Monday, February 4, 2013
INDONESIA's Economic Growth Slows
Indonesia's economic expansion slowed slightly in the fourth quarter, dragging down the country's full-year growth, in a sign that the global slowdown hurt Southeast Asia's largest economy.
VIETNAM hands down long jail terms in subversion case: TV
BANGKOK (Reuters) - A court in Vietnam has sentenced a man to life in prison and given jail terms of up to 17 years to other defendants after they were found guilty of subversive activities, state-run Vietnam Television said on Monday.
THAILAND: Thais angered by Saturday Night Live's language of love
BANGKOK (Reuters) - A U.S. comedy skit that makes fun of Thailand's booming sex industry has angered the government and it is trying to block videos of the sketch on the Internet, the Thai culture minister said on Monday.
CHINA, JAPAN seek to dial down tension, but risk remains
TOKYO/SHANGHAI (Reuters) - Two Japanese F-15s scramble as a Chinese plane nears the disputed islands: one in the lead, the other providing cover.
RUSSIA eyes crackdown on duty-free booze after brawls on flights
MOSCOW (Reuters) - Russia may soon crack down to stop boozy flights after a spate of brawls involving drunken passengers.
SOUTH KOREA: US soldiers accused of sexually harassing Korean woman on subway
Six U.S. soldiers have been accused of sexually harassing a Korean woman after she complained about their rowdy behavior on a subway train, an incident that has drawn national attention here.
Sunday, February 3, 2013
NORTH KOREAN nuclear test imminent
NORTH Korean leader Kim Jong-un has chaired a high-level meeting that has fuelled expectations of an imminent nuclear test.
CHINESE invited to naval exercise
CHINA has been invited to send warships to a massive naval exercise off Hawaii with the US, Australia and 20 other nations next year.
RUSSIA: Bolshoi Theater Director Filin Says He Knows Attacker
The Bolshoi Ballet's Artistic Director Sergei Filin who suffered severe burns in a recent acid attack said he was “absolutely certain” he knew who was behind the attack, the BBC reported on Sunday.
JAPAN & KOREA: Historian releases photos of Japanese post-quake massacre
Jeong Seong-gil, honorary director of Keimyung University Dongsan Medical Center Museum, shows a photo of Koreans massacred by the Japanese after the 1923 earthquake.
JAPAN releases CHINESE crew amid territorial dispute
Japan on Sunday released the crew of a Chinese boat who had been detained on suspicion of illegal fishing, amid a festering territorial row between the neighbours.
AUSTRALIA: Dolphins 'saved' by distress call
The distress call of a young dolphin is used to lure to safety a large pod of the animals in danger of being stranded off Western Australia.
JAPAN: Abe to tackle US-Japan military relations
When new Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe visits Washington next month, he will likely be greeted with the warm tones of diplomacy due a close ally, followed by an urgent message: Please don’t draw us into a shooting match with the Chinese over a pile of uninhabited rocks.
THAILAND: Pattaya nightlife world class
Pattaya nightlife was ranked fourth best in the world, according to a recent consumer survey.
Agoda.com, the hotel booking site, has released a list of the top 25 cities that offer the best nightlife excitement, as chosen by its customers. Bangkok was rated as number one in the world with the next four being Dubai, Boracay, Pattaya and Tokyo, to round out the top five. Sydney placed 15, London 18, and Paris 24. New York, Las Vegas and Berlin did not make the top 25.
Agoda.com, the hotel booking site, has released a list of the top 25 cities that offer the best nightlife excitement, as chosen by its customers. Bangkok was rated as number one in the world with the next four being Dubai, Boracay, Pattaya and Tokyo, to round out the top five. Sydney placed 15, London 18, and Paris 24. New York, Las Vegas and Berlin did not make the top 25.
HONG KONG VIDEO: Last orders for snake soup?
One of Hong Kong's most traditional winter dishes could be under threat, according to those who collect its key ingredient.
Saturday, February 2, 2013
CHINA: Washington Post joins list of hacked US media
The Washington Post disclosed on Saturday that it had suffered a cyberattack and suspects Chinese hackers were behind it, joining Twitter and major US media outlets that have endured intrusions.
JAPANESE Premier Won’t Take Step in Relocating U.S. Base Before Meeting Obama
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is caught between trying to improve relations with the United States and opposition on Okinawa to an American military presence.
CAMBODIA: A Generation Says Farewell to Their King, Norodom Sihanouk
Va Sin was just 27 the last time Cambodia said goodbye to a king. It was 1960 and King Norodom Suramarit, the father of Norodom Sihanouk, had passed away, ceding the throne to his son, who was serving as prince and head of state.
It was a humble affair, Ms. Sin remembers, without the outpouring of emotion that has followed the death of the late King Father Norodom Sihanouk.
“It was much different from the King Father’s procession. At the time, there were less people at the parade because there was less sadness,” said Ms. Sin.
In Sok was 24 when King Suramarit was carried to his cremation site 53 years ago. Now 77, he joined the tens of thousands of people who lined Norodom Boulevard on Friday morning to watch the procession that delivered the late King Father’s body to its cremation site in front of the National Museum.
“King Suramarit’s cremation procession was accompanied by elephants, horses, and a lot less people,” Mr. Sok said. “But the King Father’s procession is so sad. Even the kids are crying.”
Though emotions were not as raw on Friday as they were among the crowds that poured into Phnom Penh’s streets when the King Father’s body was returned to the Royal Palace from Beijing on October 17, many people still bowed their heads and cried as the golden casket carrying the king’s remained moved past them.
And for the older generation of Cambodians, who grew up during a time when Norodom Sihanouk was at the height of his power, it was a particularly meaningful farewell.
“I and all Cambodian people will never forget [the late King Father] because people all over the country, especially those who lived during the 1950s and 1960s, received affection and care from him,” Ms. Sin said.
In the 1950s, she remembers then-King Sihanouk giving a speech at a silk factory that had recently opened in Kompong Cham province, where she lived at the time.
“He chose to sleep in a small shelter without concern for himself because he would do anything to meet his people,” she said.
Sum Kul was just 17 and when he first saw then-King Norodom Sihanouk in person. It was 1946 and King Sihanouk had come to visit Cambodian troops stationed in Prey Veng province to offer encouragement.
“We only had wooden guns,” recounted Mr. Kul, now 84, as he waited to see the funeral procession pass.
“But the King Father always made us strong and courageous.”
Although Norodom Sihanouk’s legacy has been widely debated since his death almost four months ago, the reverence of Cambodians for their former king, prince and head of state is without question.
To the generation who watched Norodom Sihanouk lead Cambodia to independence from France, who had ruled the country for 90 years, he was “quite simply, a god,” said historian Henri Locard.
“He was an exceptional personality, an extremely strong character, and he united in just one person the independence movement,” Mr. Locard said.
Chuob Pov Rousette, 85, a doctor who returned to Cambodia last year after 45 years working in France, said that she first fell in love with King Sihanouk as a student at the University of Health Sciences.
“I think the Cambodian people love all their kings,” she said.
“But King Sihanouk is buried deep in people’s heart because he was the only King that brought Cambodia independence and he loved his people from the bottom of his stomach.”
It was a humble affair, Ms. Sin remembers, without the outpouring of emotion that has followed the death of the late King Father Norodom Sihanouk.
“It was much different from the King Father’s procession. At the time, there were less people at the parade because there was less sadness,” said Ms. Sin.
In Sok was 24 when King Suramarit was carried to his cremation site 53 years ago. Now 77, he joined the tens of thousands of people who lined Norodom Boulevard on Friday morning to watch the procession that delivered the late King Father’s body to its cremation site in front of the National Museum.
“King Suramarit’s cremation procession was accompanied by elephants, horses, and a lot less people,” Mr. Sok said. “But the King Father’s procession is so sad. Even the kids are crying.”
Though emotions were not as raw on Friday as they were among the crowds that poured into Phnom Penh’s streets when the King Father’s body was returned to the Royal Palace from Beijing on October 17, many people still bowed their heads and cried as the golden casket carrying the king’s remained moved past them.
And for the older generation of Cambodians, who grew up during a time when Norodom Sihanouk was at the height of his power, it was a particularly meaningful farewell.
“I and all Cambodian people will never forget [the late King Father] because people all over the country, especially those who lived during the 1950s and 1960s, received affection and care from him,” Ms. Sin said.
In the 1950s, she remembers then-King Sihanouk giving a speech at a silk factory that had recently opened in Kompong Cham province, where she lived at the time.
“He chose to sleep in a small shelter without concern for himself because he would do anything to meet his people,” she said.
Sum Kul was just 17 and when he first saw then-King Norodom Sihanouk in person. It was 1946 and King Sihanouk had come to visit Cambodian troops stationed in Prey Veng province to offer encouragement.
“We only had wooden guns,” recounted Mr. Kul, now 84, as he waited to see the funeral procession pass.
“But the King Father always made us strong and courageous.”
Although Norodom Sihanouk’s legacy has been widely debated since his death almost four months ago, the reverence of Cambodians for their former king, prince and head of state is without question.
To the generation who watched Norodom Sihanouk lead Cambodia to independence from France, who had ruled the country for 90 years, he was “quite simply, a god,” said historian Henri Locard.
“He was an exceptional personality, an extremely strong character, and he united in just one person the independence movement,” Mr. Locard said.
Chuob Pov Rousette, 85, a doctor who returned to Cambodia last year after 45 years working in France, said that she first fell in love with King Sihanouk as a student at the University of Health Sciences.
“I think the Cambodian people love all their kings,” she said.
“But King Sihanouk is buried deep in people’s heart because he was the only King that brought Cambodia independence and he loved his people from the bottom of his stomach.”
© 2013, The Cambodia Daily. All rights reserved. No part of this article may be reproduced in print, electronically, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed without written permission.
JAPAN: 6.9-magnitude earthquake hits northern Japan
At least ten people have been injured as 6.9-magnitude earthquake hit the coast of Hokkaido, Japan. The authorities are assessing the extent of material damage. Two nuclear power plants are in the affected area.
Read Full Article at RT.com
THAILAND’s 7-11 Operator Eyes Expansion to China, Neighboring Countries
Thai company CP All PCL is eyeing overseas expansion in China through the increasingly ubiquitous 7-Eleven convenience stores, hoping to replicate the huge success story in the Southeast Asian market it has created over the last two decades.
Photos: ASIA Prepares to Celebrate the Year of the Snake
It's travel season for the Lunar New Year again, and those leaving Beijing to celebrate will get a respite from their smog-ridden city.
CHINA: 250,000 Twitter accounts compromised in sophisticated cyber attack
Twitter has become the latest target of a sophisticated cyber attack, with around 250,000 accounts exposed. The breach appears to be the latest in a string of attacks on news content sites that’s being blamed on Chinese...
Read Full Article at RT.com
CHINA: 250,000 Twitter accounts compromised in sophisticated cyber attack
Twitter has become the latest target of a sophisticated cyber attack, with around 250,000 accounts exposed. The breach appears to be the latest in a string of attacks on news content sites that’s being blamed on Chinese...
Read Full Article at RT.com
NORTH KOREA imposes martial law, orders troops to ‘be ready for war’ - report
North Korea has allegedly been placed under martial law and its ruler Kim Jong-un has ordered the army to “prepare for war”, a South Korean daily claims.
Read Full Article at RT.com
ASIA: Is Asia’s Balance of Power Self-Enforcing?
Has the hour of offshore balancing struck? Sometimes you get that sense. U.S. defense budgets are on the wane, and with them the wherewithal to undertake ambitious foreign ventures. Sentiment does seem to be coalescing behind the idea that the United States should draw down expensive Eurasian entanglements, many of which provide little obvious return on the investment. If Washington cuts its commitments, it can cut down on the resources it uses to uphold those commitments. Ends will remain aligned with reduced ways and means. And to be sure, the logic of offshore balancing is seductive. If America no longer carries as big a stick as it once did, it must make doubly sure to speak softly — avoiding overextending itself and stoking needless antagonisms.
A central assumption for proponents of a more offshore posture is that the international system is mainly self-regulating. If China becomes a domineering great power, that is, lesser neighbors will make common cause. They will augment and aggregate their diplomatic, economic, and military might, constituting an ample counterweight. Only in extreme — and highly improbable — circumstances will they need outsiders to step in to tip the military balance against a would-be hegemon. Some offshore balancers just want to quit the Eurasian continent, retiring to (relatively) nearby bases like Japan and Guam. Purists clamor to bring the boys home and balance from North America. Not only can the United States pull back from the Eurasian rimlands, in their view; it can do without undue risk. The weary titan can set down his load at last.
Great-power balancing lies at the core of the realist school of international relations. There’s doubtless considerable truth to it. The inexorable logic of self-help — and self-preservation — impels societies to join against overbearing antagonists. As Benjamin Franklin quipped before signing the Declaration of Independence, you can hang together or hang separately. But does the logic of balancing warrant the confidence offshore balancers vest in it? Not necessarily. International-relations theory derives in large part from studying 19th-century Europe, where coalitions among roughly comparable great powers indeed offset one another until the rise of a far greater power in Europe's midst, Imperial Germany, upset the system. The United States ultimately had to add its weight to the European balance — twice. So much for a self-administering European Concert.
How about the Western Hemisphere? Who balanced against the United States during its ascent to regional primacy? No one, really. Unable to outmatch the U.S. Navy in its own backyard, and with a naval arms race to run in the North Sea, Great Britain and its Royal Navy beat a quiet retreat from the Americas toward the end of the 19th century. That left Latin America — chiefly the powers ringing the Caribbean Sea, where most U.S. interests resided. Governments there showed little sign of balancing behavior. They showed no sign of effective balancing — even during the banana wars, when Washington repeatedly landed troops in Caribbean nations for reasons good and ill.
Neither the European nor the American experience, then, lends much credence to the notion that regional balances are self-enforcing. Will the Far East prove different? Maybe. But neither history nor the lopsided distribution of power among Asian nations justifies assuming the region can shift for itself. Whether offshore balancing represents a feasible U.S. strategy will depend on whether China's neighbors look to their defenses effectively, and on how well they coordinate policy and strategy. Baby steps in that direction on the part of Japan, Australia, and India provide some cause for hope. But as we all know, hope is not a strategy.
A central assumption for proponents of a more offshore posture is that the international system is mainly self-regulating. If China becomes a domineering great power, that is, lesser neighbors will make common cause. They will augment and aggregate their diplomatic, economic, and military might, constituting an ample counterweight. Only in extreme — and highly improbable — circumstances will they need outsiders to step in to tip the military balance against a would-be hegemon. Some offshore balancers just want to quit the Eurasian continent, retiring to (relatively) nearby bases like Japan and Guam. Purists clamor to bring the boys home and balance from North America. Not only can the United States pull back from the Eurasian rimlands, in their view; it can do without undue risk. The weary titan can set down his load at last.
Great-power balancing lies at the core of the realist school of international relations. There’s doubtless considerable truth to it. The inexorable logic of self-help — and self-preservation — impels societies to join against overbearing antagonists. As Benjamin Franklin quipped before signing the Declaration of Independence, you can hang together or hang separately. But does the logic of balancing warrant the confidence offshore balancers vest in it? Not necessarily. International-relations theory derives in large part from studying 19th-century Europe, where coalitions among roughly comparable great powers indeed offset one another until the rise of a far greater power in Europe's midst, Imperial Germany, upset the system. The United States ultimately had to add its weight to the European balance — twice. So much for a self-administering European Concert.
How about the Western Hemisphere? Who balanced against the United States during its ascent to regional primacy? No one, really. Unable to outmatch the U.S. Navy in its own backyard, and with a naval arms race to run in the North Sea, Great Britain and its Royal Navy beat a quiet retreat from the Americas toward the end of the 19th century. That left Latin America — chiefly the powers ringing the Caribbean Sea, where most U.S. interests resided. Governments there showed little sign of balancing behavior. They showed no sign of effective balancing — even during the banana wars, when Washington repeatedly landed troops in Caribbean nations for reasons good and ill.
Neither the European nor the American experience, then, lends much credence to the notion that regional balances are self-enforcing. Will the Far East prove different? Maybe. But neither history nor the lopsided distribution of power among Asian nations justifies assuming the region can shift for itself. Whether offshore balancing represents a feasible U.S. strategy will depend on whether China's neighbors look to their defenses effectively, and on how well they coordinate policy and strategy. Baby steps in that direction on the part of Japan, Australia, and India provide some cause for hope. But as we all know, hope is not a strategy.
CHINA: Breaking Down Xi Jinping
In terms of content, Xi Jinping's foreign policy speech on Tuesday was a dud.
His first since assuming the leadership of the Communist Party, Xinhua's account (the English version is slightly abbreviated but accurate) of the speech reads like a laundry list of the Party's foreign policy buzzwords – if anything, it was closer to a Hu Jintao speech than the relatively frank and outspoken language that characterized Xi’s first public appearances. This is probably to be expected, since it was delivered at a study session of the Central Committee. Study sessions are a context in which leaders tend to address the Party rather than the public and usually use more Party jargon.
I don't think the speech really tells us anything new about Xi's plans for Chinese foreign policy, but it does seem like a poor fit for the “reformist nationalism” narrative that a lot of commentators have been using to interpret Xi's actions so far. It is certainly true that China has been unusually aggressive over its territorial disputes lately, but it remains an open question whether Xi is a factor in driving this behavior. Given his recent meeting with a member of the Japanese government, I think it is more likely than not that he is laying the groundwork for a compromise with Tokyo that defers resolving the territorial dispute to later.
Xi began his Tuesday speech by name-checking his predecessors' trademark theories – Deng Xiaoping Thought, Jiang Zemin's “Three Represents,” and Hu's “Scientific Development.” The balance covers three well-accepted foreign policy ideas – the concept of “peaceful rise,” criticism of hegemonism, and a promise not to negotiate about China's “core national interests.”
Xi's language about “core national interests” does sound tough – “Foreign countries should not expect that we will trade on our own core interests, not expect that we will eat the bitter fruits of damaging our country's sovereignty, security, and development benefits.” It has been the subject of a few stories about Chinese aggression. But “core national interests” are a pretty tightly defined category – as Michael Swaine argued in China Leadership Monitor (PDF), Chinese officials have been careful to include only the territories of Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang in the category, and they have long said that they are not up for negotiation.
Given their place in the account and Xi's evident interest in a deal with Japan, I think the right way to read this comment is as an attempt to defuse accusations that Xi is too weak to defend China's core interests. Xinhua has more or less confirmed this interpretation:
"Some have responded sharply to Xi's statement, as he declared that China will not compromise when it comes to its core interests.
But Xi's statement was far from being a hardline declaration. It showed that peaceful development is indeed a working strategy that not only has a blueprint and a goal, but also a bottom line."
If Xi's statement was intended as a strong warning, it would be very odd for official media to undercut it the following day.
That said, I would not put too much weight on the language about world peace – this is intended to make a contrast with foreign hegemonism, and is frequently used as a basis for criticizing American actions which China views as meddling in its internal affairs, such as arms sales to Taiwan. The language of “peaceful rise” does suggest the policies of Deng Xiaoping, whose policies focused on deferring resolution of territorial disputes and focusing on trade, calculating that China's growing strength means that in the future it will likely be able to get a better final deal.
Still, it is surprising how little aggressive language we have seen from Xi in the last few months. We usually expect Chinese leaders to take hawkish stances as they attempt to establish their legitimacy – as Asahi Shimbun has explained quite well – and Xi's interest in forging his public image could give him an especially strong concern about popular nationalism. With that as a baseline, it is worth being open to the possibility that Xi is looking for something like Hu's Anti-Secession Law (PDF), a strong gesture with which he can buy off the hawks without committing himself to actions which could seriously damage China's international relations.
It is, then, possible that the more aggressive parts of China's recent behavior are “freelance” work by hawks in the PLA Navy, as Susan Shirk has noted over at Chinafile. The main story to follow in the coming weeks will probably be relations with Japan – if Xi is able to make a deal with the new Japanese government that ends the current round of escalation, and pays for it by giving hawks at home a few fiery speeches about currently quiet issues like Taiwan, I think we have reason to be pretty optimistic about his approach to foreign policy.
His first since assuming the leadership of the Communist Party, Xinhua's account (the English version is slightly abbreviated but accurate) of the speech reads like a laundry list of the Party's foreign policy buzzwords – if anything, it was closer to a Hu Jintao speech than the relatively frank and outspoken language that characterized Xi’s first public appearances. This is probably to be expected, since it was delivered at a study session of the Central Committee. Study sessions are a context in which leaders tend to address the Party rather than the public and usually use more Party jargon.
I don't think the speech really tells us anything new about Xi's plans for Chinese foreign policy, but it does seem like a poor fit for the “reformist nationalism” narrative that a lot of commentators have been using to interpret Xi's actions so far. It is certainly true that China has been unusually aggressive over its territorial disputes lately, but it remains an open question whether Xi is a factor in driving this behavior. Given his recent meeting with a member of the Japanese government, I think it is more likely than not that he is laying the groundwork for a compromise with Tokyo that defers resolving the territorial dispute to later.
Xi began his Tuesday speech by name-checking his predecessors' trademark theories – Deng Xiaoping Thought, Jiang Zemin's “Three Represents,” and Hu's “Scientific Development.” The balance covers three well-accepted foreign policy ideas – the concept of “peaceful rise,” criticism of hegemonism, and a promise not to negotiate about China's “core national interests.”
Xi's language about “core national interests” does sound tough – “Foreign countries should not expect that we will trade on our own core interests, not expect that we will eat the bitter fruits of damaging our country's sovereignty, security, and development benefits.” It has been the subject of a few stories about Chinese aggression. But “core national interests” are a pretty tightly defined category – as Michael Swaine argued in China Leadership Monitor (PDF), Chinese officials have been careful to include only the territories of Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang in the category, and they have long said that they are not up for negotiation.
Given their place in the account and Xi's evident interest in a deal with Japan, I think the right way to read this comment is as an attempt to defuse accusations that Xi is too weak to defend China's core interests. Xinhua has more or less confirmed this interpretation:
"Some have responded sharply to Xi's statement, as he declared that China will not compromise when it comes to its core interests.
But Xi's statement was far from being a hardline declaration. It showed that peaceful development is indeed a working strategy that not only has a blueprint and a goal, but also a bottom line."
If Xi's statement was intended as a strong warning, it would be very odd for official media to undercut it the following day.
That said, I would not put too much weight on the language about world peace – this is intended to make a contrast with foreign hegemonism, and is frequently used as a basis for criticizing American actions which China views as meddling in its internal affairs, such as arms sales to Taiwan. The language of “peaceful rise” does suggest the policies of Deng Xiaoping, whose policies focused on deferring resolution of territorial disputes and focusing on trade, calculating that China's growing strength means that in the future it will likely be able to get a better final deal.
Still, it is surprising how little aggressive language we have seen from Xi in the last few months. We usually expect Chinese leaders to take hawkish stances as they attempt to establish their legitimacy – as Asahi Shimbun has explained quite well – and Xi's interest in forging his public image could give him an especially strong concern about popular nationalism. With that as a baseline, it is worth being open to the possibility that Xi is looking for something like Hu's Anti-Secession Law (PDF), a strong gesture with which he can buy off the hawks without committing himself to actions which could seriously damage China's international relations.
It is, then, possible that the more aggressive parts of China's recent behavior are “freelance” work by hawks in the PLA Navy, as Susan Shirk has noted over at Chinafile. The main story to follow in the coming weeks will probably be relations with Japan – if Xi is able to make a deal with the new Japanese government that ends the current round of escalation, and pays for it by giving hawks at home a few fiery speeches about currently quiet issues like Taiwan, I think we have reason to be pretty optimistic about his approach to foreign policy.
TAIPEI: World's first Barbie restaurant opens
Waiters trying to look like Ken, waitresses in tutus and tiaras, a hodgepodge menu and generous lashings of pink, welcome to the world's first Barbie restaurant.
KOREAN PENINSULA: If Korea Were to Unite…
Discussions on Korea today often revolve around North Korea and its nuclear weapons program. Yet, it is highly unlikely that the Korean Peninsula will remain divided forever, and emergence of a successfully unified and stable Korea is certainly one of many possibilities that merits close attention. Such a scenario would have far-reaching and potentially destabilizing consequences on the balance of power in Northeast Asia, especially with regard to a rising China and a normalizing Japan, both of which have critical security interests on the Korean Peninsula.
For the time being, there is in fact a great power status quo on the Korean Peninsula, as North Korea in many ways is an issue that unites the major regional powers who are often at odds with each other, including Japan, South Korea, China, the United States, and Russia. In the most basic sense, all five countries support North Korea denuclearizing and not collapsing, and oppose actions that could lead to war on the Peninsula. Thus, the lack of policy coordination among the different powers has been due to differences in priorities more so than interests.
Korean reunification would dramatically alter the consensus that now exists. Notably, China and a reunified Korea (under Seoul) will have direct security issues due to their shared borders and outstanding border disputes. Beijing will be particularly worried about Korean and U.S. troops moving up to the very open China-Korea Yalu River border. Even if the U.S. military were to remain below the DMZ line or leave the Korean Peninsula entirely, China will still have to worry about the South Korean military, which is well equipped and has nearly seven-hundred thousand troops (one of the largest in the world). Without North Korea and its 1.1 million troops serving as geographic and human buffers, Beijing will consider Korean and U.S. troops as serious regional threats.
Furthermore, a reunified Korea would be able to direct more energy to issues that received less attention before, especially highly charged historical disputes with Japan. There are several unresolved issues between the two countries, including the territorial disputes (Dokdo/Takeshima Islands, names of the Sea of Japan/East Sea) and numerous issues originating from Japan’s colonization of Korea and World War II (for example, the comfort women issue). Focusing more on these issues would fuel nationalism in an increasingly confident, assertive, and powerful Korea. This might be useful inbuilding cohesiveness among the formerly split Korean people, but Tokyo would likely feel threatened by Seoul’s intention to address its past grievances. While the two countries might not become openly hostile, their relations would almost certainly deteriorate, intensifying the tension in the region.
The second factor, which will further complicate the situation, is the on-going rise of China, assuming that it continues to grow without experiencing serious domestic instability. In the future, an increasingly powerful Chinese military power will render U.S. security guarantees in the region less credible. Despite the so-called “pivot,” the fact of the matter is that Chinese military power will grow relative to U.S. military power in the region. Given the Korean Peninsula’s importance to China’s security, Beijing may push Seoul to distance itself from Washington or even to align with it.
In its own response to a rising China, Japan could become a fully normal nation without any constitutional limit placed on its military power. Japan remains the third largest economy in the world, while the Maritime Self-Defense Force at this time remains the most powerful naval force in the region after the U.S. navy. Tokyo would consider the possibility of Seoul aligned with Beijing a serious national security threat, “a dagger pointed at the heart of Japan,” as Korea could be used as a springboard for attacks against the Japanese Isles (Pusan, a major Korean port, is less than two-hundred nautical miles from Yamaguchi Porton the Japanese mainland).
With the reunification of Korea and a rising China, the Northeast Asia of the future will be fraught with security dilemmas. Given Korea’s strategic location and the fact that it has become a significant middle power in its own right, Seoul’s choice of alignment among the great powers competing could potentially tilt the balance of power in the region in favor of one side or another. Such a shift would no doubt cause dangerous destabilization in the region, if there is no dominant force to keep stability.
In such a circumstance, one possible strategy that Seoul could pursue is balancing without alignment. Korea’s potential role as East Asia’s political and economic intersection point— and perhaps even as an independent balancing player in its own right— is being increasingly discussed in the country. Many Koreans today are hoping that Seoul in the future could be the country where regional political issues and economic exchanges are mediated, despite the fact that balancing has historically been an extraordinarily difficult feat for Korea.
In fact, Korea experimented unsuccessfully with a similarly independent balancing strategy before during the late 19th and early 20th century, when multiple great powers were competing for regional dominance in East Asia. China’s Qing Dynasty at that time had weakened significantly, and it was too risky for Korea to rely on the Middle Kingdom as the guarantor of security. Instead, Seoul tried to forge relations with as many great powers as possible and play them off one another so that none of them would be able to actually control Korea. The gambit, however, failed, and Korea came under Japanese rule between 1910 and 1945.
In the end, the best strategy (or rather, the least bad option) for Seoul may be retaining its alliance with Washington (even if its influence declines in the region), while attempting to remain as neutral as possible between Beijing and Tokyo, as difficult (and perhaps even unsustainable) as it may be. Korea should strive to act as an absolutely neutral buffer between China and Japan– a status that should preferably be guaranteed by the United States, which might still be able to play the role of a distant, neutral arbiter. This strategy would be one of neutrality guaranteed by an outside actor as opposed to active balancing without aligning with one actor. It is certainly not a risk-free strategy, as maintenance of neutrality is almost as difficult as balancing, but it may be the only viable strategy.
The primary threat to this policy remains nationalism, which will constantly push Korea to adopt a more assertive foreign policy. Maintenance of neutrality will require all the tact, restraint, and subtlety that Seoul can muster. Resolving the East Asian countries’ historical grievances with each other might be one way to moderate Korean nationalism. Washington could also further defense and technological cooperation with Seoul to strengthen the latter’s military so that it may fend for its own security to some degree.A strong Korea that is able to resist pressure from both China and Japan might lead to a more stable Northeast Asia.
Other major actors in the region too, including the United States, should recognize the pivotal importance of the Korean Peninsula in maintaining stability in the region, and work together to keep the peninsula an independent buffer state. No state should attempt to disturb the status quo and bring Korea under its dominance, and in this endeavor, the United States should continue to play its part as Northeast Asia’s peacekeeper in the future.
Sungtae“Jacky” Park is a research assistant at Center for the National Interest. He has previously written for CSIS (Center for Strategic and International Studies), France 24, and the International Affairs Review.
For the time being, there is in fact a great power status quo on the Korean Peninsula, as North Korea in many ways is an issue that unites the major regional powers who are often at odds with each other, including Japan, South Korea, China, the United States, and Russia. In the most basic sense, all five countries support North Korea denuclearizing and not collapsing, and oppose actions that could lead to war on the Peninsula. Thus, the lack of policy coordination among the different powers has been due to differences in priorities more so than interests.
Korean reunification would dramatically alter the consensus that now exists. Notably, China and a reunified Korea (under Seoul) will have direct security issues due to their shared borders and outstanding border disputes. Beijing will be particularly worried about Korean and U.S. troops moving up to the very open China-Korea Yalu River border. Even if the U.S. military were to remain below the DMZ line or leave the Korean Peninsula entirely, China will still have to worry about the South Korean military, which is well equipped and has nearly seven-hundred thousand troops (one of the largest in the world). Without North Korea and its 1.1 million troops serving as geographic and human buffers, Beijing will consider Korean and U.S. troops as serious regional threats.
Furthermore, a reunified Korea would be able to direct more energy to issues that received less attention before, especially highly charged historical disputes with Japan. There are several unresolved issues between the two countries, including the territorial disputes (Dokdo/Takeshima Islands, names of the Sea of Japan/East Sea) and numerous issues originating from Japan’s colonization of Korea and World War II (for example, the comfort women issue). Focusing more on these issues would fuel nationalism in an increasingly confident, assertive, and powerful Korea. This might be useful inbuilding cohesiveness among the formerly split Korean people, but Tokyo would likely feel threatened by Seoul’s intention to address its past grievances. While the two countries might not become openly hostile, their relations would almost certainly deteriorate, intensifying the tension in the region.
The second factor, which will further complicate the situation, is the on-going rise of China, assuming that it continues to grow without experiencing serious domestic instability. In the future, an increasingly powerful Chinese military power will render U.S. security guarantees in the region less credible. Despite the so-called “pivot,” the fact of the matter is that Chinese military power will grow relative to U.S. military power in the region. Given the Korean Peninsula’s importance to China’s security, Beijing may push Seoul to distance itself from Washington or even to align with it.
In its own response to a rising China, Japan could become a fully normal nation without any constitutional limit placed on its military power. Japan remains the third largest economy in the world, while the Maritime Self-Defense Force at this time remains the most powerful naval force in the region after the U.S. navy. Tokyo would consider the possibility of Seoul aligned with Beijing a serious national security threat, “a dagger pointed at the heart of Japan,” as Korea could be used as a springboard for attacks against the Japanese Isles (Pusan, a major Korean port, is less than two-hundred nautical miles from Yamaguchi Porton the Japanese mainland).
With the reunification of Korea and a rising China, the Northeast Asia of the future will be fraught with security dilemmas. Given Korea’s strategic location and the fact that it has become a significant middle power in its own right, Seoul’s choice of alignment among the great powers competing could potentially tilt the balance of power in the region in favor of one side or another. Such a shift would no doubt cause dangerous destabilization in the region, if there is no dominant force to keep stability.
In such a circumstance, one possible strategy that Seoul could pursue is balancing without alignment. Korea’s potential role as East Asia’s political and economic intersection point— and perhaps even as an independent balancing player in its own right— is being increasingly discussed in the country. Many Koreans today are hoping that Seoul in the future could be the country where regional political issues and economic exchanges are mediated, despite the fact that balancing has historically been an extraordinarily difficult feat for Korea.
In fact, Korea experimented unsuccessfully with a similarly independent balancing strategy before during the late 19th and early 20th century, when multiple great powers were competing for regional dominance in East Asia. China’s Qing Dynasty at that time had weakened significantly, and it was too risky for Korea to rely on the Middle Kingdom as the guarantor of security. Instead, Seoul tried to forge relations with as many great powers as possible and play them off one another so that none of them would be able to actually control Korea. The gambit, however, failed, and Korea came under Japanese rule between 1910 and 1945.
In the end, the best strategy (or rather, the least bad option) for Seoul may be retaining its alliance with Washington (even if its influence declines in the region), while attempting to remain as neutral as possible between Beijing and Tokyo, as difficult (and perhaps even unsustainable) as it may be. Korea should strive to act as an absolutely neutral buffer between China and Japan– a status that should preferably be guaranteed by the United States, which might still be able to play the role of a distant, neutral arbiter. This strategy would be one of neutrality guaranteed by an outside actor as opposed to active balancing without aligning with one actor. It is certainly not a risk-free strategy, as maintenance of neutrality is almost as difficult as balancing, but it may be the only viable strategy.
The primary threat to this policy remains nationalism, which will constantly push Korea to adopt a more assertive foreign policy. Maintenance of neutrality will require all the tact, restraint, and subtlety that Seoul can muster. Resolving the East Asian countries’ historical grievances with each other might be one way to moderate Korean nationalism. Washington could also further defense and technological cooperation with Seoul to strengthen the latter’s military so that it may fend for its own security to some degree.A strong Korea that is able to resist pressure from both China and Japan might lead to a more stable Northeast Asia.
Other major actors in the region too, including the United States, should recognize the pivotal importance of the Korean Peninsula in maintaining stability in the region, and work together to keep the peninsula an independent buffer state. No state should attempt to disturb the status quo and bring Korea under its dominance, and in this endeavor, the United States should continue to play its part as Northeast Asia’s peacekeeper in the future.
Sungtae“Jacky” Park is a research assistant at Center for the National Interest. He has previously written for CSIS (Center for Strategic and International Studies), France 24, and the International Affairs Review.
ASIA: Top 5 Naval Battles of the Asia-Pacific
Ranking apples against oranges is always a slippery process. How does one maritime battle rise above others in importance? One benchmark is whether an encounter saw one fleet crush another. We could put Lord Nelson’s face on such a list. The Battle of Trafalgar (1805) delivered astounding tactical results. Yet the Napoleonic Wars raged on for another decade after Trafalgar, until Europeans finally banded together to put a stop to the little emperor’s marauding. It was indecisive. So why not rank battles by the magnitude of the issues they decided? Which sea fights yielded the most fateful results, reshaping the Asian order?
Herewith, my list of the Top 5 Naval Battles of the Asia-Pacific:
5. Battle of Yamen (1279). Sometimes dubbed “China’s Trafalgar,” this clash between the Mongol Yuan Dynasty and the beleaguered Southern Song determined who would rule China. It was far more decisive than Nelson’s masterwork. Over 1,000 men-of-war crewed by tens of thousands of men took part in the engagement. Yuan commanders deployed deception and audacious tactics to overcome at least a 10:1 mismatch in numbers. Most important, Yamen claimed the life of the Song emperor, clearing the way for Kublai Khan’s dynasty to rule for nearly a century.
4. Pearl Harbor (1941).This epic miscalculation on Imperial Japan’s part opened a struggle for mastery of the Pacific Ocean. Rather than bypass Hawaii, strike at the U.S.-occupied Philippine Islands, and thereby firm up its control of the waters within its island defense perimeter, Tokyo dispatched Admiral Nagumo’s carrier fleet to strike at the U.S. Pacific Fleet. The result was an ephemeral tactical victory that brought about strategic catastrophe for Japan. American shipbuilders had laid the keels for a second U.S. Navy under the Two-Ocean Navy Act of 1940. The handwriting was on the wall for Japan once the new hulls arrived in theater starting in 1943. Pearl Harbor set events in motion that would give America nautical primacy for the next seven decades (and counting).
3. Guadalcanal (1942-1943). While the Battle of Midway garnered the most press, Guadalcanal and the rest of the Solomon Islands campaign launched the United States into an early offensive in the Pacific—despite the primacy Allied leaders afforded the European theater. The campaign kept Japan from extending its defense perimeter farther to the south, and thereby menacing the sea lanes connecting the United States with Australia. After six months of grueling battle—ably retold by the miniseries The Pacific and the memoirs from which it derives—U.S. forces could commence their methodical trek across the South Pacific toward the Philippines and Formosa. Never again would Japan regain the strategic initiative.
2. Battle of Tsushima (1905). Admiral Heihachiro Togo’s Combined Fleet followed up its August 1904 demolition of Russia’s Port Arthur-based Pacific Squadron by sending the Russian Baltic Fleet to the bottom. After losing the Pacific Squadron, the tsar doubled down on failure. He dispatched the Baltic Fleet on a 20,000-mile voyage from the Baltic, around the Cape of Good Hope, through the Indian Ocean, and into the Far East. Togo’s freshly refitted fleet intercepted the Russians between Japan and Korea—handing Asians their first meaningful victory over a European imperial power in centuries. Tsushima electrified Asia, showing the region’s inhabitants they could resist imperial rule. Vanquishing its chief maritime competitor, furthermore, allowed Imperial Japan to annex Taiwan and Korea. The battle’s legacy haunts the region to this day.
1. Battle of the Yalu (1894). This trial of arms turned Asia’s Sinocentric order upside down. Seaborne European conquerors ushered in China’s century of humiliation in the 1840s, marked by the Opium Wars, a series of “unequal treaties” the imperial powers imposed on the Qing Dynasty, and European occupation of seaports along the China coast. This was bad enough. Upstart Japan had opened to the world only in the 1850s, following centuries of seclusion. Its Meiji Restoration (1868) launched the island nation onto the path to outward Westernization. An Imperial Japanese Navy fleet cobbled together from imported components steamed to the Korean west coast. It defeated China’s Beiyang Fleet, a force widely considered superior in material and seamanship terms. The battle hastened the collapse of China’s dynastic order, among the most fateful events to convulse Asian history in centuries. Such repercussions land the Yalu atop my list.
Herewith, my list of the Top 5 Naval Battles of the Asia-Pacific:
5. Battle of Yamen (1279). Sometimes dubbed “China’s Trafalgar,” this clash between the Mongol Yuan Dynasty and the beleaguered Southern Song determined who would rule China. It was far more decisive than Nelson’s masterwork. Over 1,000 men-of-war crewed by tens of thousands of men took part in the engagement. Yuan commanders deployed deception and audacious tactics to overcome at least a 10:1 mismatch in numbers. Most important, Yamen claimed the life of the Song emperor, clearing the way for Kublai Khan’s dynasty to rule for nearly a century.
4. Pearl Harbor (1941).This epic miscalculation on Imperial Japan’s part opened a struggle for mastery of the Pacific Ocean. Rather than bypass Hawaii, strike at the U.S.-occupied Philippine Islands, and thereby firm up its control of the waters within its island defense perimeter, Tokyo dispatched Admiral Nagumo’s carrier fleet to strike at the U.S. Pacific Fleet. The result was an ephemeral tactical victory that brought about strategic catastrophe for Japan. American shipbuilders had laid the keels for a second U.S. Navy under the Two-Ocean Navy Act of 1940. The handwriting was on the wall for Japan once the new hulls arrived in theater starting in 1943. Pearl Harbor set events in motion that would give America nautical primacy for the next seven decades (and counting).
3. Guadalcanal (1942-1943). While the Battle of Midway garnered the most press, Guadalcanal and the rest of the Solomon Islands campaign launched the United States into an early offensive in the Pacific—despite the primacy Allied leaders afforded the European theater. The campaign kept Japan from extending its defense perimeter farther to the south, and thereby menacing the sea lanes connecting the United States with Australia. After six months of grueling battle—ably retold by the miniseries The Pacific and the memoirs from which it derives—U.S. forces could commence their methodical trek across the South Pacific toward the Philippines and Formosa. Never again would Japan regain the strategic initiative.
2. Battle of Tsushima (1905). Admiral Heihachiro Togo’s Combined Fleet followed up its August 1904 demolition of Russia’s Port Arthur-based Pacific Squadron by sending the Russian Baltic Fleet to the bottom. After losing the Pacific Squadron, the tsar doubled down on failure. He dispatched the Baltic Fleet on a 20,000-mile voyage from the Baltic, around the Cape of Good Hope, through the Indian Ocean, and into the Far East. Togo’s freshly refitted fleet intercepted the Russians between Japan and Korea—handing Asians their first meaningful victory over a European imperial power in centuries. Tsushima electrified Asia, showing the region’s inhabitants they could resist imperial rule. Vanquishing its chief maritime competitor, furthermore, allowed Imperial Japan to annex Taiwan and Korea. The battle’s legacy haunts the region to this day.
1. Battle of the Yalu (1894). This trial of arms turned Asia’s Sinocentric order upside down. Seaborne European conquerors ushered in China’s century of humiliation in the 1840s, marked by the Opium Wars, a series of “unequal treaties” the imperial powers imposed on the Qing Dynasty, and European occupation of seaports along the China coast. This was bad enough. Upstart Japan had opened to the world only in the 1850s, following centuries of seclusion. Its Meiji Restoration (1868) launched the island nation onto the path to outward Westernization. An Imperial Japanese Navy fleet cobbled together from imported components steamed to the Korean west coast. It defeated China’s Beiyang Fleet, a force widely considered superior in material and seamanship terms. The battle hastened the collapse of China’s dynastic order, among the most fateful events to convulse Asian history in centuries. Such repercussions land the Yalu atop my list.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
Posts
