Saturday, February 2, 2013
CHINA: Washington Post joins list of hacked US media
The Washington Post disclosed on Saturday that it had suffered a cyberattack and suspects Chinese hackers were behind it, joining Twitter and major US media outlets that have endured intrusions.
JAPANESE Premier Won’t Take Step in Relocating U.S. Base Before Meeting Obama
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is caught between trying to improve relations with the United States and opposition on Okinawa to an American military presence.
CAMBODIA: A Generation Says Farewell to Their King, Norodom Sihanouk
Va Sin was just 27 the last time Cambodia said goodbye to a king. It was 1960 and King Norodom Suramarit, the father of Norodom Sihanouk, had passed away, ceding the throne to his son, who was serving as prince and head of state.
It was a humble affair, Ms. Sin remembers, without the outpouring of emotion that has followed the death of the late King Father Norodom Sihanouk.
“It was much different from the King Father’s procession. At the time, there were less people at the parade because there was less sadness,” said Ms. Sin.
In Sok was 24 when King Suramarit was carried to his cremation site 53 years ago. Now 77, he joined the tens of thousands of people who lined Norodom Boulevard on Friday morning to watch the procession that delivered the late King Father’s body to its cremation site in front of the National Museum.
“King Suramarit’s cremation procession was accompanied by elephants, horses, and a lot less people,” Mr. Sok said. “But the King Father’s procession is so sad. Even the kids are crying.”
Though emotions were not as raw on Friday as they were among the crowds that poured into Phnom Penh’s streets when the King Father’s body was returned to the Royal Palace from Beijing on October 17, many people still bowed their heads and cried as the golden casket carrying the king’s remained moved past them.
And for the older generation of Cambodians, who grew up during a time when Norodom Sihanouk was at the height of his power, it was a particularly meaningful farewell.
“I and all Cambodian people will never forget [the late King Father] because people all over the country, especially those who lived during the 1950s and 1960s, received affection and care from him,” Ms. Sin said.
In the 1950s, she remembers then-King Sihanouk giving a speech at a silk factory that had recently opened in Kompong Cham province, where she lived at the time.
“He chose to sleep in a small shelter without concern for himself because he would do anything to meet his people,” she said.
Sum Kul was just 17 and when he first saw then-King Norodom Sihanouk in person. It was 1946 and King Sihanouk had come to visit Cambodian troops stationed in Prey Veng province to offer encouragement.
“We only had wooden guns,” recounted Mr. Kul, now 84, as he waited to see the funeral procession pass.
“But the King Father always made us strong and courageous.”
Although Norodom Sihanouk’s legacy has been widely debated since his death almost four months ago, the reverence of Cambodians for their former king, prince and head of state is without question.
To the generation who watched Norodom Sihanouk lead Cambodia to independence from France, who had ruled the country for 90 years, he was “quite simply, a god,” said historian Henri Locard.
“He was an exceptional personality, an extremely strong character, and he united in just one person the independence movement,” Mr. Locard said.
Chuob Pov Rousette, 85, a doctor who returned to Cambodia last year after 45 years working in France, said that she first fell in love with King Sihanouk as a student at the University of Health Sciences.
“I think the Cambodian people love all their kings,” she said.
“But King Sihanouk is buried deep in people’s heart because he was the only King that brought Cambodia independence and he loved his people from the bottom of his stomach.”
It was a humble affair, Ms. Sin remembers, without the outpouring of emotion that has followed the death of the late King Father Norodom Sihanouk.
“It was much different from the King Father’s procession. At the time, there were less people at the parade because there was less sadness,” said Ms. Sin.
In Sok was 24 when King Suramarit was carried to his cremation site 53 years ago. Now 77, he joined the tens of thousands of people who lined Norodom Boulevard on Friday morning to watch the procession that delivered the late King Father’s body to its cremation site in front of the National Museum.
“King Suramarit’s cremation procession was accompanied by elephants, horses, and a lot less people,” Mr. Sok said. “But the King Father’s procession is so sad. Even the kids are crying.”
Though emotions were not as raw on Friday as they were among the crowds that poured into Phnom Penh’s streets when the King Father’s body was returned to the Royal Palace from Beijing on October 17, many people still bowed their heads and cried as the golden casket carrying the king’s remained moved past them.
And for the older generation of Cambodians, who grew up during a time when Norodom Sihanouk was at the height of his power, it was a particularly meaningful farewell.
“I and all Cambodian people will never forget [the late King Father] because people all over the country, especially those who lived during the 1950s and 1960s, received affection and care from him,” Ms. Sin said.
In the 1950s, she remembers then-King Sihanouk giving a speech at a silk factory that had recently opened in Kompong Cham province, where she lived at the time.
“He chose to sleep in a small shelter without concern for himself because he would do anything to meet his people,” she said.
Sum Kul was just 17 and when he first saw then-King Norodom Sihanouk in person. It was 1946 and King Sihanouk had come to visit Cambodian troops stationed in Prey Veng province to offer encouragement.
“We only had wooden guns,” recounted Mr. Kul, now 84, as he waited to see the funeral procession pass.
“But the King Father always made us strong and courageous.”
Although Norodom Sihanouk’s legacy has been widely debated since his death almost four months ago, the reverence of Cambodians for their former king, prince and head of state is without question.
To the generation who watched Norodom Sihanouk lead Cambodia to independence from France, who had ruled the country for 90 years, he was “quite simply, a god,” said historian Henri Locard.
“He was an exceptional personality, an extremely strong character, and he united in just one person the independence movement,” Mr. Locard said.
Chuob Pov Rousette, 85, a doctor who returned to Cambodia last year after 45 years working in France, said that she first fell in love with King Sihanouk as a student at the University of Health Sciences.
“I think the Cambodian people love all their kings,” she said.
“But King Sihanouk is buried deep in people’s heart because he was the only King that brought Cambodia independence and he loved his people from the bottom of his stomach.”
© 2013, The Cambodia Daily. All rights reserved. No part of this article may be reproduced in print, electronically, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed without written permission.
JAPAN: 6.9-magnitude earthquake hits northern Japan
At least ten people have been injured as 6.9-magnitude earthquake hit the coast of Hokkaido, Japan. The authorities are assessing the extent of material damage. Two nuclear power plants are in the affected area.
Read Full Article at RT.com
THAILAND’s 7-11 Operator Eyes Expansion to China, Neighboring Countries
Thai company CP All PCL is eyeing overseas expansion in China through the increasingly ubiquitous 7-Eleven convenience stores, hoping to replicate the huge success story in the Southeast Asian market it has created over the last two decades.
Photos: ASIA Prepares to Celebrate the Year of the Snake
It's travel season for the Lunar New Year again, and those leaving Beijing to celebrate will get a respite from their smog-ridden city.
CHINA: 250,000 Twitter accounts compromised in sophisticated cyber attack
Twitter has become the latest target of a sophisticated cyber attack, with around 250,000 accounts exposed. The breach appears to be the latest in a string of attacks on news content sites that’s being blamed on Chinese...
Read Full Article at RT.com
CHINA: 250,000 Twitter accounts compromised in sophisticated cyber attack
Twitter has become the latest target of a sophisticated cyber attack, with around 250,000 accounts exposed. The breach appears to be the latest in a string of attacks on news content sites that’s being blamed on Chinese...
Read Full Article at RT.com
NORTH KOREA imposes martial law, orders troops to ‘be ready for war’ - report
North Korea has allegedly been placed under martial law and its ruler Kim Jong-un has ordered the army to “prepare for war”, a South Korean daily claims.
Read Full Article at RT.com
ASIA: Is Asia’s Balance of Power Self-Enforcing?
Has the hour of offshore balancing struck? Sometimes you get that sense. U.S. defense budgets are on the wane, and with them the wherewithal to undertake ambitious foreign ventures. Sentiment does seem to be coalescing behind the idea that the United States should draw down expensive Eurasian entanglements, many of which provide little obvious return on the investment. If Washington cuts its commitments, it can cut down on the resources it uses to uphold those commitments. Ends will remain aligned with reduced ways and means. And to be sure, the logic of offshore balancing is seductive. If America no longer carries as big a stick as it once did, it must make doubly sure to speak softly — avoiding overextending itself and stoking needless antagonisms.
A central assumption for proponents of a more offshore posture is that the international system is mainly self-regulating. If China becomes a domineering great power, that is, lesser neighbors will make common cause. They will augment and aggregate their diplomatic, economic, and military might, constituting an ample counterweight. Only in extreme — and highly improbable — circumstances will they need outsiders to step in to tip the military balance against a would-be hegemon. Some offshore balancers just want to quit the Eurasian continent, retiring to (relatively) nearby bases like Japan and Guam. Purists clamor to bring the boys home and balance from North America. Not only can the United States pull back from the Eurasian rimlands, in their view; it can do without undue risk. The weary titan can set down his load at last.
Great-power balancing lies at the core of the realist school of international relations. There’s doubtless considerable truth to it. The inexorable logic of self-help — and self-preservation — impels societies to join against overbearing antagonists. As Benjamin Franklin quipped before signing the Declaration of Independence, you can hang together or hang separately. But does the logic of balancing warrant the confidence offshore balancers vest in it? Not necessarily. International-relations theory derives in large part from studying 19th-century Europe, where coalitions among roughly comparable great powers indeed offset one another until the rise of a far greater power in Europe's midst, Imperial Germany, upset the system. The United States ultimately had to add its weight to the European balance — twice. So much for a self-administering European Concert.
How about the Western Hemisphere? Who balanced against the United States during its ascent to regional primacy? No one, really. Unable to outmatch the U.S. Navy in its own backyard, and with a naval arms race to run in the North Sea, Great Britain and its Royal Navy beat a quiet retreat from the Americas toward the end of the 19th century. That left Latin America — chiefly the powers ringing the Caribbean Sea, where most U.S. interests resided. Governments there showed little sign of balancing behavior. They showed no sign of effective balancing — even during the banana wars, when Washington repeatedly landed troops in Caribbean nations for reasons good and ill.
Neither the European nor the American experience, then, lends much credence to the notion that regional balances are self-enforcing. Will the Far East prove different? Maybe. But neither history nor the lopsided distribution of power among Asian nations justifies assuming the region can shift for itself. Whether offshore balancing represents a feasible U.S. strategy will depend on whether China's neighbors look to their defenses effectively, and on how well they coordinate policy and strategy. Baby steps in that direction on the part of Japan, Australia, and India provide some cause for hope. But as we all know, hope is not a strategy.
A central assumption for proponents of a more offshore posture is that the international system is mainly self-regulating. If China becomes a domineering great power, that is, lesser neighbors will make common cause. They will augment and aggregate their diplomatic, economic, and military might, constituting an ample counterweight. Only in extreme — and highly improbable — circumstances will they need outsiders to step in to tip the military balance against a would-be hegemon. Some offshore balancers just want to quit the Eurasian continent, retiring to (relatively) nearby bases like Japan and Guam. Purists clamor to bring the boys home and balance from North America. Not only can the United States pull back from the Eurasian rimlands, in their view; it can do without undue risk. The weary titan can set down his load at last.
Great-power balancing lies at the core of the realist school of international relations. There’s doubtless considerable truth to it. The inexorable logic of self-help — and self-preservation — impels societies to join against overbearing antagonists. As Benjamin Franklin quipped before signing the Declaration of Independence, you can hang together or hang separately. But does the logic of balancing warrant the confidence offshore balancers vest in it? Not necessarily. International-relations theory derives in large part from studying 19th-century Europe, where coalitions among roughly comparable great powers indeed offset one another until the rise of a far greater power in Europe's midst, Imperial Germany, upset the system. The United States ultimately had to add its weight to the European balance — twice. So much for a self-administering European Concert.
How about the Western Hemisphere? Who balanced against the United States during its ascent to regional primacy? No one, really. Unable to outmatch the U.S. Navy in its own backyard, and with a naval arms race to run in the North Sea, Great Britain and its Royal Navy beat a quiet retreat from the Americas toward the end of the 19th century. That left Latin America — chiefly the powers ringing the Caribbean Sea, where most U.S. interests resided. Governments there showed little sign of balancing behavior. They showed no sign of effective balancing — even during the banana wars, when Washington repeatedly landed troops in Caribbean nations for reasons good and ill.
Neither the European nor the American experience, then, lends much credence to the notion that regional balances are self-enforcing. Will the Far East prove different? Maybe. But neither history nor the lopsided distribution of power among Asian nations justifies assuming the region can shift for itself. Whether offshore balancing represents a feasible U.S. strategy will depend on whether China's neighbors look to their defenses effectively, and on how well they coordinate policy and strategy. Baby steps in that direction on the part of Japan, Australia, and India provide some cause for hope. But as we all know, hope is not a strategy.
CHINA: Breaking Down Xi Jinping
In terms of content, Xi Jinping's foreign policy speech on Tuesday was a dud.
His first since assuming the leadership of the Communist Party, Xinhua's account (the English version is slightly abbreviated but accurate) of the speech reads like a laundry list of the Party's foreign policy buzzwords – if anything, it was closer to a Hu Jintao speech than the relatively frank and outspoken language that characterized Xi’s first public appearances. This is probably to be expected, since it was delivered at a study session of the Central Committee. Study sessions are a context in which leaders tend to address the Party rather than the public and usually use more Party jargon.
I don't think the speech really tells us anything new about Xi's plans for Chinese foreign policy, but it does seem like a poor fit for the “reformist nationalism” narrative that a lot of commentators have been using to interpret Xi's actions so far. It is certainly true that China has been unusually aggressive over its territorial disputes lately, but it remains an open question whether Xi is a factor in driving this behavior. Given his recent meeting with a member of the Japanese government, I think it is more likely than not that he is laying the groundwork for a compromise with Tokyo that defers resolving the territorial dispute to later.
Xi began his Tuesday speech by name-checking his predecessors' trademark theories – Deng Xiaoping Thought, Jiang Zemin's “Three Represents,” and Hu's “Scientific Development.” The balance covers three well-accepted foreign policy ideas – the concept of “peaceful rise,” criticism of hegemonism, and a promise not to negotiate about China's “core national interests.”
Xi's language about “core national interests” does sound tough – “Foreign countries should not expect that we will trade on our own core interests, not expect that we will eat the bitter fruits of damaging our country's sovereignty, security, and development benefits.” It has been the subject of a few stories about Chinese aggression. But “core national interests” are a pretty tightly defined category – as Michael Swaine argued in China Leadership Monitor (PDF), Chinese officials have been careful to include only the territories of Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang in the category, and they have long said that they are not up for negotiation.
Given their place in the account and Xi's evident interest in a deal with Japan, I think the right way to read this comment is as an attempt to defuse accusations that Xi is too weak to defend China's core interests. Xinhua has more or less confirmed this interpretation:
"Some have responded sharply to Xi's statement, as he declared that China will not compromise when it comes to its core interests.
But Xi's statement was far from being a hardline declaration. It showed that peaceful development is indeed a working strategy that not only has a blueprint and a goal, but also a bottom line."
If Xi's statement was intended as a strong warning, it would be very odd for official media to undercut it the following day.
That said, I would not put too much weight on the language about world peace – this is intended to make a contrast with foreign hegemonism, and is frequently used as a basis for criticizing American actions which China views as meddling in its internal affairs, such as arms sales to Taiwan. The language of “peaceful rise” does suggest the policies of Deng Xiaoping, whose policies focused on deferring resolution of territorial disputes and focusing on trade, calculating that China's growing strength means that in the future it will likely be able to get a better final deal.
Still, it is surprising how little aggressive language we have seen from Xi in the last few months. We usually expect Chinese leaders to take hawkish stances as they attempt to establish their legitimacy – as Asahi Shimbun has explained quite well – and Xi's interest in forging his public image could give him an especially strong concern about popular nationalism. With that as a baseline, it is worth being open to the possibility that Xi is looking for something like Hu's Anti-Secession Law (PDF), a strong gesture with which he can buy off the hawks without committing himself to actions which could seriously damage China's international relations.
It is, then, possible that the more aggressive parts of China's recent behavior are “freelance” work by hawks in the PLA Navy, as Susan Shirk has noted over at Chinafile. The main story to follow in the coming weeks will probably be relations with Japan – if Xi is able to make a deal with the new Japanese government that ends the current round of escalation, and pays for it by giving hawks at home a few fiery speeches about currently quiet issues like Taiwan, I think we have reason to be pretty optimistic about his approach to foreign policy.
His first since assuming the leadership of the Communist Party, Xinhua's account (the English version is slightly abbreviated but accurate) of the speech reads like a laundry list of the Party's foreign policy buzzwords – if anything, it was closer to a Hu Jintao speech than the relatively frank and outspoken language that characterized Xi’s first public appearances. This is probably to be expected, since it was delivered at a study session of the Central Committee. Study sessions are a context in which leaders tend to address the Party rather than the public and usually use more Party jargon.
I don't think the speech really tells us anything new about Xi's plans for Chinese foreign policy, but it does seem like a poor fit for the “reformist nationalism” narrative that a lot of commentators have been using to interpret Xi's actions so far. It is certainly true that China has been unusually aggressive over its territorial disputes lately, but it remains an open question whether Xi is a factor in driving this behavior. Given his recent meeting with a member of the Japanese government, I think it is more likely than not that he is laying the groundwork for a compromise with Tokyo that defers resolving the territorial dispute to later.
Xi began his Tuesday speech by name-checking his predecessors' trademark theories – Deng Xiaoping Thought, Jiang Zemin's “Three Represents,” and Hu's “Scientific Development.” The balance covers three well-accepted foreign policy ideas – the concept of “peaceful rise,” criticism of hegemonism, and a promise not to negotiate about China's “core national interests.”
Xi's language about “core national interests” does sound tough – “Foreign countries should not expect that we will trade on our own core interests, not expect that we will eat the bitter fruits of damaging our country's sovereignty, security, and development benefits.” It has been the subject of a few stories about Chinese aggression. But “core national interests” are a pretty tightly defined category – as Michael Swaine argued in China Leadership Monitor (PDF), Chinese officials have been careful to include only the territories of Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang in the category, and they have long said that they are not up for negotiation.
Given their place in the account and Xi's evident interest in a deal with Japan, I think the right way to read this comment is as an attempt to defuse accusations that Xi is too weak to defend China's core interests. Xinhua has more or less confirmed this interpretation:
"Some have responded sharply to Xi's statement, as he declared that China will not compromise when it comes to its core interests.
But Xi's statement was far from being a hardline declaration. It showed that peaceful development is indeed a working strategy that not only has a blueprint and a goal, but also a bottom line."
If Xi's statement was intended as a strong warning, it would be very odd for official media to undercut it the following day.
That said, I would not put too much weight on the language about world peace – this is intended to make a contrast with foreign hegemonism, and is frequently used as a basis for criticizing American actions which China views as meddling in its internal affairs, such as arms sales to Taiwan. The language of “peaceful rise” does suggest the policies of Deng Xiaoping, whose policies focused on deferring resolution of territorial disputes and focusing on trade, calculating that China's growing strength means that in the future it will likely be able to get a better final deal.
Still, it is surprising how little aggressive language we have seen from Xi in the last few months. We usually expect Chinese leaders to take hawkish stances as they attempt to establish their legitimacy – as Asahi Shimbun has explained quite well – and Xi's interest in forging his public image could give him an especially strong concern about popular nationalism. With that as a baseline, it is worth being open to the possibility that Xi is looking for something like Hu's Anti-Secession Law (PDF), a strong gesture with which he can buy off the hawks without committing himself to actions which could seriously damage China's international relations.
It is, then, possible that the more aggressive parts of China's recent behavior are “freelance” work by hawks in the PLA Navy, as Susan Shirk has noted over at Chinafile. The main story to follow in the coming weeks will probably be relations with Japan – if Xi is able to make a deal with the new Japanese government that ends the current round of escalation, and pays for it by giving hawks at home a few fiery speeches about currently quiet issues like Taiwan, I think we have reason to be pretty optimistic about his approach to foreign policy.
TAIPEI: World's first Barbie restaurant opens
Waiters trying to look like Ken, waitresses in tutus and tiaras, a hodgepodge menu and generous lashings of pink, welcome to the world's first Barbie restaurant.
KOREAN PENINSULA: If Korea Were to Unite…
Discussions on Korea today often revolve around North Korea and its nuclear weapons program. Yet, it is highly unlikely that the Korean Peninsula will remain divided forever, and emergence of a successfully unified and stable Korea is certainly one of many possibilities that merits close attention. Such a scenario would have far-reaching and potentially destabilizing consequences on the balance of power in Northeast Asia, especially with regard to a rising China and a normalizing Japan, both of which have critical security interests on the Korean Peninsula.
For the time being, there is in fact a great power status quo on the Korean Peninsula, as North Korea in many ways is an issue that unites the major regional powers who are often at odds with each other, including Japan, South Korea, China, the United States, and Russia. In the most basic sense, all five countries support North Korea denuclearizing and not collapsing, and oppose actions that could lead to war on the Peninsula. Thus, the lack of policy coordination among the different powers has been due to differences in priorities more so than interests.
Korean reunification would dramatically alter the consensus that now exists. Notably, China and a reunified Korea (under Seoul) will have direct security issues due to their shared borders and outstanding border disputes. Beijing will be particularly worried about Korean and U.S. troops moving up to the very open China-Korea Yalu River border. Even if the U.S. military were to remain below the DMZ line or leave the Korean Peninsula entirely, China will still have to worry about the South Korean military, which is well equipped and has nearly seven-hundred thousand troops (one of the largest in the world). Without North Korea and its 1.1 million troops serving as geographic and human buffers, Beijing will consider Korean and U.S. troops as serious regional threats.
Furthermore, a reunified Korea would be able to direct more energy to issues that received less attention before, especially highly charged historical disputes with Japan. There are several unresolved issues between the two countries, including the territorial disputes (Dokdo/Takeshima Islands, names of the Sea of Japan/East Sea) and numerous issues originating from Japan’s colonization of Korea and World War II (for example, the comfort women issue). Focusing more on these issues would fuel nationalism in an increasingly confident, assertive, and powerful Korea. This might be useful inbuilding cohesiveness among the formerly split Korean people, but Tokyo would likely feel threatened by Seoul’s intention to address its past grievances. While the two countries might not become openly hostile, their relations would almost certainly deteriorate, intensifying the tension in the region.
The second factor, which will further complicate the situation, is the on-going rise of China, assuming that it continues to grow without experiencing serious domestic instability. In the future, an increasingly powerful Chinese military power will render U.S. security guarantees in the region less credible. Despite the so-called “pivot,” the fact of the matter is that Chinese military power will grow relative to U.S. military power in the region. Given the Korean Peninsula’s importance to China’s security, Beijing may push Seoul to distance itself from Washington or even to align with it.
In its own response to a rising China, Japan could become a fully normal nation without any constitutional limit placed on its military power. Japan remains the third largest economy in the world, while the Maritime Self-Defense Force at this time remains the most powerful naval force in the region after the U.S. navy. Tokyo would consider the possibility of Seoul aligned with Beijing a serious national security threat, “a dagger pointed at the heart of Japan,” as Korea could be used as a springboard for attacks against the Japanese Isles (Pusan, a major Korean port, is less than two-hundred nautical miles from Yamaguchi Porton the Japanese mainland).
With the reunification of Korea and a rising China, the Northeast Asia of the future will be fraught with security dilemmas. Given Korea’s strategic location and the fact that it has become a significant middle power in its own right, Seoul’s choice of alignment among the great powers competing could potentially tilt the balance of power in the region in favor of one side or another. Such a shift would no doubt cause dangerous destabilization in the region, if there is no dominant force to keep stability.
In such a circumstance, one possible strategy that Seoul could pursue is balancing without alignment. Korea’s potential role as East Asia’s political and economic intersection point— and perhaps even as an independent balancing player in its own right— is being increasingly discussed in the country. Many Koreans today are hoping that Seoul in the future could be the country where regional political issues and economic exchanges are mediated, despite the fact that balancing has historically been an extraordinarily difficult feat for Korea.
In fact, Korea experimented unsuccessfully with a similarly independent balancing strategy before during the late 19th and early 20th century, when multiple great powers were competing for regional dominance in East Asia. China’s Qing Dynasty at that time had weakened significantly, and it was too risky for Korea to rely on the Middle Kingdom as the guarantor of security. Instead, Seoul tried to forge relations with as many great powers as possible and play them off one another so that none of them would be able to actually control Korea. The gambit, however, failed, and Korea came under Japanese rule between 1910 and 1945.
In the end, the best strategy (or rather, the least bad option) for Seoul may be retaining its alliance with Washington (even if its influence declines in the region), while attempting to remain as neutral as possible between Beijing and Tokyo, as difficult (and perhaps even unsustainable) as it may be. Korea should strive to act as an absolutely neutral buffer between China and Japan– a status that should preferably be guaranteed by the United States, which might still be able to play the role of a distant, neutral arbiter. This strategy would be one of neutrality guaranteed by an outside actor as opposed to active balancing without aligning with one actor. It is certainly not a risk-free strategy, as maintenance of neutrality is almost as difficult as balancing, but it may be the only viable strategy.
The primary threat to this policy remains nationalism, which will constantly push Korea to adopt a more assertive foreign policy. Maintenance of neutrality will require all the tact, restraint, and subtlety that Seoul can muster. Resolving the East Asian countries’ historical grievances with each other might be one way to moderate Korean nationalism. Washington could also further defense and technological cooperation with Seoul to strengthen the latter’s military so that it may fend for its own security to some degree.A strong Korea that is able to resist pressure from both China and Japan might lead to a more stable Northeast Asia.
Other major actors in the region too, including the United States, should recognize the pivotal importance of the Korean Peninsula in maintaining stability in the region, and work together to keep the peninsula an independent buffer state. No state should attempt to disturb the status quo and bring Korea under its dominance, and in this endeavor, the United States should continue to play its part as Northeast Asia’s peacekeeper in the future.
Sungtae“Jacky” Park is a research assistant at Center for the National Interest. He has previously written for CSIS (Center for Strategic and International Studies), France 24, and the International Affairs Review.
For the time being, there is in fact a great power status quo on the Korean Peninsula, as North Korea in many ways is an issue that unites the major regional powers who are often at odds with each other, including Japan, South Korea, China, the United States, and Russia. In the most basic sense, all five countries support North Korea denuclearizing and not collapsing, and oppose actions that could lead to war on the Peninsula. Thus, the lack of policy coordination among the different powers has been due to differences in priorities more so than interests.
Korean reunification would dramatically alter the consensus that now exists. Notably, China and a reunified Korea (under Seoul) will have direct security issues due to their shared borders and outstanding border disputes. Beijing will be particularly worried about Korean and U.S. troops moving up to the very open China-Korea Yalu River border. Even if the U.S. military were to remain below the DMZ line or leave the Korean Peninsula entirely, China will still have to worry about the South Korean military, which is well equipped and has nearly seven-hundred thousand troops (one of the largest in the world). Without North Korea and its 1.1 million troops serving as geographic and human buffers, Beijing will consider Korean and U.S. troops as serious regional threats.
Furthermore, a reunified Korea would be able to direct more energy to issues that received less attention before, especially highly charged historical disputes with Japan. There are several unresolved issues between the two countries, including the territorial disputes (Dokdo/Takeshima Islands, names of the Sea of Japan/East Sea) and numerous issues originating from Japan’s colonization of Korea and World War II (for example, the comfort women issue). Focusing more on these issues would fuel nationalism in an increasingly confident, assertive, and powerful Korea. This might be useful inbuilding cohesiveness among the formerly split Korean people, but Tokyo would likely feel threatened by Seoul’s intention to address its past grievances. While the two countries might not become openly hostile, their relations would almost certainly deteriorate, intensifying the tension in the region.
The second factor, which will further complicate the situation, is the on-going rise of China, assuming that it continues to grow without experiencing serious domestic instability. In the future, an increasingly powerful Chinese military power will render U.S. security guarantees in the region less credible. Despite the so-called “pivot,” the fact of the matter is that Chinese military power will grow relative to U.S. military power in the region. Given the Korean Peninsula’s importance to China’s security, Beijing may push Seoul to distance itself from Washington or even to align with it.
In its own response to a rising China, Japan could become a fully normal nation without any constitutional limit placed on its military power. Japan remains the third largest economy in the world, while the Maritime Self-Defense Force at this time remains the most powerful naval force in the region after the U.S. navy. Tokyo would consider the possibility of Seoul aligned with Beijing a serious national security threat, “a dagger pointed at the heart of Japan,” as Korea could be used as a springboard for attacks against the Japanese Isles (Pusan, a major Korean port, is less than two-hundred nautical miles from Yamaguchi Porton the Japanese mainland).
With the reunification of Korea and a rising China, the Northeast Asia of the future will be fraught with security dilemmas. Given Korea’s strategic location and the fact that it has become a significant middle power in its own right, Seoul’s choice of alignment among the great powers competing could potentially tilt the balance of power in the region in favor of one side or another. Such a shift would no doubt cause dangerous destabilization in the region, if there is no dominant force to keep stability.
In such a circumstance, one possible strategy that Seoul could pursue is balancing without alignment. Korea’s potential role as East Asia’s political and economic intersection point— and perhaps even as an independent balancing player in its own right— is being increasingly discussed in the country. Many Koreans today are hoping that Seoul in the future could be the country where regional political issues and economic exchanges are mediated, despite the fact that balancing has historically been an extraordinarily difficult feat for Korea.
In fact, Korea experimented unsuccessfully with a similarly independent balancing strategy before during the late 19th and early 20th century, when multiple great powers were competing for regional dominance in East Asia. China’s Qing Dynasty at that time had weakened significantly, and it was too risky for Korea to rely on the Middle Kingdom as the guarantor of security. Instead, Seoul tried to forge relations with as many great powers as possible and play them off one another so that none of them would be able to actually control Korea. The gambit, however, failed, and Korea came under Japanese rule between 1910 and 1945.
In the end, the best strategy (or rather, the least bad option) for Seoul may be retaining its alliance with Washington (even if its influence declines in the region), while attempting to remain as neutral as possible between Beijing and Tokyo, as difficult (and perhaps even unsustainable) as it may be. Korea should strive to act as an absolutely neutral buffer between China and Japan– a status that should preferably be guaranteed by the United States, which might still be able to play the role of a distant, neutral arbiter. This strategy would be one of neutrality guaranteed by an outside actor as opposed to active balancing without aligning with one actor. It is certainly not a risk-free strategy, as maintenance of neutrality is almost as difficult as balancing, but it may be the only viable strategy.
The primary threat to this policy remains nationalism, which will constantly push Korea to adopt a more assertive foreign policy. Maintenance of neutrality will require all the tact, restraint, and subtlety that Seoul can muster. Resolving the East Asian countries’ historical grievances with each other might be one way to moderate Korean nationalism. Washington could also further defense and technological cooperation with Seoul to strengthen the latter’s military so that it may fend for its own security to some degree.A strong Korea that is able to resist pressure from both China and Japan might lead to a more stable Northeast Asia.
Other major actors in the region too, including the United States, should recognize the pivotal importance of the Korean Peninsula in maintaining stability in the region, and work together to keep the peninsula an independent buffer state. No state should attempt to disturb the status quo and bring Korea under its dominance, and in this endeavor, the United States should continue to play its part as Northeast Asia’s peacekeeper in the future.
Sungtae“Jacky” Park is a research assistant at Center for the National Interest. He has previously written for CSIS (Center for Strategic and International Studies), France 24, and the International Affairs Review.
ASIA: Top 5 Naval Battles of the Asia-Pacific
Ranking apples against oranges is always a slippery process. How does one maritime battle rise above others in importance? One benchmark is whether an encounter saw one fleet crush another. We could put Lord Nelson’s face on such a list. The Battle of Trafalgar (1805) delivered astounding tactical results. Yet the Napoleonic Wars raged on for another decade after Trafalgar, until Europeans finally banded together to put a stop to the little emperor’s marauding. It was indecisive. So why not rank battles by the magnitude of the issues they decided? Which sea fights yielded the most fateful results, reshaping the Asian order?
Herewith, my list of the Top 5 Naval Battles of the Asia-Pacific:
5. Battle of Yamen (1279). Sometimes dubbed “China’s Trafalgar,” this clash between the Mongol Yuan Dynasty and the beleaguered Southern Song determined who would rule China. It was far more decisive than Nelson’s masterwork. Over 1,000 men-of-war crewed by tens of thousands of men took part in the engagement. Yuan commanders deployed deception and audacious tactics to overcome at least a 10:1 mismatch in numbers. Most important, Yamen claimed the life of the Song emperor, clearing the way for Kublai Khan’s dynasty to rule for nearly a century.
4. Pearl Harbor (1941).This epic miscalculation on Imperial Japan’s part opened a struggle for mastery of the Pacific Ocean. Rather than bypass Hawaii, strike at the U.S.-occupied Philippine Islands, and thereby firm up its control of the waters within its island defense perimeter, Tokyo dispatched Admiral Nagumo’s carrier fleet to strike at the U.S. Pacific Fleet. The result was an ephemeral tactical victory that brought about strategic catastrophe for Japan. American shipbuilders had laid the keels for a second U.S. Navy under the Two-Ocean Navy Act of 1940. The handwriting was on the wall for Japan once the new hulls arrived in theater starting in 1943. Pearl Harbor set events in motion that would give America nautical primacy for the next seven decades (and counting).
3. Guadalcanal (1942-1943). While the Battle of Midway garnered the most press, Guadalcanal and the rest of the Solomon Islands campaign launched the United States into an early offensive in the Pacific—despite the primacy Allied leaders afforded the European theater. The campaign kept Japan from extending its defense perimeter farther to the south, and thereby menacing the sea lanes connecting the United States with Australia. After six months of grueling battle—ably retold by the miniseries The Pacific and the memoirs from which it derives—U.S. forces could commence their methodical trek across the South Pacific toward the Philippines and Formosa. Never again would Japan regain the strategic initiative.
2. Battle of Tsushima (1905). Admiral Heihachiro Togo’s Combined Fleet followed up its August 1904 demolition of Russia’s Port Arthur-based Pacific Squadron by sending the Russian Baltic Fleet to the bottom. After losing the Pacific Squadron, the tsar doubled down on failure. He dispatched the Baltic Fleet on a 20,000-mile voyage from the Baltic, around the Cape of Good Hope, through the Indian Ocean, and into the Far East. Togo’s freshly refitted fleet intercepted the Russians between Japan and Korea—handing Asians their first meaningful victory over a European imperial power in centuries. Tsushima electrified Asia, showing the region’s inhabitants they could resist imperial rule. Vanquishing its chief maritime competitor, furthermore, allowed Imperial Japan to annex Taiwan and Korea. The battle’s legacy haunts the region to this day.
1. Battle of the Yalu (1894). This trial of arms turned Asia’s Sinocentric order upside down. Seaborne European conquerors ushered in China’s century of humiliation in the 1840s, marked by the Opium Wars, a series of “unequal treaties” the imperial powers imposed on the Qing Dynasty, and European occupation of seaports along the China coast. This was bad enough. Upstart Japan had opened to the world only in the 1850s, following centuries of seclusion. Its Meiji Restoration (1868) launched the island nation onto the path to outward Westernization. An Imperial Japanese Navy fleet cobbled together from imported components steamed to the Korean west coast. It defeated China’s Beiyang Fleet, a force widely considered superior in material and seamanship terms. The battle hastened the collapse of China’s dynastic order, among the most fateful events to convulse Asian history in centuries. Such repercussions land the Yalu atop my list.
Herewith, my list of the Top 5 Naval Battles of the Asia-Pacific:
5. Battle of Yamen (1279). Sometimes dubbed “China’s Trafalgar,” this clash between the Mongol Yuan Dynasty and the beleaguered Southern Song determined who would rule China. It was far more decisive than Nelson’s masterwork. Over 1,000 men-of-war crewed by tens of thousands of men took part in the engagement. Yuan commanders deployed deception and audacious tactics to overcome at least a 10:1 mismatch in numbers. Most important, Yamen claimed the life of the Song emperor, clearing the way for Kublai Khan’s dynasty to rule for nearly a century.
4. Pearl Harbor (1941).This epic miscalculation on Imperial Japan’s part opened a struggle for mastery of the Pacific Ocean. Rather than bypass Hawaii, strike at the U.S.-occupied Philippine Islands, and thereby firm up its control of the waters within its island defense perimeter, Tokyo dispatched Admiral Nagumo’s carrier fleet to strike at the U.S. Pacific Fleet. The result was an ephemeral tactical victory that brought about strategic catastrophe for Japan. American shipbuilders had laid the keels for a second U.S. Navy under the Two-Ocean Navy Act of 1940. The handwriting was on the wall for Japan once the new hulls arrived in theater starting in 1943. Pearl Harbor set events in motion that would give America nautical primacy for the next seven decades (and counting).
3. Guadalcanal (1942-1943). While the Battle of Midway garnered the most press, Guadalcanal and the rest of the Solomon Islands campaign launched the United States into an early offensive in the Pacific—despite the primacy Allied leaders afforded the European theater. The campaign kept Japan from extending its defense perimeter farther to the south, and thereby menacing the sea lanes connecting the United States with Australia. After six months of grueling battle—ably retold by the miniseries The Pacific and the memoirs from which it derives—U.S. forces could commence their methodical trek across the South Pacific toward the Philippines and Formosa. Never again would Japan regain the strategic initiative.
2. Battle of Tsushima (1905). Admiral Heihachiro Togo’s Combined Fleet followed up its August 1904 demolition of Russia’s Port Arthur-based Pacific Squadron by sending the Russian Baltic Fleet to the bottom. After losing the Pacific Squadron, the tsar doubled down on failure. He dispatched the Baltic Fleet on a 20,000-mile voyage from the Baltic, around the Cape of Good Hope, through the Indian Ocean, and into the Far East. Togo’s freshly refitted fleet intercepted the Russians between Japan and Korea—handing Asians their first meaningful victory over a European imperial power in centuries. Tsushima electrified Asia, showing the region’s inhabitants they could resist imperial rule. Vanquishing its chief maritime competitor, furthermore, allowed Imperial Japan to annex Taiwan and Korea. The battle’s legacy haunts the region to this day.
1. Battle of the Yalu (1894). This trial of arms turned Asia’s Sinocentric order upside down. Seaborne European conquerors ushered in China’s century of humiliation in the 1840s, marked by the Opium Wars, a series of “unequal treaties” the imperial powers imposed on the Qing Dynasty, and European occupation of seaports along the China coast. This was bad enough. Upstart Japan had opened to the world only in the 1850s, following centuries of seclusion. Its Meiji Restoration (1868) launched the island nation onto the path to outward Westernization. An Imperial Japanese Navy fleet cobbled together from imported components steamed to the Korean west coast. It defeated China’s Beiyang Fleet, a force widely considered superior in material and seamanship terms. The battle hastened the collapse of China’s dynastic order, among the most fateful events to convulse Asian history in centuries. Such repercussions land the Yalu atop my list.
CHINA’s New Militancy
“We will show the courage to try and resolve our differences with other nations peacefully—not because we are naïve about the dangers we face, but because engagement can more durably lift suspicion and fear,” President Obama said in his second inaugural address.
How exactly does the international community “engage” hostile states? Take China, for instance.
Xi Jinping, named Communist Party general secretary in November, reflects a new militancy. On Tuesday, he delivered a hard-edged speech to the Politburo in which he effectively ruled out compromise on territorial and security issues. His tough words were in keeping with the ever-more strident tones of his messages to the People’s Liberation Army about being ready to plan, fight, and win wars. Chinese leaders have traditionally addressed the army and urged improvement in general readiness, but, as veteran China watcher Willy Lam notes, Xi has put a special emphasis on it. Moreover, his calls on preparing for conflict go well beyond those of his two predecessors, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao.
In the past, the military’s war talk contrasted with soothing words from senior civilian leaders. Now, with Xi, the aggressive comments from flag officers are consistent with what he, as top leader, is saying. Worse, as the Financial Times notes, Xi’s words of war are now “being bundled” with his rhetoric, which seems calculated to “fan nationalism.”
In this environment, Chinese military officers can get away with advocating “short, sharp wars” and talking about the need to “strike first.” Their boldness suggests, as some privately say, that General Secretary Xi is associating with generals and admirals who think war with the U.S. might be a good idea.
China looks like it is taking one of its periodic wrong turns. Is it because Xi Jinping is a nationalist who wants to lead the country down a path of high profile force projection? Or is he succumbing to pressures from elements inside a regime increasingly in disarray?
Most analysts think the People’s Army remains firmly under the control of Beijing’s civilian leaders. Sources, for instance, are increasingly reporting that General Secretary Xi is personally directing Beijing’s provocative intrusions into Japanese water and airspace. Moreover, Rand’s Scott Harold perceptively notes that Beijing’s civilian leaders can turn off the tough talk from military hawks when it is important for the Party to present a peaceful front, such as when Hu Jintao visited the U.S. in 2011.
“All of a sudden, bam, these guys got turned off,” Harold told Reuters, referring to the more talkative officers.
Nonetheless, there are increasing signs of a military breaking free of civilian control. Last year, there were two sets of coup rumors that circulated around China, one in January and the other in March. The stories may not be true, but that’s almost beside the point. These rumors went viral in China not only because they were sensational but also because, for many Chinese citizens, they were credible. They were credible because top leaders had conditioned the Chinese people over the last several years to believe the top brass had assumed a central role in Beijing politics.
Hu Jintao, for instance, inadvertently gave credence to the rumors of the attempted military takeovers by repeatedly issuing public warnings, in the form of pointed reminders, that the People’s Liberation Army is subject to the absolute will of the Party. Xi Jinping has also issued the same warnings during his short tenure as general secretary and as chairman of the Party’s Central Military Commission. By now, there have been too many of these statements to think that the Party at this moment truly “controls the gun.”
In fact, the generals and admirals have squabbling civilian leaders to thank for their growing influence. Beginning about a decade ago, flag officers were drawn into the power struggle between the outgoing Jiang Zemin, who was then trying to linger in the limelight, and Hu Jintao, his successor. Last year, we also witnessed top civilian leaders running to the military as they sought support in their various fights with each other.
For instance, when Bo Xilai, then-Chongqing Party secretary, sent his armed security officers to surround the American consulate in Chengdu last February, he went to Kunming to visit the headquarters of the 14th Group Army. His father, Bo Yibo, had established that unit, and analysts naturally speculated that the younger Bo was appealing to its current officers to support his now-failed bid for promotion from the Party’s Politburo to the Politburo’s Standing Committee.
Moreover, in early April, former leader Jiang is rumored to have sat down with military officers before meeting with Hu Jintao and other members of the Standing Committee before stripping Bo of his Party positions. When he later met with Hu and the Standing Committee, Jiang did so at the headquarters of the Central Military Commission in Beijing, a powerfully symbolic venue.
And in an even more disturbing sign of the growing role of the military and the erosion of the standing of civilian leaders, “leftists” last year publicly called on the army to intervene in the nation’s politics.
From all outward appearances, the military is already playing an expanded role in policy as well as politics. Senior officers look like they are acting independently of civilian officials, but in any event, they are openly criticizing them and are making pronouncements on areas that were once the exclusive province of diplomats.
The process of remilitarization of politics and policy has gone so far that the People’s Liberation Army could soon become the most powerful faction in the Communist Party, if it is not already. The military has, from all accounts, retained its cohesiveness better than other Party factions, especially Xi’s amorphous Princeling group.
Xi Jinping appears to have no power base to speak of. Jiang Zemin has apparently packed the Standing Committee, the apex of political power in China, and Hu Jintao has picked the Party’s Central Military Commission. So where does that leave Xi? Normally, the general secretary’s faction ends up the most powerful, but his faction—if he has one—is clearly not. Therefore, it makes sense for him to rely on the military to consolidate a shaky position.
There is always constant bargaining when a new Chinese leader takes over, and this is especially true now because the ongoing transition did not start well. In this troubled time, we should not be surprised that the most hardline elements in Beijing look like they are free to say and do what they want.
And perhaps that’s why Chinese leaders talk war and employ bellicose tactics while they try to push China’s borders outward, taking on Japan, India, and all the nations bordering the South China Sea. At the same time, the Chinese navy is seeking to close off that critical body of water, which Beijing political leaders claim as an internal Chinese lake. State media has been hinting since the middle of 2011 that it is China’s “territorial waters.”
Beijing’s expansive territorial claims are perhaps the inevitable result of the Communist Party’s trajectory. As Pentagon consultant Edward Luttwak notes, “Militant nationalism is the only possible substitute for ex-communists who seek to retain power.” So it is natural that Xi Jinping is talking tough and that the military is assuming a frontal role in expanding territory and waters under China’s control.
In these circumstances, the international community is struggling to maintain good relations with Beijing.
There is always a renewal of hope when a new Chinese leader shows up on the scene, but do not expect the optimism to last long. If Xi is as good as his word and there will be no compromise on important issues, as he indicated on Tuesday, then he leaves threatened nations little choice but to oppose his country’s expansive claims.
President Obama may think he will be able to craft a nuanced policy of engagement with China, but he will instead end up desperately reacting to a regime on the march.
Gordon G. Chang writes at Forbes.com. He is the author of ‘The Coming Collapse of China.’ Follow him on Twitter @GordonGChang
The post China’s New Militancy appeared first on The Diplomat.
How exactly does the international community “engage” hostile states? Take China, for instance.
Xi Jinping, named Communist Party general secretary in November, reflects a new militancy. On Tuesday, he delivered a hard-edged speech to the Politburo in which he effectively ruled out compromise on territorial and security issues. His tough words were in keeping with the ever-more strident tones of his messages to the People’s Liberation Army about being ready to plan, fight, and win wars. Chinese leaders have traditionally addressed the army and urged improvement in general readiness, but, as veteran China watcher Willy Lam notes, Xi has put a special emphasis on it. Moreover, his calls on preparing for conflict go well beyond those of his two predecessors, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao.
In the past, the military’s war talk contrasted with soothing words from senior civilian leaders. Now, with Xi, the aggressive comments from flag officers are consistent with what he, as top leader, is saying. Worse, as the Financial Times notes, Xi’s words of war are now “being bundled” with his rhetoric, which seems calculated to “fan nationalism.”
In this environment, Chinese military officers can get away with advocating “short, sharp wars” and talking about the need to “strike first.” Their boldness suggests, as some privately say, that General Secretary Xi is associating with generals and admirals who think war with the U.S. might be a good idea.
China looks like it is taking one of its periodic wrong turns. Is it because Xi Jinping is a nationalist who wants to lead the country down a path of high profile force projection? Or is he succumbing to pressures from elements inside a regime increasingly in disarray?
Most analysts think the People’s Army remains firmly under the control of Beijing’s civilian leaders. Sources, for instance, are increasingly reporting that General Secretary Xi is personally directing Beijing’s provocative intrusions into Japanese water and airspace. Moreover, Rand’s Scott Harold perceptively notes that Beijing’s civilian leaders can turn off the tough talk from military hawks when it is important for the Party to present a peaceful front, such as when Hu Jintao visited the U.S. in 2011.
“All of a sudden, bam, these guys got turned off,” Harold told Reuters, referring to the more talkative officers.
Nonetheless, there are increasing signs of a military breaking free of civilian control. Last year, there were two sets of coup rumors that circulated around China, one in January and the other in March. The stories may not be true, but that’s almost beside the point. These rumors went viral in China not only because they were sensational but also because, for many Chinese citizens, they were credible. They were credible because top leaders had conditioned the Chinese people over the last several years to believe the top brass had assumed a central role in Beijing politics.
Hu Jintao, for instance, inadvertently gave credence to the rumors of the attempted military takeovers by repeatedly issuing public warnings, in the form of pointed reminders, that the People’s Liberation Army is subject to the absolute will of the Party. Xi Jinping has also issued the same warnings during his short tenure as general secretary and as chairman of the Party’s Central Military Commission. By now, there have been too many of these statements to think that the Party at this moment truly “controls the gun.”
In fact, the generals and admirals have squabbling civilian leaders to thank for their growing influence. Beginning about a decade ago, flag officers were drawn into the power struggle between the outgoing Jiang Zemin, who was then trying to linger in the limelight, and Hu Jintao, his successor. Last year, we also witnessed top civilian leaders running to the military as they sought support in their various fights with each other.
For instance, when Bo Xilai, then-Chongqing Party secretary, sent his armed security officers to surround the American consulate in Chengdu last February, he went to Kunming to visit the headquarters of the 14th Group Army. His father, Bo Yibo, had established that unit, and analysts naturally speculated that the younger Bo was appealing to its current officers to support his now-failed bid for promotion from the Party’s Politburo to the Politburo’s Standing Committee.
Moreover, in early April, former leader Jiang is rumored to have sat down with military officers before meeting with Hu Jintao and other members of the Standing Committee before stripping Bo of his Party positions. When he later met with Hu and the Standing Committee, Jiang did so at the headquarters of the Central Military Commission in Beijing, a powerfully symbolic venue.
And in an even more disturbing sign of the growing role of the military and the erosion of the standing of civilian leaders, “leftists” last year publicly called on the army to intervene in the nation’s politics.
From all outward appearances, the military is already playing an expanded role in policy as well as politics. Senior officers look like they are acting independently of civilian officials, but in any event, they are openly criticizing them and are making pronouncements on areas that were once the exclusive province of diplomats.
The process of remilitarization of politics and policy has gone so far that the People’s Liberation Army could soon become the most powerful faction in the Communist Party, if it is not already. The military has, from all accounts, retained its cohesiveness better than other Party factions, especially Xi’s amorphous Princeling group.
Xi Jinping appears to have no power base to speak of. Jiang Zemin has apparently packed the Standing Committee, the apex of political power in China, and Hu Jintao has picked the Party’s Central Military Commission. So where does that leave Xi? Normally, the general secretary’s faction ends up the most powerful, but his faction—if he has one—is clearly not. Therefore, it makes sense for him to rely on the military to consolidate a shaky position.
There is always constant bargaining when a new Chinese leader takes over, and this is especially true now because the ongoing transition did not start well. In this troubled time, we should not be surprised that the most hardline elements in Beijing look like they are free to say and do what they want.
And perhaps that’s why Chinese leaders talk war and employ bellicose tactics while they try to push China’s borders outward, taking on Japan, India, and all the nations bordering the South China Sea. At the same time, the Chinese navy is seeking to close off that critical body of water, which Beijing political leaders claim as an internal Chinese lake. State media has been hinting since the middle of 2011 that it is China’s “territorial waters.”
Beijing’s expansive territorial claims are perhaps the inevitable result of the Communist Party’s trajectory. As Pentagon consultant Edward Luttwak notes, “Militant nationalism is the only possible substitute for ex-communists who seek to retain power.” So it is natural that Xi Jinping is talking tough and that the military is assuming a frontal role in expanding territory and waters under China’s control.
In these circumstances, the international community is struggling to maintain good relations with Beijing.
There is always a renewal of hope when a new Chinese leader shows up on the scene, but do not expect the optimism to last long. If Xi is as good as his word and there will be no compromise on important issues, as he indicated on Tuesday, then he leaves threatened nations little choice but to oppose his country’s expansive claims.
President Obama may think he will be able to craft a nuanced policy of engagement with China, but he will instead end up desperately reacting to a regime on the march.
Gordon G. Chang writes at Forbes.com. He is the author of ‘The Coming Collapse of China.’ Follow him on Twitter @GordonGChang
The post China’s New Militancy appeared first on The Diplomat.
JAPAN’s Demographic Disaster
Last August, I wrote an article for The Diplomat that discussed some of the issues Japan is facing in relation to population decline. As I noted, the population has dropped for three years in a row. Recently, the Japanese government announced that the population decrease for 2012 is expected to be 212,000—a new record—while the number of births is expected to have fallen by 18,000 to 1,033,000—also a record low. Projections by the Japanese government indicate that if the current trend continues, the population of Japan will decline from its current 127.5 million to 116.6 million in 2030, and 97 million in 2050. This is truly astonishing and puts Japan at the forefront of uncharted demographic territory; but it is territory that many other industrial countries also are beginning to enter as well.
Predicting the consequences of Japan's demographic shift is difficult. And it is important to remember that these are projections; it seems to me unlikely that this trend will continue for the next century without some sort of intervening political, cultural, or economic factors that generate increased immigration or more robust fertility rates. Indeed, there have been modest—very modest—increases in the number of foreign residents in Japan over the past twenty years, with a little over twice the number today (2,134,151) as compared to 1990 (1,075,317). Many towns have developed international centers where opportunities are developed and supported, creating contexts for interactions between local residents and foreigners such as a monthly English dinner hosted in the town where I have done fieldwork for several years.
Government officials have often explained to me that one of the goals of these initiatives is to create contexts in which Japanese people can interact, and thus become more comfortable with, foreigners. The widespread presence of foreign English teachers supported through the JET program and other English language programs has also meant that, unlike forty for fifty years ago, most younger Japanese have grown up regularly interacting with individuals from other countries. At the same time, there has been some immigration of women from other Asian countries, such as the Philippines, into rural parts of Japan for the purpose of marrying men who otherwise would have had difficulties finding a wife among the native population. These developments may allow for increased openness to immigration in the future, although for the most part, the Japanese government has remained lukewarm, at best, when it comes to allowing any significant increase in the number of permanent residents or immigrants. Naturalized Japanese citizenship remains difficult to obtain.
While predicting the future of these demographic trends is difficult, the causes are at least somewhat decipherable. The proximate cause of population decline in Japan are fairly clear: a low fertility combined with increased life expectancy has led to a population structure that is increasingly weighted towards older members of society. Currently there are significantly fewer people under 30 than there are between the ages of 30 and 60. As the population of middle-aged individuals grows older and dies, there will be far fewer people remaining behind. In other words, the current middle-aged generation of Japanese has failed to replace itself. The question, of course, is why?
Various studies of demographic change in Japan have linked declining fertility to other changing social factors such as increased education, delayed marriage age, more economic opportunities for women, and the expense of raising children in modern, urban societies. All of these have played a role in reducing fertility over the past few decades. In addition, beyond delayed marriage many Japanese have chosen not to marry and, as a result, not have children. According to the 2010 census, 30% of all households in Japan were single, representing the largest category of household composition in the country. A significant portion of these households were widows over the age of 65. At the same time, a not insignificant portion were women and men in both early adulthood and middle-age who have simply chosen to not get married. In a society like Japan where child-birth out of wedlock is stigmatized, the decision not to marry also normally means that one has chosen not to have children.
Indeed, there are many women in Japan today in their forties and fifties who have opted for a career over marriage and child-rearing. In Japan, social pressures make it difficult for women to manage a career while also raising a family. Furthermore, recent trends suggest that both men and women are increasingly uncertain about the value of marriage and having a family. A government survey of people between the ages of 18 and 34 in 2011 showed that over 61% of unmarried men among those surveyed lacked a girlfriend and 49.5% unmarried women had no boyfriend, the latter being a new record. Forty percent of respondents indicated that there was no need to marry and 45% of men showed no interest in "dating the opposite sex." These results, which represented significant increases over the same type of survey conducted in previous years, have raised concerns that the population problem Japan is facing will not change in the foreseeable future.
The consequences of changing attitudes about marriage and gender roles and associated low fertility are considerable. One problem that has arisen is that many single women are living on very low incomes and have joined the ranks of the poor. Recent research has shown that 1 in 3 single women of working age in Japan qualify as poor and that the number of poor women in Japan is likely to increase; by 2030 it is projected that 1 in 5 women in Japan will be single. Many of these women may well be living in some level of poverty.
Another problem Japan faces is that the general low fertility rate means there are not enough younger people paying into the national pension program, and this will cause increasing strain on government coffers as the proportion of elderly (currently about 23% of the population is over 65) continues to grow.
Finally, the decline of the population over the next few decades, and the shortage of young people in particular, will have a significant impact on the Japanese labor force. Questions related to how to maintain economic growth—an issue that has been at the forefront of thinking about the country for the past twenty years, due to a generally sluggish economy—with a decreasing population are both complex and on the minds of policymakers. One obvious solution to this would be for Japan to relax immigration policies and allow for more workers, particularly healthcare workers, to enter the country. As noted above, to date this has not been a particularly palatable solution, but this may well change as younger Japanese, with regular experience and interactions with foreigners, move into positions of power and guide policy.
An alternative to this social-centered solution of increased immigration has been raised in recent years. Rather than relaxing immigration laws, some have proposed increasing investment in robotics as a means of addressing the conflict of a shortfall of labor with the need for workers. This idea has been raised particularly in relation to elder care, where demand for workers has increased rapidly with the promulgation of the longer term care insurance program in 2001 and the continued growth of the elderly population. It may well be that a technological solution to Japan’s population problem will be seen as preferable to other possible solutions.
Obviously, only time will tell. But Japan is faced with an unprecedented population challenge that will have social, economic, and political consequences over the next century—consequences that will not only affect Japan, but also influence Japan’s trading partners as well as its political and military allies.
There is, perhaps, no single variable in the complex web of East Asian politics more uncertain in terms of how it may influence future relations throughout the region than the fate of Japan’s population, because the manner in which that population changes over the next several decades is both difficult to predict and likely to have a profound influence in shaping the regional role Japan is able to play as a political, cultural, and economic power.
Dr. John W. Traphagan is a professor in the Department of Religious Studies, University of Texas at
Austin.
The post Japan’s Demographic Disaster appeared first on The Diplomat.
Predicting the consequences of Japan's demographic shift is difficult. And it is important to remember that these are projections; it seems to me unlikely that this trend will continue for the next century without some sort of intervening political, cultural, or economic factors that generate increased immigration or more robust fertility rates. Indeed, there have been modest—very modest—increases in the number of foreign residents in Japan over the past twenty years, with a little over twice the number today (2,134,151) as compared to 1990 (1,075,317). Many towns have developed international centers where opportunities are developed and supported, creating contexts for interactions between local residents and foreigners such as a monthly English dinner hosted in the town where I have done fieldwork for several years.
Government officials have often explained to me that one of the goals of these initiatives is to create contexts in which Japanese people can interact, and thus become more comfortable with, foreigners. The widespread presence of foreign English teachers supported through the JET program and other English language programs has also meant that, unlike forty for fifty years ago, most younger Japanese have grown up regularly interacting with individuals from other countries. At the same time, there has been some immigration of women from other Asian countries, such as the Philippines, into rural parts of Japan for the purpose of marrying men who otherwise would have had difficulties finding a wife among the native population. These developments may allow for increased openness to immigration in the future, although for the most part, the Japanese government has remained lukewarm, at best, when it comes to allowing any significant increase in the number of permanent residents or immigrants. Naturalized Japanese citizenship remains difficult to obtain.
While predicting the future of these demographic trends is difficult, the causes are at least somewhat decipherable. The proximate cause of population decline in Japan are fairly clear: a low fertility combined with increased life expectancy has led to a population structure that is increasingly weighted towards older members of society. Currently there are significantly fewer people under 30 than there are between the ages of 30 and 60. As the population of middle-aged individuals grows older and dies, there will be far fewer people remaining behind. In other words, the current middle-aged generation of Japanese has failed to replace itself. The question, of course, is why?
Various studies of demographic change in Japan have linked declining fertility to other changing social factors such as increased education, delayed marriage age, more economic opportunities for women, and the expense of raising children in modern, urban societies. All of these have played a role in reducing fertility over the past few decades. In addition, beyond delayed marriage many Japanese have chosen not to marry and, as a result, not have children. According to the 2010 census, 30% of all households in Japan were single, representing the largest category of household composition in the country. A significant portion of these households were widows over the age of 65. At the same time, a not insignificant portion were women and men in both early adulthood and middle-age who have simply chosen to not get married. In a society like Japan where child-birth out of wedlock is stigmatized, the decision not to marry also normally means that one has chosen not to have children.
Indeed, there are many women in Japan today in their forties and fifties who have opted for a career over marriage and child-rearing. In Japan, social pressures make it difficult for women to manage a career while also raising a family. Furthermore, recent trends suggest that both men and women are increasingly uncertain about the value of marriage and having a family. A government survey of people between the ages of 18 and 34 in 2011 showed that over 61% of unmarried men among those surveyed lacked a girlfriend and 49.5% unmarried women had no boyfriend, the latter being a new record. Forty percent of respondents indicated that there was no need to marry and 45% of men showed no interest in "dating the opposite sex." These results, which represented significant increases over the same type of survey conducted in previous years, have raised concerns that the population problem Japan is facing will not change in the foreseeable future.
The consequences of changing attitudes about marriage and gender roles and associated low fertility are considerable. One problem that has arisen is that many single women are living on very low incomes and have joined the ranks of the poor. Recent research has shown that 1 in 3 single women of working age in Japan qualify as poor and that the number of poor women in Japan is likely to increase; by 2030 it is projected that 1 in 5 women in Japan will be single. Many of these women may well be living in some level of poverty.
Another problem Japan faces is that the general low fertility rate means there are not enough younger people paying into the national pension program, and this will cause increasing strain on government coffers as the proportion of elderly (currently about 23% of the population is over 65) continues to grow.
Finally, the decline of the population over the next few decades, and the shortage of young people in particular, will have a significant impact on the Japanese labor force. Questions related to how to maintain economic growth—an issue that has been at the forefront of thinking about the country for the past twenty years, due to a generally sluggish economy—with a decreasing population are both complex and on the minds of policymakers. One obvious solution to this would be for Japan to relax immigration policies and allow for more workers, particularly healthcare workers, to enter the country. As noted above, to date this has not been a particularly palatable solution, but this may well change as younger Japanese, with regular experience and interactions with foreigners, move into positions of power and guide policy.
An alternative to this social-centered solution of increased immigration has been raised in recent years. Rather than relaxing immigration laws, some have proposed increasing investment in robotics as a means of addressing the conflict of a shortfall of labor with the need for workers. This idea has been raised particularly in relation to elder care, where demand for workers has increased rapidly with the promulgation of the longer term care insurance program in 2001 and the continued growth of the elderly population. It may well be that a technological solution to Japan’s population problem will be seen as preferable to other possible solutions.
Obviously, only time will tell. But Japan is faced with an unprecedented population challenge that will have social, economic, and political consequences over the next century—consequences that will not only affect Japan, but also influence Japan’s trading partners as well as its political and military allies.
There is, perhaps, no single variable in the complex web of East Asian politics more uncertain in terms of how it may influence future relations throughout the region than the fate of Japan’s population, because the manner in which that population changes over the next several decades is both difficult to predict and likely to have a profound influence in shaping the regional role Japan is able to play as a political, cultural, and economic power.
Dr. John W. Traphagan is a professor in the Department of Religious Studies, University of Texas at
Austin.
The post Japan’s Demographic Disaster appeared first on The Diplomat.
CHINA: Hacking with Chinese Characteristics
The Times has gone public with the story of how it has been under persistent attack from Chinese hackers for four months, ever since they got wind that the Times was preparing to reveal that Prime Minister Wen Jiabao’s family acquired $2.7 billion in assets.
...read more
ASIA: Is Asia on the cusp of a space race?
The U.S. and Russia defined the world's first space race, but following South Korea's successful rocket launch, it seems Asia is the world's new epicenter for space rivalries.
RUSSIA: Capitol Indifference - By Dmitri Trenin
Washington ignores Russia's obsession with America at its own peril.
CHINA: Hackers in China Attacked The New York Times for Last 4 Months
The timing of the attacks coincided with reporting for an investigation that found that the relatives of China’s prime minister had accumulated a fortune worth several billion dollars through business dealings.
CHINA: Greenland—China’s Foothold in Europe?
Paula Briscoe is the National Intelligence Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.
China’s current and planned investments in Greenland raise concerns, not only about Chinese access to more of the world’s resources but also about China’s longer term objectives and the foothold in Europe that a strong partnership with Greenland could provide for Beijing.
Greenland has substantial natural resources including ore, oil, and rare earths. The government is eager to attract significant international investment, including from Chinese companies, because economic independence is the path to complete independence from Denmark.
In the face of such growing Chinese interest in Greenland, Europe has become concerned. It recently requested that Greenland restrict Chinese access to Greenland’s rare earths because China already controls 95 percent of world production and has at times used its monopoly position to drive up prices or to punish other nations for perceived political transgressions. However, despite these concerns,
Greenland’s premier recently rejected the EU request saying: “Greenland is open for investments from the whole world.” This is a significant stand because the country remains only semi-autonomous from Denmark but is moving toward full independence and is still reliant on Copenhagen for foreign and defense matters and an annual subsidy that amounts to half its budget. (Note: Denmark is courting Chinese investment too and likely cautiously supports Greenland’s partnership with China despite the official EU position.)
The scale of potential Chinese investment in Greenland was brought to the fore recently by the large Chinese backed iron ore extraction operation planned by London Mining, a British company backed by Chinese financiers. The deal includes a $2.3 billion investment and will employ 2,300 Chinese workers, boosting Greenland’s population by a full 4 percent. At the same time, Alcoa, an American-based aluminum company, is reportedly planning to bring in an additional 3,000 Chinese workers to build its large aluminum smelting plant and two planned hydroelectric plants in Greenland. Despite great enthusiasm for such investment, officials in Greenland and Denmark are concerned about a number of issues, including Greenland’s ability to: effectively oversee the influx of new, heavily technical industries; oversee the responsible development of standards these heavy industries require; and ensure industrial compliance with regulatory and environmental standards.
If Greenland, a littoral Arctic territory, becomes increasingly dependent on Chinese investment, Beijing’s influence in Greenland and Arctic affairs also grows. China’s application to be elevated to permanent observer status is on the Arctic Council’s agenda in 2013, and Greenland’s administrator, Denmark, is already a supporter of China’s bid. Should Greenland become fully autonomous, and then a likely permanent member of the Arctic Council—two possibilities made more likely by heavy Chinese investment—China’s increased influence in Greenland could help buy Beijing a proxy voice in Arctic matters.
Speculation about China’s Arctic ambitions generally falls into three categories: securing a share of the Arctic’s natural resources; securing considerably shorter shipping routes from the Pacific to the Atlantic; and obtaining fishing rights and conducting research in the Arctic. There is nothing particularly sinister about China’s interest in the Arctic regarding shipping and research although China does have a poor track record—along with other states—when it comes to fishing practices. The most contentious issue, however, is likely to be the extraction of natural resources—the Arctic holds substantial oil and natural gas deposits.
It is conceivable—but certainly many years off—that China could at some point in the future use its economic might and the lure of more money flowing into Greenland’s economy to persuade Greenland to allow Beijing to base permanent military and intelligence capabilities in Greenland. China has global economic interests and may want to be better positioned to protect them in the future. Depending on the evolution of China’s foreign policy over the coming years, such worries may be well-founded or for naught.
If Greenland manages the development properly and takes the time needed to ensure it can effectively oversee development, then the people of Greenland will be on the road to a prosperous future where many native Greenlanders are better educated, more skilled, and generally better off than they are now. But if Greenland, lured by the promise of investments and earlier autonomy from Denmark, allows itself to be overwhelmed by foreign companies, then China in particular could use its economic influence to Beijing’s advantage.
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