Friday, February 8, 2013
NORTH KOREA Covers Tunnel Entrance at Nuclear Test Site
After threatening to conduct a nuclear test, North Korea is keeping intelligence analysts guessing when a blast might occur.
CHINESE NEW YEAR Photos: Trying to Make Snakes Cute and Cuddly
On Saturday, the auspicious Year of the Dragon will give way to the Year of the Snake, a somewhat less auspicious symbol that’s hard to warm up to. In Hong Kong, some vendors are going to great lengths to disguise snakes to make them look as cute as possible. Here’s what they’ve come up with.
AUSTRALIA: Julia Gillard Rolls the Dice
U.S. President Barack Obama won re-election despite a poor economy. Can his center-left counterpart from Down Under, Australian Prime Minister Julia Gillard, do likewise this year despite the business cycle turning against her?
Launching the nation’s longest ever election campaign with a poll date of September 14th, the Labor leader sought to clear the air and put the focus back on policy.
"The benefit of fixing the date now is not just the end of speculation about election timing. It gives shape and order to year," Gillard said, urging the rival parties to “lay out their fully-detailed costed plans for the timely consideration of voters”.
Political gamble backfires
Trailing the conservative Liberal-National Coalition in the polls, Gillard’s gamble almost immediately backfired.
Just a day after her announcement, former Labor lawmaker Craig Thomson was arrested over alleged misuse of his former trade union’s funds for prostitutes, air travel and entertainment.
Along with the uproar over the departure of former parliamentary Speaker Peter Slipper, the Thomson scandal gave the Opposition more ammunition in its attacks on the prime minister’s credibility.
If the campaign started badly, it quickly got worse when two senior cabinet ministers announced their resignations two days later, adding to the uncertainty surrounding the minority Labor government.
Polls show Opposition Leader Tony Abbott would win office comfortably if an election were held today, with Labor forecasted to lose up to 18 seats in the national Parliament.
Economy faltering?
“It’s the economy, stupid” might have been Bill Clinton’s famous line, but in Australia the Coalition has made the most ground from its economic credentials and not its leftish opponent.
Despite likely undergoing its 22nd straight year of economic expansion in 2013, Australia’s faltering housing market and mining industry downturn have raised the prospect of weaker growth ahead.
On Friday, the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) added to Gillard’s political gloom by downgrading its forecast for economic growth to 2.5 percent in 2013, a full percentage point lower than the previous year.
Despite the much talked about switching from growth in mining to other sectors such as construction, the central bank was less confident about the outlook.
“While the underlying drivers of investment are supportive of growth, the absence of any clear indications of a pick-up in non-mining investment means that the outlook remains quite uncertain,” the RBA noted.
The bank said unemployment would “drift gradually higher” while business investment would cool, with the economy set to grow below the long-run average of around 3 percent until the end of 2014.
After abandoning its previous pledge of a budget surplus, the government’s fiscal problems have also increased with its admission of a shortfall in revenues from the new tax on mining profits.
Forecast to generate $2 billion this fiscal year, the minerals resource rent tax (MRRT) only collected $126 million in its first six months of operation. The politically costly tax was watered down after its original version cost former Prime Minister Kevin Rudd his job.
Campaign rate hike?
The RBA’s bearishness came despite it leaving interest rate settings unchanged at its first monetary policy meeting of the year on Tuesday.
Holding the official cash rate at 3 percent, Governor Glenn Stevens said the previous “substantial easing of policy” in 2012 had made another decrease unnecessary, with global downside risks said to have abated.
Yet former RBA board member Warwick McKibbin warned that the central bank might rock the government’s re-election prospects with a rate hike before the poll, should global economic conditions continue to improve.
“We’ve been adjusting monetary policy in Australia…partly in anticipation of a bad outcome in the world,” McKibbin told the Australian Financial Review.
“Now if that outcome hasn’t occurred, then you really have to get back up to where you should have been, which is closer to 4 percent than 3 percent.”
The RBA’s decision to increase rates weeks ahead of the 2007 election was considered to have help cost longstanding leader John Howard the election, catapulting his Labor opponent Rudd into the Lodge.
“You would never have predicted a rate increase during the 2007 election,” McKibbin said. “I think they will do the right thing if they have to [in 2013].”
Ironically, media commentators have speculated that Labor could call on its former leader to replace the woman who betrayed him, should the poor polls continue. With the economy softening and the RBA potentially helping the Opposition, will history repeat itself at the ultimate cost to the nation’s first elected female leader?
Launching the nation’s longest ever election campaign with a poll date of September 14th, the Labor leader sought to clear the air and put the focus back on policy.
"The benefit of fixing the date now is not just the end of speculation about election timing. It gives shape and order to year," Gillard said, urging the rival parties to “lay out their fully-detailed costed plans for the timely consideration of voters”.
Political gamble backfires
Trailing the conservative Liberal-National Coalition in the polls, Gillard’s gamble almost immediately backfired.
Just a day after her announcement, former Labor lawmaker Craig Thomson was arrested over alleged misuse of his former trade union’s funds for prostitutes, air travel and entertainment.
Along with the uproar over the departure of former parliamentary Speaker Peter Slipper, the Thomson scandal gave the Opposition more ammunition in its attacks on the prime minister’s credibility.
If the campaign started badly, it quickly got worse when two senior cabinet ministers announced their resignations two days later, adding to the uncertainty surrounding the minority Labor government.
Polls show Opposition Leader Tony Abbott would win office comfortably if an election were held today, with Labor forecasted to lose up to 18 seats in the national Parliament.
Economy faltering?
“It’s the economy, stupid” might have been Bill Clinton’s famous line, but in Australia the Coalition has made the most ground from its economic credentials and not its leftish opponent.
Despite likely undergoing its 22nd straight year of economic expansion in 2013, Australia’s faltering housing market and mining industry downturn have raised the prospect of weaker growth ahead.
On Friday, the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) added to Gillard’s political gloom by downgrading its forecast for economic growth to 2.5 percent in 2013, a full percentage point lower than the previous year.
Despite the much talked about switching from growth in mining to other sectors such as construction, the central bank was less confident about the outlook.
“While the underlying drivers of investment are supportive of growth, the absence of any clear indications of a pick-up in non-mining investment means that the outlook remains quite uncertain,” the RBA noted.
The bank said unemployment would “drift gradually higher” while business investment would cool, with the economy set to grow below the long-run average of around 3 percent until the end of 2014.
After abandoning its previous pledge of a budget surplus, the government’s fiscal problems have also increased with its admission of a shortfall in revenues from the new tax on mining profits.
Forecast to generate $2 billion this fiscal year, the minerals resource rent tax (MRRT) only collected $126 million in its first six months of operation. The politically costly tax was watered down after its original version cost former Prime Minister Kevin Rudd his job.
Campaign rate hike?
The RBA’s bearishness came despite it leaving interest rate settings unchanged at its first monetary policy meeting of the year on Tuesday.
Holding the official cash rate at 3 percent, Governor Glenn Stevens said the previous “substantial easing of policy” in 2012 had made another decrease unnecessary, with global downside risks said to have abated.
Yet former RBA board member Warwick McKibbin warned that the central bank might rock the government’s re-election prospects with a rate hike before the poll, should global economic conditions continue to improve.
“We’ve been adjusting monetary policy in Australia…partly in anticipation of a bad outcome in the world,” McKibbin told the Australian Financial Review.
“Now if that outcome hasn’t occurred, then you really have to get back up to where you should have been, which is closer to 4 percent than 3 percent.”
The RBA’s decision to increase rates weeks ahead of the 2007 election was considered to have help cost longstanding leader John Howard the election, catapulting his Labor opponent Rudd into the Lodge.
“You would never have predicted a rate increase during the 2007 election,” McKibbin said. “I think they will do the right thing if they have to [in 2013].”
Ironically, media commentators have speculated that Labor could call on its former leader to replace the woman who betrayed him, should the poor polls continue. With the economy softening and the RBA potentially helping the Opposition, will history repeat itself at the ultimate cost to the nation’s first elected female leader?
U.S.-CHINA Relations: Key Data Points from Pew Research
American public opinion has shifted in favor of getting tougher with China when it comes to economic and trade policy.
In March 2011, a majority of Americans (53%) said strengthening relations with China was more important, while 40% favored getting tougher with China on economic policy. That changed in 2012 — a year in which U.S.-China trade became an issue in the presidential campaign. In our October 2012 survey, 49% prioritized getting tougher with China, while 42% said it was more important to strengthen relations.
Republicans were the strongest advocates of a get-tough policy with 65% favoring that course. In comparison, a majority of Democrats (53%) said the priority should be strengthening relations compared with 39% who wanted to get tougher with China. Independents were divided: 47% favored a get-tough approach while 44% said it was more important to work on building stronger relations.
The shifting views of U.S.-China relations came against a backdrop in which perceptions of China’s rising economic power continued to grow around the world.
Looking at 14 countries in spring 2012 that are surveyed regularly by the Pew Research Center, a median of 42% said they believed China was the world’s leading economic power compared with 36% who said it was the U.S. Before the onset of the 2008 financial crisis, 45% had named the U.S. as the top economic power while just 22% said China.
Americans are more concerned about China’s economic strength than about its military strength.
About two-thirds of Americans distrust China and see it as a competitor.
At the same time, the Chinese public has taken a dimmer view of the U.S.
The top three economic concerns that Americans have about China are the large amount of U.S. debt that it holds, the loss of jobs to China and the trade deficit.
Some U.S. media companies recently said they were targeted by Chinese hackers. While the issue of cyber attacks from China was a lesser concern among the general public, it rated higher on the list of foreign affairs experts in the survey.
There are partisan differences among the U.S. public over which issues with China are of the most concern.
Republicans are more concerned than Democrats about economic issues related to China, while Democrats and independents are more likely than Republicans to say China’s impact on the global environment is a major problem.
Read more Pew Research reports on China, including these reports:
U.S. Public, Experts Differ on China Policies
Public Favors Tough U.S. Stance on Iran, China
In March 2011, a majority of Americans (53%) said strengthening relations with China was more important, while 40% favored getting tougher with China on economic policy. That changed in 2012 — a year in which U.S.-China trade became an issue in the presidential campaign. In our October 2012 survey, 49% prioritized getting tougher with China, while 42% said it was more important to strengthen relations.
Republicans were the strongest advocates of a get-tough policy with 65% favoring that course. In comparison, a majority of Democrats (53%) said the priority should be strengthening relations compared with 39% who wanted to get tougher with China. Independents were divided: 47% favored a get-tough approach while 44% said it was more important to work on building stronger relations.
The shifting views of U.S.-China relations came against a backdrop in which perceptions of China’s rising economic power continued to grow around the world.
Looking at 14 countries in spring 2012 that are surveyed regularly by the Pew Research Center, a median of 42% said they believed China was the world’s leading economic power compared with 36% who said it was the U.S. Before the onset of the 2008 financial crisis, 45% had named the U.S. as the top economic power while just 22% said China.
Americans are more concerned about China’s economic strength than about its military strength.
About two-thirds of Americans distrust China and see it as a competitor.
At the same time, the Chinese public has taken a dimmer view of the U.S.
The top three economic concerns that Americans have about China are the large amount of U.S. debt that it holds, the loss of jobs to China and the trade deficit.
Some U.S. media companies recently said they were targeted by Chinese hackers. While the issue of cyber attacks from China was a lesser concern among the general public, it rated higher on the list of foreign affairs experts in the survey.
There are partisan differences among the U.S. public over which issues with China are of the most concern.
Republicans are more concerned than Democrats about economic issues related to China, while Democrats and independents are more likely than Republicans to say China’s impact on the global environment is a major problem.
U.S. Public, Experts Differ on China Policies
Public Favors Tough U.S. Stance on Iran, China
New JAPAN-CHINA Air Tensions: Smog
In a new spat between China and Japan, Japanese officials and media are suggesting China's latest air-pollution crisis may be spreading across the East China Sea into Japan.
CHINA's great migration from 'Hukou Hell'
AT this very moment, in a major Chinese city, a worker is boarding a train home.
Thursday, February 7, 2013
CHINA intensifies crackdown on Tibetan burnings, detains 70
BEIJING (Reuters) - Chinese authorities have detained 70 people in a crackdown on self-immolations in ethnic Tibetan regions, state media said on Thursday, the largest single reported sweep of suspects to date as the government tries to stop the unrest.
7 Reasons CHINA and JAPAN Won’t Go To War
The sequel seldom improves on the original. Yet Shinzo Abe, Japan’s newly re-elected prime minister, has already displayed more conviction during his second spell at the Kantei than in the entire year of his first, unhappy premiership.
Political energy is a plus only when it’s wisely deployed however, and some fear that Abe is picking a fight he can’t win when it comes to his hardline stance on China.
Rather than attempting to soothe the tensions that built between Beijing and Tokyo in 2012, Abe has struck a combative tone, especially concerning their dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands – a keystone for nationalists in both countries. Each time fighter aircraft are scrambled or ships are sent to survey the likely flashpoint, we hear more warnings about the approach of a war that China and Japan now seem almost eager to wage. The Economist, for example,recently observed that, “China and Japan are sliding towards war,” while Hugh White of the Australian National University warned his readers:
“Don't be too surprised if the U.S. and Japan go to war with China [in 2013].” News this week of another reckless act of escalation – Chinese naval vessels twice training their radars on their Japanese counterparts – will only have ratcheted up their concerns.
These doomful predictions came as Abe set out his vision of a more hard-nosed Japan that will no longer be pushed around when it comes to sovereignty issues. In his December op-ed on Project Syndicate Abe accused Beijing of performing “daily exercises in coercion” and advocated a “democratic security diamond” comprising Australia, India, Japan and the U.S. (rehashing a concept from the 2007 Quadrilateral Security Dialogue). He then proposed defense spending increases – Japan’s first in a decade – and strengthened security relations with the Philippines and Vietnam, which both share Tokyo’s misgivings about China’s intentions. An alliance-affirming trip to the U.S.is expected soon, and there is talk of Japan stationing F-15s on Shimojijima, close to the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands.
However, Abe would argue that he is acting to strengthen Japan in order to balance a rising China and prevent a conflict, rather than creating the conditions for one. And he undoubtedly has a more sanguine view of the future of Sino-Japanese relations than those who see war as an ever more likely outcome. Of course, there is a chance that Chinese and Japanese ships or aircraft will clash as the dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands rumbles on; and, if they do, there is a chance that a skirmish could snowball unpredictably into a wider conflict.
But if Shinzo Abe is gambling with the region’s security, he is at least playing the odds. He is calculating that Japan can pursue a more muscular foreign policy without triggering a catastrophic backlash from China, based on the numerous constraints that shape Chinese actions, as well as the interlocking structure of the globalized environment which the two countries co-inhabit. Specifically, there are seven reasons to think that war is a very unlikely prospect, even with a more hawkish prime minister running Japan:
1. Beijing’s nightmare scenario. China might well win a war against Japan, but defeat would also be a very real possibility. As China closes the book on its “century of humiliation” and looks ahead to prouder times, the prospect of a new, avoidable humiliation at the hands of its most bitter enemy is enough to persuade Beijing to do everything it can to prevent that outcome (the surest way being not to have a war at all). Certainly, China’s new leader, Xi Jinping, does not want to go down in history as the man who led China into a disastrous conflict with the Japanese. In that scenario, Xi would be doomed politically, and, as China’s angry nationalism turned inward, the Communist Party probably wouldn’t survive either.
2. Economic interdependence. Win or lose, a Sino-Japanese war would be disastrous for both participants. The flagging economy that Abe is trying to breathe life into with a $117 billion stimulus package would take a battering as the lucrative China market was closed off to Japanese business. China would suffer, too, as Japanese companies pulled out of a now-hostile market, depriving up to 5 million Chinese workers of their jobs, even as Xi Jinping looks to double per capita income by 2020. Panic in the globalized economy would further depress both economies, and potentially destroy the programs of both countries’ new leaders.
3. Question marks over the PLA’s operational effectiveness.The People’s Liberation Army is rapidly modernizing, but there are concerns about how effective it would prove if pressed into combat today – not least within China’s own military hierarchy. New Central Military Commission Vice-Chairman Xu Qiliang recently told the PLA Daily that too many PLA exercises are merely for show, and that new elite units had to be formed if China wanted to protect its interests. CMC Chairman Xi Jinping has also called on the PLA to improve its readiness for “real combat.” Other weaknesses within the PLA, such as endemic corruption, would similarly undermine the leadership’s confidence in committing it to a risky war with a peer adversary.
4. Unsettled politics. China’s civil and military leaderships remain in a state of flux, with the handover initiated in November not yet complete. As the new leaders find their feet and jockey for position amongst themselves, they will want to avoid big foreign-policy distractions – war with Japan and possibly the U.S. being the biggest of them all.
5. The unknown quantity of U.S. intervention. China has its hawks, such as Dai Xu, who think that the U.S. would never intervene in an Asian conflict on behalf of Japan or any other regional ally. But this view is far too casual. U.S. involvement is a real enough possibility to give China pause, should the chances of conflict increase.
6. China’s policy of avoiding military confrontation. China has always said that it favors peaceful solutions to disputes, and its actions have tended to bear this out. In particular, it continues to usually dispatch unarmed or only lightly armed law enforcement ships to maritime flashpoints, rather than naval ships.There have been calls for a more aggressive policy in the nationalist media, and from some military figures; but Beijing has not shown much sign of heeding them. The PLA Navy made a more active intervention in the dispute this week when one of its frigates trained its radar on a Japanese naval vessel. This was a dangerous and provocative act of escalation, but once again the Chinese action was kept within bounds that made violence unlikely (albeit, needlessly, more likely than before).
7. China’s socialization. China has spent too long telling the world that it poses no threat to peace to turn around and fulfill all the China-bashers’ prophecies. Already, China’s reputation in Southeast Asia has taken a hit over its handling of territorial disputes there. If it were cast as the guilty party in a conflict with Japan –which already has the sympathy of many East Asian countries where tensions China are concerned – China would see regional opinion harden against it further still. This is not what Beijing wants: It seeks to influence regional affairs diplomatically from within, and to realize “win-win” opportunities with its international partners.
In light of these constraints, Abe should be able to push back against China – so long as he doesn’t go too far. He was of course dealt a rotten hand by his predecessor, Yoshihiko Noda, whose bungled nationalization of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands triggered last year’s plunge in relations. Noda’s misjudgments raised the political temperature to the point where neither side feels able to make concessions, at least for now, in an attempt to repair relations.
However, Abe can make the toxic Noda legacy work in his favor. Domestically, he can play the role of the man elected to untangle the wreckage, empowered by his democratic mandate to seek a new normal in Sino-Japanese relations. Chinese assertiveness would be met with a newfound Japanese assertiveness, restoring balance to the relationship. It is also timely for Japan to push back now, while its military is still a match for China’s. Five or ten years down the line this may no longer be the case, even if Abe finally grows the stagnant defense budget.
Meanwhile, Abe is also pursuing diplomatic avenues. It was Abe who mended Japan’s ties with China after the Koizumi years, and he is now trying to reprise his role as peacemaker, having dispatched his coalition partner, Natsuo Yamaguchi, to Beijing reportedly to convey his desire for a new dialogue. It is hardly surprising, given his daunting domestic laundry list, that Xi Jinping should have responded encouragingly to the Japanese olive branch.
In the end, Abe and Xi are balancing the same equation: They will not give ground on sovereignty issues, but they have no interest in a war – in fact, they must dread it. Even if a small skirmish between Chinese and Japanese ships or aircraft occurs, the leaders will not order additional forces to join the battle unless they are boxed in by a very specific set of circumstances that makes escalation the only face-saving option. The escalatory spiral into all-out war that some envisage once the first shot is fired is certainly not the likeliest outcome, as recurrent skirmishes elsewhere – such as in Kashmir, or along the Thai-Cambodian border – have demonstrated.
The post 7 Reasons China and Japan Won’t Go To War appeared first on The Diplomat.
Political energy is a plus only when it’s wisely deployed however, and some fear that Abe is picking a fight he can’t win when it comes to his hardline stance on China.
Rather than attempting to soothe the tensions that built between Beijing and Tokyo in 2012, Abe has struck a combative tone, especially concerning their dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands – a keystone for nationalists in both countries. Each time fighter aircraft are scrambled or ships are sent to survey the likely flashpoint, we hear more warnings about the approach of a war that China and Japan now seem almost eager to wage. The Economist, for example,recently observed that, “China and Japan are sliding towards war,” while Hugh White of the Australian National University warned his readers:
“Don't be too surprised if the U.S. and Japan go to war with China [in 2013].” News this week of another reckless act of escalation – Chinese naval vessels twice training their radars on their Japanese counterparts – will only have ratcheted up their concerns.
These doomful predictions came as Abe set out his vision of a more hard-nosed Japan that will no longer be pushed around when it comes to sovereignty issues. In his December op-ed on Project Syndicate Abe accused Beijing of performing “daily exercises in coercion” and advocated a “democratic security diamond” comprising Australia, India, Japan and the U.S. (rehashing a concept from the 2007 Quadrilateral Security Dialogue). He then proposed defense spending increases – Japan’s first in a decade – and strengthened security relations with the Philippines and Vietnam, which both share Tokyo’s misgivings about China’s intentions. An alliance-affirming trip to the U.S.is expected soon, and there is talk of Japan stationing F-15s on Shimojijima, close to the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands.
However, Abe would argue that he is acting to strengthen Japan in order to balance a rising China and prevent a conflict, rather than creating the conditions for one. And he undoubtedly has a more sanguine view of the future of Sino-Japanese relations than those who see war as an ever more likely outcome. Of course, there is a chance that Chinese and Japanese ships or aircraft will clash as the dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands rumbles on; and, if they do, there is a chance that a skirmish could snowball unpredictably into a wider conflict.
But if Shinzo Abe is gambling with the region’s security, he is at least playing the odds. He is calculating that Japan can pursue a more muscular foreign policy without triggering a catastrophic backlash from China, based on the numerous constraints that shape Chinese actions, as well as the interlocking structure of the globalized environment which the two countries co-inhabit. Specifically, there are seven reasons to think that war is a very unlikely prospect, even with a more hawkish prime minister running Japan:
1. Beijing’s nightmare scenario. China might well win a war against Japan, but defeat would also be a very real possibility. As China closes the book on its “century of humiliation” and looks ahead to prouder times, the prospect of a new, avoidable humiliation at the hands of its most bitter enemy is enough to persuade Beijing to do everything it can to prevent that outcome (the surest way being not to have a war at all). Certainly, China’s new leader, Xi Jinping, does not want to go down in history as the man who led China into a disastrous conflict with the Japanese. In that scenario, Xi would be doomed politically, and, as China’s angry nationalism turned inward, the Communist Party probably wouldn’t survive either.
2. Economic interdependence. Win or lose, a Sino-Japanese war would be disastrous for both participants. The flagging economy that Abe is trying to breathe life into with a $117 billion stimulus package would take a battering as the lucrative China market was closed off to Japanese business. China would suffer, too, as Japanese companies pulled out of a now-hostile market, depriving up to 5 million Chinese workers of their jobs, even as Xi Jinping looks to double per capita income by 2020. Panic in the globalized economy would further depress both economies, and potentially destroy the programs of both countries’ new leaders.
3. Question marks over the PLA’s operational effectiveness.The People’s Liberation Army is rapidly modernizing, but there are concerns about how effective it would prove if pressed into combat today – not least within China’s own military hierarchy. New Central Military Commission Vice-Chairman Xu Qiliang recently told the PLA Daily that too many PLA exercises are merely for show, and that new elite units had to be formed if China wanted to protect its interests. CMC Chairman Xi Jinping has also called on the PLA to improve its readiness for “real combat.” Other weaknesses within the PLA, such as endemic corruption, would similarly undermine the leadership’s confidence in committing it to a risky war with a peer adversary.
4. Unsettled politics. China’s civil and military leaderships remain in a state of flux, with the handover initiated in November not yet complete. As the new leaders find their feet and jockey for position amongst themselves, they will want to avoid big foreign-policy distractions – war with Japan and possibly the U.S. being the biggest of them all.
5. The unknown quantity of U.S. intervention. China has its hawks, such as Dai Xu, who think that the U.S. would never intervene in an Asian conflict on behalf of Japan or any other regional ally. But this view is far too casual. U.S. involvement is a real enough possibility to give China pause, should the chances of conflict increase.
6. China’s policy of avoiding military confrontation. China has always said that it favors peaceful solutions to disputes, and its actions have tended to bear this out. In particular, it continues to usually dispatch unarmed or only lightly armed law enforcement ships to maritime flashpoints, rather than naval ships.There have been calls for a more aggressive policy in the nationalist media, and from some military figures; but Beijing has not shown much sign of heeding them. The PLA Navy made a more active intervention in the dispute this week when one of its frigates trained its radar on a Japanese naval vessel. This was a dangerous and provocative act of escalation, but once again the Chinese action was kept within bounds that made violence unlikely (albeit, needlessly, more likely than before).
7. China’s socialization. China has spent too long telling the world that it poses no threat to peace to turn around and fulfill all the China-bashers’ prophecies. Already, China’s reputation in Southeast Asia has taken a hit over its handling of territorial disputes there. If it were cast as the guilty party in a conflict with Japan –which already has the sympathy of many East Asian countries where tensions China are concerned – China would see regional opinion harden against it further still. This is not what Beijing wants: It seeks to influence regional affairs diplomatically from within, and to realize “win-win” opportunities with its international partners.
In light of these constraints, Abe should be able to push back against China – so long as he doesn’t go too far. He was of course dealt a rotten hand by his predecessor, Yoshihiko Noda, whose bungled nationalization of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands triggered last year’s plunge in relations. Noda’s misjudgments raised the political temperature to the point where neither side feels able to make concessions, at least for now, in an attempt to repair relations.
However, Abe can make the toxic Noda legacy work in his favor. Domestically, he can play the role of the man elected to untangle the wreckage, empowered by his democratic mandate to seek a new normal in Sino-Japanese relations. Chinese assertiveness would be met with a newfound Japanese assertiveness, restoring balance to the relationship. It is also timely for Japan to push back now, while its military is still a match for China’s. Five or ten years down the line this may no longer be the case, even if Abe finally grows the stagnant defense budget.
Meanwhile, Abe is also pursuing diplomatic avenues. It was Abe who mended Japan’s ties with China after the Koizumi years, and he is now trying to reprise his role as peacemaker, having dispatched his coalition partner, Natsuo Yamaguchi, to Beijing reportedly to convey his desire for a new dialogue. It is hardly surprising, given his daunting domestic laundry list, that Xi Jinping should have responded encouragingly to the Japanese olive branch.
In the end, Abe and Xi are balancing the same equation: They will not give ground on sovereignty issues, but they have no interest in a war – in fact, they must dread it. Even if a small skirmish between Chinese and Japanese ships or aircraft occurs, the leaders will not order additional forces to join the battle unless they are boxed in by a very specific set of circumstances that makes escalation the only face-saving option. The escalatory spiral into all-out war that some envisage once the first shot is fired is certainly not the likeliest outcome, as recurrent skirmishes elsewhere – such as in Kashmir, or along the Thai-Cambodian border – have demonstrated.
The post 7 Reasons China and Japan Won’t Go To War appeared first on The Diplomat.
RUSSIA's Putin sacks Olympic official over delays
SOCHI, Russia (Reuters) - President Vladimir Putin dismissed a senior Russian Olympic Committee official on Thursday over rising costs and delays in construction work for the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi.
Did RUSSIAN Jets Violate JAPANESE Airspace?
Japan scrambled fighter jets after two Russian Su-27 fighter jets entered Japanese airspace over the territorial waters of Rishiri Island in Hokkaido the Japanese government said on Thursday.
“Today, around 03:00 (06:00 GMT), military fighters belonging to Russian Federation breached our nation's airspace above territorial waters off Rishiri island in Hokkaido,” Japan’s Foreign Ministry said, the BBC reported. Japan responded by scrambling two F-2 jets.
Russia denied the incident saying it had been holding military drills over the Kuril Islands this week but had not violated Japanese airspace.
A spokesperson for the Russian Defense Ministry said, “"Flights of military aircraft are … carried out in strict accordance with the international rules governing air space and do not violate the border of other states,” Yahoo! News reported.
Moscow and Tokyo have been locked in a dispute over the ownership of the Kurils Islands since WWII. There have recently been signs emanating out of Tokyo that suggested the Japanese government was looking to finally end the ongoing spat over the Islands. Last month on national television, former Japanese Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori proposed a solution to the conflict that would leave Russia in control over some of the islands. The Abe administration quickly distanced itself from this proposal, however, it has since expressed interest in ending the dispute.
If this latest incident is true, it would mark the first time that Russia has violated Japanese airspace since 2008.
“Today, around 03:00 (06:00 GMT), military fighters belonging to Russian Federation breached our nation's airspace above territorial waters off Rishiri island in Hokkaido,” Japan’s Foreign Ministry said, the BBC reported. Japan responded by scrambling two F-2 jets.
Russia denied the incident saying it had been holding military drills over the Kuril Islands this week but had not violated Japanese airspace.
A spokesperson for the Russian Defense Ministry said, “"Flights of military aircraft are … carried out in strict accordance with the international rules governing air space and do not violate the border of other states,” Yahoo! News reported.
Moscow and Tokyo have been locked in a dispute over the ownership of the Kurils Islands since WWII. There have recently been signs emanating out of Tokyo that suggested the Japanese government was looking to finally end the ongoing spat over the Islands. Last month on national television, former Japanese Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori proposed a solution to the conflict that would leave Russia in control over some of the islands. The Abe administration quickly distanced itself from this proposal, however, it has since expressed interest in ending the dispute.
If this latest incident is true, it would mark the first time that Russia has violated Japanese airspace since 2008.
HONG KONG: Why 'snake kings' are a dying breed in Hong Kong
Wrangling cobras to make a traditional soup is tough work – but fewer young Chinese are willing to do it
CHINA: Xi Jinping heads top-level Diaoyu task force
Xi Jinping will head a newly created task force created to monitor the dispute with Japan over the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands as tensions continue to build in the East China Sea. The territorial dispute over the uninhabited islands has escalated in recent weeks, with ships and airplanes from both sides squaring off in the disputed territory. [ more › ]
Wednesday, February 6, 2013
ASIA Photos: Wrap Yourself in Snake-Themed Luxury
As they have in the past, luxury brands are rolling out a menagerie of zodiac-inflected merchandise to capitalize on the Lunar New Year holiday, which marks Asia's biggest shopping season. Here's a sampling of the serpentine gear on offer.
CHINA averts local government defaults
Chinese banks extend maturities on at least three-quarters of loans to local governments, indicating the challenge facing the country in working down its debt load.
CHINA averts local government defaults
Chinese banks extend maturities on at least three-quarters of loans to local governments, indicating the challenge facing the country in working down its debt load.
SOUTH KOREA: Nose Jobs Most Popular Plastic Surgery
Liposuction is the most popular cosmetic surgery in the world, according to the International Society of Aesthetic Plastic Surgery.
ISAPS looked at 14.7 million procedures carried out in 2011. The U.S. had the most plastic surgeries with 3.11 million, followed by 1.45 million in Brazil and...
ISAPS looked at 14.7 million procedures carried out in 2011. The U.S. had the most plastic surgeries with 3.11 million, followed by 1.45 million in Brazil and...
AUSTRALIA, JAPAN, SOUTH KOREA: The World’s Best Post Offices
The much-maligned U.S. Postal Service stacks up surprisingly well in international rankings.
HONG KONG Still Attracting Retailers Despite Forbidding Costs
The latest arrival, the clothing brand Tommy Bahama, said its new location in the city was about as expensive as its larger flagship store in New York.
THAILAND Cracks Down on Animal Trafficking
The Thai government wants to shed its image as a place where many types of wildlife — turtles from Madagascar, marmoset monkeys from South America, baby sun bears, large exotic birds, to name a few — are for sale.
CHINA 'jails 10 over petitioners'
Ten people are jailed for illegally detaining petitioners who travelled to Beijing to appeal to the central government, Chinese state media say.
CRUISING: New cruise ships for 2013: Royal Princess
The 3,600-passenger vessel is scheduled to debut in June in Europe.
CRUISING: Secrets the Cruise Lines Don't Tell You
Secrets the Cruise Lines Don't Tell You: 
Cruise ship life can be a little mysterious. All of your choices aren't always spelled out in black and white. The more you cruise, the more you pick up on the unofficial cruising "secrets" that give you more options, let you save money and generally allow you to have a better time onboard.
Cruise ship life can be a little mysterious. All of your choices aren't always spelled out in black and white. The more you cruise, the more you pick up on the unofficial cruising "secrets" that give you more options, let you save money and generally allow you to have a better time onboard.
THAI Alphabet Song: เพลง ก.เอ๋ย ก.ไก่
Written Thai has a complex relationship to the spoken language. Most consonants can be written in two different ways, indicating different tones. There are also additional marks for tones and for vowels. There are 44 consonants to memorize, and the task is made easier by associating each one with a word in which the sound is featured. So the first letter is 'ko' as in kai (chicken), the second is 'kho' as in khai (egg), and so on down through bottle, water buffalo, person, bell, snake, etc.
JAPANESE Alphabet Song - Katakana - Hiragana - 日本語
Japanese is represented with a few different writing systems. This song names the syllables represented by the katakana and hiragana characters. Katakana is mostly used for foreign loan words or technical vocabulary, and hiragana is used for Japanese words and word endings. There's a third system based on characters adopted from Chinese writing that isn't in the song
MALAY (Jawi alphabet): Aa Ba Tha
The Malaysian language can be written with the Latin alphabet or in Jawi, a form of Arabic script.
SINGAPORE: The Worldview of Lee Kuan Yew
Befitting an individual who will be turning 90 this year, Lee Kuan Yew is increasingly reflective these days—about his life, the memories that he shared with his wife of 60 years, and the lives that their three children have led. Unlike most his age, however, he is also preoccupied with the challenges that his country will confront when he is gone. And Singapore truly is his country: he served as its founding father, its prime minister (1959-90), its senior minister (1990-2004), and its minister mentor (2004-11). As Nicholas Kristof observed in a review of Lee’s 2000 memoir, From Third World to First: The Singapore Story, “[o]ther leaders have reshaped nations—Kemal Ataturk in Turkey, Lenin in Russia, Deng Xiaoping in China—but no one left a deeper imprint on his people than Lee.”
Lee is concerned that future leaders of Singapore may take for granted the peace and prosperity that it now enjoys. The further removed one is from the struggles that made them possible, after all, the more likely one is to act as though they are organic conditions rather than fleeting ones; and, it follows, the less urgency one is likely to demonstrate in striving for their preservation. He also fears that Singapore may be squeezed amidst growing strategic distrust between the Asia's two giants, China and India.
Interestingly, though, for someone who cuts as complex and contentious a figure, Lee is not that concerned about how others appraise him and his policies. “I have never been overconcerned or obsessed with opinion polls or popularity polls,” he once said, echoing a sentiment that he has conveyed throughout his career. “I think a leader who is, is a weak leader.” As for his legacy, he insists on being remembered for the virtues that he embodied, not the positions that he attained. He told a group of journalists from the Straits Times that he is “determined, consistent, persistent. I set out to do something. I keep on chasing it until it succeeds. That is all….Anybody who thinks he is a statesman needs to see a psychiatrist.”
Lee’s policies have elicited great criticism over the decades, as has the determination with which he has pursued them; as a quick Google search will reveal, some hail him as a visionary while others denounce him as an authoritarian. Regarding the breadth of his perspective, however, there is far less debate. As Seth Mydans noted in a September 2010 profile, when his conversation with Lee shifted “from introspection to geopolitics…he grew vigorous and forceful, his worldview still wide ranging, detailed and commanding.” I was able to catch a glimpse of that worldview in December 2011 and March 2012, when I accompanied Graham Allison and Robert Blackwill to meet with him in Singapore. Here are some of the questions on which he meditated at length:
- “Are Chinese leaders serious about displacing the United States as the number one power in Asia?”
- “Is the United States in systemic decline?”
- “How should U.S. policies and actions adjust to deal with the rise of China?”
- “Will India rise to become a great power, and if so, on what timeline?”
- “What are Russia’s long-term prospects?”
- “What lessons have you learned from the global financial crisis?”
Drawing on his answers to these and many other questions, Lee’s own writings and speeches, and other publicly available sources, we tried to distill his most important strategic insights into a book that was published February 1st, Lee Kuan Yew: The Grand Master’s Insights on China, the United States, and the World (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2013).
Given the respect that Lee commands among leaders in the U.S. and China, his observations about the dynamics between those two countries are of particular interest. He does not subscribe to the declinism that is increasingly common among U.S. commentators, emphasizing America’s regenerative capacities as well as the myriad challenges that China confronts in trying to sustain a robust rate of growth. At the same time, he argues, given China’s historical experience and present momentum, one should not be surprised that it eventually aspires to be the world’s preeminent power. It is accustomed to a Sino-centric international system in which its neighbors pay it tribute, it will soon have the world’s largest economy, and it is making it harder for the U.S. military to operate in the Asia-Pacific.
These trends, among others, have crystallized a strategic competition between the U.S. and China. Unlike most observers, however, Lee was discussing the inevitability of such a competition in the 1990s, when it was common to hear that the dissolution of the Soviet Union had yielded a unipolar international system. In 1993, for example, in an essay for Foreign Affairs, Nicholas Kristof cited Lee’s observation that the international system would have to reconfigure itself to accommodate the China of 30 or 40 years hence. “China,” Lee noted, “is [not] just another big player. This is the biggest player in the history of the world.” Three years later, he ventured that China might be able to contest U.S. preeminence in three decades.
In a nod to his panoramic worldview, Arnaud de Borchgrave dubbed Lee the “Kissinger of the orient” (incidentally, Henry Kissinger has stated on many occasions that no world leader has taught him more than Lee). One of the limitations to that analogy, of course, is that while Kissinger has had the opportunity to shape the foreign policy of the world’s preeminent power, Lee has been constrained to implementing his vision in one of its smallest countries: with an area of 697 square kilometers, Singapore is only about 3.5 times as large as Washington, DC. That he emerged as one of the world’s leading strategic thinkers is further remarkable given his responsibilities; while the leader of a stable, secure, and prosperous country might have more time to contemplate trends in international order, he was consumed with far more exigent tasks: creating a country amidst hostile conditions and then preventing it from collapsing.
Given the gravity of those tasks, it is not surprising that Lee has grown accustomed to speaking honestly, succinctly, and forcefully—not as an idle provocateur, but as one who believes that candor is essential to developing prudent policies. In a January 1950 address to Malay students in England, he stated that “between platitudes and personal convictions…it is my duty to state my convictions vigorously,” and warned against “ignoring unpalatable facts and avoiding unpleasant controversy.”
It is doubtful that any observer would agree with all of Lee’s judgments (indeed, he would probably be disappointed if one did), especially concerning governance. Given his success in modernizing Singapore as well as his criticisms of democratic excess—he famously argued in 1992 that the “exuberance of democracy leads to undisciplined and disorderly conditions which are inimical to development”—he is often characterized as an enlightened authoritarian who advocates “Asian values.”
He is not, however, a reflexive supporter of the “Beijing Consensus”: essentially, a fusion of authoritarian governance, state capitalism, and incremental reforms. Indeed, Lee increasingly discusses the challenges that the information revolution will pose to Chinese governance. Above all, then, he is not an ideologue, but a pragmatist: he does not see governance as the process of executing policy in accordance with principles, but rather, of developing principles by using trial and error to determine which policies work. This judgment will doubtlessly frustrate those who believe that certain values are intrinsically superior, even universal; given the challenges that presently confront both East and West, however, it has much to recommend it.
Ali Wyne is an associate of the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and a contributing analyst at Wikistrat.
The post The Worldview of Lee Kuan Yew appeared first on The Diplomat.
Lee is concerned that future leaders of Singapore may take for granted the peace and prosperity that it now enjoys. The further removed one is from the struggles that made them possible, after all, the more likely one is to act as though they are organic conditions rather than fleeting ones; and, it follows, the less urgency one is likely to demonstrate in striving for their preservation. He also fears that Singapore may be squeezed amidst growing strategic distrust between the Asia's two giants, China and India.
Interestingly, though, for someone who cuts as complex and contentious a figure, Lee is not that concerned about how others appraise him and his policies. “I have never been overconcerned or obsessed with opinion polls or popularity polls,” he once said, echoing a sentiment that he has conveyed throughout his career. “I think a leader who is, is a weak leader.” As for his legacy, he insists on being remembered for the virtues that he embodied, not the positions that he attained. He told a group of journalists from the Straits Times that he is “determined, consistent, persistent. I set out to do something. I keep on chasing it until it succeeds. That is all….Anybody who thinks he is a statesman needs to see a psychiatrist.”
Lee’s policies have elicited great criticism over the decades, as has the determination with which he has pursued them; as a quick Google search will reveal, some hail him as a visionary while others denounce him as an authoritarian. Regarding the breadth of his perspective, however, there is far less debate. As Seth Mydans noted in a September 2010 profile, when his conversation with Lee shifted “from introspection to geopolitics…he grew vigorous and forceful, his worldview still wide ranging, detailed and commanding.” I was able to catch a glimpse of that worldview in December 2011 and March 2012, when I accompanied Graham Allison and Robert Blackwill to meet with him in Singapore. Here are some of the questions on which he meditated at length:
- “Are Chinese leaders serious about displacing the United States as the number one power in Asia?”
- “Is the United States in systemic decline?”
- “How should U.S. policies and actions adjust to deal with the rise of China?”
- “Will India rise to become a great power, and if so, on what timeline?”
- “What are Russia’s long-term prospects?”
- “What lessons have you learned from the global financial crisis?”
Drawing on his answers to these and many other questions, Lee’s own writings and speeches, and other publicly available sources, we tried to distill his most important strategic insights into a book that was published February 1st, Lee Kuan Yew: The Grand Master’s Insights on China, the United States, and the World (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2013).
Given the respect that Lee commands among leaders in the U.S. and China, his observations about the dynamics between those two countries are of particular interest. He does not subscribe to the declinism that is increasingly common among U.S. commentators, emphasizing America’s regenerative capacities as well as the myriad challenges that China confronts in trying to sustain a robust rate of growth. At the same time, he argues, given China’s historical experience and present momentum, one should not be surprised that it eventually aspires to be the world’s preeminent power. It is accustomed to a Sino-centric international system in which its neighbors pay it tribute, it will soon have the world’s largest economy, and it is making it harder for the U.S. military to operate in the Asia-Pacific.
These trends, among others, have crystallized a strategic competition between the U.S. and China. Unlike most observers, however, Lee was discussing the inevitability of such a competition in the 1990s, when it was common to hear that the dissolution of the Soviet Union had yielded a unipolar international system. In 1993, for example, in an essay for Foreign Affairs, Nicholas Kristof cited Lee’s observation that the international system would have to reconfigure itself to accommodate the China of 30 or 40 years hence. “China,” Lee noted, “is [not] just another big player. This is the biggest player in the history of the world.” Three years later, he ventured that China might be able to contest U.S. preeminence in three decades.
In a nod to his panoramic worldview, Arnaud de Borchgrave dubbed Lee the “Kissinger of the orient” (incidentally, Henry Kissinger has stated on many occasions that no world leader has taught him more than Lee). One of the limitations to that analogy, of course, is that while Kissinger has had the opportunity to shape the foreign policy of the world’s preeminent power, Lee has been constrained to implementing his vision in one of its smallest countries: with an area of 697 square kilometers, Singapore is only about 3.5 times as large as Washington, DC. That he emerged as one of the world’s leading strategic thinkers is further remarkable given his responsibilities; while the leader of a stable, secure, and prosperous country might have more time to contemplate trends in international order, he was consumed with far more exigent tasks: creating a country amidst hostile conditions and then preventing it from collapsing.
Given the gravity of those tasks, it is not surprising that Lee has grown accustomed to speaking honestly, succinctly, and forcefully—not as an idle provocateur, but as one who believes that candor is essential to developing prudent policies. In a January 1950 address to Malay students in England, he stated that “between platitudes and personal convictions…it is my duty to state my convictions vigorously,” and warned against “ignoring unpalatable facts and avoiding unpleasant controversy.”
It is doubtful that any observer would agree with all of Lee’s judgments (indeed, he would probably be disappointed if one did), especially concerning governance. Given his success in modernizing Singapore as well as his criticisms of democratic excess—he famously argued in 1992 that the “exuberance of democracy leads to undisciplined and disorderly conditions which are inimical to development”—he is often characterized as an enlightened authoritarian who advocates “Asian values.”
He is not, however, a reflexive supporter of the “Beijing Consensus”: essentially, a fusion of authoritarian governance, state capitalism, and incremental reforms. Indeed, Lee increasingly discusses the challenges that the information revolution will pose to Chinese governance. Above all, then, he is not an ideologue, but a pragmatist: he does not see governance as the process of executing policy in accordance with principles, but rather, of developing principles by using trial and error to determine which policies work. This judgment will doubtlessly frustrate those who believe that certain values are intrinsically superior, even universal; given the challenges that presently confront both East and West, however, it has much to recommend it.
Ali Wyne is an associate of the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and a contributing analyst at Wikistrat.
The post The Worldview of Lee Kuan Yew appeared first on The Diplomat.
CHINA: Toddler Death Shines Light on China’s One-Child Enforcers
The death this week of a Chinese toddler has shined the spotlight once again on China’s family planning enforcers, who have been increasingly under a microscope for the sometimes brutal ways they implement the country's one-child policy.
RUSSIA exploiting workers at Olympic venue: video report
Human Rights Watch publishes a report suggesting migrant worker abuse at the Winter Olympics construction sites in Sochi. Simon Hanna reports.
JAPAN: Tokyo calls for CHINA restraint
JAPANESE Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has asked Beijing to rein in its "provocative" actions.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
Posts
