Saturday, Nov. 21, 2009
Three Key Lessons from Obama's China Tour
By Tony Karon
President Obama's trip to China yielded precious little Chinese cooperation on the Administration's key concerns, ranging from currency issues to Iran. That's a sign of the shifting balance of power between two countries that have been locked in an uneasy embrace for more than three decades. "I underlined to President Obama that given our differences in national conditions, it is only normal that our two sides may disagree on some issues," said China's President Hu Jintao. "What is important is to respect and accommodate each other's core interests and major concerns."
China's concerns, of course, have dramatically expanded in recent years, as was emphasized by Beijing's anxiety over the implication for its own dollar-denominated wealth of U.S. budget deficits. At the same time, Beijing is in no hurry to play the "other" global superpower rule vacated by the Soviet Union two decades ago. (See pictures of Obama visiting Asia.)
Herewith, three key lessons to draw from the visit:
1. China's Star Has Risen and America's Has Ebbed, But the U.S. is 'Too Big to Fail'
As the Washington Post noted, when Bill Clinton visited Beijing a decade ago, the U.S. owed more money to Spain than it did to China. President Obama's America owes China some $800 billion and counting. China's economy is humming again, while America's is likely to remain sluggish for years. The sharp economic downturn, and the failure of the U.S. to impose its will in two very costly ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, have shrunk America's global leverage. Today, far less powerful countries than China routinely decline to follow Washington's lead. An ironic dividend of capitalism's Cold War triumph has been the emergence of new power centers in the world economy — Brazil, Russia, India and, of course, China.
Given its economic health and growing influence, Beijing is not simply able to rebuff U.S. demands; it is making its own demands of the U.S., in whose economy much of China's own wealth is tied up. For example, U.S. officials traveling with President Obama faced detailed questions about how the U.S. planned to pay for health-care reform, with China increasingly alarmed at the ballooning deficit and the gloomy economic outlook. The best thing going for the U.S. in its economic relationship with Beijing — which holds $800 billion in U.S. debt and some $2 trillion in dollar-denominated assets — is that for China, the American economy is simply "too big to fail".
While the U.S. currently needs Chinese help on a raft of economic and geopolitical issues, Beijing is less dependent on U.S. help, although it balks at any hint out of Washington of protectionist trade policies. While some in Washington will criticize Obama for being too deferential and allowing the Chinese to stage-manage the visit to avoid any domestic discomfort, it is the shift in the real balance of power that has forced the U.S. to change its approach to China.
2. China Doesn't Want to Run the World, But It Has Interests That Differ from America's
Russia may be engaged in a geopolitical chess game with the U.S. aimed at recovering from the demise of its great power status, but China is different. It pushes back against U.S. initiatives only when those are deemed inimical to its national interests. Iran is a good example. Beijing's heavy investment in and reliance on Iran's energy sector make it extremely averse to serious sanctions or strategies that create political turmoil in Tehran. While insisting on compliance with the non-proliferation regime, Beijing does not believe Iran represents an imminent nuclear weapons threat. And its response to North Korea going nuclear suggests that a nuclear armed Iran is something it could live with.
Obama went to China arguing that its emergence as a major power gives it greater responsibility, as a partner to the U.S., in helping run the world and tackle such global challenges as climate change and Iran. Indeed, there was a collective shudder in Europe's corridors of power at the idea of global leadership being concentrated in a "G2" partnership between Washington and Beijing. They needn't have worried. China's response to Obama could be read as: "Running the world is your gig, we're focused on running our own country, and ensuring security in our immediate neighborhood. We want harmonious relations with you, but don't expect us to do anything that we deem harmful to our national interests." That means no serious sanctions against Iran, regardless of what deals are struck between Washington and Moscow, because China's national interests require growing Iran's energy exports. (Read "For His Asia Trip, Obama Has a United Brain Trust")
3. Personal Chemistry Can't Change the World
The personal trust between President Ronald Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev was indispensable in fostering the climate for a rapid, peaceful end to the Cold War. Presidents Clinton, Bush and now Obama have all tried to cultivate personal relationships with their Chinese counterparts in the hope of smoothing a tricky relationship. But the usefulness of personal chemistry in dealing with China has strict limits, for a simple reason: While the President of the United States is, in George W. Bush's words, "the decider," his Chinese counterpart is not. He's not a figurehead, but executive power in Beijing is the preserve of a collective leadership in the form of the nine-man standing committee of the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party — in which Hu is obviously the key player. Some observers say this is why the Chinese try to avoid informal one-on-one meetings with their U.S. counterparts, preferring more formal exchanges of talking points cleared with the Politburo. The problem of dealing with opaque foreign leadership structures is a recurring one for the Administration. Obama met with Russia's President Dmitry Medvedev last week to discuss sanctions against Iran, but nothing will happen unless Prime Minister Vladimir Putin is on board. And the Iranians themselves are even more complicated since the traditional balance of power between the government and the clerical leadership has been shaken up by the post-election turmoil. President Obama's personal charm and charisma may be a national asset when dealing with many countries, but, through no fault of his own, China is not necessarily one of them.
Saturday, November 21, 2009
Thursday, November 19, 2009
'Skirt boys' make waves in wild world of Tokyo street fashion
Walking through the lively districts of Harajuku and Shibuya in Tokyo, one might encounter a sight unusual to many people's eyes: men in skirts. Not kilts or kimono, but skirts.
Called "the skirt boys," or "skirt tribe," the skirt-wearing men of Tokyo are beginning to get some attention from the fashion world. And so, though it may be a little rude, I have to ask: How is this different from being a cross-dresser?
I see my first skirt-clad man in Harajuku on a weekday afternoon, his garment made of an almost transparent white cotton, with pretty geometric designs along the hem. He is a second-year art student named Haruki Shana.
"I liked the way the hem flutters in the wind," he says. "I got it at a used clothes shop for 1,000 yen."
Shana says he first wanted a skirt after seeing the robes in the "Harry Potter" films, and now has four that he made himself. He also says that he first became aware he was part of a trend when an employee at the driver's license testing center said, "So, there really is a skirt tribe."
When asked how wearing skirt is different than cross-dressing, Shana says, "Cross-dressers are people who want to be girls. I'm not wearing this because it's what girls wear, but because I like the line and the texture of the material."
His immediate family hasn't passed comment, but a number of his extended relations live in his neighborhood, and he's careful not to be seen on days he wears one of his skirts.
The following day, I came across another of "the skirt boys" around the same spot. He was wearing a yellow jersey-like top and a checked skirt of about the same color, extending around 10 centimeters below the knee. A pair of sandals completed the look. When I tried to approach him, he looked embarrassed and slipped into the crowd.
At an Indian wares shop on Takeshita Street in the heart of Harajuku, staff noticed about six men buying sarongs during the summer.
"There are many ways to wear a sarong," says a 24-year-old shop clerk. "They feel like they really take to the shape of your body."
How do people in the fashion industry see the skirt tribe?
"As the line of men's clothes becomes more androgynous, a skirt comes in handy for setting the full form of an outfit, that is, if you feel it's beautiful," says Tomoyuki Ota, editor-in-chief of the men's fashion magazine Smart. As to the emergent trend's difference from cross-dressing, Ota says, "The major point there is whether skirts suit a particular man." Smart is currently considering running a skirt boy special in an upcoming issue.
Street fashion news site Fashionsnap.com operator Reona Mitsuyama says that, along with skirts, men's heels and slim, muscular physiques are forming the basis for a "slim macho" look that is just now gaining popularity.
"More than whether a look is manly or feminine, there are more men now who think that, as long as it's stylish, it's good," Mitsuyama says. "As disparities widen in this competitive society, there are more non-aggressive men who prize choosing their own lifestyle over conventional social status -- a spirit that has come to be reflected in their fashion," she concludes. (By Tsukimi Goda, City News Department)
(Mainichi Japan) October 25, 2009
Called "the skirt boys," or "skirt tribe," the skirt-wearing men of Tokyo are beginning to get some attention from the fashion world. And so, though it may be a little rude, I have to ask: How is this different from being a cross-dresser?
I see my first skirt-clad man in Harajuku on a weekday afternoon, his garment made of an almost transparent white cotton, with pretty geometric designs along the hem. He is a second-year art student named Haruki Shana.
"I liked the way the hem flutters in the wind," he says. "I got it at a used clothes shop for 1,000 yen."
Shana says he first wanted a skirt after seeing the robes in the "Harry Potter" films, and now has four that he made himself. He also says that he first became aware he was part of a trend when an employee at the driver's license testing center said, "So, there really is a skirt tribe."
When asked how wearing skirt is different than cross-dressing, Shana says, "Cross-dressers are people who want to be girls. I'm not wearing this because it's what girls wear, but because I like the line and the texture of the material."
His immediate family hasn't passed comment, but a number of his extended relations live in his neighborhood, and he's careful not to be seen on days he wears one of his skirts.
The following day, I came across another of "the skirt boys" around the same spot. He was wearing a yellow jersey-like top and a checked skirt of about the same color, extending around 10 centimeters below the knee. A pair of sandals completed the look. When I tried to approach him, he looked embarrassed and slipped into the crowd.
At an Indian wares shop on Takeshita Street in the heart of Harajuku, staff noticed about six men buying sarongs during the summer.
"There are many ways to wear a sarong," says a 24-year-old shop clerk. "They feel like they really take to the shape of your body."
How do people in the fashion industry see the skirt tribe?
"As the line of men's clothes becomes more androgynous, a skirt comes in handy for setting the full form of an outfit, that is, if you feel it's beautiful," says Tomoyuki Ota, editor-in-chief of the men's fashion magazine Smart. As to the emergent trend's difference from cross-dressing, Ota says, "The major point there is whether skirts suit a particular man." Smart is currently considering running a skirt boy special in an upcoming issue.
Street fashion news site Fashionsnap.com operator Reona Mitsuyama says that, along with skirts, men's heels and slim, muscular physiques are forming the basis for a "slim macho" look that is just now gaining popularity.
"More than whether a look is manly or feminine, there are more men now who think that, as long as it's stylish, it's good," Mitsuyama says. "As disparities widen in this competitive society, there are more non-aggressive men who prize choosing their own lifestyle over conventional social status -- a spirit that has come to be reflected in their fashion," she concludes. (By Tsukimi Goda, City News Department)
(Mainichi Japan) October 25, 2009
Asia-Pacific leaders agree to shift focus of climate conference
At a Singapore meeting with President Obama and other leaders, the Danish prime minister, who will host the Copenhagen conference, proposes aiming for a political agreement as a preliminary step.
By Peter Nicholas
9:04 PM PST, November 14, 2009
Reporting from Singapore
President Obama and leaders of other Asia-Pacific countries reached a consensus early Sunday that it is unlikely that negotiators can achieve a binding accord to limit climate change at an international conference next month, and should instead focus on a more limited agreement.
Danish Prime Minister Lars Lokke Rasmussen, who will host the Copenhagen conference, flew to Singapore and laid out a two-step process at a hastily arranged breakfast meeting, according to the White House.
Under his plan, negotiators in Copenhagen would try to reach a political agreement on attacking climate change as a prelude to a later, legally binding accord.
A senior Obama administration official who attended the meeting said, "There was broad consensus of support by the leaders" for Rasumussen's proposal. The official spoke on condition of anonymity.
The Danish prime minister's idea, which he has touted before, reflects a hard-eyed calculation that talks in Copenhagen will founder without an alternative approach.
"I don't think the negotiations have proceeded in such a way that any of the leaders thought it was likely that we were going to achieve a final agreement in Copenhagen, and yet thought that it was important that Copenhagen be an important step forward," said Michael Froman, deputy national security advisor for economic affairs.
Froman said that Obama spoke in favor of Rasmussen's proposal.
Nineteen of the 21 members of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum were present at the meeting, including Chinese President Hu Jintao. China and the United States are the two largest emitters of the gases that cause global warming.
"There was a realistic assessment . . . by the leaders that it was unrealistic to expect a full internationally legally binding agreement to be negotiated between now and when Copenhagen starts in 22 days," Froman said.
Negotiations leading to the Copenhagen conference have foundered on disputes between developed countries and those with developing economies. Developed countries want all countries to agree to binding limits on greenhouse gases. Developing countries say they need more flexibility than binding targets would give them, and they need more aid from the wealthiest countries to achieve reductions in emissions.
In his remarks, Obama told his counterparts they face two choices, Froman said. One is to declare that they had tried and failed to reach a deal, but pledge to keep trying. The second is to "see if we could reach the sort of accord that the Danish prime minister laid out that would have immediate operational impact," Froman said.
Asked whether Hu seemed open to the path suggested by Rasmussen, Froman said, "I think he supported the concept of . . . making progress in Copenhagen, the importance of that, and using Copenhagen as a step toward resolving the overall issues."
Obama and other Asian-Pacific leaders are in Singapore for a series of meetings on economic issues. Obama arrived Saturday night and is scheduled to leave today for Shanghai.
The president is in the midst of a week-long tour of Asia, his first since taking office.
peter.nicholas@latimes.com
Copyright © 2009, The Los Angeles Times
By Peter Nicholas
9:04 PM PST, November 14, 2009
Reporting from Singapore
President Obama and leaders of other Asia-Pacific countries reached a consensus early Sunday that it is unlikely that negotiators can achieve a binding accord to limit climate change at an international conference next month, and should instead focus on a more limited agreement.
Danish Prime Minister Lars Lokke Rasmussen, who will host the Copenhagen conference, flew to Singapore and laid out a two-step process at a hastily arranged breakfast meeting, according to the White House.
Under his plan, negotiators in Copenhagen would try to reach a political agreement on attacking climate change as a prelude to a later, legally binding accord.
A senior Obama administration official who attended the meeting said, "There was broad consensus of support by the leaders" for Rasumussen's proposal. The official spoke on condition of anonymity.
The Danish prime minister's idea, which he has touted before, reflects a hard-eyed calculation that talks in Copenhagen will founder without an alternative approach.
"I don't think the negotiations have proceeded in such a way that any of the leaders thought it was likely that we were going to achieve a final agreement in Copenhagen, and yet thought that it was important that Copenhagen be an important step forward," said Michael Froman, deputy national security advisor for economic affairs.
Froman said that Obama spoke in favor of Rasmussen's proposal.
Nineteen of the 21 members of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum were present at the meeting, including Chinese President Hu Jintao. China and the United States are the two largest emitters of the gases that cause global warming.
"There was a realistic assessment . . . by the leaders that it was unrealistic to expect a full internationally legally binding agreement to be negotiated between now and when Copenhagen starts in 22 days," Froman said.
Negotiations leading to the Copenhagen conference have foundered on disputes between developed countries and those with developing economies. Developed countries want all countries to agree to binding limits on greenhouse gases. Developing countries say they need more flexibility than binding targets would give them, and they need more aid from the wealthiest countries to achieve reductions in emissions.
In his remarks, Obama told his counterparts they face two choices, Froman said. One is to declare that they had tried and failed to reach a deal, but pledge to keep trying. The second is to "see if we could reach the sort of accord that the Danish prime minister laid out that would have immediate operational impact," Froman said.
Asked whether Hu seemed open to the path suggested by Rasmussen, Froman said, "I think he supported the concept of . . . making progress in Copenhagen, the importance of that, and using Copenhagen as a step toward resolving the overall issues."
Obama and other Asian-Pacific leaders are in Singapore for a series of meetings on economic issues. Obama arrived Saturday night and is scheduled to leave today for Shanghai.
The president is in the midst of a week-long tour of Asia, his first since taking office.
peter.nicholas@latimes.com
Copyright © 2009, The Los Angeles Times
Obama to press Asia to open markets and buy more U.S. imports
The president will urge leaders to do more to 'rebalance' the global economy by increasing domestic consumption and focusing less on exporting to American consumers.
By Don Lee and David Pierson
November 13, 2009
Reporting from Washington and Beijing
On the eve of his first Pacific trip since entering the White House, President Obama signaled Thursday that he would press Asian leaders to open up their markets and boost purchases of U.S. goods instead of relentlessly focusing on exporting more and more to American consumers.
In remarks made before leaving Washington on the seven-day, four-nation trip, the president suggested that Asia must do more to "rebalance" the global economy by accepting more U.S. imports, increasing its own domestic consumption and relying less on Americans as buyers of last resort.
In part, Obama's remarks were aimed at reassuring a domestic audience that is struggling with double-digit unemployment. But they come as China, Japan and other countries on his itinerary are emerging from downturns of their own, and where the prospect of throttling back their economies to help the U.S. won't be popular.
"I think he's going to face a very, very tough reception on this" part of the mission, said Drew Thompson, director of China Studies at the Nixon Center, a think tank in Washington.
In China, which is at the center of his journey, policymakers have for years acknowledged that a shift toward more domestic consumption will help reduce the nation's reliance on foreign markets and give other countries a greater share of trade.
The problem is such reform requires lifting financial and political controls that China's rulers are in no rush to surrender.
Among them is a chief sticking point, the Chinese currency, which has long been seen as undervalued. Beijing has pegged the yuan to the dollar since the financial crisis began and it has recently sunk with the declining greenback, making China's exports even more attractive. This has given China a larger share of exports even though exports as a whole worldwide have shrunk.
Not surprisingly, American manufacturers aren't happy. They scored a major victory when Obama imposed tariffs on cheap Chinese tires in September. And last week, the U.S. imposed duties on Chinese steel pipes. China has responded by launching probes of U.S. auto parts and chicken.
The significance of the spats may be more symbolic, however, amounting to only a fraction of the $212 billion in trade the two countries shared this year. Obama has said he will discuss the Chinese currency, but he also will need to assure the Chinese that there is no protectionist strategy emanating from Washington.
"There has been real disappointment about the Obama administration on trade," said Liu Baocheng, a professor at the University of International Business and Economics in Beijing. "We expected more positive proposals to strengthen the economic relationship."
Beijing will also want assurances that the president will control inflation, and thus not jeopardize its $797-billion investment in U.S. treasuries.
Obama was careful not to label China a manipulator of its currency last month, and there are signals that the yuan may appreciate. A Chinese central bank report released Wednesday hinted that it might consider other financial trends in determining the value of the currency. Analysts are expecting a modest hike sometime next year.
"I think this colors everything" said Oded Shenkar, a management professor at Ohio State University and author of "The Chinese Century," referring to U.S. foreign debt.
"We don't want the Chinese to stop buying our bonds," Shenkar said. "This is where the domestic agenda and printing a lot of money and taking on enormous debt meets with the foreign agenda. Historically, countries that are struggling with financial debt had problems projecting global power."
Senior White House aides have downplayed expectations of breakthroughs or tangible "deliverables" from the trip, which will begin with a speech in Tokyo on Saturday and include the 21-member Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit.
Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.) sees Obama's trip as a vital part of securing U.S. interests. "China is a dynamic country on the rise . . . and it needs to be understood," she said. "I think President Obama can have an enormously beneficial impact on this relationship."
Although some analysts say Sino-U.S. relations are as strong as they've ever been, deep mistrust lingers, especially over military and economic interests. That uneasiness may be all the greater since Obama, as analysts expect, will deliver a strong message that the U.S. intends to keep playing a major role in the region.
China's neighbors, however haltingly and uneasily, are responding to the gravitational pull of the Middle Kingdom, which is moving toward levels of economic and military strength not enjoyed by Beijing in more than a century.
"The perception in Asia is the U.S. is on a decline, that the era of Pax Americana may be over," said Minxin Pei, a China specialist who directs the Keck Center for International and Strategic Studies at Claremont McKenna College. "The U.S. wants to reassure its allies and friends, 'Don't think we're ceding the region to China.' "
No place may be as sensitive to such a message as Japan, America's strongest Asian ally since its rebirth after World War II and the world's second-largest economy. In Tokyo's Suntory Hall on Saturday, Obama is expected to deliver a major speech on U.S. engagement in Asia and the U.S.-Japan alliance.
Japan's new government, led by the Democratic Party of Japan, has indicated that it wants a more equal partnership with Washington, which Obama administration officials say the U.S. is prepared to move toward.
Obama will have at least one thing going for him: Like much of the rest of the world, many Japanese and other Asians are intrigued by the youthful president, all the more so because he spent four years of his childhood in Indonesia. Obama's first stop in China will be in Shanghai, where he's expected to hold a town-hall style session with Chinese students.
What remains to be seen is how that event and, more broadly, how Obama's communication skills will translate to an Asian audience and culture. Will the president capture the moment as he did in tours of Europe, where he won praise for rejecting the unilateralism of his predecessor, or Cairo, where he eloquently extended the hand of openness to the Muslim world?
"I'm not sure the Obama spell will have the same effect," said Jean-Pierre Lehmann, a frequent visitor to China and a founder of the Evian Group, a free-trade advocacy group in Switzerland. He points out that in China, Obama is dealing with thorny issues such as global warming and trade imbalances that won't be solved by soaring rhetoric.
Although Obama and Chinese President Hu Jintao may announce joint efforts on efficient energy programs and modest progress toward a hoped-for international climate agreement in Copenhagen next month, nobody is expecting a signing of major agreements in China or in South Korea, Obama's final stop.
In Beijing, Obama is likely to discuss sensitive issues of security in the Taiwan straits as well as human rights, Tibet and Beijing's role in places such as Sudan, where China has strong economic interests.
On trade, Obama's visit comes as China appears to be leaping toward economic recovery. Industrial production is up, exports are rebounding, and stocks and real estate are soaring.
China's growing global influence and financial power -- its economy is now about 33% of America's compared with 12% at the start of the decade -- prompted Obama and other world leaders in September to replace the clubby Group of 8 with the more inclusive Group of 20 as the permanent body of international economic cooperation.
Picking up where that meeting left off, Obama will ask China to balance its economy and not rely so much on the exports that over-leveraged Americans so dutifully consumed before the crisis.
don.lee@latimes.com
david.pierson@latimes.com
Copyright © 2009, The Los Angeles Times
By Don Lee and David Pierson
November 13, 2009
Reporting from Washington and Beijing
On the eve of his first Pacific trip since entering the White House, President Obama signaled Thursday that he would press Asian leaders to open up their markets and boost purchases of U.S. goods instead of relentlessly focusing on exporting more and more to American consumers.
In remarks made before leaving Washington on the seven-day, four-nation trip, the president suggested that Asia must do more to "rebalance" the global economy by accepting more U.S. imports, increasing its own domestic consumption and relying less on Americans as buyers of last resort.
In part, Obama's remarks were aimed at reassuring a domestic audience that is struggling with double-digit unemployment. But they come as China, Japan and other countries on his itinerary are emerging from downturns of their own, and where the prospect of throttling back their economies to help the U.S. won't be popular.
"I think he's going to face a very, very tough reception on this" part of the mission, said Drew Thompson, director of China Studies at the Nixon Center, a think tank in Washington.
In China, which is at the center of his journey, policymakers have for years acknowledged that a shift toward more domestic consumption will help reduce the nation's reliance on foreign markets and give other countries a greater share of trade.
The problem is such reform requires lifting financial and political controls that China's rulers are in no rush to surrender.
Among them is a chief sticking point, the Chinese currency, which has long been seen as undervalued. Beijing has pegged the yuan to the dollar since the financial crisis began and it has recently sunk with the declining greenback, making China's exports even more attractive. This has given China a larger share of exports even though exports as a whole worldwide have shrunk.
Not surprisingly, American manufacturers aren't happy. They scored a major victory when Obama imposed tariffs on cheap Chinese tires in September. And last week, the U.S. imposed duties on Chinese steel pipes. China has responded by launching probes of U.S. auto parts and chicken.
The significance of the spats may be more symbolic, however, amounting to only a fraction of the $212 billion in trade the two countries shared this year. Obama has said he will discuss the Chinese currency, but he also will need to assure the Chinese that there is no protectionist strategy emanating from Washington.
"There has been real disappointment about the Obama administration on trade," said Liu Baocheng, a professor at the University of International Business and Economics in Beijing. "We expected more positive proposals to strengthen the economic relationship."
Beijing will also want assurances that the president will control inflation, and thus not jeopardize its $797-billion investment in U.S. treasuries.
Obama was careful not to label China a manipulator of its currency last month, and there are signals that the yuan may appreciate. A Chinese central bank report released Wednesday hinted that it might consider other financial trends in determining the value of the currency. Analysts are expecting a modest hike sometime next year.
"I think this colors everything" said Oded Shenkar, a management professor at Ohio State University and author of "The Chinese Century," referring to U.S. foreign debt.
"We don't want the Chinese to stop buying our bonds," Shenkar said. "This is where the domestic agenda and printing a lot of money and taking on enormous debt meets with the foreign agenda. Historically, countries that are struggling with financial debt had problems projecting global power."
Senior White House aides have downplayed expectations of breakthroughs or tangible "deliverables" from the trip, which will begin with a speech in Tokyo on Saturday and include the 21-member Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit.
Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.) sees Obama's trip as a vital part of securing U.S. interests. "China is a dynamic country on the rise . . . and it needs to be understood," she said. "I think President Obama can have an enormously beneficial impact on this relationship."
Although some analysts say Sino-U.S. relations are as strong as they've ever been, deep mistrust lingers, especially over military and economic interests. That uneasiness may be all the greater since Obama, as analysts expect, will deliver a strong message that the U.S. intends to keep playing a major role in the region.
China's neighbors, however haltingly and uneasily, are responding to the gravitational pull of the Middle Kingdom, which is moving toward levels of economic and military strength not enjoyed by Beijing in more than a century.
"The perception in Asia is the U.S. is on a decline, that the era of Pax Americana may be over," said Minxin Pei, a China specialist who directs the Keck Center for International and Strategic Studies at Claremont McKenna College. "The U.S. wants to reassure its allies and friends, 'Don't think we're ceding the region to China.' "
No place may be as sensitive to such a message as Japan, America's strongest Asian ally since its rebirth after World War II and the world's second-largest economy. In Tokyo's Suntory Hall on Saturday, Obama is expected to deliver a major speech on U.S. engagement in Asia and the U.S.-Japan alliance.
Japan's new government, led by the Democratic Party of Japan, has indicated that it wants a more equal partnership with Washington, which Obama administration officials say the U.S. is prepared to move toward.
Obama will have at least one thing going for him: Like much of the rest of the world, many Japanese and other Asians are intrigued by the youthful president, all the more so because he spent four years of his childhood in Indonesia. Obama's first stop in China will be in Shanghai, where he's expected to hold a town-hall style session with Chinese students.
What remains to be seen is how that event and, more broadly, how Obama's communication skills will translate to an Asian audience and culture. Will the president capture the moment as he did in tours of Europe, where he won praise for rejecting the unilateralism of his predecessor, or Cairo, where he eloquently extended the hand of openness to the Muslim world?
"I'm not sure the Obama spell will have the same effect," said Jean-Pierre Lehmann, a frequent visitor to China and a founder of the Evian Group, a free-trade advocacy group in Switzerland. He points out that in China, Obama is dealing with thorny issues such as global warming and trade imbalances that won't be solved by soaring rhetoric.
Although Obama and Chinese President Hu Jintao may announce joint efforts on efficient energy programs and modest progress toward a hoped-for international climate agreement in Copenhagen next month, nobody is expecting a signing of major agreements in China or in South Korea, Obama's final stop.
In Beijing, Obama is likely to discuss sensitive issues of security in the Taiwan straits as well as human rights, Tibet and Beijing's role in places such as Sudan, where China has strong economic interests.
On trade, Obama's visit comes as China appears to be leaping toward economic recovery. Industrial production is up, exports are rebounding, and stocks and real estate are soaring.
China's growing global influence and financial power -- its economy is now about 33% of America's compared with 12% at the start of the decade -- prompted Obama and other world leaders in September to replace the clubby Group of 8 with the more inclusive Group of 20 as the permanent body of international economic cooperation.
Picking up where that meeting left off, Obama will ask China to balance its economy and not rely so much on the exports that over-leveraged Americans so dutifully consumed before the crisis.
don.lee@latimes.com
david.pierson@latimes.com
Copyright © 2009, The Los Angeles Times
A 'grand bargain' for North Korea
A visiting President Obama and his South Korean host agree on an offer to the North. Free trade is also key in Seoul talks.
By John M. Glionna and Peter Nicholas
November 19, 2009
Reporting from Seoul
President Obama met today with South Korean President Lee Myung-bak, calling for North Korea to take "serious steps" to give up its nuclear weapons and committing himself to reviving a free-trade deal between Seoul and Washington that has stalled in the U.S. Congress.
In a nationally televised joint news conference, Lee said the two presidents agreed to offer North Korea a "grand bargain" designed to provide the North with security guarantees and economic assistance in exchange for dismantling its core nuclear programs.
The last stop on Obama's weeklong Asia tour was expected to be a bit of a diplomatic breather after the sticky foreign policy issues the U.S. president faced during stops in Japan and China.
On the eve of Obama's visit, during which he planned to meet with U.S. troops stationed here, South Korea announced the expansion of its presence in Afghanistan, saying it will send more troops and contractors to aid the U.S. effort there.
Standing on red-carpeted steps at Seoul's Blue House before colorful military regiments and waving children, Obama called the welcome the most spectacular ceremony he's enjoyed so far in Asia.
Lee presented his counterpart, who has studied the Korean self-defense art taekwondo, with a uniform and black belt in the discipline.
Still, serious issues loomed, most critically the efforts to bring North Korea back to the so-called six-party talks.
Obama also reiterated his plan to hold direct talks with North Korea. U.S. special envoy Stephen Bosworth is scheduled to visit Pyongyang, the North Korean capital, next month in an effort to restart the multilateral talks involving the United States, North Korea, South Korea, China, Japan and Russia.
Analysts in South Korea described comments made by both countries on the looming threat of North Korean leader Kim Jong Il's growing nuclear arsenal as "well couched."
"They could not show their cards before the American envoy's visit to Pyongyang," said Chang Yong-seok, research director at the Institute for Peace Affairs in Seoul.
North Korea conducted a nuclear test in May and later abrogated the 1953 cease-fire agreement that ended the Korean War.
On another matter, Obama expressed impatience with Iran during the news conference, saying that he and U.S. allies are developing a package of sanctions that would be leveled against the country if it failed to accept a proposal curbing its nuclear program.
He was asked about a report that Iran has spurned the offer to relinquish its nuclear ambitions in return for assistance in developing nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.
"Iran has taken weeks now and has not shown a willingness to say yes," Obama said. "I've not seen the report, but we've seen indications that whether it's for internal political reasons or they're stuck in their own rhetoric, they have been unable to get to yes."
After the news conference, one of his top advisors, David Axelrod, rejected arguments that Obama has proved too accommodating -- particularly in dealings with China -- and failed to gain concessions on economic issues.
"We're laying the foundation for progress. Whether it's climate change, security issues, economic issues, the discussions that we had on this trip advanced our goals," Axelrod said.
Obama's visit came barely a week after a naval skirmish heightened tensions between North and South -- highlighting the conservative Lee's aggressive stance on North Korea.
Obama said American and South Korean officials were working to overcome obstacles that remained in the way of a free-trade pact.
In his major speech in Asia, delivered last weekend in Tokyo, Obama had pledged to "move forward" on a free-trade pact with Seoul.
But in a private meeting, Obama told the South Korean trade minister that "we have a lot of work to do," according to the semiofficial Yonhap news agency.
The main sticking point has been autos. South Korea is a major exporter of cars to the U.S., but very few vehicles made in America are sold in South Korea, an imbalance that many analysts say is largely market driven and not a result of trade barriers.
Nonetheless, pressed by organized labor, key members of Congress in states such as Michigan and Ohio have blocked the trade agreement, insisting that additional measures and safeguards be put in place to boost American car shipments to South Korea.
During the news conference, Lee told Obama, "If the car [issue] is a problem, we are ready to talk again."
john.glionna@latimes.com
peter.nicholas@latimes.com
Times staff writer Don Lee in Washington and special correspondent Ju-min Park in Seoul contributed to this report.
Copyright © 2009, The Los Angeles Times
By John M. Glionna and Peter Nicholas
November 19, 2009
Reporting from Seoul
President Obama met today with South Korean President Lee Myung-bak, calling for North Korea to take "serious steps" to give up its nuclear weapons and committing himself to reviving a free-trade deal between Seoul and Washington that has stalled in the U.S. Congress.
In a nationally televised joint news conference, Lee said the two presidents agreed to offer North Korea a "grand bargain" designed to provide the North with security guarantees and economic assistance in exchange for dismantling its core nuclear programs.
The last stop on Obama's weeklong Asia tour was expected to be a bit of a diplomatic breather after the sticky foreign policy issues the U.S. president faced during stops in Japan and China.
On the eve of Obama's visit, during which he planned to meet with U.S. troops stationed here, South Korea announced the expansion of its presence in Afghanistan, saying it will send more troops and contractors to aid the U.S. effort there.
Standing on red-carpeted steps at Seoul's Blue House before colorful military regiments and waving children, Obama called the welcome the most spectacular ceremony he's enjoyed so far in Asia.
Lee presented his counterpart, who has studied the Korean self-defense art taekwondo, with a uniform and black belt in the discipline.
Still, serious issues loomed, most critically the efforts to bring North Korea back to the so-called six-party talks.
Obama also reiterated his plan to hold direct talks with North Korea. U.S. special envoy Stephen Bosworth is scheduled to visit Pyongyang, the North Korean capital, next month in an effort to restart the multilateral talks involving the United States, North Korea, South Korea, China, Japan and Russia.
Analysts in South Korea described comments made by both countries on the looming threat of North Korean leader Kim Jong Il's growing nuclear arsenal as "well couched."
"They could not show their cards before the American envoy's visit to Pyongyang," said Chang Yong-seok, research director at the Institute for Peace Affairs in Seoul.
North Korea conducted a nuclear test in May and later abrogated the 1953 cease-fire agreement that ended the Korean War.
On another matter, Obama expressed impatience with Iran during the news conference, saying that he and U.S. allies are developing a package of sanctions that would be leveled against the country if it failed to accept a proposal curbing its nuclear program.
He was asked about a report that Iran has spurned the offer to relinquish its nuclear ambitions in return for assistance in developing nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.
"Iran has taken weeks now and has not shown a willingness to say yes," Obama said. "I've not seen the report, but we've seen indications that whether it's for internal political reasons or they're stuck in their own rhetoric, they have been unable to get to yes."
After the news conference, one of his top advisors, David Axelrod, rejected arguments that Obama has proved too accommodating -- particularly in dealings with China -- and failed to gain concessions on economic issues.
"We're laying the foundation for progress. Whether it's climate change, security issues, economic issues, the discussions that we had on this trip advanced our goals," Axelrod said.
Obama's visit came barely a week after a naval skirmish heightened tensions between North and South -- highlighting the conservative Lee's aggressive stance on North Korea.
Obama said American and South Korean officials were working to overcome obstacles that remained in the way of a free-trade pact.
In his major speech in Asia, delivered last weekend in Tokyo, Obama had pledged to "move forward" on a free-trade pact with Seoul.
But in a private meeting, Obama told the South Korean trade minister that "we have a lot of work to do," according to the semiofficial Yonhap news agency.
The main sticking point has been autos. South Korea is a major exporter of cars to the U.S., but very few vehicles made in America are sold in South Korea, an imbalance that many analysts say is largely market driven and not a result of trade barriers.
Nonetheless, pressed by organized labor, key members of Congress in states such as Michigan and Ohio have blocked the trade agreement, insisting that additional measures and safeguards be put in place to boost American car shipments to South Korea.
During the news conference, Lee told Obama, "If the car [issue] is a problem, we are ready to talk again."
john.glionna@latimes.com
peter.nicholas@latimes.com
Times staff writer Don Lee in Washington and special correspondent Ju-min Park in Seoul contributed to this report.
Copyright © 2009, The Los Angeles Times
U.S. in standoff with Beijing over Chinese currency
GLOBAL ECONOMY
By reducing the value of the yuan in lock step with the declining dollar, China is making it difficult for American exporters to gain ground in overseas markets.
By Don Lee and David Pierson
November 19, 2009
Reporting from Washington and Beijing
As President Obama's trip to Beijing proved, the days when U.S. leaders could jawbone China into making major changes in economic policy appear to be gone. Not only did the Chinese brush off Obama's appeals this week, they harangued the United States for its own shortcomings.
But the standoff in Beijing marked more than the changing balance of power between two countries -- one riding a wave of surging growth, the other still mired in troubles.
Although Obama wasn't expected to wring agreement from China's leaders, the tepid response the president got casts a shadow over prospects for reinvigorating the whole global economy.
The immediate issues in Beijing centered on highly technical matters of currency valuation and import-export policy. Beyond the arcane specifics, however, was the simple question of whether the leading economic powers could forge agreements on policies that promoted the overall welfare of the global economy.
And at least on the evidence of Obama's visit to Beijing, the answer may be no.
Although many nations in both Asia and the West are bound together in a system of trade and global finance, they have yet to develop an effective system for making policy decisions in the interest of the whole.
Instead, while rhetorically committed to cooperation, Beijing and other capitals make independent decisions, each for its own reasons, including short-term self-interest and internal politics.
Obama was not alone in asking Beijing to reconsider its economic strategy. Other developed nations and some emerging economies in Asia have made similar appeals. The head of the International Monetary Fund, Dominique Strauss-Kahn, was in Beijing making the same pitch during Obama's visit. He contended that change was in China's interest, as well as the world's.
All the appeals seemed to be turned away politely.
Nor was the larger problem visible only in Beijing. Throughout his Asia trip, Obama has pushed host governments to adopt policies that relied less on selling exports to U.S. consumers and to open up their markets to more U.S. goods. The responses were muted at best.
In the case of China, that means that, at least well into next year, it's likely to stick to a policy of using government authority to peg the value of its currency to the dollar instead of raising the yuan and gradually letting it fluctuate freely in response to independent market forces, as other major currencies do.
Since mid-2008, Beijing has kept the exchange rate fixed at about 6.8 yuan to the dollar.
China's policy of mandating a set relationship with the dollar helps the Chinese economy even as it hobbles efforts in the U.S. to create jobs and return to prosperity by stepping up American exports.
Theoretically, with the dollar falling in value, American products should be cheaper and more competitive in overseas markets.
But China, by reducing the value of the yuan in lock step with the declining dollar, makes it hard for U.S. companies to gain ground. China's already cheaper products remain cheaper.
One result is huge deficits for the U.S. in its trade with China. Even though the trade deficit has eased, it was still running at $165.8 billion in the first nine months of this year.
Much the same is true of some other countries, including some of China's neighbors, that are still struggling with the effects of the global financial crisis.
China's party line throughout has been that it seeks greater currency flexibility, but on its own timetable, not someone else's.
In part, China's refusal to bend reflects a growing nationalism.
Behind the scenes, it also masks a split between two powerful groups -- its central bank and China's huge job- and tax-generating manufacturing sector, supported by the Ministry of Commerce.
Officials of China's central bank have been warning political leaders that keeping the yuan artificially low could ultimately hurt China too by exacerbating the country's trade imbalance problem and bringing in a flood of so-called hot money, or speculative funds from investors.
To keep the yuan pegged to the dollar, "the central bank has to intervene enormously," said Michael Pettis, a professor of finance at Peking University. It's why China holds a record of nearly $2.3 trillion in foreign reserves as of September, most of it in dollar-denominated assets.
The central bank's position is getting a determined push-back from manufacturers and exporters -- especially along China's wealthy coast -- who stand to reap significant gains in the short term. If the yuan were to rise in value, China's exports would become more expensive relative to goods in the U.S. and other foreign markets.
"It's not the right time for the [yuan] to appreciate," said Wu Haoliang, general secretary of the Foshan Textile Assn., which represents about 3,000 manufacturers in Guangdong province in southeast China.
"Exports are not looking optimistic at all. We're continuing to decline," he added. "We know under the current environment that depreciation is not possible."
Twice a year, a small group of association leaders like Wu, usually no more than 20 people, get together with government officials to air their concerns. Wu said they last met over the summer, and sitting in was an official from the central government's National Development and Reform Commission, an important policymaking body.
"They pay attention," Wu said. "But most of the time they can't give you a direct answer. They have to go back to Beijing and discuss policy."
Aside from lobbying or sniping between ministries and other groups over the currency, any movement on the subject would be deliberated by the Politburo, the inner sanctum of the Chinese Communist Party, said Arthur Kroeber, managing director of Dragonomics, a Beijing economic research firm.
Kroeber added that despite some terse remarks from officials on the currency, negotiations between U.S. and Chinese were almost certainly more constructive.
But soft as Obama's selling style apparently was, there was no indication that the Chinese would make a move to revalue their currency any time soon.
"That's part of what's needed to re-balance the economy," said Victor Shih, a China political economy specialist at Northwestern University.
Some financial analysts are predicting a modest increase in the yuan in the first half of next year, but Shih thinks it may come later.
Given the domestic pressures facing Beijing, Shih said he didn't expect Chinese leaders to make a move on currency until exports stay positive for at least two quarters in a row. Exports were down nearly 14% in October.
don.lee@latimes.com
david.pierson@latimes.com
Copyright © 2009, The Los Angeles Times
By reducing the value of the yuan in lock step with the declining dollar, China is making it difficult for American exporters to gain ground in overseas markets.
By Don Lee and David Pierson
November 19, 2009
Reporting from Washington and Beijing
As President Obama's trip to Beijing proved, the days when U.S. leaders could jawbone China into making major changes in economic policy appear to be gone. Not only did the Chinese brush off Obama's appeals this week, they harangued the United States for its own shortcomings.
But the standoff in Beijing marked more than the changing balance of power between two countries -- one riding a wave of surging growth, the other still mired in troubles.
Although Obama wasn't expected to wring agreement from China's leaders, the tepid response the president got casts a shadow over prospects for reinvigorating the whole global economy.
The immediate issues in Beijing centered on highly technical matters of currency valuation and import-export policy. Beyond the arcane specifics, however, was the simple question of whether the leading economic powers could forge agreements on policies that promoted the overall welfare of the global economy.
And at least on the evidence of Obama's visit to Beijing, the answer may be no.
Although many nations in both Asia and the West are bound together in a system of trade and global finance, they have yet to develop an effective system for making policy decisions in the interest of the whole.
Instead, while rhetorically committed to cooperation, Beijing and other capitals make independent decisions, each for its own reasons, including short-term self-interest and internal politics.
Obama was not alone in asking Beijing to reconsider its economic strategy. Other developed nations and some emerging economies in Asia have made similar appeals. The head of the International Monetary Fund, Dominique Strauss-Kahn, was in Beijing making the same pitch during Obama's visit. He contended that change was in China's interest, as well as the world's.
All the appeals seemed to be turned away politely.
Nor was the larger problem visible only in Beijing. Throughout his Asia trip, Obama has pushed host governments to adopt policies that relied less on selling exports to U.S. consumers and to open up their markets to more U.S. goods. The responses were muted at best.
In the case of China, that means that, at least well into next year, it's likely to stick to a policy of using government authority to peg the value of its currency to the dollar instead of raising the yuan and gradually letting it fluctuate freely in response to independent market forces, as other major currencies do.
Since mid-2008, Beijing has kept the exchange rate fixed at about 6.8 yuan to the dollar.
China's policy of mandating a set relationship with the dollar helps the Chinese economy even as it hobbles efforts in the U.S. to create jobs and return to prosperity by stepping up American exports.
Theoretically, with the dollar falling in value, American products should be cheaper and more competitive in overseas markets.
But China, by reducing the value of the yuan in lock step with the declining dollar, makes it hard for U.S. companies to gain ground. China's already cheaper products remain cheaper.
One result is huge deficits for the U.S. in its trade with China. Even though the trade deficit has eased, it was still running at $165.8 billion in the first nine months of this year.
Much the same is true of some other countries, including some of China's neighbors, that are still struggling with the effects of the global financial crisis.
China's party line throughout has been that it seeks greater currency flexibility, but on its own timetable, not someone else's.
In part, China's refusal to bend reflects a growing nationalism.
Behind the scenes, it also masks a split between two powerful groups -- its central bank and China's huge job- and tax-generating manufacturing sector, supported by the Ministry of Commerce.
Officials of China's central bank have been warning political leaders that keeping the yuan artificially low could ultimately hurt China too by exacerbating the country's trade imbalance problem and bringing in a flood of so-called hot money, or speculative funds from investors.
To keep the yuan pegged to the dollar, "the central bank has to intervene enormously," said Michael Pettis, a professor of finance at Peking University. It's why China holds a record of nearly $2.3 trillion in foreign reserves as of September, most of it in dollar-denominated assets.
The central bank's position is getting a determined push-back from manufacturers and exporters -- especially along China's wealthy coast -- who stand to reap significant gains in the short term. If the yuan were to rise in value, China's exports would become more expensive relative to goods in the U.S. and other foreign markets.
"It's not the right time for the [yuan] to appreciate," said Wu Haoliang, general secretary of the Foshan Textile Assn., which represents about 3,000 manufacturers in Guangdong province in southeast China.
"Exports are not looking optimistic at all. We're continuing to decline," he added. "We know under the current environment that depreciation is not possible."
Twice a year, a small group of association leaders like Wu, usually no more than 20 people, get together with government officials to air their concerns. Wu said they last met over the summer, and sitting in was an official from the central government's National Development and Reform Commission, an important policymaking body.
"They pay attention," Wu said. "But most of the time they can't give you a direct answer. They have to go back to Beijing and discuss policy."
Aside from lobbying or sniping between ministries and other groups over the currency, any movement on the subject would be deliberated by the Politburo, the inner sanctum of the Chinese Communist Party, said Arthur Kroeber, managing director of Dragonomics, a Beijing economic research firm.
Kroeber added that despite some terse remarks from officials on the currency, negotiations between U.S. and Chinese were almost certainly more constructive.
But soft as Obama's selling style apparently was, there was no indication that the Chinese would make a move to revalue their currency any time soon.
"That's part of what's needed to re-balance the economy," said Victor Shih, a China political economy specialist at Northwestern University.
Some financial analysts are predicting a modest increase in the yuan in the first half of next year, but Shih thinks it may come later.
Given the domestic pressures facing Beijing, Shih said he didn't expect Chinese leaders to make a move on currency until exports stay positive for at least two quarters in a row. Exports were down nearly 14% in October.
don.lee@latimes.com
david.pierson@latimes.com
Copyright © 2009, The Los Angeles Times
Man unable to enter China languishes in Tokyo airport
FOREIGN EXCHANGE
Activist Feng Zhenghu has been sitting near the customs booths at Narita International Airport for nearly three weeks, refusing to enter Japan in hopes his protest will gain him entry back home.
By John M. Glionna and Catherine Makino
8:12 PM PST, November 18, 2009
Reporting from Tokyo and Seoul
He is a man caught between two countries, a political protester who has stubbornly steeled himself inside the sterile purgatory of Tokyo's Narita International Airport.
Each day, Feng Zhenghu sits on a bench in front of the Japanese customs booths, calmly looking on as tens of thousands of arriving passengers go by, resigning himself to residence in a diplomatic no man's land.
He refuses to pass through government customs because that would mean entering Japan -- something Feng has decided he simply will not do. He wants to go home to China.
Eight times since June, the 55-year-old activist has been rebuffed by Chinese officials in his attempts to reenter his homeland, with no reason being given.
On four of the occasions, airlines in Japan didn't allow him to board. On the other four, he got as far as Shanghai's Pudong International Airport before being dispatched back to Tokyo.
During the last go-round, on Nov. 2, a defiant Feng drew the line: Arriving back at Narita, he refused to enter the country.
Feng, an economist turned human rights author and blogger, was sentenced in 2000 to three years in a Chinese prison for writing a book he said criticized Chinese regulations against foreign company investment.
He also believes a speech he once gave criticizing the 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown is being held against him.
Still, he said, officials cannot banish him on mere pretense. Speaking on his cellphone recently, Feng said he would prefer to languish in a Chinese jail rather than live as a free man in Japan or anywhere else.
Although he is angry at his government, Feng misses his homeland -- his family, his friends, the feel of the place he has spent most of his life.
"I just want to go home," he told a reporter Wednesday, tears welling in his eyes as he spoke. "I'm Chinese. Why can't I go home? I didn't do anything illegal. I just wrote a book that didn't meet with the regulations of the Chinese government."
Feng's plight is reminiscent of that of the Tom Hanks character in Steven Spielberg's 2004 film "The Terminal." But this unlikely sojourner has no access to food courts or hot showers.
For 17 days now, he has kept a lonely vigil at the south arrival wing of Narita's hyper-busy Terminal 1. Many workers and travelers are unaware he's there, staging a protest in a nation where few people question authority.
The days are long. Feng gets to bed about midnight. He sleeps fitfully in a chair, often using his suitcase as a pillow. He rises at 6 a.m., jarred by the first passengers arriving on international flights.
On a white T-shirt, he has scrawled messages about his protest in both English and Mandarin -- pulling the garment over his luggage to create a small billboard.
One message reads, "The Chinese government is shameful."
He uses his cellphone to accept calls and send text messages. He also keeps a diary on his computer. He hasn't showered; instead he splashes water on his face in the restroom.
He eats only snacks -- candy, ramen noodles, cookies -- offered by well-meaning passengers and supporters.
Embarrassed airport authorities say they must follow regulations and would prefer that Feng enter Japan so they can be rid of him.
"Every day the officers gently try to coax me to leave," he said. "They say: 'It's a beautiful world out there. There's lots of good food to eat. All you have to do is walk through those doors.' "
For days Feng survived on tap water after Japanese officials refused to accept his money for snacks at airport eateries.
"The authorities obviously want to distance themselves," said Yang Jianli, a fellow at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government. "At first they thought if no food or supplies were provided, he would give up and enter Japan. But they miscalculated his determination."
Yang, a onetime Chinese political prisoner who met Feng this fall at a human rights conference in Washington, is funding a campaign to supply the activist with food and emotional support.
With Feng lodged in a high-security area between the airplane disembarkation point and immigration, airport officials will not allow non-traveling airport visitors to meet with him. The only way to reach him is to arrive via plane at the south wing of Terminal 1 and greet him at customs.
Hong Kong activist Christina Chan learned that lesson the hard way. Arriving at the north wing of the terminal, she was not allowed to see Feng.
So Yang paid her fare back to Hong Kong, where she boarded a different flight she knew would land in the south wing.
"He looks better than I thought he'd look," Chan, a pro-Tibet student campaigner, said of Feng. "He believes that if he sticks to his struggle, they will eventually have to let him back into China.
"It's a theme familiar to many: the right to go home again."
Feng's sister, Natsuki Suzuki, who lives in Japan, has not been allowed to visit her brother. But she calls him often on his cellphone.
"My brother is stubborn," Suzuki said. "He insists there is only one way for him to go -- back to China."
Feng, who has studied law, says he traveled to Japan from China in April after being inexplicably jailed for 41 days there. Chinese officials insisted that he could return to Shanghai in June, after the 20th anniversary of the Tiananmen Square crackdown, he said.
But when he tried to return in mid-June, authorities blocked his path and have rejected him since, Feng said.
One day at Narita, Feng spotted a top official in the Chinese Communist Party's international department passing by. He slipped a note to a member of his entourage but has not had a response.
Meanwhile, the sleepless nights and long days have begun to take their toll. Feng says he has started to feel weak. He has dark circles under his eyes and an open sore on his lower lip.
But he plans to stay put for as long as it takes to persuade the Chinese government to bend.
"I don't know how long I will stay," he said. "It all depends on the Chinese government."
john.glionna@latimes.com
Makino is a special correspondent.
Copyright © 2009, The Los Angeles Times
Activist Feng Zhenghu has been sitting near the customs booths at Narita International Airport for nearly three weeks, refusing to enter Japan in hopes his protest will gain him entry back home.
By John M. Glionna and Catherine Makino
8:12 PM PST, November 18, 2009
Reporting from Tokyo and Seoul
He is a man caught between two countries, a political protester who has stubbornly steeled himself inside the sterile purgatory of Tokyo's Narita International Airport.
Each day, Feng Zhenghu sits on a bench in front of the Japanese customs booths, calmly looking on as tens of thousands of arriving passengers go by, resigning himself to residence in a diplomatic no man's land.
He refuses to pass through government customs because that would mean entering Japan -- something Feng has decided he simply will not do. He wants to go home to China.
Eight times since June, the 55-year-old activist has been rebuffed by Chinese officials in his attempts to reenter his homeland, with no reason being given.
On four of the occasions, airlines in Japan didn't allow him to board. On the other four, he got as far as Shanghai's Pudong International Airport before being dispatched back to Tokyo.
During the last go-round, on Nov. 2, a defiant Feng drew the line: Arriving back at Narita, he refused to enter the country.
Feng, an economist turned human rights author and blogger, was sentenced in 2000 to three years in a Chinese prison for writing a book he said criticized Chinese regulations against foreign company investment.
He also believes a speech he once gave criticizing the 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown is being held against him.
Still, he said, officials cannot banish him on mere pretense. Speaking on his cellphone recently, Feng said he would prefer to languish in a Chinese jail rather than live as a free man in Japan or anywhere else.
Although he is angry at his government, Feng misses his homeland -- his family, his friends, the feel of the place he has spent most of his life.
"I just want to go home," he told a reporter Wednesday, tears welling in his eyes as he spoke. "I'm Chinese. Why can't I go home? I didn't do anything illegal. I just wrote a book that didn't meet with the regulations of the Chinese government."
Feng's plight is reminiscent of that of the Tom Hanks character in Steven Spielberg's 2004 film "The Terminal." But this unlikely sojourner has no access to food courts or hot showers.
For 17 days now, he has kept a lonely vigil at the south arrival wing of Narita's hyper-busy Terminal 1. Many workers and travelers are unaware he's there, staging a protest in a nation where few people question authority.
The days are long. Feng gets to bed about midnight. He sleeps fitfully in a chair, often using his suitcase as a pillow. He rises at 6 a.m., jarred by the first passengers arriving on international flights.
On a white T-shirt, he has scrawled messages about his protest in both English and Mandarin -- pulling the garment over his luggage to create a small billboard.
One message reads, "The Chinese government is shameful."
He uses his cellphone to accept calls and send text messages. He also keeps a diary on his computer. He hasn't showered; instead he splashes water on his face in the restroom.
He eats only snacks -- candy, ramen noodles, cookies -- offered by well-meaning passengers and supporters.
Embarrassed airport authorities say they must follow regulations and would prefer that Feng enter Japan so they can be rid of him.
"Every day the officers gently try to coax me to leave," he said. "They say: 'It's a beautiful world out there. There's lots of good food to eat. All you have to do is walk through those doors.' "
For days Feng survived on tap water after Japanese officials refused to accept his money for snacks at airport eateries.
"The authorities obviously want to distance themselves," said Yang Jianli, a fellow at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government. "At first they thought if no food or supplies were provided, he would give up and enter Japan. But they miscalculated his determination."
Yang, a onetime Chinese political prisoner who met Feng this fall at a human rights conference in Washington, is funding a campaign to supply the activist with food and emotional support.
With Feng lodged in a high-security area between the airplane disembarkation point and immigration, airport officials will not allow non-traveling airport visitors to meet with him. The only way to reach him is to arrive via plane at the south wing of Terminal 1 and greet him at customs.
Hong Kong activist Christina Chan learned that lesson the hard way. Arriving at the north wing of the terminal, she was not allowed to see Feng.
So Yang paid her fare back to Hong Kong, where she boarded a different flight she knew would land in the south wing.
"He looks better than I thought he'd look," Chan, a pro-Tibet student campaigner, said of Feng. "He believes that if he sticks to his struggle, they will eventually have to let him back into China.
"It's a theme familiar to many: the right to go home again."
Feng's sister, Natsuki Suzuki, who lives in Japan, has not been allowed to visit her brother. But she calls him often on his cellphone.
"My brother is stubborn," Suzuki said. "He insists there is only one way for him to go -- back to China."
Feng, who has studied law, says he traveled to Japan from China in April after being inexplicably jailed for 41 days there. Chinese officials insisted that he could return to Shanghai in June, after the 20th anniversary of the Tiananmen Square crackdown, he said.
But when he tried to return in mid-June, authorities blocked his path and have rejected him since, Feng said.
One day at Narita, Feng spotted a top official in the Chinese Communist Party's international department passing by. He slipped a note to a member of his entourage but has not had a response.
Meanwhile, the sleepless nights and long days have begun to take their toll. Feng says he has started to feel weak. He has dark circles under his eyes and an open sore on his lower lip.
But he plans to stay put for as long as it takes to persuade the Chinese government to bend.
"I don't know how long I will stay," he said. "It all depends on the Chinese government."
john.glionna@latimes.com
Makino is a special correspondent.
Copyright © 2009, The Los Angeles Times
Tattoos have Japanese cover up
AFP October 29, 2009 9:43AM
SAMOAN-born All Black Rodney So'oialo, who has been put back at number-eight for the year's fourth and final trans-Tasman game in Tokyo on Saturday, has faced a culture clash this week over tattoos he and many of his team mates wear.
The All Blacks were told by team officials to cover up their tattooed arms and torsos with training vests when they took part in swimming pool sessions on Monday.
In Japan, tattoos traditionally associate a person with the yakuza, or Japanese mafia, who are heavily tattooed. Some public baths still refuse people entry if they have visible tattoos.
"Most people know that when you go to the pool in Japan you have to cover up. The players were reminded when we arrived,'' a team spokesman said. Asked about this, the 30-year-old So'oialo said tattoos on his left arm, including images of his family, had a "lot of meaning''.
"There is a lot of Asian heritage in mine and my wife's family,'' he said. "So the Asian tattoos are all over on my left arm.''
It will be the second time an Australia-New Zealand Test has played on neutral soil after a ground-breaker in Hong Kong last year. The two sides are on their way to end-of-year European tours.
SAMOAN-born All Black Rodney So'oialo, who has been put back at number-eight for the year's fourth and final trans-Tasman game in Tokyo on Saturday, has faced a culture clash this week over tattoos he and many of his team mates wear.
The All Blacks were told by team officials to cover up their tattooed arms and torsos with training vests when they took part in swimming pool sessions on Monday.
In Japan, tattoos traditionally associate a person with the yakuza, or Japanese mafia, who are heavily tattooed. Some public baths still refuse people entry if they have visible tattoos.
"Most people know that when you go to the pool in Japan you have to cover up. The players were reminded when we arrived,'' a team spokesman said. Asked about this, the 30-year-old So'oialo said tattoos on his left arm, including images of his family, had a "lot of meaning''.
"There is a lot of Asian heritage in mine and my wife's family,'' he said. "So the Asian tattoos are all over on my left arm.''
It will be the second time an Australia-New Zealand Test has played on neutral soil after a ground-breaker in Hong Kong last year. The two sides are on their way to end-of-year European tours.
Lucie Blackman, the dark world of Tokyo nightclub hostessing, and the man who made her an offer she couldn't refuse
By Clare Campbell
Last updated at 8:13 AM on 04th August 2009
Seeking money and excitement, Lucie Blackman left her home in Kent in May 2000 to find work in Tokyo as a nightclub hostess.
In the second part of an authoritative and groundbreaking book charting the life and death of the 21-year-old, we explain how she was instructed in the art of targeting wealthy customers. She was soon earning £1,500 a week - but other girls made more.
When one customer suggested Lucie boost her earnings by going to his apartment for a drink, she agreed, thinking it would be safe.
In fact, it would turn out to be the biggest mistake of her life...
Lucie Blackman and her best friend Louise Phillips stepped off the Virgin Atlantic flight from London at Tokyo’s Narita Airport on May 4, 2000. As former air stewardesses, they navigated their entry into this new world with the confidence of seasoned travellers.
They were tourists here to see the sights of fabulous Japan. Of course they were. The immigration inspector looked dispassionately at them before wearily stamping each passport. They were in.
Telling lies had been part of the crazy plan from the moment Louise had first thought of it.
There had been no discounted flight tickets courtesy of their former employer, British Airways - despite what Lucie had told her father. There was no ‘aunt’ of Louise’s to provide them with accommodation and nor would they be working legally, as they’d also assured Lucie’s dad.
Both of them were on tourist visas, like every other would-be gaijin (Western) bar hostess. They found somewhere to rent pretty quickly, a hostel sandwiched between the headquarters of the Japanese Communist Party Central Committee and an electricity substation. The price - 30,000 yen (£190) a month for a six-tatami room (six rush mats’ worth of floor space, about ten square metres). There were no carpets or soft furnishings, just a futon to sleep on and communal kitchen and bathroom. Even for seen-it-all Lucie, it was a shock. Pay all this money and what do you get?
They’d need a mobile phone, of course, but decided to rent one to share between them. Tokyo prices were jawdropping and Lucie’s credit card was already maxed out.
She needed money, and quickly, but that really was not going to be a problem.
Everything Lucie had ever heard or read about Tokyo seemed to be true. The city was vast, teeming, a megalopolis of 40 million. The way people held themselves was different; their body language as they swooped and manoeuvred like huge flocks of starlings. Wherever you went there was the crowd. An intense, crackling energy drove the city day and night.
Once they had settled in at the hostel, Lucie and Louise headed for Roppongi. Lucie knew all about it, or thought she did - Tokyo’s glittering, expensive, shiny entertainment district, the ‘favourite haunt of young Japanese and expats out for a night on the tiles’, as the guidebook blandly described it.
There was more to it than that, though. Roppongi was a legend among BA cabin crew. A place for hard-partiers, not backpackers, it had for decades been caught in that weird cultural hinterland of America-worship with a uniquely Japanese twist.
Roppongi was where Japanese men went to be entertained by gaijin girls and where Japanese women, who dressed up like schoolgirls tottering on stack heels, went to find gaijin boyfriends (it was a much commented-on phenomenon that nerdy gaijin men could date stunning Japanese girls. Being a foreigner of any sort in Japan was like being famous).
For a 21-year-old blonde from Sevenoaks who spoke no Japanese, finding work in Roppongi was not going to be a problem. The weekly freesheet for gaijin, Tokyo Classified, was full of ads: ‘Fun, exciting Club J F in Roppongi,’ wanted ‘genki (lively) girls who can entertain and like to enjoy themselves. Y2500 (£16) an hour plus tips. Call. We’re waiting.’
Club Climax was looking for ‘female dancers, hostesses, scouts, etc. Proper visa required’. That was a problem. So how about ‘Casablanca, now hiring Western hostesses. Very nice and friendly atmosphere Y3000-6000 (£20- £40) per hour plus bonus. Great business clientele’. No mention of visas there - and they were offering good money. Casablanca was the place.
Lucie and Louise glammed up and made their way to the club’s entrance with its tuxedoed doorman. He let them in without a word.
The manager, Tetsuo Nishi, eyed them professionally. These two were cool. He’d encountered their type many times before. Neither had work visas but what did that matter - they’d be gone in three months. Mama-san (the den mother) nodded her assent. They were hired.
The girls had struck lucky with Casablanca. It was one of the most popular (with Japanese men) clubs featuring foreign hostesses.
The place was comparatively small, done up like an over-upholstered living room, with black leather couches and dinky little tables, each just big enough for a bottle of whisky, a bottle of soda water and an ice bucket - with the obligatory karaoke system parked in one corner.
Chloe (not her real name), who was working at the club when Lucie and Louise showed up, remembered it clearly: ‘It was so bizarre, and so funny - that strange room with Ricky, the Filipino entertainer, launching into a desperate chorus of Do The Locomotion, while we sat laughing in the Doggy Box, a low sofa by the bar where we girls sat waiting for the men to pick us.
‘All the management told me when I started there was to “create a party atmosphere”.’
As new arrivals, Lucie and Louise were eyed with a certain suspicion by the other Casablanca girls. ‘New girls always stood out and were very popular with the customers,’ recalled Chloe.
‘I chatted to Louise first, who seemed very relaxed and in charge of herself. Then later she brought Lucie over. She was very different to Louise. She struck me as defensive, but at the same time very competitive.’
Lucie began on the nursery slopes of club work, as a kyaku-hiki (‘customerpuller’),handing out flyers in the streets, snuggling up to every drunk man walking by, trying to get him through the door with the strength of her bubbly personality. She hated it. ‘I feel like a prostitute standing on the corner,’ she told Louise.
After a few days, she was pulled inside by the mama-san to begin work properly as a hostess. Was she going to have a hostess name? Some girls called themselves things like ‘Passion’ or ‘Flame’. She’d stick with Lucie.
It would be printed on a business card with her personal mobile number (she’d certainly have to get one of those) and email address. Customers expected that.
There were plenty of dos and don’ts to learn. Girls were to be in their seats in
the Doggy Box by 7.30pm. When beckoned to a table with customers, hostesses were not allowed ‘private conversation’; indeed, chatting in any language besides Japanese or English was forbidden.
Make a mistake, break something, turn up late, and they would be fined. Habitual leg-crossing (considered especially vulgar) could mean being fired. Casablanca was tacky, with its sozzled manager and Ricky’s singing. But it was also one of
the most above-board establishments in Roppongi.
For the most part, it treated its girls well. There were places, it was said, where girls had their passports taken off them, where their pay was docked for putting on weight, where cocaine and methamphetamine were relentlessly pushed as surefire ways of
staying slim.
In the same building as Casablanca was Seventh Heaven, Tokyo’s largest strip club (‘with over 30 gorgeous exotic dancers, the majority from America’), but that was something else altogether. Stripping was not expected of Lucie and Louise.
Clothes were important, not bare flesh - a flash of cleavage or leg maybe, but not much more. Casablanca had its own dress code expressed in uncertain English: ‘Skirts should either be a miniskirt or a long skirt. Shoes should cover the ankle and have heels with a minimum height of three centimetres or higher.
‘T-shirts, pants, cardigans, sweaters and sandals are prohibited. Violations will lead to a disallowable of work for that day (hint: party dresses are OK). If you have questions, ask a member of the staff or an experienced hostess.’
The nightly ritual was as follows: as clients arrived, girls in the Doggy Box would say ‘irashimas’ [‘welcome’] and smile. Once a customer was seated, Tetsuo Nishi or, if he was too drunk (which was quite often), Tahara, the head waiter, would lead a girl over to him and introduce her.
Her first task was to make a small bow and smilingly exchange meishii, business cards. That little sliver of Japanese protocol was as important in a hostess bar as it was in a corporate boardroom.
One girl who worked with Lucie at Casablanca explained: ‘What you needed most of all was energy. The whole business was totally, mind-numbingly exhausting. You had to take something - drink or drugs - just to keep you going.
‘Alcohol was the easiest, and your tolerance grew the longer you were in Tokyo. I thought nothing of doing ten or 12 tequila shots before going out to dinner.’
Keeping the drink moving was vital. Behind the bar were bottles of Scotch belonging to regular customers. When one of them arrived, a waiter would bring his bottle to the table and the hostesses would attempt to pour it all, so he would have to buy another.
Some girls would go shot for shot with a customer. Unsurprisingly, they found it hard to stay sober.
There were no ‘members’ at Casablanca. Customers came and went as their fancies changed. There were single guys and married guys, rich and not so rich, reasonable-looking and ugly.
But who were they? The businesscard ritual told its own story. A Casablanca hostess kept her collection in a wallet, a time capsule of her Roppongi nights.
There was a retired senior officer with the Self Defence Force (the Japanese army) who was now head of a large company, lots of investment bankers, some advertising guys, oil exploration executives, a brace of Mitsubishi salarymen.
Plus some Westerners - a Californian wind-farm promoter and the owner of a Donegal wool mill on a sales mission (the Japanese liked tweed).
Often, there would be gaggles of men, noisy parties out on a settai (company outing) flushed with corporate solidarity.
But a keen hostess wasn’t interested in a group. She needed to find the single customer with big money to spend - the one who would keep coming back for more.
He would become the special target; she would sit next to him and do everything she could to enthral. A sempai (older mentor) would show her just how to do it: ‘You say: “Nomimono yoroshii desu ka?” [Would you like to buy me a drink?] If he already has a bottle you take ice like this, pour whisky like this, then water, stir together . . .
‘You dance when asked, light his cigarettes and swap the ashtray as soon as one cigarette has been put out in it. You make sure there are always four cubes of ice in a customer’s mizuwari [whisky and water] and wipe off any condensation from the glass.
‘If the customer needs the toilet, show him where it is and wait for him with an oshiburi [warm towel] outside. Bow when he takes it.’
If a customer saw a girl he liked sitting at another table, he could ask for her. It was called shimei - ‘choosing’ or ‘request’ - and he had to pay more for the privilege.
There was an internal hierarchy at the club, with a number one girl who made the most money and various pretenders to the crown.
The top girl had regular customers asking for her by name. She would get money for each request and a percentage of the takings for that table.
She might ask other girls to join her in a little circle of giggling, simulated infatuation. They played her charming younger sisters. The top girl got an extra monthly cash bonus and her assistants would get a lesser slice of the cake, but at least they were out of the Doggy Box.
Keeping the conversation rolling and acting genki was what mattered. In an email to her sister, Sophie, at home, Lucie confided that she was earning the equivalent of £1,500 a week: ‘I can’t believe I am paid so much just to pretend I am listening to them.’
Much of the time, the conversation was staggeringly banal. Some customers liked to talk about golf, others droned on about work.
Some men got down to the sukebei (dirty) stuff immediately: ‘How many times have you had sex?’ ‘Your breasts are like melons.’ They would also make crude remarks about the prostitutes they’d had sex with. As the boozing wore on, hands sometimes began to wander. But physical contact - if it happened at all - was transitory.
As a girl from Casablanca explained: ‘Kissing was frowned upon in the club, as other customers might want to “request” you. Request was more money for you and more money for the club. So no kissing and it was wise never physically to look attached.’
Casablanca hostesses worked six days a week. But they could also be working outside the club if they had a dohan (literally ‘going with’) - a date in which they went to dinner or to play golf, perhaps, acting as a customer’s fantasy girlfriend.
This was the money-shot, the centre of the whole hostess business. After two dohans with a man he was ‘her’ customer, and then each time he came to the club, the hostess received a cut of whatever was spent at his table.
The clubs demanded at least four dohans a month and paid a bonus for more than 12. Some had mandatory competitions for the girls to get the most customers - and posted scores in the dressing rooms just to heighten the tension. The whole system was designed to incentivise by humiliation.
Almost six weeks after Lucie arrived in Tokyo, the dohan wall chart at Casablanca placed her about 11th out of 20 girls. She had thought she was tough, but her fragile confidence was taking a pounding.
She wrote in her diary: ‘I’ve had one dohan. Another stood me up. I mean, how s*** must you be for a dohan to stand you up? Louise gets men falling over themselves to request her (she’s just falling so well into it) making heaps of friends and as usual, wherever I am, I feel alone . . .’
But there was one guy who did seem interested in Lucie. He came alone and spoke English. He said he was a company director, some sort of property developer.
He had a house in the Tokyo suburbs, a big place with a garden, plus an apartment downtown and one out by the sea. He had a boat.
Lucie’s thoughts are easy to imagine. This one was too good to lose. She’d better keep this one to herself. Perhaps even from Louise. He was offering all sorts of stuff, if she’d just come to his fabulous apartment out by the coast.
It was a risk, but one worth taking. It would bounce her right up the dohan charts. How could she say no?
July 1 was a Saturday. Lucie had found herself a proper boyfriend - a U.S. marine called Scott Fraser. She and Louise were having a rare night off from Casablanca, and planned instead to meet Scott for the evening.
But first, Lucie said something vague to Louise about an arrangement she had made with a customer. Shortly after midday, she put on a black dress and silver necklace and packed a smart handbag. She was dressed as though she was going on a dohan. She’d be back in plenty of time for their night out, she told Louise.
Three times that afternoon, she rang, just to keep in touch. Then, at 7.17pm, she called again, saying: ‘I’ll be back in half an hour.’
Lucie phoned Scott a few minutes later with the same message. They were all going out together that night. To Roppongi. It was going to be fantastic.
But she never showed up. Something had gone terribly wrong .. .
■ Extracted from Tokyo Hostess: Inside The Shocking World Of Tokyo Nightclub Hostessing by Clare Campbell, to be published by Sphere on August 20 at £14.99. © 2009 Clare Campbell. To order a copy p&p free, call 0845 155 0720.
Last updated at 8:13 AM on 04th August 2009
Seeking money and excitement, Lucie Blackman left her home in Kent in May 2000 to find work in Tokyo as a nightclub hostess.
In the second part of an authoritative and groundbreaking book charting the life and death of the 21-year-old, we explain how she was instructed in the art of targeting wealthy customers. She was soon earning £1,500 a week - but other girls made more.
When one customer suggested Lucie boost her earnings by going to his apartment for a drink, she agreed, thinking it would be safe.
In fact, it would turn out to be the biggest mistake of her life...
Lucie Blackman and her best friend Louise Phillips stepped off the Virgin Atlantic flight from London at Tokyo’s Narita Airport on May 4, 2000. As former air stewardesses, they navigated their entry into this new world with the confidence of seasoned travellers.
They were tourists here to see the sights of fabulous Japan. Of course they were. The immigration inspector looked dispassionately at them before wearily stamping each passport. They were in.
Telling lies had been part of the crazy plan from the moment Louise had first thought of it.
There had been no discounted flight tickets courtesy of their former employer, British Airways - despite what Lucie had told her father. There was no ‘aunt’ of Louise’s to provide them with accommodation and nor would they be working legally, as they’d also assured Lucie’s dad.
Both of them were on tourist visas, like every other would-be gaijin (Western) bar hostess. They found somewhere to rent pretty quickly, a hostel sandwiched between the headquarters of the Japanese Communist Party Central Committee and an electricity substation. The price - 30,000 yen (£190) a month for a six-tatami room (six rush mats’ worth of floor space, about ten square metres). There were no carpets or soft furnishings, just a futon to sleep on and communal kitchen and bathroom. Even for seen-it-all Lucie, it was a shock. Pay all this money and what do you get?
They’d need a mobile phone, of course, but decided to rent one to share between them. Tokyo prices were jawdropping and Lucie’s credit card was already maxed out.
She needed money, and quickly, but that really was not going to be a problem.
Everything Lucie had ever heard or read about Tokyo seemed to be true. The city was vast, teeming, a megalopolis of 40 million. The way people held themselves was different; their body language as they swooped and manoeuvred like huge flocks of starlings. Wherever you went there was the crowd. An intense, crackling energy drove the city day and night.
Once they had settled in at the hostel, Lucie and Louise headed for Roppongi. Lucie knew all about it, or thought she did - Tokyo’s glittering, expensive, shiny entertainment district, the ‘favourite haunt of young Japanese and expats out for a night on the tiles’, as the guidebook blandly described it.
There was more to it than that, though. Roppongi was a legend among BA cabin crew. A place for hard-partiers, not backpackers, it had for decades been caught in that weird cultural hinterland of America-worship with a uniquely Japanese twist.
Roppongi was where Japanese men went to be entertained by gaijin girls and where Japanese women, who dressed up like schoolgirls tottering on stack heels, went to find gaijin boyfriends (it was a much commented-on phenomenon that nerdy gaijin men could date stunning Japanese girls. Being a foreigner of any sort in Japan was like being famous).
For a 21-year-old blonde from Sevenoaks who spoke no Japanese, finding work in Roppongi was not going to be a problem. The weekly freesheet for gaijin, Tokyo Classified, was full of ads: ‘Fun, exciting Club J F in Roppongi,’ wanted ‘genki (lively) girls who can entertain and like to enjoy themselves. Y2500 (£16) an hour plus tips. Call. We’re waiting.’
Club Climax was looking for ‘female dancers, hostesses, scouts, etc. Proper visa required’. That was a problem. So how about ‘Casablanca, now hiring Western hostesses. Very nice and friendly atmosphere Y3000-6000 (£20- £40) per hour plus bonus. Great business clientele’. No mention of visas there - and they were offering good money. Casablanca was the place.
Lucie and Louise glammed up and made their way to the club’s entrance with its tuxedoed doorman. He let them in without a word.
The manager, Tetsuo Nishi, eyed them professionally. These two were cool. He’d encountered their type many times before. Neither had work visas but what did that matter - they’d be gone in three months. Mama-san (the den mother) nodded her assent. They were hired.
The girls had struck lucky with Casablanca. It was one of the most popular (with Japanese men) clubs featuring foreign hostesses.
The place was comparatively small, done up like an over-upholstered living room, with black leather couches and dinky little tables, each just big enough for a bottle of whisky, a bottle of soda water and an ice bucket - with the obligatory karaoke system parked in one corner.
Chloe (not her real name), who was working at the club when Lucie and Louise showed up, remembered it clearly: ‘It was so bizarre, and so funny - that strange room with Ricky, the Filipino entertainer, launching into a desperate chorus of Do The Locomotion, while we sat laughing in the Doggy Box, a low sofa by the bar where we girls sat waiting for the men to pick us.
‘All the management told me when I started there was to “create a party atmosphere”.’
As new arrivals, Lucie and Louise were eyed with a certain suspicion by the other Casablanca girls. ‘New girls always stood out and were very popular with the customers,’ recalled Chloe.
‘I chatted to Louise first, who seemed very relaxed and in charge of herself. Then later she brought Lucie over. She was very different to Louise. She struck me as defensive, but at the same time very competitive.’
Lucie began on the nursery slopes of club work, as a kyaku-hiki (‘customerpuller’),handing out flyers in the streets, snuggling up to every drunk man walking by, trying to get him through the door with the strength of her bubbly personality. She hated it. ‘I feel like a prostitute standing on the corner,’ she told Louise.
After a few days, she was pulled inside by the mama-san to begin work properly as a hostess. Was she going to have a hostess name? Some girls called themselves things like ‘Passion’ or ‘Flame’. She’d stick with Lucie.
It would be printed on a business card with her personal mobile number (she’d certainly have to get one of those) and email address. Customers expected that.
There were plenty of dos and don’ts to learn. Girls were to be in their seats in
the Doggy Box by 7.30pm. When beckoned to a table with customers, hostesses were not allowed ‘private conversation’; indeed, chatting in any language besides Japanese or English was forbidden.
Make a mistake, break something, turn up late, and they would be fined. Habitual leg-crossing (considered especially vulgar) could mean being fired. Casablanca was tacky, with its sozzled manager and Ricky’s singing. But it was also one of
the most above-board establishments in Roppongi.
For the most part, it treated its girls well. There were places, it was said, where girls had their passports taken off them, where their pay was docked for putting on weight, where cocaine and methamphetamine were relentlessly pushed as surefire ways of
staying slim.
In the same building as Casablanca was Seventh Heaven, Tokyo’s largest strip club (‘with over 30 gorgeous exotic dancers, the majority from America’), but that was something else altogether. Stripping was not expected of Lucie and Louise.
Clothes were important, not bare flesh - a flash of cleavage or leg maybe, but not much more. Casablanca had its own dress code expressed in uncertain English: ‘Skirts should either be a miniskirt or a long skirt. Shoes should cover the ankle and have heels with a minimum height of three centimetres or higher.
‘T-shirts, pants, cardigans, sweaters and sandals are prohibited. Violations will lead to a disallowable of work for that day (hint: party dresses are OK). If you have questions, ask a member of the staff or an experienced hostess.’
The nightly ritual was as follows: as clients arrived, girls in the Doggy Box would say ‘irashimas’ [‘welcome’] and smile. Once a customer was seated, Tetsuo Nishi or, if he was too drunk (which was quite often), Tahara, the head waiter, would lead a girl over to him and introduce her.
Her first task was to make a small bow and smilingly exchange meishii, business cards. That little sliver of Japanese protocol was as important in a hostess bar as it was in a corporate boardroom.
One girl who worked with Lucie at Casablanca explained: ‘What you needed most of all was energy. The whole business was totally, mind-numbingly exhausting. You had to take something - drink or drugs - just to keep you going.
‘Alcohol was the easiest, and your tolerance grew the longer you were in Tokyo. I thought nothing of doing ten or 12 tequila shots before going out to dinner.’
Keeping the drink moving was vital. Behind the bar were bottles of Scotch belonging to regular customers. When one of them arrived, a waiter would bring his bottle to the table and the hostesses would attempt to pour it all, so he would have to buy another.
Some girls would go shot for shot with a customer. Unsurprisingly, they found it hard to stay sober.
There were no ‘members’ at Casablanca. Customers came and went as their fancies changed. There were single guys and married guys, rich and not so rich, reasonable-looking and ugly.
But who were they? The businesscard ritual told its own story. A Casablanca hostess kept her collection in a wallet, a time capsule of her Roppongi nights.
There was a retired senior officer with the Self Defence Force (the Japanese army) who was now head of a large company, lots of investment bankers, some advertising guys, oil exploration executives, a brace of Mitsubishi salarymen.
Plus some Westerners - a Californian wind-farm promoter and the owner of a Donegal wool mill on a sales mission (the Japanese liked tweed).
Often, there would be gaggles of men, noisy parties out on a settai (company outing) flushed with corporate solidarity.
But a keen hostess wasn’t interested in a group. She needed to find the single customer with big money to spend - the one who would keep coming back for more.
He would become the special target; she would sit next to him and do everything she could to enthral. A sempai (older mentor) would show her just how to do it: ‘You say: “Nomimono yoroshii desu ka?” [Would you like to buy me a drink?] If he already has a bottle you take ice like this, pour whisky like this, then water, stir together . . .
‘You dance when asked, light his cigarettes and swap the ashtray as soon as one cigarette has been put out in it. You make sure there are always four cubes of ice in a customer’s mizuwari [whisky and water] and wipe off any condensation from the glass.
‘If the customer needs the toilet, show him where it is and wait for him with an oshiburi [warm towel] outside. Bow when he takes it.’
If a customer saw a girl he liked sitting at another table, he could ask for her. It was called shimei - ‘choosing’ or ‘request’ - and he had to pay more for the privilege.
There was an internal hierarchy at the club, with a number one girl who made the most money and various pretenders to the crown.
The top girl had regular customers asking for her by name. She would get money for each request and a percentage of the takings for that table.
She might ask other girls to join her in a little circle of giggling, simulated infatuation. They played her charming younger sisters. The top girl got an extra monthly cash bonus and her assistants would get a lesser slice of the cake, but at least they were out of the Doggy Box.
Keeping the conversation rolling and acting genki was what mattered. In an email to her sister, Sophie, at home, Lucie confided that she was earning the equivalent of £1,500 a week: ‘I can’t believe I am paid so much just to pretend I am listening to them.’
Much of the time, the conversation was staggeringly banal. Some customers liked to talk about golf, others droned on about work.
Some men got down to the sukebei (dirty) stuff immediately: ‘How many times have you had sex?’ ‘Your breasts are like melons.’ They would also make crude remarks about the prostitutes they’d had sex with. As the boozing wore on, hands sometimes began to wander. But physical contact - if it happened at all - was transitory.
As a girl from Casablanca explained: ‘Kissing was frowned upon in the club, as other customers might want to “request” you. Request was more money for you and more money for the club. So no kissing and it was wise never physically to look attached.’
Casablanca hostesses worked six days a week. But they could also be working outside the club if they had a dohan (literally ‘going with’) - a date in which they went to dinner or to play golf, perhaps, acting as a customer’s fantasy girlfriend.
This was the money-shot, the centre of the whole hostess business. After two dohans with a man he was ‘her’ customer, and then each time he came to the club, the hostess received a cut of whatever was spent at his table.
The clubs demanded at least four dohans a month and paid a bonus for more than 12. Some had mandatory competitions for the girls to get the most customers - and posted scores in the dressing rooms just to heighten the tension. The whole system was designed to incentivise by humiliation.
Almost six weeks after Lucie arrived in Tokyo, the dohan wall chart at Casablanca placed her about 11th out of 20 girls. She had thought she was tough, but her fragile confidence was taking a pounding.
She wrote in her diary: ‘I’ve had one dohan. Another stood me up. I mean, how s*** must you be for a dohan to stand you up? Louise gets men falling over themselves to request her (she’s just falling so well into it) making heaps of friends and as usual, wherever I am, I feel alone . . .’
But there was one guy who did seem interested in Lucie. He came alone and spoke English. He said he was a company director, some sort of property developer.
He had a house in the Tokyo suburbs, a big place with a garden, plus an apartment downtown and one out by the sea. He had a boat.
Lucie’s thoughts are easy to imagine. This one was too good to lose. She’d better keep this one to herself. Perhaps even from Louise. He was offering all sorts of stuff, if she’d just come to his fabulous apartment out by the coast.
It was a risk, but one worth taking. It would bounce her right up the dohan charts. How could she say no?
July 1 was a Saturday. Lucie had found herself a proper boyfriend - a U.S. marine called Scott Fraser. She and Louise were having a rare night off from Casablanca, and planned instead to meet Scott for the evening.
But first, Lucie said something vague to Louise about an arrangement she had made with a customer. Shortly after midday, she put on a black dress and silver necklace and packed a smart handbag. She was dressed as though she was going on a dohan. She’d be back in plenty of time for their night out, she told Louise.
Three times that afternoon, she rang, just to keep in touch. Then, at 7.17pm, she called again, saying: ‘I’ll be back in half an hour.’
Lucie phoned Scott a few minutes later with the same message. They were all going out together that night. To Roppongi. It was going to be fantastic.
But she never showed up. Something had gone terribly wrong .. .
■ Extracted from Tokyo Hostess: Inside The Shocking World Of Tokyo Nightclub Hostessing by Clare Campbell, to be published by Sphere on August 20 at £14.99. © 2009 Clare Campbell. To order a copy p&p free, call 0845 155 0720.
Flush before you fly: Japanese airline asks passengers to 'empty bladders' before take-off
By Sarah Gordon
Last updated at 11:41 AM on 06th October 2009
A Japanese airline has embraced a controversial new method of reducing aircraft weight - by asking passengers to spend a penny before boarding.
All Nippon Airways has announced that 'loo monitors' will be positioned by the boarding gates in terminals to ask waiting passengers to use the toilets before entering the aircraft.
The airline believes that empty bladders will equal lighter passengers and therefore, a reduction in carbon emissions.
In fact, it believes the weight saved could lead to a five-tonne reduction in carbon emissions over the course of a month, according to Japan’s NHK television station.
All Nippon Airways brought in the controversial policy on October 1 as a month-long experiment.
However, it may expand the trial if it is successful and well-received by passengers.
TravelMail put the money-saving idea to Ryanair, an airline renowned for its cost-cutting measures.
'We have actually been looking at removing two of the toilets on board in favour of one coin-operated cubicle, and encouraging people to use the toilets in the terminal before boarding,' explains spokesman Stephen McNamara .
Controversial new aircraft design puts passengers face-to-face in rows
Crocodile attacks tourist answering 'call of nature' in Cancun, Mexico
One in ten people unhappy with the standards of hygiene in British hotels
'So perhaps the airline got the "go before you go" idea from us. Our idea to will allow us to ultimately put more seats on each plane and charge a lower fare.'
The unusual bid to reduce weight on board is the latest in a long list of cost-cutting measures used by different airlines.
As well as coin-operated toilets, Ryanair is removing check-in desks and has discussed the idea of offering standing room on flights.
Australia's budget carrier Jetstar is also asking passengers to print out their own luggage tags.
Last updated at 11:41 AM on 06th October 2009
A Japanese airline has embraced a controversial new method of reducing aircraft weight - by asking passengers to spend a penny before boarding.
All Nippon Airways has announced that 'loo monitors' will be positioned by the boarding gates in terminals to ask waiting passengers to use the toilets before entering the aircraft.
The airline believes that empty bladders will equal lighter passengers and therefore, a reduction in carbon emissions.
In fact, it believes the weight saved could lead to a five-tonne reduction in carbon emissions over the course of a month, according to Japan’s NHK television station.
All Nippon Airways brought in the controversial policy on October 1 as a month-long experiment.
However, it may expand the trial if it is successful and well-received by passengers.
TravelMail put the money-saving idea to Ryanair, an airline renowned for its cost-cutting measures.
'We have actually been looking at removing two of the toilets on board in favour of one coin-operated cubicle, and encouraging people to use the toilets in the terminal before boarding,' explains spokesman Stephen McNamara .
Controversial new aircraft design puts passengers face-to-face in rows
Crocodile attacks tourist answering 'call of nature' in Cancun, Mexico
One in ten people unhappy with the standards of hygiene in British hotels
'So perhaps the airline got the "go before you go" idea from us. Our idea to will allow us to ultimately put more seats on each plane and charge a lower fare.'
The unusual bid to reduce weight on board is the latest in a long list of cost-cutting measures used by different airlines.
As well as coin-operated toilets, Ryanair is removing check-in desks and has discussed the idea of offering standing room on flights.
Australia's budget carrier Jetstar is also asking passengers to print out their own luggage tags.
Scant welcome for refugees in Japan
By Abigail Mawdsley
BBC News, Tokyo
In a cramped apartment in Tokyo, volunteers are teaching Burmese asylum seekers how to make clothes combining Japanese fashion with their own traditional embroidery.
They hope the project will give women like Lu [not her real name] a way to make ends meet.
It has been three years since Lu fled Burma, leaving her husband and children behind. She claimed asylum on arrival in Tokyo and was sent straight to an immigration detention centre where she spent almost a year.
Two years on she is still waiting for a final decision on her status. Every day is a struggle to get by. Like many people claiming asylum in Japan, she is denied government financial aid but also banned from getting a job.
"I'm not allowed to work, but if I don't work I can't live. I get no financial assistance, I'm supporting myself."
When asked about her experience in Japan, she is visibly upset.
"I love my country but I couldn't stay there," she says.
"When I came here, I believed that because Japan is a democracy they would welcome me, because I'm a refugee. But it hasn't. I'm really afraid for my future. I feel very sad."
REFUGEES WORLDWIDE
USA: 16,742
France: 11,441
Germany: 7,853
UK: 7,079
Australia: 1,854
Japan: 417
Number of people granted refugee status or some other form of protection in 2008 (UNHCR)
Japan is one of the largest single donors providing financial aid and assistance to refugees overseas.
But critics say that is in stark contrast to the reception given to asylum seekers at home.
Last year the world's second-largest economy granted refugee status to just 57 people - a tiny number compared to most other wealthy countries. But it is still an almost four-fold increase on 10 years ago.
Another 360 people were given special residence permits on humanitarian grounds, but with fewer rights and benefits than fully recognised refugees.
'Unwelcoming'
Part of the reason the number of recognitions is low is that is the number of people applying for refugee status in Japan has also been relatively low.
Japan is comparatively hard to get to and presents a linguistic challenge to many asylum seekers.
The flow of people has tended to be outwards rather than inwards and governments have traditionally adopted tight border controls, fearing immigration could harm social cohesion.
Human rights groups like the Japan Association for Refugees (Jar) say the system is unwelcoming.
They say communication problems, lack of appropriate legal advice and the lack of an independent appeals procedure have led to a high rate of refusals in the past and deterred some people from even applying.
Incidents like the high-profile deportation of two UN-recognised Kurdish refugees in 2005 have also made it seem like a poor option to some.
"Japan wants to be seen as a humanitarian giant," says Hiroaka Ishii, the acting head of Jar. "To do so it must look at how it treats people inside as well as outside of the country."
"I feel that we need a more generous attitude," he says.
Financial hardship
Those who do apply for refugee status often find themselves in a similar situation to Lu - with no access to financial support but no legal right to work.
Asylum seekers in Japan do not qualify for general public assistance or health insurance, although a small amount of money is made available through the foreign ministry to those considered the most needy.
Even for the few who qualify, it is less money than Japanese people on welfare receive and is only available for four months, though this can be extended.
Campaign groups say many asylum seekers are left facing extreme financial hardship.
And they say that this hardship is getting worse because the number of people seeking asylum is growing while the funds for assistance and the number of people processing claims are not keeping up.
"Since 2006, the number of asylum seekers coming to Japan rapidly increased," says Mr Ishii.
"That has caused many problems, both in terms of financial support but also the length of time people have to wait for their applications to be decided. Many people are really suffering."
There is currently nothing in Japanese law that guarantees even a minimum safety net to asylum seekers, he says. Jar and other campaign groups are calling for this to change.
Asked to comment, the foreign ministry told the BBC it "would continue to consider taking the necessary measures to protect applicants… by carefully examining the situation surrounding refugee applications."
'Progress'
Johan Cels, the UN refugee agency's representative to Japan, agrees on the need for people awaiting a decision on their status to have access to basic assistance.
But he says it is also important to recognise that positive changes have been made.
"Last year saw the highest figures ever [for granting of refugee status or permission to stay on humanitarian grounds] and it's a development," he says.
Changes to the law in 2004 relaxed policy in some areas, such as getting rid of a 60-day limit to apply for refugee status after entering the country.
And he says an agreement for a pilot resettlement programme for Burmese refugees beginning next year is a milestone, despite only involving 30 people a year.
Looking forward, he is cautiously optimistic.
"The new government has made quite a number of references to the refugee issue not only here in Japan but worldwide. We hope it will translate into concrete actions."
Mr Ishii also hopes the new Democratic Party of Japan-led government will take a fresh look at asylum policy.
"Among the parliament members from the governing party coalition there are many people who have shown concern about refugee issues," he says.
"Now they have moved from opposition to the ruling party, of course we are expecting some improvements will come."
But for people like Lu, they cannot come soon enough.
Published: 2009/11/18 06:40:22 GMT
© BBC MMIX
BBC News, Tokyo
In a cramped apartment in Tokyo, volunteers are teaching Burmese asylum seekers how to make clothes combining Japanese fashion with their own traditional embroidery.
They hope the project will give women like Lu [not her real name] a way to make ends meet.
It has been three years since Lu fled Burma, leaving her husband and children behind. She claimed asylum on arrival in Tokyo and was sent straight to an immigration detention centre where she spent almost a year.
Two years on she is still waiting for a final decision on her status. Every day is a struggle to get by. Like many people claiming asylum in Japan, she is denied government financial aid but also banned from getting a job.
"I'm not allowed to work, but if I don't work I can't live. I get no financial assistance, I'm supporting myself."
When asked about her experience in Japan, she is visibly upset.
"I love my country but I couldn't stay there," she says.
"When I came here, I believed that because Japan is a democracy they would welcome me, because I'm a refugee. But it hasn't. I'm really afraid for my future. I feel very sad."
REFUGEES WORLDWIDE
USA: 16,742
France: 11,441
Germany: 7,853
UK: 7,079
Australia: 1,854
Japan: 417
Number of people granted refugee status or some other form of protection in 2008 (UNHCR)
Japan is one of the largest single donors providing financial aid and assistance to refugees overseas.
But critics say that is in stark contrast to the reception given to asylum seekers at home.
Last year the world's second-largest economy granted refugee status to just 57 people - a tiny number compared to most other wealthy countries. But it is still an almost four-fold increase on 10 years ago.
Another 360 people were given special residence permits on humanitarian grounds, but with fewer rights and benefits than fully recognised refugees.
'Unwelcoming'
Part of the reason the number of recognitions is low is that is the number of people applying for refugee status in Japan has also been relatively low.
Japan is comparatively hard to get to and presents a linguistic challenge to many asylum seekers.
The flow of people has tended to be outwards rather than inwards and governments have traditionally adopted tight border controls, fearing immigration could harm social cohesion.
Human rights groups like the Japan Association for Refugees (Jar) say the system is unwelcoming.
They say communication problems, lack of appropriate legal advice and the lack of an independent appeals procedure have led to a high rate of refusals in the past and deterred some people from even applying.
Incidents like the high-profile deportation of two UN-recognised Kurdish refugees in 2005 have also made it seem like a poor option to some.
"Japan wants to be seen as a humanitarian giant," says Hiroaka Ishii, the acting head of Jar. "To do so it must look at how it treats people inside as well as outside of the country."
"I feel that we need a more generous attitude," he says.
Financial hardship
Those who do apply for refugee status often find themselves in a similar situation to Lu - with no access to financial support but no legal right to work.
Asylum seekers in Japan do not qualify for general public assistance or health insurance, although a small amount of money is made available through the foreign ministry to those considered the most needy.
Even for the few who qualify, it is less money than Japanese people on welfare receive and is only available for four months, though this can be extended.
Campaign groups say many asylum seekers are left facing extreme financial hardship.
And they say that this hardship is getting worse because the number of people seeking asylum is growing while the funds for assistance and the number of people processing claims are not keeping up.
"Since 2006, the number of asylum seekers coming to Japan rapidly increased," says Mr Ishii.
"That has caused many problems, both in terms of financial support but also the length of time people have to wait for their applications to be decided. Many people are really suffering."
There is currently nothing in Japanese law that guarantees even a minimum safety net to asylum seekers, he says. Jar and other campaign groups are calling for this to change.
Asked to comment, the foreign ministry told the BBC it "would continue to consider taking the necessary measures to protect applicants… by carefully examining the situation surrounding refugee applications."
'Progress'
Johan Cels, the UN refugee agency's representative to Japan, agrees on the need for people awaiting a decision on their status to have access to basic assistance.
But he says it is also important to recognise that positive changes have been made.
"Last year saw the highest figures ever [for granting of refugee status or permission to stay on humanitarian grounds] and it's a development," he says.
Changes to the law in 2004 relaxed policy in some areas, such as getting rid of a 60-day limit to apply for refugee status after entering the country.
And he says an agreement for a pilot resettlement programme for Burmese refugees beginning next year is a milestone, despite only involving 30 people a year.
Looking forward, he is cautiously optimistic.
"The new government has made quite a number of references to the refugee issue not only here in Japan but worldwide. We hope it will translate into concrete actions."
Mr Ishii also hopes the new Democratic Party of Japan-led government will take a fresh look at asylum policy.
"Among the parliament members from the governing party coalition there are many people who have shown concern about refugee issues," he says.
"Now they have moved from opposition to the ruling party, of course we are expecting some improvements will come."
But for people like Lu, they cannot come soon enough.
Published: 2009/11/18 06:40:22 GMT
© BBC MMIX
Vitamin cafes: Japan's latest health injection
Story Highlights
* Intravenous vitamin boosts are the latest health fad in Japan
* Vitamin injections target specific health aliments and beauty concerns
* Nutritionists warn of vitamin overdose from high quantities of supplements
* Vitamin injections are popular among celebrities and businessmen for fatigue
(CNN) -- In trendy neighborhoods of Tokyo customers are lining up for vitamin injections that promise to improve health and beauty.
These intravenous vitamin "drips" are part of the latest quick-fix, health fad catching on in Japan: the IV cafe.
Each drip pack contains saline solution and specific vitamins and minerals to target a particular health ailment or beauty concern.
"I used to take vitamin supplements, but changed to the IV drip because I feel the effects more quickly," a 20-something woman at the Tenteki 10 Café told CNN. She said she receives specific injections to get better skin, burn fat and boost her energy.
There are 10 different varieties to choose from at Tenteki. The "orange" variety touts anti-aging properties, loaded with antioxidants. The "placenta pack" is said to help rejuvenate and ease muscle stiffness.
Prices range from $20-$30 per injection, and nurses see about 30-40 people each day. Their most common patients are Japanese businessmen who work in the same office building.
"I see a lot of businessmen who say they don't have time to sleep. They can't take a break from working and get the vitamin drip for an extra kick of energy," a Tenteki nurse told CNN.
"Blue" is the most requested vitamin pack among these men: a concoction of B1 and vitamin E that claims to offer relief from exhaustion.
Registered nurses and doctors administer the drips at Tenteki, but there's no conclusive medical evidence to back up the health claims.
Many nutritionists actually caution against using injectable vitamin supplements because the quantities are not regulated.
"More is not necessarily better...some vitamins and minerals can be toxic in high doses," particularly the fat-soluble ones which the body stores like Vitamins A, D, E and K, explained Claire Williamson, Nutrition Scientist at the British Nutrition Foundation.
In Europe and the United States vitamin shots are popular among celebrities with hectic lifestyles and little time to sleep, particularly vitamin B 12.
Former Spice Girl Geri Halliwell and singer Robbie Williams have both confirmed they've used the shots as part of their diets to maintain stamina during tours.
Dermatological injections of Vitamin C are also popular among women hoping to keep their skin looking young. Former supermodel Cindy Crawford has admitted using such injections to keep her skin firm and wrinkle-free.
According to Williamson, it does not matter if supplements are injected into the vein or into the skin. "At the end of the day it will go into the blood stream," she said.
Most of these nutrients we can get sufficient from foods, nutrients tend to be better absorbed by the body if they are consumed in foods."
* Intravenous vitamin boosts are the latest health fad in Japan
* Vitamin injections target specific health aliments and beauty concerns
* Nutritionists warn of vitamin overdose from high quantities of supplements
* Vitamin injections are popular among celebrities and businessmen for fatigue
(CNN) -- In trendy neighborhoods of Tokyo customers are lining up for vitamin injections that promise to improve health and beauty.
These intravenous vitamin "drips" are part of the latest quick-fix, health fad catching on in Japan: the IV cafe.
Each drip pack contains saline solution and specific vitamins and minerals to target a particular health ailment or beauty concern.
"I used to take vitamin supplements, but changed to the IV drip because I feel the effects more quickly," a 20-something woman at the Tenteki 10 Café told CNN. She said she receives specific injections to get better skin, burn fat and boost her energy.
There are 10 different varieties to choose from at Tenteki. The "orange" variety touts anti-aging properties, loaded with antioxidants. The "placenta pack" is said to help rejuvenate and ease muscle stiffness.
Prices range from $20-$30 per injection, and nurses see about 30-40 people each day. Their most common patients are Japanese businessmen who work in the same office building.
"I see a lot of businessmen who say they don't have time to sleep. They can't take a break from working and get the vitamin drip for an extra kick of energy," a Tenteki nurse told CNN.
"Blue" is the most requested vitamin pack among these men: a concoction of B1 and vitamin E that claims to offer relief from exhaustion.
Registered nurses and doctors administer the drips at Tenteki, but there's no conclusive medical evidence to back up the health claims.
Many nutritionists actually caution against using injectable vitamin supplements because the quantities are not regulated.
"More is not necessarily better...some vitamins and minerals can be toxic in high doses," particularly the fat-soluble ones which the body stores like Vitamins A, D, E and K, explained Claire Williamson, Nutrition Scientist at the British Nutrition Foundation.
In Europe and the United States vitamin shots are popular among celebrities with hectic lifestyles and little time to sleep, particularly vitamin B 12.
Former Spice Girl Geri Halliwell and singer Robbie Williams have both confirmed they've used the shots as part of their diets to maintain stamina during tours.
Dermatological injections of Vitamin C are also popular among women hoping to keep their skin looking young. Former supermodel Cindy Crawford has admitted using such injections to keep her skin firm and wrinkle-free.
According to Williamson, it does not matter if supplements are injected into the vein or into the skin. "At the end of the day it will go into the blood stream," she said.
Most of these nutrients we can get sufficient from foods, nutrients tend to be better absorbed by the body if they are consumed in foods."
Fewer Korean Residents Seek Japanese Citizenship
englishnews@chosun.com / Nov. 19, 2009 10:33 KST
Four out of five Koreans in Japan have no desire to become naturalized Japanese citizens, a straw poll suggests. The Korea University Center for Japanese Studies on Wednesday released a survey of 502 Korean residents in Japan.
The last survey of the kind was when the Korean Residents Union in Japan or Mindan surveyed around 1,300 people in 2000.
In the new poll, 21.7 percent of respondents said they wished to become naturalized Japanese citizens, much the same as the 24.9 percent who said so in the Mindan survey in 2000 but down significantly from 37 percent in a 1995 survey conducted by the Korean Embassy.
The most common reason respondents gave for wanting to keep their Korean passport was a sense of national identity, with 42.6 percent, followed by a lack of practical need for Japanese citizenship with 36.4 percent of them. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, around 62,000 North Koreans and around 486,000 South Koreans have settled in Japan with permanent residency status as of July 2009. Another estimated 30,000 Korean residents did not choose either North or South Korean citizenship when the peninsula was divided.
Japanese Justice Ministry statistics show around 10,000 Koreans became naturalized between 2003 and 2009. "More and more North Korean and undecided citizenship holders became naturalized Japanese citizens but a decreasing number of South Koreans made the move," said Chung Chang-won, who directed the latest survey by the Korea University Center for Japanese Studies. "This is due to North Korea's notoriety as an impoverished country, while South Korea's international status has risen."
According to Mindan, the number of Koreans in Japan with undecided citizenship decreased from around 100,000 in 2000 to around 30,000 in 2009.
The survey shows a rise in the number of Koreans in Japan who used their Korean names instead of Japanese ones. In the 2000 survey by Mindan, only 13.4 percent of Korean residents said they used their Korean names only or most of the time. But in the latest survey, 25.4 percent said they used only their Korean names. "Following the easing of travel restrictions in 1988, many new Koreans moved to Japan, and this has had an influence," Chung said.
Kwon Ik-ho of Chung-Ang University, said, "It appears that the development of the Korean economy and the popularity of Korean culture and movies in Japan strengthened the pride felt among Korean residents there."
Four out of five Koreans in Japan have no desire to become naturalized Japanese citizens, a straw poll suggests. The Korea University Center for Japanese Studies on Wednesday released a survey of 502 Korean residents in Japan.
The last survey of the kind was when the Korean Residents Union in Japan or Mindan surveyed around 1,300 people in 2000.
In the new poll, 21.7 percent of respondents said they wished to become naturalized Japanese citizens, much the same as the 24.9 percent who said so in the Mindan survey in 2000 but down significantly from 37 percent in a 1995 survey conducted by the Korean Embassy.
The most common reason respondents gave for wanting to keep their Korean passport was a sense of national identity, with 42.6 percent, followed by a lack of practical need for Japanese citizenship with 36.4 percent of them. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, around 62,000 North Koreans and around 486,000 South Koreans have settled in Japan with permanent residency status as of July 2009. Another estimated 30,000 Korean residents did not choose either North or South Korean citizenship when the peninsula was divided.
Japanese Justice Ministry statistics show around 10,000 Koreans became naturalized between 2003 and 2009. "More and more North Korean and undecided citizenship holders became naturalized Japanese citizens but a decreasing number of South Koreans made the move," said Chung Chang-won, who directed the latest survey by the Korea University Center for Japanese Studies. "This is due to North Korea's notoriety as an impoverished country, while South Korea's international status has risen."
According to Mindan, the number of Koreans in Japan with undecided citizenship decreased from around 100,000 in 2000 to around 30,000 in 2009.
The survey shows a rise in the number of Koreans in Japan who used their Korean names instead of Japanese ones. In the 2000 survey by Mindan, only 13.4 percent of Korean residents said they used their Korean names only or most of the time. But in the latest survey, 25.4 percent said they used only their Korean names. "Following the easing of travel restrictions in 1988, many new Koreans moved to Japan, and this has had an influence," Chung said.
Kwon Ik-ho of Chung-Ang University, said, "It appears that the development of the Korean economy and the popularity of Korean culture and movies in Japan strengthened the pride felt among Korean residents there."
Wednesday, November 18, 2009
China: Self-Centered on the World's Center Stage
Wednesday, Nov. 18, 2009
China: Self-Centered on the World's Center Stage
By Austin Ramzy / Beijing
President Barack Obama went to Beijing with a broad array of issues to put before China's leaders. If there was one theme that linked them, it was that U.S.-China ties were no longer just about the U.S. and China; they were also about the rest of the world.
"The relationship between the United States and China has never been more important to our collective future," Obama said on Tuesday as he stood before reporters with Chinese President Hu Jintao. "The major challenges of the 21st century, from climate change to nuclear proliferation to economic recovery, are challenges that touch both our nations and challenges that neither of our nations can solve by acting alone. That's why the United States welcomes China's efforts in playing a greater role on the world stage — a role in which a growing economy is joined by growing responsibilities."
China, for its part, has been reluctant to take up those new responsibilities. The late paramount leader Deng Xiaoping once admonished his countrymen to "disguise their ambitions and hide their claws." It was useful advice for a country trying to pull itself out of decades of war and chaos. But now China's booming economy and resilience in the face of the global slowdown have left it in a prime position. It holds nearly $800 billion in U.S. Treasuries, making it Washington's biggest creditor. But Beijing is still not confident in acting on the world stage for any interest besides its own. A recent survey of Chinese élites by Pacific Forum CSIS, a Honolulu-based foreign policy research institute, found that more than 90% rejected a special leadership role for China and more than 70% said the greatest contribution the country could provide the world would be to provide for its own development.
While China has vastly expanded trade ties and investments in Africa, Central Asia and South America, its foremost goal is to ensure its access to natural resources. In Afghanistan, China's $3 billion copper-mine investment is the country's largest single investment, but the stability of the war-torn region didn't merit a mention in Hu's 20-minute address. Neither did appreciation of China's currency, the renminbi, which Obama called "an essential contribution to the global rebalancing effort." Hu did, however, say that China and the U.S. "need to oppose and reject protectionism in all its manifestations in an even stronger stand," reinforcing China's view that recent U.S. tariffs pose a greater threat to the global economy than an undervalued renminbi, which has helped China prop up its exports sector even as global trade has slumped. (See pictures of China's economic expansion into Africa.)
But while Obama leaves Beijing with little in the way of a diplomatic victory, Hu was able to win some acknowledgments from the U.S. Obama said the U.S. considers Tibet to be part of the People's Republic of China. While that is long-standing American policy, scholars could recall no point when a U.S. President has stated it publicly. Territorial questions like Tibet remain top priorities for China, and Obama's mention of that issue was a key win for Beijing. It's a sign that while China doesn't know how it wants to use its newfound clout on the global stage, it is learning how to get what it wants from the U.S.
China: Self-Centered on the World's Center Stage
By Austin Ramzy / Beijing
President Barack Obama went to Beijing with a broad array of issues to put before China's leaders. If there was one theme that linked them, it was that U.S.-China ties were no longer just about the U.S. and China; they were also about the rest of the world.
"The relationship between the United States and China has never been more important to our collective future," Obama said on Tuesday as he stood before reporters with Chinese President Hu Jintao. "The major challenges of the 21st century, from climate change to nuclear proliferation to economic recovery, are challenges that touch both our nations and challenges that neither of our nations can solve by acting alone. That's why the United States welcomes China's efforts in playing a greater role on the world stage — a role in which a growing economy is joined by growing responsibilities."
China, for its part, has been reluctant to take up those new responsibilities. The late paramount leader Deng Xiaoping once admonished his countrymen to "disguise their ambitions and hide their claws." It was useful advice for a country trying to pull itself out of decades of war and chaos. But now China's booming economy and resilience in the face of the global slowdown have left it in a prime position. It holds nearly $800 billion in U.S. Treasuries, making it Washington's biggest creditor. But Beijing is still not confident in acting on the world stage for any interest besides its own. A recent survey of Chinese élites by Pacific Forum CSIS, a Honolulu-based foreign policy research institute, found that more than 90% rejected a special leadership role for China and more than 70% said the greatest contribution the country could provide the world would be to provide for its own development.
While China has vastly expanded trade ties and investments in Africa, Central Asia and South America, its foremost goal is to ensure its access to natural resources. In Afghanistan, China's $3 billion copper-mine investment is the country's largest single investment, but the stability of the war-torn region didn't merit a mention in Hu's 20-minute address. Neither did appreciation of China's currency, the renminbi, which Obama called "an essential contribution to the global rebalancing effort." Hu did, however, say that China and the U.S. "need to oppose and reject protectionism in all its manifestations in an even stronger stand," reinforcing China's view that recent U.S. tariffs pose a greater threat to the global economy than an undervalued renminbi, which has helped China prop up its exports sector even as global trade has slumped. (See pictures of China's economic expansion into Africa.)
But while Obama leaves Beijing with little in the way of a diplomatic victory, Hu was able to win some acknowledgments from the U.S. Obama said the U.S. considers Tibet to be part of the People's Republic of China. While that is long-standing American policy, scholars could recall no point when a U.S. President has stated it publicly. Territorial questions like Tibet remain top priorities for China, and Obama's mention of that issue was a key win for Beijing. It's a sign that while China doesn't know how it wants to use its newfound clout on the global stage, it is learning how to get what it wants from the U.S.
On Obama’s Asia Trip, Not Much Adulation
November 19, 2009
On Obama’s Asia Trip, Not Much Adulation
By HELENE COOPER and MARTIN FACKLER
SEOUL, South Korea — For all of President Obama’s laying claim to the title of “America’s first Pacific president,” Asia was always going to be a tough nut for him to crack.
Without the first lady at his side, he would not have the kind of round-the-clock coverage the first couple got during their inaugural tour of Europe. Without a popular gesture like elevating the plight of the Palestinian people to equal status of the Israelis’, he would not be showered with the kind of praise he got for his speech to the Muslim world in Cairo. And without a stop in Indonesia, his boyhood home, he would not bask in the kind of adulation he received in Accra, Ghana.
Instead, with the novelty of a visit as America’s first black president having given way to the reality of having to plow through intractable issues like monetary policy (China), trade (Singapore, China, South Korea), security (Japan) and the 800-pound gorilla on the continent (China), Mr. Obama’s Asia trip has been, in many ways, a long uphill slog.
So it is no wonder that on the last day of the toughest part of his trip — the China part — Mr. Obama took a hike: a brisk, bracing 30-minute climb up the Great Wall. At around 3:30 Wednesday afternoon, Mr. Obama’s mile-long motorcade arrived at the Great Wall’s Badaling section, which snakes over jagged, rocky mountains.
Visitors to that touristy section of the wall generally encounter a cacophonous melee of vendors, but on this day, the place was like a ghost town, courtesy of Chinese authorities who had shut it down. (The same happened Tuesday when Mr. Obama sped through an empty-but-for-his-entourage Forbidden City.)
Even the two sightseeing trips did not offer a total respite, however, as they were prominent, well-publicized examples of what Mr. Obama did not do in China. He steered clear of public meetings with Chinese liberals, free press advocates and even average Chinese, with his aides citing scheduling conflicts. Mr. Obama did, though, give an interview on Wednesday morning to Southern Weekly, one of China’s most popular newspapers, sometimes known for poking the authorities by breaking news on delicate subjects.
Still, for an American president who has tried to make openness a hallmark of his public persona, it was a departure, made more stark since Chinese authorities largely hijacked Mr. Obama’s one other attempt at a give and take with Chinese students, a town hall meeting in Shanghai, by stuffing the auditorium with young Communist Party aspirants.
A week ago, when Mr. Obama kicked off his trip in Japan, things were not so grim. Tokyo welcomed him as much as a celebrity as a world leader, with cries of “Obama-san!” from the people who gathered in the rain to watch his motorcade pass. Local newspapers gushed about how he told his Japanese hosts that he wanted to eat tuna and Kobe beef. Even the ballyhoo from right-wing bloggers back at home over Mr. Obama’s deep bow to Emperor Akihito did not seem to dent Mr. Obama’s Japan experience; his aides say he was unfazed by the criticism.
But Mr. Obama quickly discovered that popularity on the Asian streets did not necessarily translate into policy successes behind closed doors in the Kantei, the Japanese White House, let alone in the Great Hall of the People in Beijing.
Political analysts in Japan gave Mr. Obama high marks for what was one of his principal goals: improving communication with Japan’s outspoken new government. But the trip managed only to paper over some of the recent differences between the sides, like the contentious issue of the relocation of an unpopular Marine air base in Futenma, on the southern island of Okinawa. Mr. Obama and Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama could not solve that issue, instead merely deferring a tough decision by agreeing to form a working group to look at the relocation problem.
One former Japanese diplomat praised the president for showing patience and avoiding mishaps that would have further tarnished the relationship. The former diplomat, Kunihiko Miyake, who now teaches international affairs at Ritsumeikan University in Kyoto, said the United States and Japan still did not see eye to eye on their single biggest bilateral issue: how to make their cold-war-era alliance relevant in a region where the balance of power had been upset by China’s rise.
“The two countries are in the same bed, but dreaming different dreams,” Mr. Miyake said. “The Americans want the alliance to be stronger, but the Japanese seem to want to do less.”
Mr. Obama’s next stop was Singapore for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation conference best known for its quaint custom of making all the leaders wear the same colorful shirt, helpfully supplied by the host country. Mr. Obama, in blue, wore a brave grin in the group photo, flanked by the red-shirted Singaporean prime minister and an identical blue-shirted Indonesian president.
This year, APEC made headlines, though not the sort Mr. Obama might have liked. With a deadline looming for a big climate change conference in Copenhagen, the leaders convened a hastily called breakfast meeting to acknowledge that they would not be able to resolve entrenched differences in time.
And then, Mr. Obama departed for China, where the authorities stage-managed and restricted access to his town hall meeting in Shanghai. He did offer a nuanced, oblique critique of China’s rigid controls and restrictions of the Internet and free speech without mentioning, let alone condemning, China’s government.
Mr. Obama and President Hu Jintao presented their two days of talks as substantive, even though they did not appear to make much progress on issues like Iran, China’s currency or human rights. Robert Gibbs, the White House spokesman, took the unusual step of sending a statement to reporters — something he did not do for either stop in Japan or Singapore — saying the China trip went well.
In Seoul, where Mr. Obama ends his trip, he will have perhaps his easiest leg. South Korea is a longtime ally that has been cooperating with the United States on vital issues like North Korea and does not appear to have any big ax to grind with the United States.
Copyright 2009 The New York Times Company
On Obama’s Asia Trip, Not Much Adulation
By HELENE COOPER and MARTIN FACKLER
SEOUL, South Korea — For all of President Obama’s laying claim to the title of “America’s first Pacific president,” Asia was always going to be a tough nut for him to crack.
Without the first lady at his side, he would not have the kind of round-the-clock coverage the first couple got during their inaugural tour of Europe. Without a popular gesture like elevating the plight of the Palestinian people to equal status of the Israelis’, he would not be showered with the kind of praise he got for his speech to the Muslim world in Cairo. And without a stop in Indonesia, his boyhood home, he would not bask in the kind of adulation he received in Accra, Ghana.
Instead, with the novelty of a visit as America’s first black president having given way to the reality of having to plow through intractable issues like monetary policy (China), trade (Singapore, China, South Korea), security (Japan) and the 800-pound gorilla on the continent (China), Mr. Obama’s Asia trip has been, in many ways, a long uphill slog.
So it is no wonder that on the last day of the toughest part of his trip — the China part — Mr. Obama took a hike: a brisk, bracing 30-minute climb up the Great Wall. At around 3:30 Wednesday afternoon, Mr. Obama’s mile-long motorcade arrived at the Great Wall’s Badaling section, which snakes over jagged, rocky mountains.
Visitors to that touristy section of the wall generally encounter a cacophonous melee of vendors, but on this day, the place was like a ghost town, courtesy of Chinese authorities who had shut it down. (The same happened Tuesday when Mr. Obama sped through an empty-but-for-his-entourage Forbidden City.)
Even the two sightseeing trips did not offer a total respite, however, as they were prominent, well-publicized examples of what Mr. Obama did not do in China. He steered clear of public meetings with Chinese liberals, free press advocates and even average Chinese, with his aides citing scheduling conflicts. Mr. Obama did, though, give an interview on Wednesday morning to Southern Weekly, one of China’s most popular newspapers, sometimes known for poking the authorities by breaking news on delicate subjects.
Still, for an American president who has tried to make openness a hallmark of his public persona, it was a departure, made more stark since Chinese authorities largely hijacked Mr. Obama’s one other attempt at a give and take with Chinese students, a town hall meeting in Shanghai, by stuffing the auditorium with young Communist Party aspirants.
A week ago, when Mr. Obama kicked off his trip in Japan, things were not so grim. Tokyo welcomed him as much as a celebrity as a world leader, with cries of “Obama-san!” from the people who gathered in the rain to watch his motorcade pass. Local newspapers gushed about how he told his Japanese hosts that he wanted to eat tuna and Kobe beef. Even the ballyhoo from right-wing bloggers back at home over Mr. Obama’s deep bow to Emperor Akihito did not seem to dent Mr. Obama’s Japan experience; his aides say he was unfazed by the criticism.
But Mr. Obama quickly discovered that popularity on the Asian streets did not necessarily translate into policy successes behind closed doors in the Kantei, the Japanese White House, let alone in the Great Hall of the People in Beijing.
Political analysts in Japan gave Mr. Obama high marks for what was one of his principal goals: improving communication with Japan’s outspoken new government. But the trip managed only to paper over some of the recent differences between the sides, like the contentious issue of the relocation of an unpopular Marine air base in Futenma, on the southern island of Okinawa. Mr. Obama and Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama could not solve that issue, instead merely deferring a tough decision by agreeing to form a working group to look at the relocation problem.
One former Japanese diplomat praised the president for showing patience and avoiding mishaps that would have further tarnished the relationship. The former diplomat, Kunihiko Miyake, who now teaches international affairs at Ritsumeikan University in Kyoto, said the United States and Japan still did not see eye to eye on their single biggest bilateral issue: how to make their cold-war-era alliance relevant in a region where the balance of power had been upset by China’s rise.
“The two countries are in the same bed, but dreaming different dreams,” Mr. Miyake said. “The Americans want the alliance to be stronger, but the Japanese seem to want to do less.”
Mr. Obama’s next stop was Singapore for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation conference best known for its quaint custom of making all the leaders wear the same colorful shirt, helpfully supplied by the host country. Mr. Obama, in blue, wore a brave grin in the group photo, flanked by the red-shirted Singaporean prime minister and an identical blue-shirted Indonesian president.
This year, APEC made headlines, though not the sort Mr. Obama might have liked. With a deadline looming for a big climate change conference in Copenhagen, the leaders convened a hastily called breakfast meeting to acknowledge that they would not be able to resolve entrenched differences in time.
And then, Mr. Obama departed for China, where the authorities stage-managed and restricted access to his town hall meeting in Shanghai. He did offer a nuanced, oblique critique of China’s rigid controls and restrictions of the Internet and free speech without mentioning, let alone condemning, China’s government.
Mr. Obama and President Hu Jintao presented their two days of talks as substantive, even though they did not appear to make much progress on issues like Iran, China’s currency or human rights. Robert Gibbs, the White House spokesman, took the unusual step of sending a statement to reporters — something he did not do for either stop in Japan or Singapore — saying the China trip went well.
In Seoul, where Mr. Obama ends his trip, he will have perhaps his easiest leg. South Korea is a longtime ally that has been cooperating with the United States on vital issues like North Korea and does not appear to have any big ax to grind with the United States.
Copyright 2009 The New York Times Company
Obama is Saving the Best for Last
Douglas H. Paal
South China Morning Post, November 16, 2009
U.S. President Barack Obama will end his first trip to Asia since he entered the White House in January with a visit to Seoul. South Korea, where Obama’s visit was originally scheduled as an afterthought, will prove to be the most rewarding stop.
On October 30, the Korean government announced a new commitment of 300 troops and 200 civilians to constitute a Provincial Reconstruction Team for an as-yet unnamed province in Afghanistan.
In return for its troubles, Seoul seeks White House support for the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (Korus), which has been languishing in Congress for more than two years. Obama is unlikely to do more than commit to a further review of the pact, which he criticized as falling short in his presidential campaign.
Nonetheless, the background of this visit reveals a positive change in the management of the alliance, in contrast with the policy spats between Washington and Seoul towards North Korea under President Lee Myung-bak’s two predecessors. Obama’s team has reestablished genuine consultation with America’s Korean allies.
Even under Lee’s predecessor, the late president Roh Moo-hyun, and despite noisy public disputes, substantial progress was achieved in modernizing the alliance, as South Korea contributed to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, reached a free trade agreement, and undertook long-delayed adjustments in the footprint of the US military presence. The White House staff naturally sought to limit Obama’s travel time, but he wisely recognized that it would be an unpardonable snub not to stop in South Korea and show his commitment to the alliance. So he is due to fly in from China late on Wednesday evening, and leave after lunch the next day.
Nine days is a substantial commitment of White House time, and a wise gesture to reassure Asian nations that, while China is growing in power and influence, the US will not abandon them to face it alone. At the same time, Obama’s trip signals that Washington seeks no confrontation with Beijing and in fact hopes to work with China on problems too great for any one power to manage.
Obama is also boosting the message that America is back after its long preoccupation with terrorism. Within that context, U.S. relations with South Korea are their best in 12 years. But the US cannot take Seoul for granted, as political support for the high-visibility free trade agreement is starting to wane in South Korea while the Obama administration sorts out its domestic priorities and examines flaws it sees.
Obama will also need to be careful not to let new and worthy, but less domestically sensitive, free trade opportunities – such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership – jump the queue on Korus, which would only fire up Korean opponents of a deal that already favors US exporters overwhelmingly.
By paying respects in Seoul, and addressing the South Korean people’s concerns with sincerity and action, Obama can depart from Asia on a high note, demonstrating American co-operation with a longtime ally in the region and underscoring the purpose of his trip.
South China Morning Post, November 16, 2009
U.S. President Barack Obama will end his first trip to Asia since he entered the White House in January with a visit to Seoul. South Korea, where Obama’s visit was originally scheduled as an afterthought, will prove to be the most rewarding stop.
On October 30, the Korean government announced a new commitment of 300 troops and 200 civilians to constitute a Provincial Reconstruction Team for an as-yet unnamed province in Afghanistan.
In return for its troubles, Seoul seeks White House support for the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (Korus), which has been languishing in Congress for more than two years. Obama is unlikely to do more than commit to a further review of the pact, which he criticized as falling short in his presidential campaign.
Nonetheless, the background of this visit reveals a positive change in the management of the alliance, in contrast with the policy spats between Washington and Seoul towards North Korea under President Lee Myung-bak’s two predecessors. Obama’s team has reestablished genuine consultation with America’s Korean allies.
Even under Lee’s predecessor, the late president Roh Moo-hyun, and despite noisy public disputes, substantial progress was achieved in modernizing the alliance, as South Korea contributed to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, reached a free trade agreement, and undertook long-delayed adjustments in the footprint of the US military presence. The White House staff naturally sought to limit Obama’s travel time, but he wisely recognized that it would be an unpardonable snub not to stop in South Korea and show his commitment to the alliance. So he is due to fly in from China late on Wednesday evening, and leave after lunch the next day.
Nine days is a substantial commitment of White House time, and a wise gesture to reassure Asian nations that, while China is growing in power and influence, the US will not abandon them to face it alone. At the same time, Obama’s trip signals that Washington seeks no confrontation with Beijing and in fact hopes to work with China on problems too great for any one power to manage.
Obama is also boosting the message that America is back after its long preoccupation with terrorism. Within that context, U.S. relations with South Korea are their best in 12 years. But the US cannot take Seoul for granted, as political support for the high-visibility free trade agreement is starting to wane in South Korea while the Obama administration sorts out its domestic priorities and examines flaws it sees.
Obama will also need to be careful not to let new and worthy, but less domestically sensitive, free trade opportunities – such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership – jump the queue on Korus, which would only fire up Korean opponents of a deal that already favors US exporters overwhelmingly.
By paying respects in Seoul, and addressing the South Korean people’s concerns with sincerity and action, Obama can depart from Asia on a high note, demonstrating American co-operation with a longtime ally in the region and underscoring the purpose of his trip.
Lee, Obama to focus on N. Korea, FTA
Presidents Lee Myung-bak and Barack Obama will hold a summit today to coordinate their strategies to denuclearize North Korea before Washington resumes high-level dialogue with Pyongyang soon.
The leaders will also discuss how to advance a stalled Korea-U.S. free trade agreement and reaffirm their commitment to a broader partnership, Lee's aides said.
Obama yesterday arrived in Seoul, the last leg of an Asian trip that also took him to Japan, Singapore and China.
Also on the agenda will be cooperation for next year's Group of 20 summit in Seoul and joint efforts to promote green growth, including development of renewable energy sources, Lee's aides said.
It will be their third bilateral summit, following one in London in April and another in Washington in June. They also met on the sidelines of multilateral forums such as G8, G20, U.N. and APEC summits.
The presidents are scheduled to meet one-on-one and have an extended session with aides present at Cheong Wa Dae. Obama then will visit a U.S. military base before leaving the country in the afternoon.
The summit is expected to set the stage for the allies' concerted diplomacy to engage North Korea. Obama is expected send his special envoy Stephen Bosworth to Pyongyang by the end of this year to try to bring the North back to the six-party nuclear disarmament talks.
The North declared in April that it will not take part in the dialogue in protest of a U.N. action against its rocket firing. In October the Stalinist state expressed willingness to return to multilateral talks depending on results of upcoming bilateral meetings with Washington.
Lee and Obama are expected to coordinate their long-term comprehensive approaches to deal with North Korea.
Lee and Obama discussed the possibility of a package deal with the North when they met in Washington in June.
In September, Lee proposed the "grand bargain," a one-step agreement to provide the North with security guarantees and economic assistance in exchange for its irreversible dismantlement of its core nuclear programs.
Obama said last week the two leaders are "in full agreement on the need to achieve a comprehensive resolution of the nuclear, missile and proliferation problems.
Obama has repeatedly assured the North's security and prosperity if it drops nuclear programs.
"North Korea has a choice. It can continue down the path of confrontation and provocation that has led to less security, less prosperity and more isolation from the global community, or it can choose to become a full member of the international community," Obama said after a summit with Chinese leader Hu Jintao in Beijing on Tuesday.
Another focal point of the Lee-Obama summit is the bilateral free trade pact which was signed in 2007 but has languished at both counties' the legislatures.
Chances are low that the summit will generate more than a declaration of their political will to expedite its ratification.
U.S. Trade Representative Ron Kirk said earlier this month that Korea must address U.S. concerns over automobiles and beef before the Obama administration can send the pact to Congress.
On Wednesday, the leaders of the House Ways and Means Committee said that the pact must be revised to fix Korea's rules limiting sales of American cars.
Obama is also likely to appreciate Seoul's recent decision to send workers and security staff to Afghanistan. But Seoul's dispatch will not be discussed during the summit, a senior Lee aide said.
The two leaders will also review the progress made since they adopted the Joint Vision for the Alliance in June promising to forge a comprehensive strategic partnership to tackle regional and global challenges, Cheong Wa Dae said.
(jjhwang@heraldm.com)
By Hwang Jang-jin
2009.11.19
The leaders will also discuss how to advance a stalled Korea-U.S. free trade agreement and reaffirm their commitment to a broader partnership, Lee's aides said.
Obama yesterday arrived in Seoul, the last leg of an Asian trip that also took him to Japan, Singapore and China.
Also on the agenda will be cooperation for next year's Group of 20 summit in Seoul and joint efforts to promote green growth, including development of renewable energy sources, Lee's aides said.
It will be their third bilateral summit, following one in London in April and another in Washington in June. They also met on the sidelines of multilateral forums such as G8, G20, U.N. and APEC summits.
The presidents are scheduled to meet one-on-one and have an extended session with aides present at Cheong Wa Dae. Obama then will visit a U.S. military base before leaving the country in the afternoon.
The summit is expected to set the stage for the allies' concerted diplomacy to engage North Korea. Obama is expected send his special envoy Stephen Bosworth to Pyongyang by the end of this year to try to bring the North back to the six-party nuclear disarmament talks.
The North declared in April that it will not take part in the dialogue in protest of a U.N. action against its rocket firing. In October the Stalinist state expressed willingness to return to multilateral talks depending on results of upcoming bilateral meetings with Washington.
Lee and Obama are expected to coordinate their long-term comprehensive approaches to deal with North Korea.
Lee and Obama discussed the possibility of a package deal with the North when they met in Washington in June.
In September, Lee proposed the "grand bargain," a one-step agreement to provide the North with security guarantees and economic assistance in exchange for its irreversible dismantlement of its core nuclear programs.
Obama said last week the two leaders are "in full agreement on the need to achieve a comprehensive resolution of the nuclear, missile and proliferation problems.
Obama has repeatedly assured the North's security and prosperity if it drops nuclear programs.
"North Korea has a choice. It can continue down the path of confrontation and provocation that has led to less security, less prosperity and more isolation from the global community, or it can choose to become a full member of the international community," Obama said after a summit with Chinese leader Hu Jintao in Beijing on Tuesday.
Another focal point of the Lee-Obama summit is the bilateral free trade pact which was signed in 2007 but has languished at both counties' the legislatures.
Chances are low that the summit will generate more than a declaration of their political will to expedite its ratification.
U.S. Trade Representative Ron Kirk said earlier this month that Korea must address U.S. concerns over automobiles and beef before the Obama administration can send the pact to Congress.
On Wednesday, the leaders of the House Ways and Means Committee said that the pact must be revised to fix Korea's rules limiting sales of American cars.
Obama is also likely to appreciate Seoul's recent decision to send workers and security staff to Afghanistan. But Seoul's dispatch will not be discussed during the summit, a senior Lee aide said.
The two leaders will also review the progress made since they adopted the Joint Vision for the Alliance in June promising to forge a comprehensive strategic partnership to tackle regional and global challenges, Cheong Wa Dae said.
(jjhwang@heraldm.com)
By Hwang Jang-jin
2009.11.19
Engaging the DPRK: A “Deferred Delivery” Option?
Georgy Toloraya
Regardless of rhetoric, there is little doubt that North Korea is not prepared to give up its nuclear capability any time soon. Although it might simply be a bargaining position, Pyongyang has even made it clear that there can be no such outcome until the whole world becomes free of nuclear weapons.1 That creates a new strategic reality – even if we do not recognize North Korea as a nuclear power, we will have to live side by side with it as a de-facto nuclear possessing state for a considerable period of time. While the United States is separated from it by an ocean, for Russia, China and South Korea there is just a river or a border. How are all the parties concerned going to deal with this country?
Although the risk of conflict has probably not increased with the DPRK becoming a de-facto nuclear power, a further escalation of tensions is a serious threat. Nuclear proliferation and the emergence of new regional nuclear powers also constitute serious threats. To avert such threats, the diplomatic process, even when seemingly fruitless, must be maintained. Additional pressure on North Korea would only be likely to result in further provocative actions by Pyongyang, including new WMD programs, increased risk of proliferation, and even military actions near the southern border (although probably limited) meant to discourage its opponents from stepping up the pressure. Such spiraling tensions, with the potential of leading to open conflict, should be avoided by re-engagement of the de-facto nuclear North Korea. The choice is between a hostile and cornered nuclear North Korea and a nuclear North Korea engaged in a search for compromise and acting responsibly.
The current cycle of tensions leading to the emergence of the DPRK as a de-facto nuclear weapons state started when North Korea became disappointed concerning the lame-duck Bush administration’s true intentions in the Six Party talks. North Koreans grew frustrated as their actual gains from the diplomatic process were marginal - they did not come much closer to obtaining substantial security guarantees. Even a largely symbolic (and easily reversible) “delisting” of DPRK as a terrorist state caused much controversy in the US and abroad, and when the US demanded new concessions in exchange from North Korea, they saw this as a breach of trust. As to the modest economic assistance promised when the accord was sealed, only the US and Russia actually fulfilled their obligations (200,000 tons of heavy oil), while other countries either totally abstained (Japan) or dragged their feet (ROK). For its part, the DPRK felt that its concessions were not fully recognized and valued. “Hawks” in Pyongyang might have suspected that these concessions were perceived in the West as a sign of weakness and testimony to its pressing need to normalize relations. Kim Jong Il probably considered that the incoming Obama administration would not take North Korea seriously enough and that he would not get the regime sustainability guarantees he needed by continuing tit-for-tat bargaining. Pyongyang therefore decided to “tame” the new US leaders and “teach them a lesson”. The new message was that Obama would have to talk to an established nuclear state. The strategy of increasing tensions to raise the stakes was adopted.
Now that yet another round of negotiations (first US-DPRK bilateral “contacts”, to be followed, if those are reasonably successful, by talks in a broader format) is about to begin, it is worth considering the objectives and evaluating different ways of attaining them.
Could the talks yet again be perceived (as some in Washington, Seoul and Tokyo do perceive them) simply as a tool to prevent further provocations and increase of WMD and military capabilities on the North Korean side while waiting for the regime “to collapse”? Such a strategy would mean that no significant concessions would be granted to Pyongyang, while North Korea would be kept at bay by promises, while the possible expansion of cooperation with the West and South Korea would be used to soften and undermine the regime. Such thinking seems to me delusory. Over-suspicious North Koreans well see these dangers and will not accommodate such treatment from their adversaries. In such a case tensions and provocations are almost certain to re-emerge periodically.
I believe that a totally different “gambit” is called for. Actually the only chance for denuclearization is to promote a substantial evolution in North Korea that would enable it to become a “normal” country that could live without nuclear weapons. The often-repeated declaration that NK should be “rewarded” by economic assistance and strategic reassurances after denuclearization is taken seriously neither by North Koreans nor its allies. If a chance to achieve the de-weaponization of DPRK is not to be lost, the sequencing should be reversed. That means that engagement, both political and economic, should precede phased denuclearization. The current political and economic system of the DPRK should be assisted in its positive evolution, ensuring the smooth transition to a new generation of leaders and “conventionalization” of the country. Such a changed North Korea would feel that militarization (including WMD) as a deterrent and guarantee of preserving its statehood is redundant. This would lead to a natural conclusion of the need to renounce WMD and decrease military potential.
Such a vision presupposes that denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula should remain a vital final goal, but it cannot become the sole issue to be discussed with North Korea. As prior experience has shown, no progress from such a discussion can be expected without taking into consideration the legimate interests of the DPRK. No “denuclearization first, cooperation later” scenario is plausible. The agenda for future talks should be comprehensive, including the issue of a Korean and regional security and peace regime, non-proliferation and economic cooperation. If we are to take seriously North Korea’s position that “the DPRK will never participate in the talks any longer nor it will be bound to any agreement of the six-party talks”2, the convening of completely new talks will probably have to be considered, with a broader agenda, provided all parties proclaim their adherence to the agreements reached in the course of the Six-Party talks, including the September 19, 2005 Statement. However, the format should be the same – the original six parties, plus, perhaps, UN representative and observers from the EU and other interested parties. The talks should discuss the modalities of phased denuclearization and new security regime building.
Such an approach, or a similar one, has long been advocated by specialists in member countries of the Six-Party talks, including Russia, and it has sometimes served as a basis for practical policies. Those policies were moderately successful in freezing and at times even halting DPRK nuclear programs, although so far they have only led to false starts for a variety of reasons. The single most important reason for these failures has been the absence of any genuine commitment by the opponents of North Korea to coexist with the regime. Insincere and half-hearted “partial” engagement, with an underlying intention of regime change, does more harm than good. A “strategic decision” on coexistence with the DPRK’s existing regime needs to be taken in the capitals of Pyongyang’s adversaries – to be followed by Pyongyang’s own “strategic decision” to forego nuclear weapons when relations are normalized. This could be the basis for a future “package deal” or “grand bargain”.
If we analyze the results of the DPRK leadership’s recent strategy (demanded by the military and ideologues) of closing up and tightening the screws when frightened by Kim Jong Il's sudden illness, we notice that efforts to reestablish centralized control on the population were not equally successful in all spheres. The hardening of political and ideological pressure caused no major opposition, and even the number of those seeking to leave the country seems not to have increased. However, attempts (perceptible from 2005 but reinforced since 2008) to limit “marketization from below”–which began following the economic crisis of the 1990s–failed. Strangely, the restoration of Kim Il-Song era governance methods augmented by militarization (songun ideology) is proceeding against a background of grassroots economic liberalization, which tends to become irreversible. As signs of the times, cell phones, “Kentucky” chicken and pizza are in vogue in Pyongyang, while markets thrive with imported goods regardless of sanctions.
Such a development could be for the DPRK's own good. Transformation is needed unless North Korean leaders want to risk cornering the country into a geopolitical impasse and eventually a catastrophe.
The country has all the possibilities for economic advance. It is located at the very center of the world's most vibrant and dynamically developing region and it possesses labor and mineral resources, a history of industrial and technological development (unlike, say African countries with a comparable national income). The changes should start with gradual “marketization” of the economy, first on the microeconomic level (already happening), later extending to the macroeconomic level under state control. This could lead to a “guided market economy”, and the evolution of multi-sectoral production and trade conglomerates (resembling South Korean chaebols).3 These actors could become the centerpiece of engagement, which could continue irrespective of periodic setbacks in the diplomatic process. Economic sanctions only impede the return to normality. As the Kaesong zone experience showed in 2008-2009, unreasonable politicized demands from ideology-dictated North Koreans tend to subside, leaving room for sounder economy-based approaches even if ideologues are not happy with it.
Successful engagement is one in which the country experiences the benefits of economic development and a more peaceful environment. Unconditional economic assistance is not the answer. Assistance should be aimed at developing the marketized sector of the economy, which should not be perceived by DRPK leaders as a threat to their power. Rather, this sector should be brought out of the shadows and produce resources (via taxation, increased employment and incomes, and corresponding growth in demand and in other forms) for the development of strategic industries, which are typically unprofitable and which the government wants to keep state-owned and controlled.
This could lead to a transformation of the structure of the economy: the decline of outdated and non-competitive branches and the emergence of industries based on comparative advantage–cheap and comparatively well-educated labor, mineral resources, and location/transit potential–thanks to foreign capital (chiefly South Korean, Chinese, perhaps eventually Japanese). Economic growth would bring about socio-political stabilization, which, while alleviating DPRK security concerns, would enable the authorities to soften their grip on the population. Communist ideology might eventually give way to “social-nationalism” and “patriotism” (with a sacral role for the founder of the state) as the foundation of the societal mentality. The political system in the long run might evolve into a sort of “constitutional monarchy” or a “collective leadership” with much greater feedback from the grassroots for Kim Jong Il's successor. A corresponding decrease of tension and confrontation between the DPRK and the outside world would set the stage for military confidence-building measures and eventual creation of a multilateral system of international arrangements for Korean security (a system of checks and balances guaranteed by the US, Japan, China, and Russia). Of course, this is a long time off. However, embarking on this road offers the only opportunity for North Korea to recognize that it no longer needs the absolute strategic deterrent. This would enable it to voluntarily abandon its nuclear and other WMD ambitions (following a variant of the ”South African model”) and reduce its level of militarization within a broader agreement.
Such an option, however long it might take (one or two decades at least) is the only realistic peaceful path to achieve the goals of denuclearization and peace in Korea for the international community to pursue. This also corresponds with North Korea's own interests. The responsibility to embark on this road largely rests with the US. There seems as yet to be no clear concept of what policy the US should adopt regarding the Korean issue. No strategic decision on a US commitment to co-exist with the present DPRK leadership is in sight. On the contrary, there seem still to be expectations of possible turmoil in the country due to the succession issue leading to implosion and a South-led unification, thus solving all the problems.
Such expectations date back to Clinton’s failed 1990s approach. So far the Obama administration, enraged by North Korean provocations (the “slap in the face”, “a fist in exchange for a hand outstretched”) and unable to decipher their meaning, have chosen a wait and see approach, enforcing sanctions without offering any coherent vision. Yet such a vision is a pre-requisite for meaningful talks. The October-November bilateral “contacts” thus far seem to be just “talks about talks” on the US side, while North Koreans present a fairly clear view of what they want US to do. Even if positive results might be viewed as extending well beyond its term in office, the Obama administration should take a new, bolder approach and spearhead these efforts without letting unrealistic “prior denuclearization” theory block the way. A new strategy should include assurances that the US will undertake a strategic commitment to coexist with the DPRK regime. As proof, North Korea should feel the benefits derived from its cooperation with the world community, both political (normalization of relations without prior conditions) and economic. The aid, however, should help change, with the consent of the North Korean authorities, the political economy of the country in ways that allow it to develop on its own basis while taking advantage of the international division of labor. These policies should not have a “hidden agenda” of undermining the regime. As a result the economic reality of the country would change.
However idealistic it might sound, strategic reassurances and international assistance may be granted in exchange for a promise (probably a summit-level public commitment) to completely denuclearize by a target date, say 2012, in exchange for multilateral security guarantees. By that time the Pyongyang leadership (perhaps with a larger group of a new generation of reformists and pragmatists resulting from the above-mentioned changes) will have to face a choice: either to lose all the achievements resulting from normalization of international standing and economic cooperation, while keeping its nuclear weapons, or accept the bargain. The two decades long experience of half-hearted attempts to get the goods (denuclearization) first and pay later should prompt us to try this “deferred delivery” approach for a change. After all, 2012 is much closer than 1993 when the bargaining over nuclear issue started. And even if not totally successful such a policy (which could easily be reversed if North Koreans did not keep their word) could at least keep a lid on North Korean military programs, including nuclear and missile ones.
Georgy Toloraya is Director of Korean Programs, Institute of Economy, Russian Academy of Science.
Recommended citation: Georgy Toloraya, "Engaging the DPRK: A 'Deferred Delivery' Option?" The Asia-Pacific Journal, 47-2-09, November 23, 2009.
See the following articles on related themes:
Michael Yo, Sleight of Law and U.S.-North Korea Relations: Re-nuclearization and Re-sanctioning
Ruediger Frank, Ideological Risk versus Economic Necessity: The Future of Reform in North Korea
Leonid Petrov, The Politics of Inter-Korean Economic Cooperation: 1998-2009
Leon V. Sigal, Why Punishing North Korea Won’t Work . . . and What Will
Notes
1 The Pyongyang media stated in October 2009, “In order to make the Korean Peninsula nuclear-free, it is necessary to make a comprehensive and total elimination of all the nuclear weapons on earth, to say nothing of those in and around south Korea. A prerequisite for global denuclearization is for the U.S., which tops the world's list of nuclear weapons, to cut down and dismantle them, to begin with.”
2 DPRK Foreign Ministry Vehemently Refutes UNSC's "Presidential Statement”, KCNA, 14 April 2009.
3 For details see Georgy Toloraya, ‘The Economic Future of North Korea: Will the Market Rule?’ KEI Academic Paper Series on Korea Vol.2, (Washington, 2007).
Regardless of rhetoric, there is little doubt that North Korea is not prepared to give up its nuclear capability any time soon. Although it might simply be a bargaining position, Pyongyang has even made it clear that there can be no such outcome until the whole world becomes free of nuclear weapons.1 That creates a new strategic reality – even if we do not recognize North Korea as a nuclear power, we will have to live side by side with it as a de-facto nuclear possessing state for a considerable period of time. While the United States is separated from it by an ocean, for Russia, China and South Korea there is just a river or a border. How are all the parties concerned going to deal with this country?
Although the risk of conflict has probably not increased with the DPRK becoming a de-facto nuclear power, a further escalation of tensions is a serious threat. Nuclear proliferation and the emergence of new regional nuclear powers also constitute serious threats. To avert such threats, the diplomatic process, even when seemingly fruitless, must be maintained. Additional pressure on North Korea would only be likely to result in further provocative actions by Pyongyang, including new WMD programs, increased risk of proliferation, and even military actions near the southern border (although probably limited) meant to discourage its opponents from stepping up the pressure. Such spiraling tensions, with the potential of leading to open conflict, should be avoided by re-engagement of the de-facto nuclear North Korea. The choice is between a hostile and cornered nuclear North Korea and a nuclear North Korea engaged in a search for compromise and acting responsibly.
The current cycle of tensions leading to the emergence of the DPRK as a de-facto nuclear weapons state started when North Korea became disappointed concerning the lame-duck Bush administration’s true intentions in the Six Party talks. North Koreans grew frustrated as their actual gains from the diplomatic process were marginal - they did not come much closer to obtaining substantial security guarantees. Even a largely symbolic (and easily reversible) “delisting” of DPRK as a terrorist state caused much controversy in the US and abroad, and when the US demanded new concessions in exchange from North Korea, they saw this as a breach of trust. As to the modest economic assistance promised when the accord was sealed, only the US and Russia actually fulfilled their obligations (200,000 tons of heavy oil), while other countries either totally abstained (Japan) or dragged their feet (ROK). For its part, the DPRK felt that its concessions were not fully recognized and valued. “Hawks” in Pyongyang might have suspected that these concessions were perceived in the West as a sign of weakness and testimony to its pressing need to normalize relations. Kim Jong Il probably considered that the incoming Obama administration would not take North Korea seriously enough and that he would not get the regime sustainability guarantees he needed by continuing tit-for-tat bargaining. Pyongyang therefore decided to “tame” the new US leaders and “teach them a lesson”. The new message was that Obama would have to talk to an established nuclear state. The strategy of increasing tensions to raise the stakes was adopted.
Now that yet another round of negotiations (first US-DPRK bilateral “contacts”, to be followed, if those are reasonably successful, by talks in a broader format) is about to begin, it is worth considering the objectives and evaluating different ways of attaining them.
Could the talks yet again be perceived (as some in Washington, Seoul and Tokyo do perceive them) simply as a tool to prevent further provocations and increase of WMD and military capabilities on the North Korean side while waiting for the regime “to collapse”? Such a strategy would mean that no significant concessions would be granted to Pyongyang, while North Korea would be kept at bay by promises, while the possible expansion of cooperation with the West and South Korea would be used to soften and undermine the regime. Such thinking seems to me delusory. Over-suspicious North Koreans well see these dangers and will not accommodate such treatment from their adversaries. In such a case tensions and provocations are almost certain to re-emerge periodically.
I believe that a totally different “gambit” is called for. Actually the only chance for denuclearization is to promote a substantial evolution in North Korea that would enable it to become a “normal” country that could live without nuclear weapons. The often-repeated declaration that NK should be “rewarded” by economic assistance and strategic reassurances after denuclearization is taken seriously neither by North Koreans nor its allies. If a chance to achieve the de-weaponization of DPRK is not to be lost, the sequencing should be reversed. That means that engagement, both political and economic, should precede phased denuclearization. The current political and economic system of the DPRK should be assisted in its positive evolution, ensuring the smooth transition to a new generation of leaders and “conventionalization” of the country. Such a changed North Korea would feel that militarization (including WMD) as a deterrent and guarantee of preserving its statehood is redundant. This would lead to a natural conclusion of the need to renounce WMD and decrease military potential.
Such a vision presupposes that denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula should remain a vital final goal, but it cannot become the sole issue to be discussed with North Korea. As prior experience has shown, no progress from such a discussion can be expected without taking into consideration the legimate interests of the DPRK. No “denuclearization first, cooperation later” scenario is plausible. The agenda for future talks should be comprehensive, including the issue of a Korean and regional security and peace regime, non-proliferation and economic cooperation. If we are to take seriously North Korea’s position that “the DPRK will never participate in the talks any longer nor it will be bound to any agreement of the six-party talks”2, the convening of completely new talks will probably have to be considered, with a broader agenda, provided all parties proclaim their adherence to the agreements reached in the course of the Six-Party talks, including the September 19, 2005 Statement. However, the format should be the same – the original six parties, plus, perhaps, UN representative and observers from the EU and other interested parties. The talks should discuss the modalities of phased denuclearization and new security regime building.
Such an approach, or a similar one, has long been advocated by specialists in member countries of the Six-Party talks, including Russia, and it has sometimes served as a basis for practical policies. Those policies were moderately successful in freezing and at times even halting DPRK nuclear programs, although so far they have only led to false starts for a variety of reasons. The single most important reason for these failures has been the absence of any genuine commitment by the opponents of North Korea to coexist with the regime. Insincere and half-hearted “partial” engagement, with an underlying intention of regime change, does more harm than good. A “strategic decision” on coexistence with the DPRK’s existing regime needs to be taken in the capitals of Pyongyang’s adversaries – to be followed by Pyongyang’s own “strategic decision” to forego nuclear weapons when relations are normalized. This could be the basis for a future “package deal” or “grand bargain”.
If we analyze the results of the DPRK leadership’s recent strategy (demanded by the military and ideologues) of closing up and tightening the screws when frightened by Kim Jong Il's sudden illness, we notice that efforts to reestablish centralized control on the population were not equally successful in all spheres. The hardening of political and ideological pressure caused no major opposition, and even the number of those seeking to leave the country seems not to have increased. However, attempts (perceptible from 2005 but reinforced since 2008) to limit “marketization from below”–which began following the economic crisis of the 1990s–failed. Strangely, the restoration of Kim Il-Song era governance methods augmented by militarization (songun ideology) is proceeding against a background of grassroots economic liberalization, which tends to become irreversible. As signs of the times, cell phones, “Kentucky” chicken and pizza are in vogue in Pyongyang, while markets thrive with imported goods regardless of sanctions.
Such a development could be for the DPRK's own good. Transformation is needed unless North Korean leaders want to risk cornering the country into a geopolitical impasse and eventually a catastrophe.
The country has all the possibilities for economic advance. It is located at the very center of the world's most vibrant and dynamically developing region and it possesses labor and mineral resources, a history of industrial and technological development (unlike, say African countries with a comparable national income). The changes should start with gradual “marketization” of the economy, first on the microeconomic level (already happening), later extending to the macroeconomic level under state control. This could lead to a “guided market economy”, and the evolution of multi-sectoral production and trade conglomerates (resembling South Korean chaebols).3 These actors could become the centerpiece of engagement, which could continue irrespective of periodic setbacks in the diplomatic process. Economic sanctions only impede the return to normality. As the Kaesong zone experience showed in 2008-2009, unreasonable politicized demands from ideology-dictated North Koreans tend to subside, leaving room for sounder economy-based approaches even if ideologues are not happy with it.
Successful engagement is one in which the country experiences the benefits of economic development and a more peaceful environment. Unconditional economic assistance is not the answer. Assistance should be aimed at developing the marketized sector of the economy, which should not be perceived by DRPK leaders as a threat to their power. Rather, this sector should be brought out of the shadows and produce resources (via taxation, increased employment and incomes, and corresponding growth in demand and in other forms) for the development of strategic industries, which are typically unprofitable and which the government wants to keep state-owned and controlled.
This could lead to a transformation of the structure of the economy: the decline of outdated and non-competitive branches and the emergence of industries based on comparative advantage–cheap and comparatively well-educated labor, mineral resources, and location/transit potential–thanks to foreign capital (chiefly South Korean, Chinese, perhaps eventually Japanese). Economic growth would bring about socio-political stabilization, which, while alleviating DPRK security concerns, would enable the authorities to soften their grip on the population. Communist ideology might eventually give way to “social-nationalism” and “patriotism” (with a sacral role for the founder of the state) as the foundation of the societal mentality. The political system in the long run might evolve into a sort of “constitutional monarchy” or a “collective leadership” with much greater feedback from the grassroots for Kim Jong Il's successor. A corresponding decrease of tension and confrontation between the DPRK and the outside world would set the stage for military confidence-building measures and eventual creation of a multilateral system of international arrangements for Korean security (a system of checks and balances guaranteed by the US, Japan, China, and Russia). Of course, this is a long time off. However, embarking on this road offers the only opportunity for North Korea to recognize that it no longer needs the absolute strategic deterrent. This would enable it to voluntarily abandon its nuclear and other WMD ambitions (following a variant of the ”South African model”) and reduce its level of militarization within a broader agreement.
Such an option, however long it might take (one or two decades at least) is the only realistic peaceful path to achieve the goals of denuclearization and peace in Korea for the international community to pursue. This also corresponds with North Korea's own interests. The responsibility to embark on this road largely rests with the US. There seems as yet to be no clear concept of what policy the US should adopt regarding the Korean issue. No strategic decision on a US commitment to co-exist with the present DPRK leadership is in sight. On the contrary, there seem still to be expectations of possible turmoil in the country due to the succession issue leading to implosion and a South-led unification, thus solving all the problems.
Such expectations date back to Clinton’s failed 1990s approach. So far the Obama administration, enraged by North Korean provocations (the “slap in the face”, “a fist in exchange for a hand outstretched”) and unable to decipher their meaning, have chosen a wait and see approach, enforcing sanctions without offering any coherent vision. Yet such a vision is a pre-requisite for meaningful talks. The October-November bilateral “contacts” thus far seem to be just “talks about talks” on the US side, while North Koreans present a fairly clear view of what they want US to do. Even if positive results might be viewed as extending well beyond its term in office, the Obama administration should take a new, bolder approach and spearhead these efforts without letting unrealistic “prior denuclearization” theory block the way. A new strategy should include assurances that the US will undertake a strategic commitment to coexist with the DPRK regime. As proof, North Korea should feel the benefits derived from its cooperation with the world community, both political (normalization of relations without prior conditions) and economic. The aid, however, should help change, with the consent of the North Korean authorities, the political economy of the country in ways that allow it to develop on its own basis while taking advantage of the international division of labor. These policies should not have a “hidden agenda” of undermining the regime. As a result the economic reality of the country would change.
However idealistic it might sound, strategic reassurances and international assistance may be granted in exchange for a promise (probably a summit-level public commitment) to completely denuclearize by a target date, say 2012, in exchange for multilateral security guarantees. By that time the Pyongyang leadership (perhaps with a larger group of a new generation of reformists and pragmatists resulting from the above-mentioned changes) will have to face a choice: either to lose all the achievements resulting from normalization of international standing and economic cooperation, while keeping its nuclear weapons, or accept the bargain. The two decades long experience of half-hearted attempts to get the goods (denuclearization) first and pay later should prompt us to try this “deferred delivery” approach for a change. After all, 2012 is much closer than 1993 when the bargaining over nuclear issue started. And even if not totally successful such a policy (which could easily be reversed if North Koreans did not keep their word) could at least keep a lid on North Korean military programs, including nuclear and missile ones.
Georgy Toloraya is Director of Korean Programs, Institute of Economy, Russian Academy of Science.
Recommended citation: Georgy Toloraya, "Engaging the DPRK: A 'Deferred Delivery' Option?" The Asia-Pacific Journal, 47-2-09, November 23, 2009.
See the following articles on related themes:
Michael Yo, Sleight of Law and U.S.-North Korea Relations: Re-nuclearization and Re-sanctioning
Ruediger Frank, Ideological Risk versus Economic Necessity: The Future of Reform in North Korea
Leonid Petrov, The Politics of Inter-Korean Economic Cooperation: 1998-2009
Leon V. Sigal, Why Punishing North Korea Won’t Work . . . and What Will
Notes
1 The Pyongyang media stated in October 2009, “In order to make the Korean Peninsula nuclear-free, it is necessary to make a comprehensive and total elimination of all the nuclear weapons on earth, to say nothing of those in and around south Korea. A prerequisite for global denuclearization is for the U.S., which tops the world's list of nuclear weapons, to cut down and dismantle them, to begin with.”
2 DPRK Foreign Ministry Vehemently Refutes UNSC's "Presidential Statement”, KCNA, 14 April 2009.
3 For details see Georgy Toloraya, ‘The Economic Future of North Korea: Will the Market Rule?’ KEI Academic Paper Series on Korea Vol.2, (Washington, 2007).
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