Jan 28th 2010
From The Economist print edition
Illustration by M. Morgenstern
Hatoyama's advances to China raise fundamental questions about regional security
WHAT our colleague, Charlemagne, calls “bubbles of optimism” over China have been popping in Western capitals, as China has taken a hard line against internal dissent, proven unhelpful in efforts to tackle both climate change and Iran’s growing nuclear threat, manipulated its currency and launched cyber- attacks on Western computer networks. China, muscling its way to global prominence, is not quite the partner the West had been cultivating. Striking, then, that in Japan the bubble of optimism, among the country’s new leaders, is only inflating.
Soon after the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) swept into office nearly five months ago, the prime minister, Yukio Hatoyama, unveiled a vision for an East Asian Community (EAC). For all that it was dreamy and disjointed, it had at its heart a rapprochement between Japan and China leading towards regional integration. Asia, Mr Hatoyama reaffirmed, was Japan’s “basic sphere of being”. As for integration, fraternity was to be the glue.
Then late last year the DPJ’s secretary-general, Ichiro Ozawa, travelled to Beijing at the head of a 639-strong mission, including 143 parliamentarians with whom a beaming President Hu Jintao took the trouble to be photographed, each in turn. Mr Hu doesn’t smile like that for Westerners. Back in Tokyo, Mr Hatoyama horrified sticklers for imperial protocol by insisting that Mr Hu’s heir-apparent, Xi Jinping, pay an impromptu call on Emperor Akihito. Now rumours suggest Mr Hatoyama may make a visit of remorse, the first by a Japanese prime minister, to Nanjing, site of a massacre by Japanese forces in 1937. In return (and at less political cost), Mr Hu may pay respects to the nuclear victims of Hiroshima. Japan under the DPJ seems to get on better with China than it does with its ally and security guarantor, the United States. Relations with the United States are strained over the relocation of a military base for American marines on Okinawa, leading to worries over the future of the two countries’ alliance, keystone to security in the western Pacific.
Economic logic argues for closer ties with China, which has already overtaken America as Japan’s biggest trading partner, and is about to overtake Japan’s economy to become the world’s second-biggest. After not one but arguably two “lost decades”, an ageing population cannot drive demand in Japan. It must hitch itself to the Chinese juggernaut. A strategic vision, too, lurks somewhere in the idea of an EAC. Mr Hatoyama has committed Japan to cutting greenhouse-gas emissions by a quarter by 2020. He thinks Japan can lead Asia towards a low-carbon future.
But contradictions lurk too. The idea makes a nod to China’s rise. Yet it assumes Japan’s rightful lead in proposing a new regional architecture, while impressing Japan’s technological prowess on China. The impulse is deeper-seated than Mr Hatoyama might admit.
The story of modern Japan is of the use of Western arms and technology to overturn China’s centuries-old regional dominance. China now intends to restore the natural order, and does not need directions from others, least of all Japan.
It has made only the minimum polite noises about an EAC. As for the green technology that Japan can share, both sides say it is a good thing but are infuriatingly sparing with the details. Besides, since the December summit in Copenhagen, China has hinted it might go its own way on climate change.
Popular Japanese attitudes towards China suffer from the same doublethink. In one recent poll, most of those questioned wanted a “warmer” political relationship with their big neighbour. But most also wanted the prime minister to visit Yasukuni, Tokyo’s militarist shrine, on remembrance day. That is one issue guaranteed to send China-Japan relations into the cooler. A sense of Japanese superiority over coarse, authoritarian China is also widespread. More than one Japanese professor has told Banyan that Japan is the true guardian of Chinese culture.
History wars, still far from resolved, point to the limits of rapprochement. So too do maritime disputes over territory. But a huge constraint is the fiscal one. Greying Japan is burdened with deflation, stagnant growth and a national debt close to 200% of GDP. Japan lacks the resources (and the will) for the kind of bold strategic moves, putting Japan at the heart of Asia, at which Mr Hatoyama and Mr Ozawa hint. Even a more autonomous security policy, out from under America’s wing, is almost a non-starter. Japan has cut its defence spending in recent years, to just 1% of GDP. It has grown more dependent on the United States, not less.
Behind China’s smile
This is where strains over the alliance really matter for the security of the whole region, not least because of Taiwan. On January 24th the Okinawan township picked, after painful years of talks, by the United States and Japan’s previous government as the destination for the relocated marine base elected a mayor resolutely opposed to the move. Popular concerns about the “occupation mentality” of American forces are valid. But Mr Hatoyama, according to colleagues, was sleepwalking when he reopened the issue. Now he cannot go back. Local politics and national security are on a collision course. Mr Hatoyama has said he will decide over the base by May. But moving it anywhere else in Japan will face local resistance too.
As Yoichi Funabashi, editor of Asahi Shimbun puts it, if the new administration bungles relations with Washington, it will look diplomatically inept at a time when power relations in Asia are shifting fast. That might spell the end of the hapless Mr Hatoyama. So it is hardly cynical to assume that one aim behind China’s outbreak of smiling is to drive a wedge between a slightly clueless Japan and its longstanding protector. After all, Japan would be its base were America to come to Taiwan’s rescue in the event of a mainland attack.
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