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Wednesday, November 11, 2009

Fat in Japan? You're breaking the law.

As the health care debate rages in the US, Tokyo lawmakers set a maximum waist size. Are you too fat for Japan?

By David Nakamura — Special to GlobalPost

Published: November 10, 2009 06:29 ET

Updated: November 11, 2009 08:40 ETEditor's note: David Nakamura also contributes to The Atlantic's excellent Food blog. Read his personal take on this story, which includes the shocking revelation of his own waist size.

TOKYO, Japan — In Japan, being thin isn’t just the price you pay for fashion or social acceptance. It’s the law.

So before the fat police could throw her in pudgy purgatory, Miki Yabe, 39, a manager at a major transportation corporation, went on a crash diet last month. In the week before her company’s annual health check-up, Yabe ate 21 consecutive meals of vegetable soup and hit the gym for 30 minutes a day of running and swimming.

“It’s scary,” said Yabe, who is 5 feet 3 inches and 133 pounds. “I gained 2 kilos [4.5 pounds] this year.”

In Japan, already the slimmest industrialized nation, people are fighting fat to ward off dreaded metabolic syndrome and comply with a government-imposed waistline standard. Metabolic syndrome, known here simply as “metabo,” is a combination of health risks, including stomach flab, high blood pressure and high cholesterol, that can lead to cardiovascular disease and diabetes.

Concerned about rising rates of both in a graying nation, Japanese lawmakers last year set a maximum waistline size for anyone age 40 and older: 85 centimeters (33.5 inches) for men and 90 centimeters (35.4 inches) for women.

In the United States, the Senate and House health care reform bills have included the so-called “Safeway Amendment,” which would offer reductions in insurance premiums to people who lead fitter lives. The experience of the Japanese offers lessons in how complicated it is to legislate good health.

Though Japan’s “metabo law” aims to save money by heading off health risks related to obesity, there is no consensus that it will. Doctors and health experts have said the waistline limits conflict with the International Diabetes Federation’s recommended guidelines for Japan. Meantime, ordinary residents have been buying fitness equipment, joining gyms and popping herbal pills in an effort to lose weight, even though some doctors warn that they are already too thin to begin with.

The amount of “food calories which the Japanese intake is decreasing from 10 years ago,” said Yoichi Ogushi, professor of medicine at Tokai University and one of the leading critics of the law. “So there is no obesity problem as in the USA. To the contrary, there is a problem of leanness in young females.”

One thing’s certain: Most Japanese aren’t taking any chances.

Companies are offering discounted gym memberships and developing special diet plans for employees. Residents are buying new products touted as fighting metabo, including a $1,400 machine called the Joba that imitates a bucking bronco. The convenience store chain Lawson has opened healthier food stores called Natural Lawson, featuring fresh fruits and vegetables.

Under Japan’s health care coverage, companies administer check-ups to employees once a year. Those who fail to meet the waistline requirement must undergo counseling. If companies do not reduce the number of overweight employees by 10 percent by 2012 and 25 percent by 2015, they could be required to pay more money into a health care program for the elderly. An estimated 56 million Japanese will have their waists measured this year.

Though Japan has some of the world’s lowest rates of obesity — less than 5 percent, compared to nearly 35 percent for the United States — people here on average have gotten heavier in the past three decades, according to government statistics. More worrisome, in a nation that is aging faster than any other because of long life spans and low birth rates, the number of people with diabetes has risen from 6.9 million in 1997 to 8.9 million last year.

Health care costs here are projected to double by 2020 and represent 11.5 percent of gross domestic product. That’s why some health experts support the metabo law.

“Due to the check up, there is increased public awareness on the issue of obesity and metabolic syndrome,” said James Kondo, president of the Health Policy Institute Japan, an independent think tank. “Since fighting obesity is a habit underlined by heightened awareness, this is a good thing. The program is also revolutionary in that incentivizes [companies] to reduce obesity.”

Though the health exams for metabolic syndrome factor in blood pressure, cholesterol, blood sugar, weight and smoking, waist size is the most critical element in the Japanese law — and perhaps the most humiliating.

The hesitancy of some Japanese to expose their bare stomachs to the tape measure has led the government to allow the tape measures to be administered to clothed patients. Those who elect not to strip down are permitted to deduct 1.5 centimeters from their results.

The crudeness of the system has alarmed some doctors. Satoru Yamada, a doctor at Kitasato Institute Hospital in Tokyo, published a study two years ago in which several doctors measured the waist of the same person. Their results varied by as much as 7.8 centimeters.

“I cannot agree with waist size being the essential element,” Yamada said.

Perhaps more astounding, even before Japanese lawmakers set the waistline limits last year, the International Diabetes Federation (IDF) amended its recommended guidelines for the Japanese. The new IDF standard is 90 centimeters (35.4 inches) for men and 80 centimeters (31.5 inches) for women. But the Japanese government has yet to modify its limits.

On the day of her exam, Yabe arrived at the clinic at 8:30 in the morning. The battery of tests lasted an hour. The result: her waist was 84 centimeters — safely under the limit. She had shed 6.5 pounds thanks to her diet and exercise.

A week later, however, Yabe was back to eating pasta and other favorite foods.

“I want to keep healthy now, but I don’t know,” she said. “Maybe in December, I will have many bonenkai [year-end parties]. And next summer I will drink beer, almost every day.”

Japan's attempt to rely less on U.S. chills bilateral ties

The ongoing discord between Japan and the United States over the relocation of U.S. Marine Corps Air Station Futenma has demonstrated that the bilateral alliance has come to a turning point.

The Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ)-led administration's attempt to rely less on the United States has chilled bilateral relations.

Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama's remarks in his talks with Chinese and South Korean leaders in Beijing in mid-October that "Japan has tended to rely excessively on the United States. We'll work out policies that attach more importance to Asia" have angered the United States.

In a meeting with Senior Vice Foreign Minister Koichi Takemasa two days later, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell criticized Hatoyama for making the remarks without consulting Washington and asked Takemasa about what the prime minister precisely meant.

Hatoyama's remarks, which pleased Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, have raised concern within the U.S. administration that Tokyo is distancing itself from Washington.

The first summit between Hatoyama and U.S. President Barack Obama in New York on Sept. 23 was aimed at demonstrating their efforts to nurture mutual trust rather than negotiate outstanding bilateral issues.

However, Japan-U.S. relations have been strained since then. A senior Foreign Ministry official says bilateral ties have entered a "period of winter-like hardship" while a high-ranking official at the Defense Ministry warns they have worsened to an "alarming level."

The discord is attributable partly to Japan's decision to withdraw Maritime Self-Defense Force troops from missions in the Indian Ocean to refuel foreign vessels engaged in the war against terror and Hatoyama's proposal for the formation of an East Asian Community.

However, the main cause of the discord is the Hatoyama administration's indecisiveness over the relocation of U.S. Marine Corps Air Station Futenma in Okinawa Prefecture.

The Cabinet is divided over the relocation. The prime minister is seeking to postpone a final decision until after the Nago mayoral election in January, in consideration of the DPJ's election campaign pledge to relocate it out of the prefecture, as the city was designated by the previous government as the site for the relocation.

Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada has called for the integration of Futenma base with U.S. Kadena Air Base in Okinawa Prefecture. Defense Minister Toshimi Kitazawa has urged that the base be relocated to an offshore area of Camp Schwab in Nago within this year in line with the bilateral agreement.

Aides to Hatoyama said the prime minister should make a final decision without narrowing differences within the Cabinet.

"We should leave it until the prime minister makes a final decision. If Japan obeys what the United States says whenever bilateral relations are strained, we can't end our reliance on the United States," one of them said.

Some government officials are even attempting to take advantage of the conflict within the administration to demonstrate the DPJ's efforts to transform the bureaucrat-dominated government into one led by politicians.

The government is also trying to use the Futenma relocation issue as a litmus test for whether it can end its reliance on the United States and achieve an equal partnership between the two countries.

Campbell, who initially chose to take a wait-and-see attitude toward the Hatoyama administration, is now under fire from within the Obama administration for making an error in his initial response to Japan's new administration.

U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, who visited Japan on Oct. 20 and 21, strongly pressured Tokyo to go ahead with the agreed-upon plan to relocate Futenma base in Ginowan to Nago.

However, it only stirred opposition in Japan. "He acted as if he were the commander of occupation forces. He tightened the screw too much, causing it to break," said one Japan-U.S. diplomatic source.

In the upcoming summit in Tokyo, Hatoyama and Obama intend to reconfirm that they will strengthen the bilateral alliance without having in-depth discussions on the Futenma issue. However, it reflects their sense of crisis.

Bruce Klingner, a senior researcher at the conservative Heritage Foundation, predicts that Japan-U.S. relations will remain chilled after the two countries settle their dispute over the Futenma relocation. Klingner, a former Central Intelligence Agency official, also pointed out that current bilateral ties are similar to U.S.-South Korean ties under the administration of President Roh Moo-hyun, who was supported by anti-U.S. forces.

(By Takashi Sudo and Yu Takayama, Political News Department)

(This is the first part of a five-part series on the Japan-U.S. alliance)

Hatoyama's push to review Japan-U.S. alliance comes from desire for independence

(Mainichi Japan) November 10, 2009

Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama's enthusiasm about pursuing more independence and self-reliance for Japan is behind his calls for a fundamental review of the Japan-U.S. alliance, which has caused friction between the two countries.

Eight Japanese and U.S. defense and diplomatic experts had a dinner meeting at a steak restaurant in Washington on Oct. 14. They included Parliamentary Secretary of Defense Akihisa Nagashima, Takeo Akiba, a minister at the Japanese Embassy in Washington, and James Przystup, a senior research fellow at the Institute for National Strategic Studies.

While appreciating the Hatoyama administration's efforts to pursue different policies from those of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)-led government, Przystup urged Tokyo to do so under a strategic framework of relations between Japan, the U.S. and China. Przystup then warned Japan would only marginalize itself as the U.S. and China are getting closer to each other.

Nagashima countered by saying, "I wonder if we can respond to major international political and economic trends if we continue policies implemented under the LDP-led government. We'd like to review and improve the foundation for the Japan-U.S. alliance from a strategic viewpoint, even though it may cause some friction and take time."

Nagashima's view is shared by Prime Minister Hatoyama. "Next year marks the 50th anniversary of the amendment of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. We'd like to review the Japan-U.S. alliance in a comprehensive manner," he told a House of Councillors plenary session on Oct. 29.

In his e-mail magazine dated Saturday, Hatoyama expressed his intention to fundamentally review the Futenma relocation plan and settle the issue.

"We want to clarify Japan's will on the Futenma matter," the e-mail magazine partly reads.

Hatoyama has called for an end to Japan's reliance on the U.S. for over a decade. In his campaign pledge for the 1996 House of Representatives election, he incorporated a "security arrangement without the continuous presence of U.S. forces."

Many of those close to Hatoyama point out that the origin of this idea is his grandfather, former Prime Minister Ichiro Hatoyama, who called for an end to Japan's reliance on the U.S. through its restoration of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, drafting and enactment of a new constitution on its own and the rearmament of Japan.

It represented a clear departure from former Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida's policy of pursuing diplomacy through Japan's relations with the U.S. as a core and attaching importance on economic growth.

One source close to Hatoyama points out that his idea comes from his experience of studying at Stanford University. Hatoyama saw the 200th anniversary of the U.S. foundation in 1976 when he was studying at the university, and was deeply impressed with the Americans' patriotism and pride in their own country.

He then became aware of the importance of independence and self-reliance of sovereign states, which motivated him to become a politician, according to the source.

(By Shinichiro Nishida and Muru Yamada, Political News Department, Yoso Furumoto, Washington Bureau, and Joji Uramatsu, Beijing Bureau)

(This is the second part of a five-part series on the Japan-U.S. alliance)

Hatoyama's calls for independence from U.S. lack vision

Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama's repeated calls for an end to Japan's policy of depending on Washington have confused the U.S. government because he has yet to show a specific strategy to achieve his goal.

Concern is growing within the U.S. administration about the impact the dispute between the two countries over the relocation of U.S. Air Station Futenma will have on the Japan-U.S. alliance as a whole. However, there is more to the friction.

The key to the maintenance and improvement of the bilateral alliance is President Barack Obama's diplomatic philosophy of finding common benefits when there are problems with relations with other countries.

The Obama administration has called on North Korea and Iran to hold dialogue while announcing that it will review its missile defense system deployed in Europe in a bid to build cooperative relations with Russia.

However, Washington has failed to clarify how it intends to strike a balance between such international cooperation and its longstanding relations with its close allies.

Michael Green, former senior director for Asian affairs at the U.S. National Security Council, describes the Obama administration's diplomacy as dual-natured. He pointed out that the U.S. government attaches importance to its cooperation with China in dealing with global issues while placing emphasis on the Japan-U.S. alliance with the balance of power in mind.

China is paying close attention to such relations between Japan and the United States as it is seeking to form a Group of Two -- a framework in which China, a major emerging country, and the United States, a major developed country, will jointly manage the world.

As if to symbolize the move, Obama will visit Japan for only two days during the upcoming Asia tour while he is scheduled to stay in China for four days. Moreover, the U.S.-China summit meeting on Sept. 22 lasted for 90 minutes -- three times the length of Japan-U.S. talks the following day -- and addressed wide-ranging issues from Iran and North Korea's nuclear issues and the global financial crisis to climate change.

The Japan-U.S. alliance has begun to drift under the two new leaders. Will it eventually lead to sober relations between Japan, whose influence has declined after being replaced by China as the leader of East Asia, and the United States, which no longer expects much from Japan? Or will the two countries open the door to a new era of bilateral relations by redefining their alliance?

(By Shinichiro Nishida and Muru Yamada, Political News Department, Yoso Furumoto, Washington Bureau, and Joji Uramatsu, Beijing Bureau)

(This is the third part of a five-part series on the Japan-U.S. alliance)

Japan, U.S. can no longer ignore the presence of China

The plan to form a Group of Four (G4) between Japan, the United States, Europe and China has demonstrated that Beijing's growing presence and influence can no longer be ignored.

A European news organization's report that U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy F. Geithner would propose the formation of the G4 created a stir in the Group of Seven (G7) meeting of finance ministers and central bank governors held in Istanbul on Oct. 3.

Prior to the G7 meeting, the U.S. government had proposed behind the scenes that Japan, the United States, Europe and China should form the G4. The proposal was retracted in response to stiff opposition from European countries that feared the formation of the G4 would lead to a decline in their influence.

The confusion over the G4 plan has reminded global players of China's rising influence in the world.

At the same time, the surfacing of the issue has reinforced to Japan, which has previously taken advantage of its close relations with the United States to represent Asia in G7 meetings, that it will soon lose such a privilege.

It appears that the G4 plan abruptly came about, but it had been carefully prepared in advance. In early 2005, Japan, the United States and China began unofficial talks on currency policy, say international financial sources.

Their talks prior to the G7 meeting in that year led to the appreciation of the yuan in July 2005, according to a high-ranking official of the Japanese government.

They secretly began a G3 movement because they needed to clarify how Japan and China, which have huge amounts of U.S. government bonds, should support the dollar-led currency system.

"The U.S. economy couldn't survive unless Japan and China help make up for the huge U.S. budget deficit," says an official of a major U.S. brokerage.

Confidence in the U.S. economy and the dollar has sharply declined amid the global economic crisis triggered by the September 2008 collapse of Lehman Brothers, resulting in major changes in global economic relations.

China is enjoying high economic growth while Japan, the United States and Europe have fallen into negative growth.

In 2008, China surpassed Japan in terms of the amount of U.S. government bonds they possess, and China's gross domestic product is forecast to exceed that of Japan possibly this year. China's presence and influence is undeniable.

However, there are many problems in China, such as its closed market and differences between its political system and those of Western countries. Therefore, Japan is indispensable for the United States as well as for the G4 to restrain China, says a top official of an international organization.

Amid such a situation, an article -- which Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) leader Yukio Hatoyama contributed to the online edition of The New York Times in late August before he took over the reins of government -- came as a shock to U.S. government officials. In his article, Hatoyama criticized market fundamentalism in the United States.

In response, the Wall Street Journal said there is no hope that Japan would achieve economic recovery if the DPJ takes over the reins of government, pointing out that Hatoyama did not sufficiently understand entrepreneurship.

Japan-U.S relations have been further strained since Hatoyama took office in mid-September over diplomatic and security issues, including the relocation of U.S. Air Station Futenma in Okinawa Prefecture.

Under the circumstances, U.S. officials have warned that the current disputes should not worsen bilateral economic ties.

The Obama administration consequently hastily dispatched Geithner to Japan one week before Obama is scheduled to visit Tokyo. "The move was aimed at maintaining normal economic relations with Japan by dispatching the pro-Japan secretary," a Japan-U.S. diplomatic source said.

In the upcoming summit with Obama, Hatoyama is expected to not only confirm that the two countries should strengthen their bilateral alliance but also consider how Japan can serve as a go-between between the United States and China. (By Nozomu Saito, Economic News Department, and Nobuhiro Saito, Washington Bureau)

(This is the fourth part of a five-part series on the Japan-U.S. alliance)

China, the U.S. and Taiwan

Opinion

The U.S. could use arms sales as leverage to ease tensions between mainland China and Taiwan, pave the way for closer Sino-American ties and promote peace and stability in Asia.

By Dennis V. Hickey

5:23 PM PST, November 10, 2009

President Obama will have a lot on his agenda when he visits China this week as part of his four-nation Asia trip. He wants to strengthen ties with Beijing in an effort to resolve the global financial crisis, foster collaboration on climate change and curb nuclear proliferation in North Korea. China's cooperation is also essential on a wide range of other pressing problems, including terrorism, threats to public health and dwindling energy supplies. Most analysts agree, however, that Beijing's chief concern is the United States' continued military support of Taiwan.

American arms sales to Taiwan hold the potential to jeopardize Sino-American relations. But there is a way for Washington to use military arms to turn this situation into a win-win-win scenario for the U.S., China and Taiwan.

Relations between the Chinese mainland and Taiwan have improved enormously in the last year. The two sides have hammered out agreements easing travel and trade restrictions, promoting tourism and providing for improved postal services and food safety. Beijing has agreed to Taipei's participation as an observer in the World Health Assembly -- the steering body of the World Health Organization -- as "Chinese Taipei," while Taipei has junked the quixotic campaign to rejoin the United Nations. A free-trade pact is on the horizon, and both sides are talking about a peace agreement.

Despite these positive trends, U.S. military support for Taiwan remains the most sensitive and volatile issue in Sino-American relations. During the 2008 U.S. presidential campaign, Obama endorsed the Bush administration's decision to sell $6.5 billion in arms to Taiwan. But Arizona Republican Sen. John McCain called for a more robust weapons package -- a position embraced by arms merchants and many of Taipei's friends in Washington. And they are now calling on the U.S. to sell 66 upgraded F-16 warplanes to Taiwan for up to $4.9 billion. The Obama administration has yet to decide whether it will approve the contentious sale.

The problem is that Beijing would consider any sale of advanced fighters to Taipei as extremely provocative, and it is probable that such a deal would lead to an escalation in tensions with Taiwan. And U.S. military officials have warned that the sale could also severely strain Sino-American relations at a time when Washington requires Beijing's support to cope with a host of international challenges.

Obama should not bow to Chinese pressure and scuttle the idea of F-16 sales. Rather, the warplanes should be used as bargaining chips. The administration ought to explore the possibility of agreeing to a deal similar to that proposed by then-President Jiang Zemin to President Bush in 2002. Namely, the U.S. should agree not to sell advanced fighters to Taiwan in exchange for the removal of the 1,500 ballistic missiles that China has deployed directly opposite Taiwan. Such an initiative could yield numerous dividends.

For starters, it is likely that Beijing would seriously consider this proposal, because removal of the missiles would generate a lot of goodwill among the Taiwanese people and the weapons could no longer be cited by local politicians as evidence of Beijing's hostility. In fact, Taiwan has stated repeatedly that the mainland must either "remove or dismantle" the missiles as a precondition for any negotiations toward a peace agreement.

In Taiwan, removal of the missiles would provide officials with tangible evidence that the policy of cooperation and conciliation with the Chinese mainland is working. The current leaders would be able to more easily move forward with other measures aimed at rapprochement and enhance their prospects for reelection.

Moreover, the move would enable Taiwan to reduce the level of arms purchases from the United States. Officials in Taipei acknowledge (and sometimes complain) that they are pressured by Washington to "do more" to provide for their own defense. But they note that arms purchases are linked directly to the threat posed by the mainland. Taiwan's Defense Ministry has conceded that the removal of the missiles would prompt the island to "make adjustments on military procurements and research and development."

U.S. officials have long emphasized that arms sales to Taiwan can serve as a stabilizing factor in East Asian affairs. In this instance, approval of the high-profile F-16 sale would jeopardize relations with Beijing, undermine core American interests and help spark an arms race across the Taiwan Strait. But if Washington uses the prospect of dropping such sales as a bargaining chip to persuade China to remove the missiles, it would help reduce cross-strait tensions, pave the way for closer Sino-American relations and promote peace and stability in the western Pacific.

The choice should be obvious.

Dennis V. Hickey is a professor of political science at Missouri State University.

Copyright © 2009, The Los Angeles Times

For items made in China, a tougher sell overseas

TRADE

U.S. orders have been hurt by the economic crisis, so the Asian nation's manufacturers are targeting emerging markets such as Latin America.

By David Pierson

November 11, 2009

Reporting from Guangzhou, China

With 190,000 foreign buyers roaming 12 million square feet of showroom floor, Sandy Wang hoped there would be plenty of new orders for her company's steel-toe work boots and leather loafers.

But despite recent signs of an uptick in global trade, Wang's booth at the Canton Trade Fair saw little action. There were plenty of lookers, she said, but few takers.

"Things will never be the same again," said Wang, whose orders from the United States dropped 20% in the last year. "We're all very worried."

As President Obama prepares for his trip to China this weekend, the recovering Chinese economy could complicate his push to "rebalance" the global economy.

The U.S. would like the Chinese government to allow its currency to appreciate, a move that could help U.S. companies ship goods to China. But China has resisted letting the yuan rise and hurt China's exports by making them more expensive.

At one of the world's largest trade fairs last week, exhibitors said they were adjusting to doing business in a world where the ubiquitous "made in China" label has been humbled by the economic crisis.

Many said they were targeting new markets such as Latin America to make up for the diminished role of U.S. consumers. Others spoke of having to drop prices or use cheaper materials to stay competitive.

It has been a difficult time for China's light manufacturers -- the mostly private enterprises that for years have produced the nation's bread-and-butter exports such as clothes, shoes and household items.

Lower demand has exposed their vulnerability to foreign markets. And when Chinese policymakers discuss the nation's continuing economic development, they speak of shifting away from being the cheap factory floor of the world. The future, they say, is in value-added products.

"Light manufacturing is still very important, but it is a little anachronistic," said Ben Simpfendorfer, chief China economist for the Royal Bank of Scotland. "It's less relevant than it was a decade ago."

Between 2002 and 2008, the share of China's light-industrial products fell from 45% to 30% of the nation's total exports, according to Dragonomics, a Beijing research firm. Exports of heavy industrial goods such as steel and chemicals grew from a 29% share to 40% in the same period. The remainder was made up of electronic goods.

The 52-year-old Canton Fair has, in more recent times, been considered a barometer for the health of China's light manufacturing industries, which make the everyday goods that fill the shelves at Wal-Mart, Target and Sears.

There may be no better place than the semiannual event in Southern China to witness the scope of the Chinese manufacturing machine. Tens of thousands of goods are showcased inside seemingly endless lanes of stalls, including velvet yarmulkes and a leather massage chair that plays the theme song from the movie "Titanic."

At the end of the three-week session, exhibitors hidden among the rows of sneakers, handbags and throw pillows said it would be difficult to return to the heady days before the financial crisis.

In dollar terms, China's exports from January to September decreased about one-fifth compared with the same period last year, Global Trade Information Services said.

But manufacturers said they were seeing some improvement in orders as retailers replenished their inventories for Christmas. The demand for factory labor has also rebounded.

Chinese exports fell 13.8% year over year in October, the slowest decline of any month this year and an improvement from the September decline of 15.2%. The exchange rate has helped Chinese exports but it has reignited calls for China to adjust its currency. The yuan is tightly controlled by the central government and widely agreed to be undervalued.

Although this has hurt competing exporters -- mainly in Europe and Japan -- it has given many foreign buyers more purchasing power.

"Everything is cheaper for us now," said Raphaelle Emery, a buyer for a French handbag wholesaler at the Guangzhou trade fair. "We can look for something trendy and original. We don't have to just buy anything."

Many producers are turning to emerging markets such as Latin America and Africa, where competition among Chinese manufacturers is not as fierce as it is in the U.S. or Europe.

Octavio Acevedo, a buyer for a Colombian chain of shoe stores, said Chinese manufacturers were learning to adapt.

"They have many more Spanish speakers," said Acevedo, who has been traveling to China on business for five years. "Before, you'd call to ask what shoes we should buy, and they'd tell us they didn't know anything about our market. Now they do."

Many aren't waiting for a return to the heyday in exports earlier this decade. Economists have been clamoring for Beijing to reform its economy so that it can rely more on Chinese consumers. Household consumption accounts for 35% of China's economic output. In the U.S., household consumption is responsible for 70% of the nation's output.

Simon Cheng of Xiamen Funchain Garments Co. makes board shorts and athletic pullovers for Wal-Mart and Sears, but orders have been down since the financial crisis began. The lesson Cheng took away was to diversify. He's now looking into South American and Australian markets. But his biggest leap was when he opened his own retail store in China.

"We have to balance things," Cheng said from his booth at the trade show. "We can't rely on the U.S. forever."

david.pierson@latimes.com

Tommy Yang in The Times' Beijing bureau contributed to this report.

Copyright © 2009, The Los Angeles Times

Before Obama's Visit, a New Clash Between Koreas

Tuesday, Nov. 10, 2009

Before Obama's Visit, a New Clash Between Koreas

By Bill Powell / Shanghai

If U.S. President Barack Obama, who is just a week away from his first visit to South Korea as head of state, needed a reminder of just how tense the Korean peninsula remains, he got one on Tuesday. For the third time in the past decade, the North and South Korean navies exchanged fire in disputed waters in the Yellow Sea, off the peninsula's west coast. According to the South Korean joint chiefs of staff, a North Korean gunboat ventured about a mile into what Seoul claims is its territorial waters. The South Koreans issued verbal warnings and then fired warning shots. In response, the North Korean boat peppered the South's patrol vessel with gunfire. The South Koreans returned fire and, they claimed, badly damaged the North Korean boat. Unlike the most recent naval clash — in which six South Korean sailors were killed in 2002 — Seoul said there were no casualties. It was unclear whether any North Korean sailors were killed or injured.

The incident came a week after Pyongyang said it was continuing to produce weapons-grade plutonium and just before an expected U.S. decision to restart talks with Pyongyang, under the auspices of the Chinese, about the North's nuclear program. The combination of the attack and Pyongyang's defiant announcement that it is still reprocessing plutonium may seem like aberrant behavior on what may be the eve of the North's re-engagement with the outside world. But for Pyongyang, it's more like standard operating procedure. "Unpredictable surprises are the strength of North Korea," says Jeung Young-tae, a senior researcher at the Korea Institute for National Unification in Seoul. Pyongyang's thinking, many analysts believe, is that by causing a mini-crisis before negotiations, the contours of the talks will be shifted and Pyongyang's counterparts will simply try to get the North to calm down before doing anything else, which makes it less likely, Jeung says, that Pyongyang will have to make any concessions on substantive issues.

The episode late Tuesday morning only intensifies the deeply strained relations between the two Koreas. Earlier this year, North Korean dictator Kim Jong Il staged a bit of a charm offensive, ending a period of silence while he recovered from a stroke. Kim said he would again agree to talks about his nuclear program, and he hosted former President Bill Clinton in Pyongyang, who traveled to the North to win the release of two U.S. journalists who had been arrested there. But there's little sign of any thaw with Seoul. Pyongyang has been infuriated that South Korean President Lee Myung Bak hasn't continued the so-called Sunshine Policy of his two predecessors, which boosted Seoul's economic aid to the North. Seoul was angered in September when North Korea, without forewarning, released a massive amount of water from behind a dam near the demilitarized zone, which ended up killing six South Koreans who were camping downstream on their side of the border. (The North issued a rare statement of regret after the incident.) Lee recently offered as a goodwill gesture to send 10,000 tons of corn and 20 tons of dry-milk powder as aid to the North, but Pyongyang, through its state-run media, was contemptuous in response. "South Koreans should be ashamed of and disgraced by this small-minded, condescending act," a state-run paper sneered.

Washington's push to re-engage Pyongyang probably won't be interrupted by the naval shootout. China, which views itself as the North's big brother, has invested a fair bit of diplomatic capital in getting Kim to agree to return to diplomacy. When Obama huddles with Chinese President Hu Jintao next week in Beijing before going to Seoul, the two will probably talk about North Korea. Obama will want a sense from Hu and the Chinese as to how serious the North is about a possible nuclear deal and what the components of such a deal might be. Obama said during his presidential campaign, and has signaled since assuming office, that he's not averse to having the U.S. talk directly with the North. The fact that the North has been typically ornery of late — possibly crossing into Seoul's territorial waters, defiantly announcing that it's still reprocessing plutonium — may just be Kim Jong Il's way of getting ready to talk.

— With reporting by Stephen Kim / Seoul

Obama, Japan PM to agree on alliance review: report

Wed Nov 11, 2009 7:28am EST

TOKYO (Reuters) - The United States and Japan will agree this week to review their decades-old security alliance to tighten ties long term, a Japanese newspaper said Wednesday, as the two countries struggled to keep a feud over a U.S. military base from spoiling their leaders' summit.

Tokyo and Washington are expected to turn down the heat in the row during President Barack Obama's two-day stay from Friday, the start of an Asian tour, but recasting the alliance as the partners adapt to China's growing clout will be tough.

Obama and new Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama, who has pledged to steer a diplomatic course more independent of Washington, will reach the agreement on reviewing the alliance at their summit on Friday, the Mainichi newspaper reported.

The two sides would aim to wrap up the discussions by next November when Obama will be back in Japan for an Asia-Pacific leaders' summit, the paper said.

Hatoyama has said he wanted to conduct a comprehensive review of the alliance, which marks its 50th anniversary next year, to create a multi-layered relationship long term.

Obama, in an interview with NHK public TV on Tuesday, stressed the importance of the ties, long seen as central to regional security arrangements.

"We depend on Japan as a stalwart ally on a whole host of global issues that we work on together and so I have both great affection for the Japanese people personally, but also understand the important strategic relationship that we have to continually nurture," Obama told NHK public TV in an interview aired Tuesday.

"I think that Prime Minister Hatoyama understands that the core fundamentals of this relationship are unchanged."

The dispute over the U.S. Marines' Futenma air base on Japan's southern island of Okinawa has threatened to cloud Obama's visit to Japan, his first as president.

Under a 2006 agreement, the two governments agreed to close Futenma, located in a crowed part of Okinawa, and replace it with a facility in a remoter part of the island as part of a broader plan to reorganize the 47,000 U.S. forces in Japan.

But Hatoyama said before the August election that swept his Democratic Party to power that the base should be moved off the island, reluctant host to over half the U.S. forces in Japan.

Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada told U.S. Secretary Hillary Clinton in Singapore that a new bilateral working group would aim to resolve the issue as fast as possible -- a time-frame a U.S. official said separately meant "the next couple of months."

But Okada added: "I also explained to her the history of Okinawa, that it was once an independent country and that during World War Two about 100,000 civilians lost their lives.

"So when Prime Minister Hatoyama said he wants to take into consideration the feelings of the Okinawa people, this is the background in which he's making the comments."

(Reporting by Linda Sieg and Yoko Kubota in Tokyo and Kazunori Takada and David Alexander in Singapore)

© Thomson Reuters 2009. All rights reserved.

Clinton says Korea naval fight won't deter U.S. envoy visit

Wed Nov 11, 2009 9:12am EST

By David Alexander

SINGAPORE (Reuters) - A naval skirmish between the two Koreas will not derail the Obama administration's plans to send its first envoy to Pyongyang to revive dormant nuclear talks, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said on Wednesday.

The rival Koreas exchanged gunfire for the first time in seven years on Tuesday. The clash took place near a disputed sea border and left a South Korean vessel pockmarked with bullet holes and a North Korean patrol ship ablaze as it retreated home.

"This does not in any way affect the decision to send Ambassador (Stephen) Bosworth. We think that this is an important step that stands on its own," Clinton told a news conference on the sidelines of an APEC meeting in Singapore.

North Korea has often used military action to force its way onto the agenda of major diplomatic events, and recently caused alarm by announcing increased production of arms-grade plutonium. Yet at the same time, it has also been seeking direct talks with Washington.

"We're obviously hoping the situation does not escalate, encouraged by the calm reaction that has been present up until now," Clinton said.

President Barack Obama is due in Japan later this week to start his first tour through Asia since taking office, and the security threat North Korea poses to the economically vital region will be high on the agenda.

The United States said on Tuesday it had agreed to send Bosworth, its special envoy for North Korea, to the country to hold bilateral talks in the hopes of coaxing Pyongyang back into broader negotiations aimed at ending its nuclear arms program.

South Korea's military was on high alert for another possible incursion but there has been no suspicious activity from the North near the disputed sea border, officials said.

NUCLEAR TALKS

North Korea for nearly a year has boycotted the six-country talks aimed at having it scrap its nuclear program in exchange for aid to rebuild its broken economy and a better diplomatic standing that could help it receive international finance.

Analysts said Washington would not have signed off on the Bosworth visit unless it had assurances Pyongyang would return to disarmament talks.

Few expect the North Korean leader Kim Jong-il to ever give up nuclear weapons, which his state's propaganda machine said have fended off invasion attempts by a hostile United States and are the crowning achievement of his "military-first" rule.

Regional powers are hoping for at least a return to pledges reached in 2005 under a six-way deal where the North resumes taking apart its aging Yongbyon nuclear plant -- the source of its arm-grade plutonium -- and allowing in international nuclear inspectors to verify claims it made about its nuclear program.

South Korean President Lee Myung-bak has tried to prevent Tuesday's clash from harming a recent warming of ties between the Koreas, who are technically still at war because their 1950-53 conflict ended with a cease fire and not a peace treaty.

"We do not want this to be an obstacle in the improvement of South-North Korea relations," Kim Eun-hye, a spokeswoman for the presidential Blue House.

(Writing by Jon Herskovitz; Editing by Jeremy Laurence)

© Thomson Reuters 2009. All rights reserved.

Tuesday, November 10, 2009

Pipeline-Istan: Everything You Need to Know About Oil, Gas, Russia, China, Iran, Afghanistan and Obama

By Pepe Escobar, Tomdispatch.com

Posted on May 13, 2009

As Barack Obama heads into his second hundred days in office, let's head for the big picture ourselves, the ultimate global plot line, the tumultuous rush towards a new, polycentric world order. In its first hundred days, the Obama presidency introduced us to a brand new acronym, OCO for Overseas Contingency Operations, formerly known as GWOT (as in Global War on Terror). Use either name, or anything else you want, and what you're really talking about is what's happening on the immense energy battlefield that extends from Iran to the Pacific Ocean. It's there that the Liquid War for the control of Eurasia takes place.

Yep, it all comes down to black gold and "blue gold" (natural gas), hydrocarbon wealth beyond compare, and so it's time to trek back to that ever-flowing wonderland -- Pipelineistan. It's time to dust off the acronyms, especially the SCO or Shanghai Cooperative Organization, the Asian response to NATO, and learn a few new ones like IPI and TAPI. Above all, it's time to check out the most recent moves on the giant chessboard of Eurasia, where Washington wants to be a crucial, if not dominant, player.

We've already seen Pipelineistan wars in Kosovo and Georgia, and we've followed Washington's favorite pipeline, the BTC, which was supposed to tilt the flow of energy westward, sending oil coursing past both Iran and Russia. Things didn't quite turn out that way, but we've got to move on, the New Great Game never stops. Now, it's time to grasp just what the Asian Energy Security Grid is all about, visit a surreal natural gas republic, and understand why that Grid is so deeply implicated in the Af-Pak war.

Every time I've visited Iran, energy analysts stress the total "interdependence of Asia and Persian Gulf geo-ecopolitics." What they mean is the ultimate importance to various great and regional powers of Asian integration via a sprawling mass of energy pipelines that will someday, somehow, link the Persian Gulf, Central Asia, South Asia, Russia, and China. The major Iranian card in the Asian integration game is the gigantic South Pars natural gas field (which Iran shares with Qatar). It is estimated to hold at least 9% of the world's proven natural gas reserves.

As much as Washington may live in perpetual denial, Russia and Iran together control roughly 20% of the world's oil reserves and nearly 50% of its gas reserves. Think about that for a moment. It's little wonder that, for the leadership of both countries as well as China's, the idea of Asian integration, of the Grid, is sacrosanct.

If it ever gets built, a major node on that Grid will surely be the prospective $7.6 billion Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) pipeline, also known as the "peace pipeline." After years of wrangling, a nearly miraculous agreement for its construction was initialed in 2008. At least in this rare case, both Pakistan and India stood shoulder to shoulder in rejecting relentless pressure from the Bush administration to scotch the deal.

It couldn't be otherwise. Pakistan, after all, is an energy-poor, desperate customer of the Grid. One year ago, in a speech at Beijing's Tsinghua University, then-President Pervez Musharraf did everything but drop to his knees and beg China to dump money into pipelines linking the Persian Gulf and Pakistan with China's Far West. If this were to happen, it might help transform Pakistan from a near-failed state into a mighty "energy corridor" to the Middle East. If you think of a pipeline as an umbilical cord, it goes without saying that IPI, far more than any form of U.S. aid (or outright interference), would go the extra mile in stabilizing the Pak half of Obama's Af-Pak theater of operations, and even possibly relieve it of its India obsession.

If Pakistan's fate is in question, Iran's is another matter. Though currently only holding "observer" status in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), sooner or later it will inevitably become a full member and so enjoy NATO-style, an-attack-on-one-of-us-is-an-attack-on-all-of-us protection. Imagine, then, the cataclysmic consequences of an Israeli preemptive strike (backed by Washington or not) on Iran's nuclear facilities. The SCO will tackle this knotty issue at its next summit in June, in Yekaterinburg, Russia.

Iran's relations with both Russia and China are swell -- and will remain so no matter who is elected the new Iranian president next month. China desperately needs Iranian oil and gas, has already clinched a $100 billion gas "deal of the century" with the Iranians, and has loads of weapons and cheap consumer goods to sell. No less close to Iran, Russia wants to sell them even more weapons, as well as nuclear energy technology.

And then, moving ever eastward on the great Grid, there's Turkmenistan, lodged deep in Central Asia, which, unlike Iran, you may never have heard a thing about. Let's correct that now.

Gurbanguly Is the Man

Alas, the sun-king of Turkmenistan, the wily, wacky Saparmurat "Turkmenbashi" Nyazov, "the father of all Turkmen" (descendants of a formidable race of nomadic horseback warriors who used to attack Silk Road caravans) is now dead. But far from forgotten.

The Chinese were huge fans of the Turkmenbashi. And the joy was mutual. One key reason the Central Asians love to do business with China is that the Middle Kingdom, unlike both Russia and the United States, carries little modern imperial baggage. And of course, China will never carp about human rights or foment a color-coded revolution of any sort.

The Chinese are already moving to successfully lobby the new Turkmen president, the spectacularly named Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov, to speed up the construction of the Mother of All Pipelines. This Turkmen-Kazakh-China Pipelineistan corridor from eastern Turkmenistan to China's Guangdong province will be the longest and most expensive pipeline in the world, 7,000 kilometers of steel pipe at a staggering cost of $26 billion. When China signed the agreement to build it in 2007, they made sure to add a clever little geopolitical kicker. The agreement explicitly states that "Chinese interests" will not be "threatened from [Turkmenistan's] territory by third parties." In translation: no Pentagon bases allowed in that country.



China's deft energy diplomacy game plan in the former Soviet republics of Central Asia is a pure winner. In the case of Turkmenistan, lucrative deals are offered and partnerships with Russia are encouraged to boost Turkmen gas production. There are to be no Russian-Chinese antagonisms, as befits the main partners in the SCO, because the Asian Energy Security Grid story is really and truly about them.

By the way, elsewhere on the Grid, those two countries recently agreed to extend the East Siberian-Pacific Ocean oil pipeline to China by the end of 2010. After all, energy-ravenous China badly needs not just Turkmen gas, but Russia's liquefied natural gas (LNG).

With energy prices low and the global economy melting down, times are sure to be tough for the Kremlin through at least 2010, but this won't derail its push to forge a Central Asian energy club within the SCO. Think of all this as essentially an energy entente cordiale with China. Russian Deputy Industry and Energy Minister Ivan Materov has been among those insistently swearing that this will not someday lead to a "gas OPEC" within the SCO. It remains to be seen how the Obama national security team decides to counteract the successful Russian strategy of undermining by all possible means a U.S.-promoted East-West Caspian Sea energy corridor, while solidifying a Russian-controlled Pipelineistan stretching from Kazakhstan to Greece that will monopolize the flow of energy to Western Europe.

The Real Afghan War

In the ever-shifting New Great Game in Eurasia, a key question -- why Afghanistan matters -- is simply not part of the discussion in the United States. (Hint: It has nothing to do with the liberation of Afghan women.) In part, this is because the idea that energy and Afghanistan might have anything in common is verboten.

And yet, rest assured, nothing of significance takes place in Eurasia without an energy angle. In the case of Afghanistan, keep in mind that Central and South Asia have been considered by American strategists crucial places to plant the flag; and once the Soviet Union collapsed, control of the energy-rich former Soviet republics in the region was quickly seen as essential to future U.S. global power. It would be there, as they imagined it, that the U.S. Empire of Bases would intersect crucially with Pipelineistan in a way that would leave both Russia and China on the defensive.

Think of Afghanistan, then, as an overlooked subplot in the ongoing Liquid War. After all, an overarching goal of U.S. foreign policy since President Richard Nixon's era in the early 1970s has been to split Russia and China. The leadership of the SCO has been focused on this since the U.S. Congress passed the Silk Road Strategy Act five days before beginning the bombing of Serbia in March 1999. That act clearly identified American geo-strategic interests from the Black Sea to western China with building a mosaic of American protectorates in Central Asia and militarizing the Eurasian energy corridor.

Afghanistan, as it happens, sits conveniently at the crossroads of any new Silk Road linking the Caucasus to western China, and four nuclear powers (China, Russia, Pakistan, and India) lurk in the vicinity. "Losing" Afghanistan and its key network of U.S. military bases would, from the Pentagon's point of view, be a disaster, and though it may be a secondary matter in the New Great Game of the moment, it's worth remembering that the country itself is a lot more than the towering mountains of the Hindu Kush and immense deserts: it's believed to be rich in unexplored deposits of natural gas, petroleum, coal, copper, chrome, talc, barites, sulfur, lead, zinc, and iron ore, as well as precious and semiprecious stones.

And there's something highly toxic to be added to this already lethal mix: don't forget the narco-dollar angle -- the fact that the global heroin cartels that feast on Afghanistan only work with U.S. dollars, not euros. For the SCO, the top security threat in Afghanistan isn't the Taliban, but the drug business. Russia's anti-drug czar Viktor Ivanov routinely blasts the disaster that passes for a U.S./NATO anti-drug war there, stressing that Afghan heroin now kills 30,000 Russians annually, twice as many as were killed during the decade-long U.S.-supported anti-Soviet Afghan jihad of the 1980s.

And then, of course, there are those competing pipelines that, if ever built, either would or wouldn't exclude Iran and Russia from the action to their south. In April 2008, Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India actually signed an agreement to build a long-dreamt-about $7.6 billion (and counting) pipeline, whose acronym TAPI combines the first letters of their names and would also someday deliver natural gas from Turkmenistan to Pakistan and India without the involvement of either Iran or Russia. It would cut right through the heart of Western Afghanistan, in Herat, and head south across lightly populated Nimruz and Helmand provinces, where the Taliban, various Pashtun guerrillas and assorted highway robbers now merrily run rings around U.S. and NATO forces and where -- surprise! -- the U.S. is now building in Dasht-e-Margo ("the Desert of Death") a new mega-base to host President Obama's surge troops.

TAPI's rival is the already mentioned IPI, also theoretically underway and widely derided by Heritage Foundation types in the U.S., who regularly launch blasts of angry prose at the nefarious idea of India and Pakistan importing gas from "evil" Iran. Theoretically, TAPI's construction will start in 2010 and the gas would begin flowing by 2015. (Don't hold your breath.) Embattled Afghan President Hamid Karzai, who can hardly secure a few square blocks of central Kabul, even with the help of international forces, nonetheless offered assurances last year that he would not only rid his country of millions of land mines along TAPI's route, but somehow get rid of the Taliban in the bargain.

Should there be investors (nursed by Afghan opium dreams) delirious enough to sink their money into such a pipeline -- and that's a monumental if -- Afghanistan would collect only $160 million a year in transit fees, a mere bagatelle even if it does represent a big chunk of the embattled Karzai's current annual revenue. Count on one thing though, if it ever happened, the Taliban and assorted warlords/highway robbers would be sure to get a cut of the action.

A Clinton-Bush-Obama Great Game

TAPI's roller-coaster history actually begins in the mid-1990s, the Clinton era, when the Taliban were dined (but not wined) by the California-based energy company Unocal and the Clinton machine. In 1995, Unocal first came up with the pipeline idea, even then a product of Washington's fatal urge to bypass both Iran and Russia. Next, Unocal talked to the Turkmenbashi, then to the Taliban, and so launched a classic New Great Game gambit that has yet to end and without which you can't understand the Afghan war Obama has inherited.

A Taliban delegation, thanks to Unocal, enjoyed Houston's hospitality in early 1997 and then Washington's in December of that year. When it came to energy negotiations, the Taliban's leadership was anything but medieval. They were tough bargainers, also cannily courting the Argentinean private oil company Bridas, which had secured the right to explore and exploit oil reserves in eastern Turkmenistan.

In August 1997, financially unstable Bridas sold 60% of its stock to Amoco, which merged the next year with British Petroleum. A key Amoco consultant happened to be that ubiquitous Eurasian player, former national security advisor Zbig Brzezinski, while another such luminary, Henry Kissinger, just happened to be a consultant for Unocal. BP-Amoco, already developing the Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, now became the major player in what had already been dubbed the Trans-Afghan Pipeline or TAP. Inevitably, Unocal and BP-Amoco went to war and let the lawyers settle things in a Texas court, where, in October 1998 as the Clinton years drew to an end, BP-Amoco seemed to emerge with the upper hand.

Under newly elected president George W. Bush, however, Unocal snuck back into the game and, as early as January 2001, was cozying up to the Taliban yet again, this time supported by a star-studded governmental cast of characters, including Undersecretary of State Richard Armitage, himself a former Unocal lobbyist. The Taliban were duly invited back to Washington in March 2001 via Rahmatullah Hashimi, a top aide to "The Shadow," the movement's leader Mullah Omar.

Negotiations eventually broke down because of those pesky transit fees the Taliban demanded. Beware the Empire's fury. At a Group of Eight summit meeting in Genoa in July 2001, Western diplomats indicated that the Bush administration had decided to take the Taliban down before year's end. (Pakistani diplomats in Islamabad would later confirm this to me.) The attacks of September 11, 2001 just slightly accelerated the schedule. Nicknamed "the kebab seller" in Kabul, Hamid Karzai, a former CIA asset and Unocal representative, who had entertained visiting Taliban members at barbecues in Houston, was soon forced down Afghan throats as the country's new leader.

Among the first fruits of Donald Rumsfeld's bombing and invasion of Afghanistan in the fall of 2001 was the signing by Karzai, Pakistani President Musharraf and Turkmenistan's Nyazov of an agreement committing themselves to build TAP, and so was formally launched a Pipelineistan extension from Central to South Asia with brand USA stamped all over it.

Russian President Vladimir Putin did nothing -- until September 2006, that is, when he delivered his counterpunch with panache. That's when Russian energy behemoth Gazprom agreed to buy Nyazov's natural gas at the 40% mark-up the dictator demanded. In return, the Russians received priceless gifts (and the Bush administration a pricey kick in the face). Nyazov turned over control of Turkmenistan's entire gas surplus to the Russian company through 2009, indicated a preference for letting Russia explore the country's new gas fields, and stated that Turkmenistan was bowing out of any U.S.-backed Trans-Caspian pipeline project. (And while he was at it, Putin also cornered much of the gas exports of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan as well.)

Thus, almost five years later, with occupied Afghanistan in increasingly deadly chaos, TAP seemed dead-on-arrival. The (invisible) star of what would later turn into Obama's "good" war was already a corpse.

But here's the beauty of Pipelineistan: like zombies, dead deals always seem to return and so the game goes on forever.

Just when Russia thought it had Turkmenistan locked in…

A Turkmen Bash

They don't call Turkmenistan a "gas republic" for nothing. I've crossed it from the Uzbek border to a Caspian Sea port named -- what else -- Turkmenbashi where you can purchase one kilo of fresh Beluga for $100 and a camel for $200. That's where the gigantic gas fields are, and it's obvious that most have not been fully explored. When, in October 2008, the British consultancy firm GCA confirmed that the Yolotan-Osman gas fields in southwest Turkmenistan were among the world's four largest, holding up to a staggering 14 trillion cubic meters of natural gas, Turkmenistan promptly grabbed second place in the global gas reserves sweepstakes, way ahead of Iran and only 20% below Russia. With that news, the earth shook seismically across Pipelineistan.

Just before he died in December 2006, the flamboyant Turkmenbashi boasted that his country held enough reserves to export 150 billion cubic meters of gas annually for the next 250 years. Given his notorious megalomania, nobody took him seriously. So in March 2008, our man Gurbanguly ordered a GCA audit to dispel any doubts. After all, in pure Asian Energy Security Grid mode, Turkmenistan had already signed contracts to supply Russia with about 50 billion cubic meters annually, China with 40 billion cubic meters, and Iran with 8 billion cubic meters.

And yet, none of this turns out to be quite as monumental or settled as it may look. In fact, Turkmenistan and Russia may be playing the energy equivalent of Russian roulette. After all, virtually all of Turkmenistani gas exports flow north through an old, crumbling Soviet system of pipelines, largely built in the 1960s. Add to this a Turkmeni knack for raising the stakes non-stop at a time when Gazprom has little choice but to put up with it: without Turkmen gas, it simply can't export all it needs to Europe, the source of 70% of Gazprom's profits.

Worse yet, according to a Gazprom source quoted in the Russian business daily Kommersant, the stark fact is that the company only thought it controlled all of Turkmenistan's gas exports; the newly discovered gas mega-fields turn out not to be part of the deal. As my Asia Times colleague, former ambassador M.K. Bhadrakumar put the matter, Gazprom's mistake "is proving to be a misconception of Himalayan proportions."

In fact, it's as if the New Great Gamesters had just discovered another Everest. This year, Obama's national security strategists lost no time unleashing a no-holds-barred diplomatic campaign to court Turkmenistan. The goal? To accelerate possible ways for all that new Turkmeni gas to flow through the right pipes, and create quite a different energy map and future. Apart from TAPI, another key objective is to make the prospective $5.8 billion Turkey-to-Austria Nabucco pipeline become viable and thus, of course, trump the Russians. In that way, a key long-term U.S. strategic objective would be fulfilled: Austria, Italy, and Greece, as well as the Balkan and various Central European countries, would be at least partially pulled from Gazprom's orbit. (Await my next "postcard" from Pipelineistan for more on this.)

IPI or TAPI?

Gurbanguly is proving an even more riotous player than the Turkmenbashi. A year ago he said he was going to hedge his bets, that he was willing to export the bulk of the eight trillion cubic meters of gas reserves he now claims for his country to virtually anyone. Washington was -- and remains -- ecstatic. At an international conference last month in Ashgabat ("the city of love"), the Las Vegas of Central Asia, Gurbanguly told a hall packed with Americans, Europeans, and Russians that "diversification of energy flows and inclusion of new countries into the geography of export routes can help the global economy gain stability."

Inevitably, behind closed doors, the TAPI maze came up and TAPI executives once again began discussing pricing and transit fees. Of course, hard as that may be to settle, it's the easy part of the deal. After all, there's that Everest of Afghan security to climb, and someone still has to confirm that Turkmenistan's gas reserves are really as fabulous as claimed.

Imperceptible jiggles in Pipelineistan's tectonic plates can shake half the world. Take, for example, an obscure March report in the Balochistan Times: a little noticed pipeline supplying gas to parts of Sindh province in Pakistan, including Karachi, was blown up. It got next to no media attention, but all across Eurasia and in Washington, those analyzing the comparative advantages of TAPI vs. IPI had to wonder just how risky it might be for India to buy future Iranian gas via increasingly volatile Balochistan.

And then in early April came another mysterious pipeline explosion, this one in Turkmenistan, compromising exports to Russia. The Turkmenis promptly blamed the Russians (and TAPI advocates cheered), but nothing in Afghanistan itself could have left them cheering very loudly. Right now, Dick Cheney's master plan to get those blue rivers of Turkmeni gas flowing southwards via a future TAPI as part of a U.S. grand strategy for a "Greater Central Asia" lies in tatters.

Still, Zbig Brzezinski might disagree, and as he commands Obama's attention, he may try to convince the new president that the world needs a $7.6-plus billion, 1,600-km steel serpent winding through a horribly dangerous war zone. That's certainly the gist of what Brzezinski said immediately after the 2008 Russia-Georgia war, stressing once again that "the construction of a pipeline from Central Asia via Afghanistan to the south... will maximally expand world society's access to the Central Asian energy market."

Washington or Beijing?

Still, give credit where it's due. For the time being, our man Gurbanguly may have snatched the leading role in the New Great Game in this part of Eurasia. He's already signed a groundbreaking gas agreement with RWE from Germany and sent the Russians scrambling.

If, one of these days, the Turkmenistani leader opts for TAPI as well, it will open Washington to an ultimate historical irony. After so much death and destruction, Washington would undoubtedly have to sit down once again with -- yes -- the Taliban! And we'd be back to July 2001 and those pesky pipeline transit fees.

As it stands at the moment, however, Russia still dominates Pipelineistan, ensuring Central Asian gas flows across Russia's network and not through the Trans-Caspian networks privileged by the U.S. and the European Union. This virtually guarantees Russia's crucial geopolitical status as the top gas supplier to Europe and a crucial supplier to Asia as well.

Meanwhile, in "transit corridor" Pakistan, where Predator drones soaring over Pashtun tribal villages monopolize the headlines, the shady New Great Game slouches in under-the-radar mode toward the immense, under-populated southern Pakistani province of Balochistan. The future of the epic IPI vs. TAPI battle may hinge on a single, magic word: Gwadar.

Essentially a fishing village, Gwadar is an Arabian Sea port in that province. The port was built by China. In Washington's dream scenario, Gwadar becomes the new Dubai of South Asia. This implies the success of TAPI. For its part, China badly needs Gwadar as a node for yet another long pipeline to be built to western China. And where would the gas flowing in that line come from? Iran, of course.

Whoever "wins," if Gwadar really becomes part of the Liquid War, Pakistan will finally become a key transit corridor for either Iranian gas from the monster South Pars field heading for China, or a great deal of the Caspian gas from Turkmenistan heading Europe-wards. To make the scenario even more locally mouth-watering, Pakistan would then be a pivotal place for both NATO and the SCO (in which it is already an official "observer").

Now that's as classic as the New Great Game in Eurasia can get. There's NATO vs. the SCO. With either IPI or TAPI, Turkmenistan wins. With either IPI or TAPI, Russia loses. With either IPI or TAPI, Pakistan wins. With TAPI, Iran loses. With IPI, Afghanistan loses. In the end, however, as in any game of high stakes Pipelineistan poker, it all comes down to the top two global players. Ladies and gentlemen, place your bets: will the winner be Washington or Beijing?

Copyright 2009 Pepe Escobar

© 2009 Tomdispatch.com All rights reserved.

Green tea is more than a way of life in South Korea

The farming, harvesting and drinking of the beverage dates back about 1,500 years.

By Cecilia Hae-Jin Lee reporting from Boseong, South Korea

May 13, 2009

Seasonal changes are subtle in Los Angeles. Having lived here most of my life, I appreciate the delicate, small signs that signal a new season. Spring rains bring fluffy white clouds that gather above our surrounding mountains. Large bunches of basil make their way into our farmers markets in the summer. The autumn brings cooler nights. And the Southern California winter yields fragrant lemons and tangerines, ripe for the picking.

Although I love the mild climate of my adopted Southland, the cool breezes and early morning fog this time of year sometimes find me reaching for a cup of green tea and longing for the verdant hills of my birth country, South Korea.

In early spring, the first leaves from the tea plant poke their heads into the sunshine of Boseong, a tiny town in the southern part of the country known for its tea fields. The leaves are harvested from early April through the first part of September, but these earliest leaves are the most prized. Handpicked by the local women who live in the South Jeolla Province, they're sold for exorbitant prices at fancy tea shops throughout the country.

Tea drinking has been part of Korean culture since at least the 7th century. There are historical documents that describe Emperor Suro (he founded the Gaya Kingdom, during Korea's Three Kingdom Period) and Queen Seondeok (the first female ruler of the neighboring Silla Kingdom) enjoying cups of green tea. The seeds most likely traveled to the peninsula in the luggage of monks from China's Yunnan province, who imported Buddhism along with the precious plants.

War-torn fields

The fields of Boseong have a less peaceful history. During their occupation of Korea in the 1930s, the Japanese noticed that Boseong had the perfect combination of temperature, humidity and soil for growing green tea. Having conquered the country, the Japanese established the first commercial tea plantation there to grow the coveted leaves and ship them back to Japan. But when the Japanese were defeated and forced to leave Korea in 1945, production came to a standstill. The fields became overgrown with weeds and lay fallow for years.

In 1957, Jang Young-seob, a visionary entrepreneur, bought the land and established the Daehan Tea Plantation (Daehan Dawon), the largest in the area, restoring green tea production in Jeolla-do. Now Boseong, famous for growing quality tea leaves, produces over a third of South Korea's green tea.

The Boseong region is to green tea what the Napa Valley is to wine. There are hundreds of tiny producers in the area. Visiting the plantations, I was struck by the pungent aroma of the leaves even before I caught sight of the fields. But it was the view that took my breath away. The soft rolling rows of tea plants stretching up along the hillside stood majestically in the morning fog.

Tea plants grow like shrubs; they're cultivated to grow only waist high for easier harvesting. If left to grow in the wild, the plants mature into tall trees.

Even with the plants at a comfortable height, green tea harvesting (like any farm work) is drudgery. I watched rural women, their hair tied up with scarves, their skin tanned a golden brown from hours under the sun, picking each leaf by hand, one by one, placing them in their plastic baskets.

Since higher-quality tea plants grow in higher elevations (the slower growth makes for a better flavor), the plants climb up the steep slopes of Boseong's hillsides. The lower rows were the most popular, while only the hard-working few climbed to pluck from the highest-growing leaves.

Tea's many uses

Even the busload of tourists from Seoul didn't want to climb to the top of the tea plantation. They oohed and aahed from below, pointing up at the green fields. I huffed and puffed my way to the top and turned around to find myself alone. By the time I had climbed up, it was break time for the female workers. They were squatting on the lower part of the hill eating their cream-filled buns and drinking cans of chilled green tea. I ran my hand over the tiny green leaves and took a deep breath of the crisp, tea-filled air before making my way back down the incline.

All kinds of tea -- green, black, white, oolong -- come from the same plant. The type of tea the leaves become is determined by fermentation and oxidation processes. Green tea comes from leaves that are wilted but left unoxidized (so the leaves retain their green color), unlike black tea leaves that are oxidized at the same time they are dried (causing their color to become darker, as tannins are released).

Green tea is the most popular in Korea, and the people in the Boseong area have incorporated the leaves into everything. They make beauty products with green tea, put green tea in their noodles and even have hot springs where you can soak in mineral waters infused with green tea. One of my favorite specialties of the region is nokdon samgyeopsal, sliced pork belly made from pigs who have dined on green tea leaves.

That afternoon, I settled for a bowl of noodles with bits of green tea in the broth, a cup of the green tea from the first harvest of the year and topped it off with a bowl of green tea ice cream, saving the pig belly for my next visit.

food@latimes.com

Copyright © 2009, The Los Angeles Times

Defying the Economic Odds: The World Melts Down, China Grows

Posted May 4, 2009.

By Dilip Hiro, Tomdispatch.com.

In the midst of the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression, a new world order is emerging -- with its center gravitating towards China. The statistics speak for themselves. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) predicts the world's gross domestic product (GDP) will shrink by an alarming 1.3% this year. Yet, defying this global trend, China expects an annual economic growth rate of 6.5% to 8.5%. During the first quarter of 2009, the world's leading stock markets combined fell by 4.5%. In contrast, the Shanghai stock exchange index leapt by a whopping 38%. In March, car sales in China hit a record 1.1 million, surpassing the U.S. for the third month in a row.

"Despite its severe impact on China's economy," said Chinese President Hu Jintao, "the current financial crisis also creates opportunity for the country." It can be argued that the present fiscal tsunami has, in fact, provided China with a chance to discard its pioneering reformer's leading guideline. "Hide your capability and bide your time" was the way former head of the Communist Party Deng Xiaoping once put it. No longer.

Recognizing that its time has indeed come, Beijing has decided to play an active, interventionist role in the international financial arena. Backed by China's $2 trillion in foreign exchange reserves, its industrialists have gone on a global buying spree in Africa and Latin America, as well as in neighboring Russia and Kazakhstan, to lock up future energy supplies for its ravenous economy. At home, the government is investing heavily not only in major infrastructure, but also in its much neglected social safety net, its health care system, and long overlooked rural development projects -- partly to bridge the increasingly wide gap between rural and urban living standards.

Among those impressed by the strides Beijing has made since launching its $585 billion stimulus package in September is the Obama administration. It views the continuing rise in China's GDP as an effective corrective to the contracting GDP of almost every other major economy on the planet, except India's. So it has stopped arguing that, by undervaluing its currency -- the yuan -- with respect to the U.S. dollar, China is making its products too cheap, thus putting competing American goods at a disadvantage in foreign markets.

The Secret of China's Success

What is the secret of China's continuing success in the worst of times? As a start, its banking system -- state-controlled and flush with cash -- has opened its lending spigots to the full, while bank credit in the U.S. and the European Union (EU) still remains clogged up, if not choked off. Therefore, consumer spending and capital investment have risen sharply.

Ever since China embarked on economic liberalization under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping in 1978, it has experienced economic ups and downs, including high inflation, deflation, recessions, uneven development of its regions, and a widening gap between the rich and the poor, as well as between the urban and the rural -- all characteristics associated with capitalism.

While China's Communist leaders have responded with a familiar range of fiscal and monetary tools like adjusting interest rates and money supply, they have achieved the desired results faster than their capitalist counterparts. This is primarily because of the state-controlled banking system where, for instance, government-owned banks act as depositories for the compulsory savings of all employees.

In addition, the "one couple, one child" law, enacted in 1980 to control China's exploding population, and a sharp decline in the state's social-support network for employees in state-owned enterprises, compelled parents to save. Add to this the earlier collapse of a rural cooperative health insurance program run by agricultural cooperatives and communes -- and many Chinese parents were left without a guarantee of being cared for in their declining years. This proved an additional incentive to set aside cash. The resulting rise in savings filled the coffers of the state-controlled banks.

On top of that came China's admission to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, which led to a dramatic jump in its exports. An average economic expansion of 12% a year became the norm.

When the credit crash in North America and the EU caused a powerful drop in China's exports, throwing millions of migrant workers in the industrialized coastal cities out of work, the authorities in Beijing focused on controlling the unemployment rate and maintaining the wages of the employed. They can now claim an urban unemployment rate of a mere 4.2% because many of the laid-off factory workers returned to their home villages. Those who did not were encouraged to enroll in government-sponsored retraining programs to acquire higher skills for better jobs in the future.

Whereas most Western leaders could do nothing more than castigate bankers filling their pockets with bonuses as the balance sheets of their companies went crimson red, the Chinese government compelled top managers at major state-owned companies to cut their salaries by 15% to 40% before tinkering with the remuneration of their workforce.

To ensure the continued rapid expansion of China's economy, which is directly related to the country's level of energy consumption, its leaders are inking many contracts for future supplies of oil and natural gas with foreign corporations.

Energy Security

Once China became an oil importer in 1993, it proved voracious. Its imports doubled every three years. This made it vulnerable to the vagaries of the international oil market and led the government to embed energy security in its foreign policy. It decided to actively participate in hydrocarbon prospecting and energy production projects abroad as well as in transnational pipeline construction. By now, the diversification of China's foreign sources of oil and gas (and their transportation) has become a cardinal principle of its foreign ministry.

Conscious of the volatility of the Middle East, the leading source of oil exports, China has scoured Africa, Australia, and Latin America for petroleum and natural gas deposits, along with other minerals needed for industry and construction. In Africa, it focused on Angola, Congo, Nigeria, and Sudan. By 2004, China's oil imports from these nations were three-fifths the size of those from the Persian Gulf region.

Nearer home, China began locking up energy deals with Russia and the Central Asian republic of Kazakhstan long before the current collapse in oil prices and the global credit crunch hit. Now, reeling from the double whammy of low energy prices and the credit squeeze, Russia's leading oil company and pipeline operator recently agreed to provide 300,000 barrels per day (bpd) in additional oil to China over 25 years for a $25 billion loan from the state-controlled China Development Bank. Likewise, a subsidiary of the China National Petroleum Corp agreed to lend Kazakhstan $10 billion as part of a joint venture to develop its hydrocarbon reserves.

Similarly, Beijing continued to make inroads into the oil and gas regions of South America. As relations between Hugo Chavez's Venezuela and the Bush administration worsened, ties with China strengthened. In 2006, during his fourth visit to Beijing since becoming president in 1999, Chavez revealed that Venezuela's oil exports to China would treble in three years to 500,000 bpd. Along with a joint refinery project to handle Venezuelan oil in China, the Chinese companies contracted to build a dozen oil-drilling platforms, supply 18 oil tankers, and collaborate with PdVSA, the state-owned Venezuelan oil company, to explore new oilfields in Venezuela.

During Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping's tour of South America in January 2009, the China Development Bank agreed to loan PdVSA $6 billion for oil to be supplied to China over the next 20 years. Since then China has agreed to double its development fund to $12 billion, in return for which Venezuela is to increase its oil shipments from the current 380,000 bpd to one million bpd.

The China Development Bank recently decided to lend Brazil's petroleum company $10 billion to be repaid in oil supplies in the coming years. This figure is almost as large as the $11.2 billion that the Inter-American Development Bank lent to various South American countries last year. China had established its commercial presence in Brazil earlier by offering lucrative prices for iron ore and soybeans, the export commodities that have fuelled Brazil's recent economic growth.

Similarly, Beijing broke new ground in the region by giving Buenos Aires access to more than $10 billion in yuans. Argentina was one of three major trading partners of China given this option, the others being Indonesia and South Korea.

Will the Yuan Become an International Currency?

Without much fanfare, China has started internationalizing the role of its currency. It is in the process of increasing the yuan's role in Hong Kong. Though part of China, Hong Kong has its own currency, the Hong Kong Dollar. Since Hong Kong is one of the world's freest financial markets, the projected arrangement will aid internationalization of the yuan.

In retrospect, an important aspect of the G-20 Summit in London in early April centered around what China did. It aired its in-depth analysis of the current fiscal crisis publicly and offered a bold solution.

In a striking on-line article, Zhou Xiaochuan, governor of China's central bank, referred to the "increasingly frequent global financial crises" that have embroiled the world. The problem could be traced to August 1971, when President Richard Nixon took the dollar off the gold standard. Until then, $35 bought one ounce of gold stored in bars in Fort Knox, Kentucky -- the rate having been fixed in 1944 during World War II by the Allies at a conference in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire. At that time, the greenback was also named as the globe's reserve currency. Since 1971, however, it has been backed by nothing more tangible than the credit of the United States.

A glance at the past decade and a half shows that, between 1994 and 2000 alone, there were economic crises in nine major countries which impacted the global economy: Mexico (1994), Thailand-Indonesia-Malaysia-South Korea-the Philippines (1997-98), Russia and Brazil (1998), and Argentina (2000).

According to Zhou, financial crises resulted when the domestic needs of the country issuing a reserve currency clashed with international fiscal requirements. For instance, responding to the demoralization caused by the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. Federal Reserve Board drastically reduced interest rates to an almost-record low of 1% to boost domestic consumption at a time when rapidly expanding economies outside the United States needed higher interest rates to cool their growth rates.

"The [present] crisis called again for creative reform of the existing international reserve currency," Zhou wrote. "A super-sovereign reserve currency managed by a global institution could be used to both create and control global liquidity. This will significantly reduce the risks of a future crisis and enhance crisis management capability."

He then alluded to the Special Drawing Rights (SDR) of the International Monetary Fund. The SDR is a virtual currency whose value is set by a currency "basket" made up of the U.S. dollar, the European euro, the British pound, and the Japanese yen, all of which qualify as reserve currencies, with the greenback being the leader. Ever since the SDR was devised in 1969, the IMF has maintained its accounts in that currency.

Zhou noted that the SDR has not yet been allowed to play its full role. If its role was enhanced, he argued, it might someday become the global reserve currency.

Zhou's idea received a positive response from the Kremlin, which suggested adding gold to the IMF's currency basket as a stabilizing element. Its own currency, the ruble, is already pegged to a basket that is 55% the euro and 45% the dollar. Within a decade of its launch, the euro has become the second most held reserve currency in the world, garnering nearly 30% of the total compared to the dollar's 67%.

Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner's immediate reaction to Zhou's article was: "China's suggestion deserves some consideration." Nervous financial markets in the U.S. took this as a sign from the Treasury Secretary that the dollar was losing its primacy. Geithner retreated post-haste. And President Obama quickly joined the fray, saying: "I don't think there is need for a global currency. The dollar is extraordinarily strong right now."

Actually, maintaining the customary Chinese discretion, Zhou never mentioned the state of the U.S. dollar in his article, nor did he even imply that the yuan should be included in the super-sovereign currency he proposed. Yet it was clear to all that at a crucial moment -- with world leaders about to meet in London to devise a way to defuse the most severe fiscal crisis since the Great Depression -- that a China which had bided its time, even though it had the third largest economy on the planet, was now showing its strong hand.

All signs are that Washington will be unable to restore the status quo ante after the present "great recession" has finally given way to recovery. In the coming years, its leaders will have to face reality and concede, however reluctantly, that the economic tectonic plates are shifting -- and that it is losing financial power to the thriving regions of the Earth, the foremost of which is China.

Dilip Hiro is the author, most recently, of Blood of the Earth: The Battle for the World's Vanishing Oil Resources (Nation Books). His upcoming book After Empire: The Rise of a Multipolar World will be published by Nation Books this year.

© 2009 Tomdispatch.com All rights reserved.

South Korea's wartime sex slaves: Hoping for closure at the end of their lives

April 30, 2009

By John M. Glionna

The 'comfort women' forced into slavery by Japanese soldiers have struggled for years to persuade the world to acknowledge their ordeal. They're growing tired now, but not giving up.

Reporting from Toechon, South Korea -- Kang Il-chul rides in the back of a van packed with gossiping old women. The 82-year-old girlishly covers her mouth to whisper a secret.

"We argue a lot about the food," she says, wrinkling her nose. "To tell you the truth, some of these old ladies are grouchy."

There are eight of them, sharing a hillside home on the outskirts of Seoul, sparring over everything from territory to room temperature.

Some wear makeup and stylish hats; others are happy in robes and slippers. A few are bitter, their golden years tarnished by painful memories; others have sweet dispositions and enjoy visiting beauty salons or performing an occasional dance in the living room.

But they all share one thing: Decades ago, they were forced to serve as sex slaves for Japanese soldiers occupying the country before and during World War II. They were repeatedly raped and beaten over months and years.

Now time is running out for the halmoni, or Korean grandmothers. About 150,000 to 200,000 Korean women served as Japanese sex slaves, most living out their lives in humiliated silence.

When activists brought the issue to light in the early 1990s, officials sought out survivors. While many were too ashamed to come forward, officials registered 234 women.

Ninety-three are still alive, according to a nonprofit group that looks after them.

In 1992, some of the so-called comfort women volunteered to live at a new House of Sharing established by Buddhist organizations and philanthropists. There is a full-time chef and nurse and volunteer caregivers. There are regular art classes, exercise sessions and trips to the doctor. Kang is the youngest of the eight remaining residents. The oldest is 92.

They are part Golden Girls, part adamant activists.

Holding out hope for closure before they die, they are waging a battle to persuade the world to acknowledge their ordeal. They are seeking reparations and a formal apology from the Japanese government. They have also pressured the South Korean government to speak out.

Japan's response has been mixed. After the war, the government maintained that military brothels had been run by private contractors. But in 1993, it officially acknowledged the Imperial Army's role in establishing so-called comfort stations.

Conservatives in the political establishment still insist there is no documentary evidence that the army conducted an organized campaign of sexual slavery -- a contention challenged by many researchers.

The testimony of the women of the House of Sharing is the riposte to those who say there is no evidence that Korean women were forced to sexually service Japanese troops. They gather every Wednesday outside the Japanese Embassy in Seoul or at various South Korean government offices. They unfurl their banners and mostly stand in silence, unflinching as guards snap their pictures. Over 17 years, they have picketed 861 times. Some have traveled to Washington to testify before Congress.

They are host to 30,000 visitors a year at the House of Sharing, part of a complex that includes the Historical Museum of Japanese Military Sexual Slavery.

They have been poked and prodded like laboratory specimens, their daily lives chronicled by sociologists, their rudimentary artwork studied to gauge the long-term emotional effects of trauma.

Now, many are tired, their years as rabble-rousers behind them. There's a changing of the guard. With a gruff, drill sergeant's demeanor, Kim Kun-ja calls herself a "troublemaker." For years, she was among the loudest activists. The others call her No. 1.

Today the 84-year-old uses a walker. She fell twice recently and rarely gets out of bed.

"We are all mentally ill and physically damaged," she says, eating a bowl of soup. "But I don't want to talk about it anymore. It brings up bad memories from the bottom of my insides."

In her place has emerged the indefatigable Kang. As a teenager, she recalls, she was lured from her home by Japanese soldiers who offered her caramel candy.

On this day, Kang receives a group of 20 mothers who sit in a semicircle on the dormitory floor. Perched on the edge of a couch, dressed in a silk shirt with a scarf wrapped stylishly around her neck, she waves her hands like a veteran politician trying to stir up a crowd.

With age, she has become more defiant, she says, and she is looking for justice.

"We have to resolve this problem before we die," she says. "We have to go away if God calls us, but until this is solved, I can't close my eyes happily."

Kang calls over to Kim, asking her to address the group.

Kim waves her off. "I am deaf," she says.

Nearby, resident Kim Soon-ok, 88, maternally strokes the hair of a visitor half her age who sits before her on the floor.

Some residents, never married, have no grandchildren to visit them. They welcome contact with strangers. They hold hands with visitors and seek long hugs as a grandfather clock in the corner ticks away their remaining days.

One carries a small stuffed rabbit. She says she likes animals more than humans.

Sometimes there is tension at the House of Sharing. Caretakers have placed each resident's photo on her bedroom door and place setting to avoid confusion and tiffs among the women, who can be territorial and cross.

"Open the window, I'm hot," one demands.

"Well, I'm cold," says the one next to her.

Often, the women have complaints. Meals served by the full-time chef are "tasteless," say several as they sit at the dining room table, talking like prisoners plotting a breakout.

Moved to temporary quarters during a renovation of the main dormitory, many complain that they no longer have keys to their rooms.

Kang, the group leader, suddenly pauses. "Shhhhh, someone is coming," she says as a nurse enters the room.

She sighs, saying that although life at the House of Sharing may not be perfect, "we have nowhere else to go."

During a tour of her room, Kang says she cannot tell the others about gifts she has been given by visitors. She holds up an exercise gripper. "If they knew this was given to me, there would be trouble," she says. She shows another gift, a silk scarf. "Isn't this pretty?"

Although many women no longer discuss their past, others seem to derive some relief from retelling their tortures.

Without prompting, Park Ok-ryun, 86, launches into an account of how, as an 18-year-old, she was abducted by two Japanese soldiers. She and a friend had gone to a stream to get water.

"Don't cry," she remembers the soldiers saying. "If you go with us, you can get some nice food and nice clothes."

Park grabs a listener's arm. "I was thrown into the truck and covered with a red-and-blue fabric," she says. She begged to be released, explaining that she had to return home to make dinner.

"But they said, 'Jackass, stop nagging,' and kicked me," she says, showing a jagged scar on her leg.

The women know that some people are listening. The U.S. Congress has called on Japan to apologize and "accept historical responsibility" for the sex slavery.

The Japanese government offered to start a fund, but the women refused the money, demanding that the government also accept responsibility for their suffering.

In a moment of quiet, Kang says that while they can never forget what happened, they must forgive the Japanese, if only for the emotional health of the next generation.

Then Kim, old No. 1, flashes a rare display of humor.

"Not all men are bad," she says, smiling. "There are good ones and there are bad ones."

john.glionna@latimes.com

Ju-min Park of The Times' Seoul Bureau contributed to this report.

A base Okinawans can live with

The Japan Times: Friday, Oct. 23, 2009

EDITORIAL

A base Okinawans can live with

U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates met with Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama, Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada and Defense Minister Toshimi Kitazawa in Tokyo this week. The two sides failed to resolve differences over the relocation of a U.S. military base on Okinawa Island. Under a 2006 bilateral agreement, the U.S. Marine Corps' Futenma Air Station in the urban area of Ginowan (southern part of the Island) would move to the shore area of Camp Schwab, in Nago (northeastern part of the island).

Mr. Gates reiterated that the present plan is the only feasible one, although he hinted that the U.S. might accept an alternative — floated by the Okinawa prefectural government — to move the proposed site at Camp Schwab about 50 meters toward the sea. He also stressed that unless the Futenma air facility is moved to Camp Schwab, the plan to move some 8,000 U.S. Marines and their dependents from Okinawa to Guam will not go ahead.

The Japanese side is apparently trying to postpone a final decision on the Futenma air facility's transfer. Referring to the fact that the four single-seat constituencies in Okinawa Prefecture in the Aug. 30 Lower House election elected candidates who are against the plan to move the Futenma facility to another part of Okinawa Prefecture, Mr. Okada said Japan cannot make a quick decision on the matter.

Mr. Hatoyama hinted that he will make a final decision by around June 2010 — after the Nago mayoral election in January that year. Okinawa Gov. Hirokazu Nakaima wants the transfer issue resolved sooner. The government should start looking for a location that will satisfy both the Okinawan people and the U.S. Merely postponing the decision will not be in Japan's interest.

Mr. Okada also proposed that Japan and the U.S. discuss a "no-first-use" policy for nuclear weapons. Mr. Gates stressed the importance of the U.S. having a flexible nuclear deterrence policy, although U.S. President Barack Obama has urged the creation of a world without nuclear weapons. Japan needs to carefully handle the no-first-use issue as it could disrupt security cooperation with the U.S.

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