sales in 2008 in Japan were drinks, followed by tickets and then cigarettes. Sales from vending machines averaged just below 7 trillion yen between 1997 and 2007, but dropped to 5.7 trillion yen in 2008. (In 2008, at an exchange rate of 100 yen to the dollar, that would be $57 billion!)
What is the difference between Japanese vending machines and American vending machines?
There are several noticeable differences to travelers to Japan. The first, as mentioned by Brian Hardgroove, is the location. Many vending machines in Japan are located outside. Machines are most commonly lined up in front of buildings, but they can be found almost everywhere—even on small streets in the middle of the countryside.
The next is type of machines. Almost half of all machines in Japan are drink machines. Canned coffee, for instance, is quite a popular product, and it is often vended both cold and hot from the same machine.
Also surprising is the lack of snack machines. Snack and drink machines may go hand-in-hand in the States, but if you want a snack in Japan you are better off going to a convenience store. In contrast, machines selling hot canned soups, ice cream, or even full meals can be found.
Japan still has machines that serve alcoholic beverages and machines that vend cigarettes. Alcohol vending machines are meant only for people over the age of 20, but it works on the honor system. (Outdoor alcohol vending machines will generally stop vending after about 11pm.) Cigarette vending machines were the same up until recently. Now one needs to use a “TASPO” card, which is an age verification ID card for cigarette machines only.
What are some truly bizarre Japanese vending machines?
What you might find strange is really all based on your own perception, but here is a short list of machines that have puzzled this examiner: battery vending machines, pasta vending machines, canned soup vending machines, rice vending machines, and adult video vending machines.
Japan has become infamous for its vending machines. Pictures of ever stranger items being sold, such as batteries, eggs, or even underwear, can be found around online. When I asked rock music and radio DJ Brian Hardgroove about any strange experiences he’s had while traveling in Japan, his first thought was “just the fact that there were soda and drink machines on the street.”
How many vending machines are there in Japan?
According the Japan Vending Machine Manufactures Association (JVMA), there were 5,263,900 vending machines in Japan in 2008, with drink machines making up 49% of that number. That means there is about one drink vending machine for every fifty people in the country.
Although America is said to have the most vending machines in terms of overall numbers, at 7.76 million, Japan is the number one vending machine society in terms of machines per person.
What kind of vending machines are there in Japan?
The JVMA divides vending machines into three large categories: product vending machines, automated service machines, and information booth machines. Product vending machines include food and drink, cigarettes, tickets, newspapers, etc. Service machines include change machines, coin lockers, laundromats, photo booths, etc.
Top vending machines by sales in 2008 in Japan were drinks, followed by tickets and then cigarettes. Sales from vending machines averaged just below 7 trillion yen between 1997 and 2007, but dropped to 5.7 trillion yen in 2008. (In 2008, at an exchange rate of 100 yen to the dollar, that would be $57 billion!)
What is the difference between Japanese vending machines and American vending machines?
There are several noticeable differences to travelers to Japan. The first, as mentioned by Brian Hardgroove, is the location. Many vending machines in Japan are located outside. Machines are most commonly lined up in front of buildings, but they can be found almost everywhere—even on small streets in the middle of the countryside.
The next is type of machines. Almost half of all machines in Japan are drink machines. Canned coffee, for instance, is quite a popular product, and it is often vended both cold and hot from the same machine.
Also surprising is the lack of snack machines. Snack and drink machines may go hand-in-hand in the States, but if you want a snack in Japan you are better off going to a convenience store. In contrast, machines selling hot canned soups, ice cream, or even full meals can be found.
Japan still has machines that serve alcoholic beverages and machines that vend cigarettes. Alcohol vending machines are meant only for people over the age of 20, but it works on the honor system. (Outdoor alcohol vending machines will generally stop vending after about 11pm.) Cigarette vending machines were the same up until recently. Now one needs to use a “TASPO” card, which is an age verification ID card for cigarette machines only.
What are some truly bizarre Japanese vending machines?
What you might find strange is really all based on your own perception, but here is a short list of machines that have puzzled this examiner: battery vending machines, pasta vending machines, canned soup vending machines, rice vending machines, and adult video vending machines.
Japan's 40 Richest
Special Report
Tatiana Serafin, 02.18.09, 10:00 PM EST
Cheap chic retailer Tadashi Yanai is the nation's richest person.
Japan's retail tycoon Tadashi Yanai, whose Uniqlo stores sell affordable apparel, has added $1.4 billion to his wealth to become Japan's richest person for the first time. He is now worth $6.1 billion and has moved up to No. 1 from No. 6 last year, becoming the fifth person in as many years to take the top spot in Japan.
Yanai's good fortune aside, most of Japan's richest lost money in the past year as the country slipped into a recession, business confidence hit its lowest level in 34 years, and the Nikkei stock index dropped 45% since its June peak.
Japan's 40 Richest are now worth a combined $69.5 billion, down from $89.9 billion in May, when we published the 2008 rankings. Even the soaring yen, which recently hit a 13-year high against the U.S. dollar, couldn't pull up these dollar-based fortunes.
Twenty-eight of the 40 richest lost money, including everyone in the top 10, excluding Yanai. Nintendo's (other-otc: NTDOY.PK - news - people ) Hiroshi Yamauchi, whose net worth fell by $3.3 billion, slipped from first to third place. Kazuo Okada, who founded pachiko and slots company Aruze, and Yasumitsu Shigeta, who runs telecom provider Hikari Tsushin, have both lost half their fortunes since our last rankings. Another 13 list members declined 25% or more.
Still, there were outperformers in addition to Yanai, including Masahiro Miki, who runs shoe retailer ABC Mart; Chizuko and Michio Matsui, whose online company, Matsui Securities, is doing well in a volatile environment; and the Kinoshita brothers, whose struggling lender became a subsidiary of Mitsubishi UFJ Financial.
The year's richest newcomer is Internet entrepreneur Yoshikazu Tanaka. He debuted his social networking site Gree on Mothers Market for small high-growth stocks in December. The stock is trading at two-thirds above the listing price, with a higher market cap than rival Mixi, run by Kenji Kasahara, who just makes the cut at No. 40 with a net worth of $480 million. Also joining the list are the Tada brothers, who share a stake in discount drug chain Sundrug, and Hirokazu Sugiura, founder of Sugi Pharmacy.
Akio Nitori, who founded discount home furnishing retailer Nitori, returns to the list after a two-year hiatus as his company racks up sales for its low-priced products, many of which are cheaper than those sold at Sweden's Ikea. Another returning retailer is Muneaki Masuda who founded Tsutaya, one of Japan's leading movie-, music- and game-rental chains.
A few individuals are holding their own in troubled industries. The fortune of real estate mogul Minoru Mori (brother of No. 4 Akira Mori) stayed flat at $1.1 billion.
Ryoichi Jinnai's Promise, Japan's third-largest consumer lender, cut costs and allied with Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group to survive sinking credit markets. His fortune is down only $200 million, to $1.5 billion.
Six from the 2008 rankings missed the cutoff despite the fact that it was $235 million lower than last year. Yoshitaka Fukuda dropped $1.5 billion to $250 million as the stock of his consumer finance company, Aiful, crashed. Ryuji Arai, whose Bic Camera restated earnings and may be fined, lost two-thirds of his fortune.
Unlike our billionaires' rankings, which highlight individual fortunes, Japan's top 40 includes numerous family fortunes. The list was compiled using shareholder and financial information obtained from the families and individuals themselves, stock exchanges and analysts. Stock prices and exchange rates were locked in on Feb. 6. Private companies were valued based on comparison with prevailing price-to-earnings or other financial ratios.
Additional reporting by Tim Kelly, Justin Doebele and Kiyoe Minami
Tatiana Serafin, 02.18.09, 10:00 PM EST
Cheap chic retailer Tadashi Yanai is the nation's richest person.
Japan's retail tycoon Tadashi Yanai, whose Uniqlo stores sell affordable apparel, has added $1.4 billion to his wealth to become Japan's richest person for the first time. He is now worth $6.1 billion and has moved up to No. 1 from No. 6 last year, becoming the fifth person in as many years to take the top spot in Japan.
Yanai's good fortune aside, most of Japan's richest lost money in the past year as the country slipped into a recession, business confidence hit its lowest level in 34 years, and the Nikkei stock index dropped 45% since its June peak.
Japan's 40 Richest are now worth a combined $69.5 billion, down from $89.9 billion in May, when we published the 2008 rankings. Even the soaring yen, which recently hit a 13-year high against the U.S. dollar, couldn't pull up these dollar-based fortunes.
Twenty-eight of the 40 richest lost money, including everyone in the top 10, excluding Yanai. Nintendo's (other-otc: NTDOY.PK - news - people ) Hiroshi Yamauchi, whose net worth fell by $3.3 billion, slipped from first to third place. Kazuo Okada, who founded pachiko and slots company Aruze, and Yasumitsu Shigeta, who runs telecom provider Hikari Tsushin, have both lost half their fortunes since our last rankings. Another 13 list members declined 25% or more.
Still, there were outperformers in addition to Yanai, including Masahiro Miki, who runs shoe retailer ABC Mart; Chizuko and Michio Matsui, whose online company, Matsui Securities, is doing well in a volatile environment; and the Kinoshita brothers, whose struggling lender became a subsidiary of Mitsubishi UFJ Financial.
The year's richest newcomer is Internet entrepreneur Yoshikazu Tanaka. He debuted his social networking site Gree on Mothers Market for small high-growth stocks in December. The stock is trading at two-thirds above the listing price, with a higher market cap than rival Mixi, run by Kenji Kasahara, who just makes the cut at No. 40 with a net worth of $480 million. Also joining the list are the Tada brothers, who share a stake in discount drug chain Sundrug, and Hirokazu Sugiura, founder of Sugi Pharmacy.
Akio Nitori, who founded discount home furnishing retailer Nitori, returns to the list after a two-year hiatus as his company racks up sales for its low-priced products, many of which are cheaper than those sold at Sweden's Ikea. Another returning retailer is Muneaki Masuda who founded Tsutaya, one of Japan's leading movie-, music- and game-rental chains.
A few individuals are holding their own in troubled industries. The fortune of real estate mogul Minoru Mori (brother of No. 4 Akira Mori) stayed flat at $1.1 billion.
Ryoichi Jinnai's Promise, Japan's third-largest consumer lender, cut costs and allied with Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group to survive sinking credit markets. His fortune is down only $200 million, to $1.5 billion.
Six from the 2008 rankings missed the cutoff despite the fact that it was $235 million lower than last year. Yoshitaka Fukuda dropped $1.5 billion to $250 million as the stock of his consumer finance company, Aiful, crashed. Ryuji Arai, whose Bic Camera restated earnings and may be fined, lost two-thirds of his fortune.
Unlike our billionaires' rankings, which highlight individual fortunes, Japan's top 40 includes numerous family fortunes. The list was compiled using shareholder and financial information obtained from the families and individuals themselves, stock exchanges and analysts. Stock prices and exchange rates were locked in on Feb. 6. Private companies were valued based on comparison with prevailing price-to-earnings or other financial ratios.
Additional reporting by Tim Kelly, Justin Doebele and Kiyoe Minami
Japan's 20-year-long lost decade
WILLIAM PESEK
October 21, 2009
The clock is ticking. Each day that passes without Japan’s officials hunkering down to boost growth, halt deflation, prepare for an aging population and increase competitiveness is a blow to the nation’s 126 million people.
December marks the 20th anniversary of the Nikkei 225 Stock Average’s bubble-years peak of 38,915. Japan’s "Lost Decade" began soon after. In some ways, it has been two decades. The first - 1990 to 2000 - was a crisis-filled one. The second, which is still playing out, has been more stable, yet not without its own perils.
Even after Japan began growing around 2002, it was only because of the economic equivalent of steroids. If you took away near-zero interest rates and massive fiscal pump-priming, growth would have fizzled. So, in a sense, Japan’s longest postwar recovery was a mirage. Japan has yet to find the exit strategy the US is now beginning to search for.
Getting a handle on political obstacles is an obvious first step toward ending Japan’s funk. The next is keeping balkanised infighting between factions from scuttling economic change. Two decades really should be long enough.
As Japanese finance ministers go, Hirohisa Fujii is setting a speed record for trashing his credibility.
Policy Dearth
Fujii’s yen policy, or lack thereof, tells the story. One day, traders think he’s fine with the yen’s 13 per cent gain versus the dollar over the last 12 months. The next, they are bracing for massive intervention in markets. Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama’s goal of wowing investors in his first five weeks in office isn’t succeeding.
Worse, strategists already sense a kind of "balkanized gridlock" seeping into a government charged with keeping Japan relevant as China becomes more powerful. If so, investors will be no happier with Japan’s new leaders than the old ones.
"When Japan awakes this New Year’s Day, it will wake to two utterly unpalatable new realities: Its economy will have been elbowed into third place by China and the 'Lost Decade' will have expanded past the two-decade mark," says Nicholas Smith of MF Global FXA Securities in Tokyo.
Investors are counting on Smith being wrong. The trouble is, Fujii isn’t even Japan’s weakest economic link. That would be Financial Services Minister Shizuka Kamei.
Out of Control
The man is clearly out of control and Hatoyama’s inability to rein him in speaks to the factional nature of Japanese politics. It’s not the political parties that matter, so much as the competing interests under their banners. How Hatoyama’s Democratic Party of Japan ended up with an anti-reform firebrand is a case in point. Last month, his administration took over from the Liberal Democratic Party, which ruled Japan for all but 10 months since 1955.
"Many foreign investors see Kamei’s appointment as a victory for old-guard LDP hardliners," says Naomi Fink, Tokyo- based strategist at Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ.
Kamei has already managed to spook stock investors with a plan for a moratorium on loan repayments for small companies that would harm banks’ profitability, asset quality and risk management. He is set on halting the privatisation of Japan’s sprawling postal system to the dismay of investors awaiting its initial public offering.
Japan’s new government deserves more time to fix an economy suffering from decades of neglect. It’s also worth pointing out some early Hatoyama successes.
One is the zeal with which his team is scaling back on wasteful public-works projects such as unnecessary dams and bridges. Concrete Economics are a major reason Japan is shackled with the biggest public debt in the developed world: almost twice the size of its economy. The Democratic Party of Japan aims to channel those vast funds to more productive pursuits.
New Energy
Another is accelerating the process of pulling power away from bureaucrats and putting it in the hands of elected officials. It’s the key to reducing corruption in an economic system in dire need of new energy and dynamism.
Hatoyama also made an impression in Pittsburgh last month at the Group of 20 summit. Let’s face it, the world didn’t much care about Japan’s last three premiers. The one that people overseas may remember most out of Japan’s last 10 leaders was Junichiro Koizumi. Who can forget his 2006 air-guitar performance at Elvis Presley’s home in Memphis, Tennessee, as an amused President George W Bush looked on?
It’s this global-recognition vacuum that made Hatoyama’s US trip so significant. The Stanford University PhD even delivered a speech to the United Nations General Assembly in English -- quite a novelty. There, he spelled out Japan’s commitment to retool its economy and create an East Asian community similar to the European Union. The UN crowd isn’t accustomed to big thoughts from a Japanese leader.
The question, of course, is whether Hatoyama’s party can do more than talk about change. His economic team is proving to be a disheartening liability. Fujii’s yen flip-flops are part of the problem. The bigger one is Kamei. Time is marching on.
Bloomberg
October 21, 2009
The clock is ticking. Each day that passes without Japan’s officials hunkering down to boost growth, halt deflation, prepare for an aging population and increase competitiveness is a blow to the nation’s 126 million people.
December marks the 20th anniversary of the Nikkei 225 Stock Average’s bubble-years peak of 38,915. Japan’s "Lost Decade" began soon after. In some ways, it has been two decades. The first - 1990 to 2000 - was a crisis-filled one. The second, which is still playing out, has been more stable, yet not without its own perils.
Even after Japan began growing around 2002, it was only because of the economic equivalent of steroids. If you took away near-zero interest rates and massive fiscal pump-priming, growth would have fizzled. So, in a sense, Japan’s longest postwar recovery was a mirage. Japan has yet to find the exit strategy the US is now beginning to search for.
Getting a handle on political obstacles is an obvious first step toward ending Japan’s funk. The next is keeping balkanised infighting between factions from scuttling economic change. Two decades really should be long enough.
As Japanese finance ministers go, Hirohisa Fujii is setting a speed record for trashing his credibility.
Policy Dearth
Fujii’s yen policy, or lack thereof, tells the story. One day, traders think he’s fine with the yen’s 13 per cent gain versus the dollar over the last 12 months. The next, they are bracing for massive intervention in markets. Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama’s goal of wowing investors in his first five weeks in office isn’t succeeding.
Worse, strategists already sense a kind of "balkanized gridlock" seeping into a government charged with keeping Japan relevant as China becomes more powerful. If so, investors will be no happier with Japan’s new leaders than the old ones.
"When Japan awakes this New Year’s Day, it will wake to two utterly unpalatable new realities: Its economy will have been elbowed into third place by China and the 'Lost Decade' will have expanded past the two-decade mark," says Nicholas Smith of MF Global FXA Securities in Tokyo.
Investors are counting on Smith being wrong. The trouble is, Fujii isn’t even Japan’s weakest economic link. That would be Financial Services Minister Shizuka Kamei.
Out of Control
The man is clearly out of control and Hatoyama’s inability to rein him in speaks to the factional nature of Japanese politics. It’s not the political parties that matter, so much as the competing interests under their banners. How Hatoyama’s Democratic Party of Japan ended up with an anti-reform firebrand is a case in point. Last month, his administration took over from the Liberal Democratic Party, which ruled Japan for all but 10 months since 1955.
"Many foreign investors see Kamei’s appointment as a victory for old-guard LDP hardliners," says Naomi Fink, Tokyo- based strategist at Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ.
Kamei has already managed to spook stock investors with a plan for a moratorium on loan repayments for small companies that would harm banks’ profitability, asset quality and risk management. He is set on halting the privatisation of Japan’s sprawling postal system to the dismay of investors awaiting its initial public offering.
Japan’s new government deserves more time to fix an economy suffering from decades of neglect. It’s also worth pointing out some early Hatoyama successes.
One is the zeal with which his team is scaling back on wasteful public-works projects such as unnecessary dams and bridges. Concrete Economics are a major reason Japan is shackled with the biggest public debt in the developed world: almost twice the size of its economy. The Democratic Party of Japan aims to channel those vast funds to more productive pursuits.
New Energy
Another is accelerating the process of pulling power away from bureaucrats and putting it in the hands of elected officials. It’s the key to reducing corruption in an economic system in dire need of new energy and dynamism.
Hatoyama also made an impression in Pittsburgh last month at the Group of 20 summit. Let’s face it, the world didn’t much care about Japan’s last three premiers. The one that people overseas may remember most out of Japan’s last 10 leaders was Junichiro Koizumi. Who can forget his 2006 air-guitar performance at Elvis Presley’s home in Memphis, Tennessee, as an amused President George W Bush looked on?
It’s this global-recognition vacuum that made Hatoyama’s US trip so significant. The Stanford University PhD even delivered a speech to the United Nations General Assembly in English -- quite a novelty. There, he spelled out Japan’s commitment to retool its economy and create an East Asian community similar to the European Union. The UN crowd isn’t accustomed to big thoughts from a Japanese leader.
The question, of course, is whether Hatoyama’s party can do more than talk about change. His economic team is proving to be a disheartening liability. Fujii’s yen flip-flops are part of the problem. The bigger one is Kamei. Time is marching on.
Bloomberg
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